

BAD APPLES: THE PEER EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE

Sidra Ahmad

THE INTERPLAY OF SECULARISM AND SOCIALISM IN MODERN INDIAN POLITICS (1947 - 2014)

Shivangi Khanna

IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES OF SHANGHAI'S GAOKAO REFORM: A POLICY ANALYSIS EXERCISE OF THE NATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION ENTRANCE EXAMINATION

Johnson Hantao Huang, Jenny Xi Chen, Osman A. Syed

WATER FLOWS FROM INDIA, PAKISTAN DRAWS BLOOD

Amy Wang



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We believe that the student theses published biannually in the Journal—chosen and edited rigorously by our editorial staff—are legitimate and valuable examples of the intellectual growth of politically-minded students and writers at New York University.

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BAD APPLES: THE PEER EFFECTS OF VIOLENCE

SIDRA AHMAD

Miguel et al. (2011) find a positive relationship between the degree of civil war in a soccer player's home country and the number of yellow and red cards he receives, suggesting that childhood socialization into violence affects future behavior. Intrigued by their work, I decided to determine whether the contagion of violence spreads from groups to individuals and between individuals through analyzing the influences of teammates' background and behavior on the cards received by a single player. My statistical analysis reveals that a team's aggregate aggressive behavior exerts a peer effect on each of its player's actions while other models are insignificant.

Introduction

One bad apple spoils the whole bunch. Many acknowledge this oft-cited idiom as a universal truth, using it to justify their prejudices against an outgroup or caution their children against associating with a particular clique. The sheer prospect of falling under someone else's sway is enough to make some people (and countries) retreat into safe, self-contained worlds of their own creation. With respect to international relations, the problem with such mindset is that it is nearly impossible for states to achieve their aims on their own, necessitating the establishment of institutions that allow them to collaborate for the sake of realizing individual and joint gains. Democratizing countries, for instance, tend to join more international organizations, (specifically of the economic and standards-based varieties), in order to overcome commitment issues and set themselves on a trajectory of sustained reform (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008). Preferential trade agreements have been shown to settle or prevent military conflicts, and increases in bilateral trade reduce sanctioning behavior (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008), but cooperation between states always leads to positive outcomes for all parties. Hafner-Burton and Montgomery found that sanctions are more likely if the potential sanctioning party's gross domestic product or centrality in the network of such agreements rises. It is evident that dealings between nations impact their future actions; Referencing previous studies conducted, it is possible to analyze whether groups of diverse individuals in a common institution modify their conduct in response to the influence of their associates' background and behavior.

This paper executes the proposed analysis in an unconventional manner by probing the purported peer effects of violence in European soccer leagues. My inquiry begins where Miguel, Saiegh, and Satyanath's (2011) paper "Civil War Exposure and Violence" left off. They establish that athletes whose native countries have endured recurrent civil conflict engage in more violent tactics on the pitch and subsequently receive more yellow and red cards, indicating a penalty, yet athletes do not comment on the effect of such conduct on their teammate's actions. I intend to determine whether a culture of violence (imparted through childhood exposure to armed conflict) and current aggressive behavior (dispersed by way of cognitive and neurological processes) exert a peer effect on an individual's behavior. Those who are skeptical about using professional sports to draw inferences regarding individual political actors should consider that athletic competitions often serve as microcosms of society, acting as the arena in which national anxieties, passions, and rivalries manifest themselves. According to George Orwell (1945), "Serious sport has nothing to do with fair play. It is bound up with hatred, jealousy, boastfulness, disregard of all rules and sadistic pleasure in witnessing violence. In other words, it is war minus the shooting." An added benefit of examining soccer leagues is that it presents a clear, easily quantifiable measure of behavior: the number of cards a player receives per season, a measure of the number of penalties or violations.

I surmise that two kinds of peer effects are transferred from team I to player i and from player j to player i: first is the influence of civil war exposure, and the second is behavior. Empirical analysis reveals a positive, statistically significant relationship between team I's violent conduct and player i's ensuing aggressive actions; the other models are found to be insignificant.

This section sets the stage for the remainder of the paper while section II presents a review of the existing literature. Section 3 discusses the theory upon which my hypotheses, found in section IV, are built. Sections 5 and 6 describe my data sets and estimation procedures, respectively. Section 7 interprets my findings, and section 8 concludes.

Literature Review

Individuals display their personality traits and other aspects of their identity in group settings, and the aggressive playing styles of some athletes in major European men's soccer leagues exemplify this practice. Miguel et al. (2011) uncover a strong, positive relationship between the prevalence of civil conflict in a player's home country and his predilection for violent tactics resulting in yellow and red cards after controlling for factors ranging from player characteristics to league, team, and world region fixed effects. These results suggest a link between growing up in a war-torn environment and behaving aggressively as an adult. One might expect a young man to reject viciousness after witnessing the horrors of conflict, but Miguel et al. (2011) find otherwise: "a history of violence appears to change norms and local 'culture', making violent conduct more socially acceptable, expected, or even desirable" (65). Culture is capable of influencing behavior and making an impression that persists even after the individual has relocated to a more stable, peaceful society and is enjoying a relatively comfortable life as a professional athlete. It remains to be seen whether aggression is confined to those who experienced it as juveniles or transmits to others through the close contact undergone by members of the same group—in this case, teammates. Before we can answer

any questions in the following sections of this investigation, a closer look at the literature on peer effects is in order.

Carrell, Malmstrom, and West (2008) studied self-reported academic cheating in United States military service academies, and their work revealed that greater levels of cheating among peers increase the probability that an individual college student will cheat, and the diffusion of this practice is compounded by a multiplier effect. A college student who cheated in high school is 13.2 percent more likely to do so at the post-secondary level, and goes on to create 0.47 additional cheaters. These results are attributed to interactions between peers that eventually cause a shift in norms and beliefs held by the initially morally upright pupil (Carrell et al. 2008). It is reasonable to anticipate that a similar mechanism is at play within sports teams, especially if they have a high concentration of players from countries with frequent intra-state conflict. Over time, players from comparatively peaceful nations will become accustomed to and adopt the techniques of their aggressive teammates because their attitudes have evolved to deem violent behavior acceptable. “Peer Effects in Academic Cheating” considered—and rejected—congestion of enforcement, the idea that inconsistent execution of the rules encourages individuals to break them, as an alternative explanation. However, such an idea has little applicability to my research since soccer matches are closely monitored by a group of referees. I am interested in what drives athletes to break the rules despite the existence of punishments.

Gould and Kaplan (2011) offer a potential answer. Upon demonstrating that a baseball player’s performance, especially with regard to power hitting, significantly improves after being on the same team with Jose Canseco, disgraced outfielder and admitted steroid user, they elucidate why someone would risk his career by engaging in illegal activities. Some workers will overcome social and moral barriers to adopt unscrupulous practices that are thought to enhance productivity when incentives are strong enough. Prestige, titles, and lucrative contracts are on the line in professional soccer, and there are players who will be inclined to play “dirty” if they believe that this behavior will improve their performance. Like Miguel et al. (2011), the authors control for variables they suspect will have an effect on power hitting, including player experience, home ballpark characteristics, team manager’s endogenous personnel decisions, managerial quality, coaching quality, divisional pitching, and batting quality in a given year, plus fixed effects for the individual player, year, and division.

Skeptics will dismiss the “incentive to imitate” mechanism as the misguided rationalizations of ambitious athletes, but Ingersoll, Malesky, and Saiegh (2013) show that there is some truth to the idea that learning from one another yields benefits on the field. An analysis of the performance of Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Champions League teams in soccer reveals that teams with a greater degree of cultural diversity (measured by linguistic distance) do better than those without: increasing diversity by one standard deviation results in an increase of 0.12 goals per game. Given that “soccer teams are characterized by a high degree of interdependent worker productivity” (Ingersoll et al. 2013, 8), it is in each player’s interest to share his culturally-specific knowledge and techniques, thereby introducing “new” methods of interpreting and solving problems. Team wealth, players’ market value, total roster value, average player value, and fixed effects in league, year, and team are included as control variables that can influence the amount of diversity on a team. For instance, organizations with more resources are better able to recruit the best competitors from

around the world, and acquiring an expensive, international superstar may compel managers to look closer to home in order to fill the rest of their roster. National background, personality, and genetic diversity are among the variables used to measure robustness, and while these features do not directly bear on my analysis, it is important for me to consider how measures to expand or limit diversity impinge on team composition, especially since countries like Spain have experimented with “Home Grown” rules which cap the number of foreign players within the domestic league in order to develop national talent. Now that the evidence of peer effects and the process by which they operate is more convincing, it may be worthwhile to explore whether all individuals respond to their associates’ influence in an equal manner.

Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and Pozen (2009) suggest that some players may be more susceptible to peer effects than others. Their study looked into the effect of staying in a juvenile correctional facility, an environment full of other offenders, on recidivism. It found strong evidence of peer effects for certain types of crimes but only among individuals who had prior experience with that specific misdeed; there is “no evidence that exposure to peers with particular criminal histories increases an individual’s propensity to recidivate in a crime category in which the individual has no prior experience” (Bayer et al. 2005, 28). In addition to the implication that athletes from relatively stable countries will be impervious to the influence of their conflict-scarred teammates, we can predict that players who initially received comparatively fewer fouls will experience an uptick in the number of yellow and red cards they obtain after interacting with their more belligerent colleagues. “Building Criminal Capital Behind Bars: Peer Effects in Juvenile Corrections” offers valuable insights: accounting for the non-random composition of teams and exploring the process of social learning through stigma, reinforcement of addictive behavior, and information dispersion and network formation (Bayer et al. 2005, 3) are important considerations for my own inquiry.

Many will have trouble believing that peer effects are always present in some capacity, and Guryan, Kroft, and Notowidigdo (2009) are able to affirm their doubts. Their paper “Peer Effects in the Workplace: Evidence from Random Groupings in Professional Golf Tournaments” examines the random assignment of competitors to groups within the first two rounds of Professional Golfers’ Association tournaments in order to determine whether a golfer’s performance is influenced by the success of his playing partners. Data analysis reveals the lack of a correlation between a golfer’s score and the ability, relative or absolute, of his “groupmates;” there is no other indication of the existence of peer effects. While the authors reason that “[w]ithin a playing group, players are proximate to one another and can therefore observe each others’ [sic] shots and scores...creat[ing] the opportunity to learn from and be motivated by peers” (Guryan et al. 2009), their results should be taken with a grain of salt because golf, unlike soccer, is not a team sport. They also contradict the results of one of the aforementioned studies. Gould and Kaplan (2011) found that a professional setting with strong financial incentives can compel an athlete to cross the line, but Bayer et al. (2009) assert that highly-skilled individuals are able to overcome social influences that would otherwise result in peer effects. Such contradiction is ripe for exploitation because my research can evaluate if teams are more conducive to peer effects. I posit that the prolonged contact with individuals sharing a common objective creates a setting in which the perceived benefits of learning and motivation are greater and

more likely to be realized.

Theory

The existing literature on peer effects is comprised of papers that either confirm or deny their presence in a specific setting, but there is a limited understanding of exactly how peer effects operate. Combining theories and evidence from sociology, psychology, and neuroscience, this section presents a possible explanation for the means by which a soccer player from a war-torn nation may inadvertently transfer his aggressive tactics to his teammate.

We are constantly exposed to diverse, innumerable influences that play a role in shaping who we are. Culture, “the distinctive ideas, customs, social behavior, [sic] products, or way of life of a particular nation, society, people, or period” (Oxford English Dictionary), is just one, but it deserves special consideration because it comprises an outsize portion of the milieu in which individuals live and function. Civil war disturbs the status quo, substituting routine activities with acts of violence that become the “new normal.” There are four levels on which a culture of violence is able to develop and persist within civil war-torn countries even after peace accords have been adopted: international, state, collective, and individual (Stenkamp 2005). Archer and Gartner (1976) documented this transformation within states as they found that combatant countries are more likely to experience increased homicide rates in the five years after the end of hostilities than those that did not engage in fighting. The wartime suspension of censuring aggression leaves citizens believing that such behavior is permissible long after the conflict has ended, but such simplified account does not do justice to the processes that bring about this change within a single person.

Developed by psychologist Albert Bandura in the late-twentieth century, social learning theory (1971) explains human behavior as “a continuous reciprocal interaction between behavior and its controlling conditions” (2). It posits that our actions are informed by life lessons learned through both direct experience and observation. Although the latter is a passive process, it allows humans to efficiently accumulate a wealth of information without having to expend much effort or take risks. Social learning theory is far from a generic model. Bandura specifically applies the theory to aggression, delving into its origins, instigators, and regulators. Hostility, like other behaviors, can be learned vicariously, and given what we know about how society changes after civil war, it comes as little surprise that culture is considered one of the three principal sources of violence (Bandura 1978, 14). Once aggression is internalized, it only takes some provocation to convert it to action. Thwarting the suppression of violent behavior, known as the disinhibitory modeling influence of a teammate who plays dirty can lead a soccer player to consider belligerence permissible, disregard the prohibitions against fouls, and adopt similar tactics. Through witnessing the consequences—be they rewards or rebukes—of others’ actions, we gain knowledge that leads us to alter our own in a process known as vicarious reinforcement. Observers will perform certain deeds less often once they recognize them as punishable offenses, and others more frequently after realizing they will reap a benefit. Nonetheless, “[i]n the case of behavior that is ordinarily disapproved...seeing transgressions go unpunished seems to heighten analogous actions in observers to the same degrees as witnessing models rewarded” (Bandura 1971, 25). Incentive inducements are another instigator of aggression.

If a player perceives that violent playing techniques bring about an increase in productivity, goals, and wins, he may self-reinforce the behavior through processes ranging from moral justification (“Excessively physical techniques are necessary for victory.”) to attribution of blame to victims (“If he was not in my way, I would not have kicked him in the shin.”) and diffusion of responsibility (“Everyone else was rough on the field, so my actions were no worse than theirs.”).

Social learning theory provides a cognitive account of how behaviors spread, but there is a biological one as well. In the early 1990’s, mirror (also known as canonical) neurons were accidentally discovered by University of Parma scientists who noticed that the same F5 neurons of the macaque monkey under observation were activated when it performed different hand movements and when it observed an experimenter performing similar hand movements (di Pellegrino et al. 1992). The existence of mirror neurons in humans was confirmed in a study—albeit one with a sample size of twenty-one—by Mukamel et al. (2010), who found that these cells are dispersed throughout the brain rather than being concentrated within a single region. The overlap between observation and execution neurons demonstrates that the contrary “actions rely on a shared neural substrate” (Sommerville and Decety 2006, 181) and are closely related. This proximity has led some scientists to believe that mirror neurons are responsible for empathy, imitation, and even the development of civilization (Jarrett 2012). According to Oztop et al. (2013), mirror neurons are thought “to play a crucial role in transforming visual appearance of objects into motor plans for interacting with them” (43). Social mirroring—attaining social benefits through modeling one’s actions after those of another—is one of the components of imitation. It relies on the brain’s mirror system, whereas the other, learning by copying, involves advanced cognitive abilities not covered by the mirror system (Byrne 2005). It seems that humans are wired to learn from each other and mimic one another’s movements.

Theoretically, soccer players hailing from countries that have endured a high degree of civil conflict continue to carry the burden of their childhood experience onto the field, where they play alongside teammates whose native countries have suffered less. Perceiving that antagonistic tactics lead to improved performance; the latter group is influenced or incentivized to mimic their colleague’s playing techniques. They encounter new behaviors, take them on—thereby firing up the neurons in the regions of the brain that control motor skills—and incorporate them into their repertoire, activating those same neurons yet again. Before drawing hypotheses from this knowledge, assumptions must be made and limitations highlighted. I assume that (1) irrespective of the team, league, season or other factors, every player’s objective is to win as many games as possible; and (2) on the pitch, players will take whatever steps they deem necessary to improve their team’s chances of winning, even if those actions are against the rules of the sport. Bear in mind that independence of units cannot be taken for granted because the influence of teammates on an individual is being studied, and my empirical analysis is weakened by the fact that players are deliberately selected to be members of the club, precluding randomness.

Hypotheses

Player *i* is subjected to two different types of influence during on-field interactions with his teammates. The first involves the collective impact of his exposure to (internationalized) internal

armed conflict. My suspicion is that greater intensity of this influence, which is also referred to as culture or background, will result in the athlete of interest receiving more cards, bringing us to the first hypothesis.

H_1 : Team T 's aggregate exposure to civil war exerts a peer effect on player i 's behavior.

Teammates' conduct is the second type of influence. Instead of drawing upon the war-torn past that has informed some players' actions, it asserts that aggression, which is measured with cards, brings an effect of its own. Once again, it is expected that player i will be issued more cards. This result leads to my second hypothesis.

H_2 : Team T 's aggregate violent behavior exerts a peer effect on player i 's behavior.

If teams as a whole are thought to play a role in how each of their players acquits himself throughout a match, then players can be expected to influence each other on a one-on-one level. Applying the previous hypotheses to the dyad composed of the player of interest and his colleague yields:

H_3 : Player j 's exposure to civil war exerts a peer effect on player i 's behavior.

H_4 : Player j 's violent behavior exerts a peer effect on player i 's behavior.

Finally, the interaction between two players is a more targeted "treatment" than the effect of the entire group on one of its members because the influence of a single player is not being diluted by the inclusion of others. Thus, player-to-player peer effects should have larger coefficients than those that are team-to-player.

H_5 : Peer effects exerted by player j will be stronger than peer effects exerted by team I .

Data

Miguel et al.'s (2011) data set is modified to meet the needs of this inquiry, which utilizes two data sets: one monadic, and the other dyadic. The original data set is comprised of statistics from six UEFA leagues—the supra-national Champions League and the elite national leagues of England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain—over the 2004-05 and 2005-06 seasons. ESPN Soccernet (now ESPN FC) provides data in: the identification, violence, player characteristics, player regions of origin, and soccer league variable categories. Computer games Football Manager, 2005 and World Soccer Manager, 2006 disclose details about each player's salary and transfer fee. The civil conflict variables are generated from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data; it presents the number of years each player's home country has endured an "internal armed conflict" or "internationalized internal armed conflict" from 1956 through 2005, but special attention is paid to 1980-2005 because these

years overlap with those in which the players matured. The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators and World Development Indicators supply country characteristics such as rule of law (Miguel et al. 2011). Nevertheless, not all of these variables ultimately make it into my data sets or estimations.

The dependent variable is the behavior of a given player, i , and it is operationalized as the yellow, red, and total cards (yellow cards + red cards) he receives per season. This is a reasonable representation of the variable because the cards are used to either discourage players from continuing to engage in objectionable behavior or sanction them for their conduct, especially if it is excessively bellicose. According to the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) Laws of the Game, the first yellow card issued during a match indicates that a player has been "warned that another cautionable offence will lead to send-off," whereas a red card compels the offending athlete to exit the match without being replaced by a teammate (FIFA 2004). Showing "dissent by word or action" and being "guilty of unsporting behavior" are two of the seven offenses that merit a yellow card. The former is straightforward enough, but the latter subsumes numerous violent actions including recklessly—"with complete disregard for danger to, or consequences for, his opponent"—committing an offense that results in a direct free kick and fouling an opponent in order to eliminate the threat of a "promising attack" (FIFA 2004). On the other hand, red cards are issued for more egregious behaviors including serious foul play ("excessive force or brutality against an opponent when challenging for the ball"), violent conduct ("excessive force or brutality against an opponent when not challenging for the ball"), spitting at an opponent or anyone else, using unacceptable language or gestures, and receiving a second yellow card in the same match (FIFA 2004). Although the yellow card is used to penalize less serious or obviously violent actions, it still serves as a valuable way to measure the incidence and intensity of aggression.

The independent variables are teammates' exposure to civil war and teammates' violent behavior, and both of them are operationalized differently depending on whether the investigated peer effect is between the team and each of its players or between two athletes. Setting the stage for my empirical analysis requires generating dyads composed of i , the player of interest, and j , his teammate, which allows me to pair player i with every other member of the same team in a given league and season. However, sixteen players were dropped from the data set because they were the sole representatives of their respective teams. Team I 's aggregate exposure to civil war is embodied by a monadic spatial effect variable created using Stata command `spmon`, which quantifies the extent to which the interdependence between units has an impact on outcomes (Neumayer and Plümper 2010a). It was concluded that larger values indicate a larger impact¹. In this case, the years of conflict between 1980 and 2005 in player j 's home country are lagged and weighted by the proportion of

¹ For more information regarding spatial statistical analysis and the `spmon` command, see Neumayer and Plümper (2010b) and Beck et al. (2006).

matches players i and j have played together². To derive this connectivity variable, the difference in the number of total games played (number of games as a starter + number of games as a substitute) by each individual in the dyad was divided by the greater of the total games played, and the absolute value of this quotient was subtracted from 1. The subsequent values are weighted averages of the spatial effect of each teammate's conflict history. This explanatory variable reflects the proposition that a legacy of violence is being transmitted from the group to the individual. Monadic spatial effect variables are also used to represent team I 's aggregate violent behavior and the claim that teammates are learning aggressive tactics from each other. The proportion of games played together continues to act as the weight, yet, in this case, yellow, red, and total cards received by player j are spatially lagged to generate three separate spatial effect variables upon which player i 's corresponding fouls will be regressed. It is worth noting that I do not consider all manifestations of the same soccer club as one and the same club. Instead, a distinction is made between a team participating in its country's national league and the same team participating in the Champions League during a particular season, because competing in one as opposed to the other has its own unique pressures and challenges which may result in altering team strategy and style of play to more violent varieties. Furthermore, the composition of the roster can change within and between seasons as new players are signed, veterans retire, and others are loaned or traded to different squads, which has the potential to impact group cohesion. Such judgment is justified by the fact that the values of the spatial effect variables vary across league and season. One-on-one peer effects are evaluated without spatial effect variables: player j 's civil war exposure and violent behavior are operationalized as the years of conflict in his native country from 1980 through 2005 and the yellow, red, and total cards issued to him, respectively.

An in-depth discussion of the control variables and why they are included is found in the following section, but I would like to point out that averages of the control variables—other than the dummy variables for field position—across members of a team are derived to serve as team I controls. Regrettably, player i was not excluded during the calculation of these means. Summary statistics (Table 1) of the monadic data set and other tables are presented after the Conclusion. Those who are interested in the finer points of the data are advised to reference the “Data and Estimation” section in Miguel et al. (2011).

Estimation Procedures

Player i on a particular team (t) in a given league (l) during season (s) is the unit of analysis. Negative binomial regressions are performed because yellow, red, and total cards constitute count variables. The controls originate from Miguel et al. (2011) and are employed in various combinations. Their main independent variable, years of civil war in player i 's home country between 1980 and 2005, serves as the most important control in my models—the positive relationship between

² Preferably, the weight would have been the absolute number of matches in which both players participated or the number of minutes spent on the pitch together, but since this information was not available, I had to settle for a noisier

experiencing conflict and subsequent violent behavior has already been established and the athlete's own background cannot be ignored as a determinant of his actions. Player's field position is included to account for the dissimilar odds of committing fouls among teammates—forwards and some midfielders are responsible for the team's offense and primary targets for the opposing team, which will try to thwart their advances and induce meting through cards. Like the authors of "Civil War Exposure and Violence," I omit the goalie position from my specifications³. Starting XI players set the tone for the match and tend to play for longer intervals than their substitutes, necessitating the addition of number of games played as a starter and as a substitute as control variables. Age is considered because younger players may be more aggressive than their older, wiser counterparts and find themselves in disputes with their adversaries or the referee, which ultimately lead to reprimands. In the same vein as field position, the number of goals scored serves as a control variable because those players who are adept at putting points on the scoreboard draw the attention of their challengers, who seek to gain an advantage at the challenger's expense. Superior athletes command higher transfer fees, and the logarithm of this figure, coupled with goals scored, represents player quality. Rule of law within a player's home country is incorporated to capture the extent to which he honors and abides by regulations⁴. Fixed effects for league (λ) and world region (ρ) are present in all specifications, addressing discrepancies in how cards and fouls are called across nations and possible racial/ethnic discrimination by referees, respectively. Whereas Miguel et al. (2011) included team fixed effects in some of their specifications, I decided against using these data because one of the models addresses team characteristics. Robust standard errors are clustered by player i 's native country. Robustness is verified through the use of zero-inflated negative binomial regressions.

Team-to-Player Model

This model examines both of the ways in which a team purportedly affects the behavior of each of its members. The first measures the collective influence of the violent cultural backgrounds present within team F 's roster on the number of cards (yellow, red, or total) received by one of its own, player i . The explanatory variable—represented by the weighted average of the spatially lagged years of civil war in a teammate's (player j) home country linked to the player of interest by the proportion of games played with the opponent—is estimated with individual and team controls. The equations for the specifications employing the former are as follows:

3. In spite of the fact that many goalies received yellow cards (and some were given red cards), Miguel et al. (2011) do not explain why they exclude the position from their models. I surmise that it is because goalies tend to stay in the penalty box, and in theory, they should not be engaging in the kinds of techniques that merit being disciplined by the referee.

4 In keeping with the estimation procedure employed in Table 2, Column 1 of Miguel et al. (2011), rule of law is not included in the yellow card models.

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Yellow Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Spatially Lagged Civil War Years}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \text{Position}_i \\
&+ \beta_4 \text{Starter}_{itls} + \beta_5 \text{Substitute}_{itls} + \beta_6 \text{Age}_{is} + \beta_7 \text{Goals Scored}_{itls} + \beta_8 \text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}_{itls} \\
&+ \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \epsilon_{itls}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Red Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Spatially Lagged Civil War Years}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \text{Position}_i \\
&+ \beta_4 \text{Starter}_{itls} + \beta_5 \text{Substitute}_{itls} + \beta_6 \text{Age}_{is} + \beta_7 \text{Goals Scored}_{itls} + \beta_8 \text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}_{itls} \\
&+ \beta_9 \text{Rule of Law}_i + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \epsilon_{itls}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Total Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Spatially Lagged Civil War Years}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \text{Position}_i \\
&+ \beta_4 \text{Starter}_{itls} + \beta_5 \text{Substitute}_{itls} + \beta_6 \text{Age}_{is} + \beta_7 \text{Goals Scored}_{itls} + \beta_8 \text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}_{itls} \\
&+ \beta_9 \text{Rule of Law}_i + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \epsilon_{itls}
\end{aligned}$$

To account for team I characteristics, player i 's field position is removed from the equations and player i controls are replaced with team averages of the corresponding variables. This adjustment allows me to determine the extent to which team performance drives a single player's aggressive actions.

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Yellow Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Spatially Lagged Civil War Years}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \overline{\text{Starter}}_{itls} \\
&+ \beta_4 \overline{\text{Substitute}}_{itls} + \beta_5 \overline{\text{Age}}_{is} + \beta_6 \overline{\text{Goals Scored}}_{itls} + \beta_7 \overline{\text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}}_{itls} + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \epsilon_{itls}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Red Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Spatially Lagged Civil War Years}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \overline{\text{Starter}}_{itls} \\
&+ \beta_4 \overline{\text{Substitute}}_{itls} + \beta_5 \overline{\text{Age}}_{is} + \beta_6 \overline{\text{Goals Scored}}_{itls} + \beta_7 \overline{\text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}}_{itls} \\
&+ \beta_8 \overline{\text{Rule of Law}}_{itls} + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \epsilon_{itls}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Total Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Spatially Lagged Civil War Years}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \overline{\text{Starter}}_{itls} \\
&+ \beta_4 \overline{\text{Substitute}}_{itls} + \beta_5 \overline{\text{Age}}_{is} + \beta_6 \overline{\text{Goals Scored}}_{itls} + \beta_7 \overline{\text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}}_{itls} \\
&+ \beta_8 \overline{\text{Rule of Law}}_{itls} + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \epsilon_{itls}
\end{aligned}$$

The second kind of peer effect capable of dispersing from the group to the individual is that of the aggregate behavior of team I , which is operationalized as spatial effect variables lagging the fouls received by player j and weighting the proportion of games he played with player i . The equations incorporating individual controls are found below.

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Yellow Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Spatially Lagged Yellow Cards}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \text{Position}_i \\
&+ \beta_4 \text{Starter}_{itls} + \beta_5 \text{Substitute}_{itls} + \beta_6 \text{Age}_{is} + \beta_7 \text{Goals Scored}_{itls} + \beta_8 \text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}_{its} \\
&+ \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \varepsilon_{itls} \\
\text{Red Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Spatially Lagged Red Cards}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \text{Position}_i + \beta_4 \text{Starter}_{itls} \\
&+ \beta_5 \text{Substitute}_{itls} + \beta_6 \text{Age}_{is} + \beta_7 \text{Goals Scored}_{itls} + \beta_8 \text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}_{its} \\
&+ \beta_9 \text{Rule of Law}_i + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \varepsilon_{itls} \\
\text{Total Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Spatially Lagged Total Cards}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \text{Position}_i \\
&+ \beta_4 \text{Starter}_{itls} + \beta_5 \text{Substitute}_{itls} + \beta_6 \text{Age}_{is} + \beta_7 \text{Goals Scored}_{itls} + \beta_8 \text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}_{its} \\
&+ \beta_9 \text{Rule of Law}_i + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \varepsilon_{itls}
\end{aligned}$$

Once again, individual control variables are substituted with team means.

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Yellow Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Spatially Lagged Yellow Cards}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \overline{\text{Starter}}_{ils} \\
&+ \beta_4 \overline{\text{Substitute}}_{ils} + \beta_5 \overline{\text{Age}}_{is} + \beta_6 \overline{\text{Goals Scored}}_{ils} + \beta_7 \overline{\text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}}_{ils} + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \varepsilon_{itls} \\
\text{Red Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Spatially Lagged Red Cards}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \overline{\text{Starter}}_{ils} \\
&+ \beta_4 \overline{\text{Substitute}}_{ils} + \beta_5 \overline{\text{Age}}_{is} + \beta_6 \overline{\text{Goals Scored}}_{ils} + \beta_7 \overline{\text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}}_{ils} \\
&+ \beta_8 \overline{\text{Rule of Law}}_{ils} + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \varepsilon_{itls} \\
\text{Total Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Spatially Lagged Total Cards}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \overline{\text{Starter}}_{ils} \\
&+ \beta_4 \overline{\text{Substitute}}_{ils} + \beta_5 \overline{\text{Age}}_{is} + \beta_6 \overline{\text{Goals Scored}}_{ils} + \beta_7 \overline{\text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}}_{ils} \\
&+ \beta_8 \overline{\text{Rule of Law}}_{ils} + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \varepsilon_{itls}
\end{aligned}$$

Player-to-Player Model

As alluded to earlier, peer effects can spread between two individuals. The team model utilized spatial statistical analysis in a monadic data set, but an alternative empirical strategy is to generate dyads comprised of player i and each of his teammates and regress his fouls on conflict years endured and cards received by his dyadic partner.⁵ Player i 's characteristics are taken into consideration as control variables, but there are no specifications incorporating player j 's attributes because the teammates are not linked to each other via spatial effect variables. Team I controls are not factored into the analysis because individual influence is being evaluated. "Years of civil war in

⁵ The shortcomings of this estimation procedure are discussed in the Conclusion section.

player j 's home country" as the independent variable provides us with these equations:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Yellow Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Civil War Years}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \text{Position}_i + \beta_4 \text{Starter}_{itls} \\
 &\quad + \beta_5 \text{Substitute}_{itls} + \beta_6 \text{Age}_{is} + \beta_7 \text{Goals Scored}_{itls} + \beta_8 \text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}_{itls} + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} \\
 &\quad + \varepsilon_{itls} \\
 \text{Red Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Civil War Years}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \text{Position}_i + \beta_4 \text{Starter}_{itls} \\
 &\quad + \beta_5 \text{Substitute}_{itls} + \beta_6 \text{Age}_{is} + \beta_7 \text{Goals Scored}_{itls} + \beta_8 \text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}_{itls} \\
 &\quad + \beta_9 \text{Rule of Law}_i + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \varepsilon_{itls} \\
 \text{Total Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Civil War Years}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \text{Position}_i + \beta_4 \text{Starter}_{itls} \\
 &\quad + \beta_5 \text{Substitute}_{itls} + \beta_6 \text{Age}_{is} + \beta_7 \text{Goals Scored}_{itls} + \beta_8 \text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}_{itls} \\
 &\quad + \beta_9 \text{Rule of Law}_i + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \varepsilon_{itls}
 \end{aligned}$$

Finally, cards received by player i serves as the explanatory variable.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Yellow Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Yellow Cards}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \text{Position}_i + \beta_4 \text{Starter}_{itls} \\
 &\quad + \beta_5 \text{Substitute}_{itls} + \beta_6 \text{Age}_{is} + \beta_7 \text{Goals Scored}_{itls} + \beta_8 \text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}_{itls} + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} \\
 &\quad + \varepsilon_{itls} \\
 \text{Red Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Red Cards}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \text{Position}_i + \beta_4 \text{Starter}_{itls} + \beta_5 \text{Substitute}_{itls} \\
 &\quad + \beta_6 \text{Age}_{is} + \beta_7 \text{Goals Scored}_{itls} + \beta_8 \text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}_{itls} + \beta_9 \text{Rule of Law}_i + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} \\
 &\quad + \varepsilon_{itls} \\
 \text{Total Cards}_{itls} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Total Cards}_j + \beta_2 \text{Civil War Years}_i + \beta_3 \text{Position}_i + \beta_4 \text{Starter}_{itls} \\
 &\quad + \beta_5 \text{Substitute}_{itls} + \beta_6 \text{Age}_{is} + \beta_7 \text{Goals Scored}_{itls} + \beta_8 \text{Ln(Transfer Fee)}_{itls} \\
 &\quad + \beta_9 \text{Rule of Law}_i + \lambda_{is} + \rho_{is} + \varepsilon_{itls}
 \end{aligned}$$

Results

Miguel et al. (2011) "Replication"

The primary "Civil War Exposure and Violence" findings for yellow cards [Table 2, Column 1] and red cards [Table 2, Column 2] are replicated in the monadic data set. Since the authors did not consider the effect of conflict history on total cards [Table 2, Column 3] received by the player of interest, I employ their red card specification because it controls for rule of law as a determinant of flagrantly aggressive acts. These results are included to function as a point of reference and to facilitate comparisons with my own.

Team I's Aggregate Civil War Exposure

There is little evidence that the collective civil war exposure of a player's peers has an effect on his own behavior. Regressing yellow cards received by player i on the spatially lagged years of civil war in player j 's home country does not yield a statistically significant relationship—irrespective of controlling for player i [Table 3, Column 1] or team I [Table 3, Column 2] characteristics. Contrary to my expectations, the coefficients in both cases, -0.000840 (individual controls) and -0.00326 (team controls), are negative, but their extremely small magnitudes make this a trivial matter. All player i controls are significant at the confidence levels of 95 percent or higher, yet among team I variables, mean age and mean log of transfer fee are not. Given that neither of these metrics directly influences what happens during a match, this development is not especially remarkable.

Red cards tell a similar story: the coefficient of spatially lagged years of civil war continues to be slight and statistically insignificant, but its sign is positive (0.0164) when accounting for the player's own characteristics [Table 3, Column 3] and negative (-0.00160) when his team's characteristics [Table 3, Column 4] are taken into consideration. Relative to the analogous yellow card specifications, fewer control variables are significant. The number of games in which player i was a substitute and the rule of law in his native country do not affect the number of red cards he accrues, nor do the averages across the team of the number of games played as a substitute, age, log of transfer fee, and rule of law. The fact that rule of law is insignificant as both an individual and team control is further proof against the presence of a peer effect since this "shared standard of appropriate behavior" (Miguel et al. 2011, 64) should also have made a difference in the number of red cards issued to player i . On the other hand, any lack of significance found in these specifications can be attributed to the much smaller quantity of red cards (814) versus yellow cards (12,683).

The findings of the other foul classifications are echoed by those of total cards. Regardless of controlling for player i [Table 3, Column 5] or team I [Table 3, Column 6] metrics, player j 's spatially lagged conflict background is statistically insignificant. Although its magnitude is inconsequential in both instances, the coefficient is positive in the first case (0.000204) and negative in the second (-0.00476). Rule of law in player i 's home country is the only insignificant individual control; the rest are significant at 95 percent or 99 percent confidence levels. Among the team I control variables, mean age and mean rule of law are not statistically significant.

Ergo, I am unable to reject the null hypothesis asserting that team I 's aggregate exposure to civil war exerts a peer effect on player i 's behavior. (H1).

Team I's Aggregate Violent Behavior

There is evidence in favor of the claim that teammates' collective aggressive actions exert a peer effect on each player in their ranks. Due to negative binomial regression's non-linear nature, discussing spatially lagged cards in terms of their regression coefficients is insufficient. An attempt will be made to supplement these interpretations with discussions of the incidence rate ratios (IRR) and clear, reliable illustrations.

Controlling for player i qualities [Table 4, Column 1], there is a positive and statistically significant relationship at the 99 percent confidence level between the spatially lagged number of

yellow cards received by player j and the number of yellow cards received by player i . Each unit increase in the spatial effect variable leads to a 0.155 increase in the expected log count of yellow cards. The magnitude of this effect is larger than the coefficient of years of civil war in player i 's home country (0.00762) observed by Miguel et al. (2011) [Table 2, Column 1]. Upon examining years of civil war as a control variable in the specification controlling for player i traits, I find that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level and has increased to 0.00800. The aggregate influence of the team's aggressive actions has a greater impact on one of its players than his exposure to armed conflict, and examining the IRRs demonstrates the extent to which this is the case⁶. Holding other variables constant, a one unit increase in the spatial effect variable drives an almost 17 percent increase in the yellow cards received per season (IRR = 1.1679), whereas every additional year of civil war in player i 's home country, *ceteris paribus*, accounts for close to one percent of the increase (IRR = 1.00803)⁷. The other control variables are statistically significant at the 95 percent and 99 percent confidence levels. This result is robust to using zero-inflated negative binomial regression as the estimator. The coefficient of the spatial effect variable remains significant at the 99 percent confidence level but drops to 0.0738 [Table 5, Column 1]. Player i 's years of civil war falls in significance to the 95 percent confidence level and in magnitude to 0.00529. On the following page, Figure 1 displays the number of per-season yellow cards the average player in the data set is expected to receive, should the specified spatial effects be exerted upon him.

⁶ Incidence rate ratios are reported in the appendix.

⁷ The most important drivers in the increase in cards, irrespective of the classification, are the field positions.




Figure 1. Zero is the minimum value of the spatially lagged yellow cards. Since multiple players have this spatial effect exerted on them, the margin does not have a label. The spatial effect exerted on Lionel Messi is included because he is a well-known player. Raúl Medina Zamora represents the median, and César Navas the maximum.

Moving on to the specification controlling for team I characteristics [Table 4, Column 2], a positive, statistically significant relationship is observed at the 99 percent confidence level. A 0.0624 increase in the expected log count of yellow cards is observed for every unit increase in the independent variable. The coefficient of years of civil war in player i 's home country has risen, albeit marginally, to 0.00827, but its significance has fallen to the 90 percent confidence level. Both variables are more forceful in this specification: with other variables held constant, spatially lagged yellow cards issued to player j have an IRR of 1.866, indicating an approximately 87 percent increase in yellow cards per season, while civil war history's IRR of 1.00830 denotes a barely perceptible one percent rise. Among the other control variables, all but mean number of games as a substitute and mean log of transfer fee are statistically significant but mostly at the 90 percent confidence level. This demonstrates that a team's overall behavior determines how each of its members will act, but team averages are inadequate in terms of explaining individual behavior. This finding is robust to the use of zero-inflated negative binomial regression. In the team control specification [Table 5, Column 2], the coefficient of the spatially lagged yellow cards received by player j is statistically significant at a confidence level of 99 percent and has a magnitude of 0.268. Player i 's conflict history is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level, and its magnitude has fallen to 0.00546.

The peer effect of the team's aggressive conduct is more pronounced for red cards, but these results must be approached with skepticism due to the significantly smaller count of these fouls. In the specification employing individual control variables [Table 4, Column 3], player j 's

spatially lagged red cards are significant at the 95 percent confidence level, and the expected log of red cards received by player i rises by 0.427 each time the spatial effect variable rises by one. This same unit increase is responsible for 53 percent more red cards per season. An athlete’s civil war exposure continues to determine how many red cards are issued to him, but it is not responsible for a sizable proportion of any increase. The coefficient of 0.0150 at the 95 percent confidence level is identical to the one detected in Miguel et al.’s (2011) findings [Table 2, Column 2]. With respect to the other controls in my specification, those found by the authors to be significant remain so and at the same confidence levels; while the coefficients tend to be the same, there are slight differences in their magnitude which may be attributed to dissimilar rounding methods. Figure 2, found on the next page, depicts the relationship between spatially lagged red cards received by player j and the number of per-season red cards the average player in the data set is expected to receive, with special attention being paid to specific values of the independent variable.




Figure 2. Zero is the minimum value of the spatially lagged red cards. Since multiple players (including Lionel Messi) have this spatial effect exerted on them, the margin does not have a label. Antonio Rodríguez Martínez represents the median, and César Navas the maximum.

The specification controlling for team qualities [Table 4, Column 4] reiterates the corresponding results for yellow cards. Spatially lagged red cards received by player j are significant at a confidence level of 99 percent, and the coefficient of 1.570 implies that a unit increase in the independent variable precipitates a 1.570 increase in the expected log of red cards. To put this in perspective, every increase in the spatial effect variable, *ceteris paribus*, increases the number of red

cards accrued per season by a factor of 4.805—or nearly 481 percent. Years of civil war in player i 's home country is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level, and its coefficient is 0.0173, which is larger than the one observed in “Civil War Exposure and Violence.” Player i 's exposure to civil war continues to precipitate an increase in his per-season red cards but by a meager 1.7 percent. As observed in the previous specifications, few of the team I control variables are significant. When team rather than individual characteristics are included in the specification, player j 's spatially lagged red cards and player i 's conflict history (to a much lesser extent) are responsible for a larger share of the latter's red cards. This comes as little surprise, as none of the team controls involve interaction with player i . Yet, as astounding as some of these figures are, it is important to remember that the smaller quantity of red cards casts doubt on the validity of these results. Robustness could not be determined for either of the red card specifications because the zero-inflated models did not converge, despite numerous diverse combinations of control variables and fixed effects.




Figure 3. Zero is the minimum value of the spatially lagged total cards. Since multiple players have this spatial effect exerted on them, the margin does not have a label. The spatial effect exerted on Lionel Messi is included because he is a well-known player. Juninho Pernambucano represents the median, and César Navas the maximum.

The total cards results reinforce the findings of the previous card classifications. Controlling for player i characteristics [Table 4, Column 5], there is a positive, statistically significant relationship at the 99 percent confidence interval between player j 's spatially lagged total cards and the fouls earned by player i . Since players tend to have more yellow than red cards, the peer effect exerted in this specification is expected to be similar to that of the spatially lagged yellow cards, and the coefficient of 0.154 supports this assumption. With an IRR of 1.167, the independent variable accounts for close to

a 17 percent increase in total cards per season a player receives. Years of civil war in player i 's home country continues to play a minor role in an athlete's on-field behavior, driving a per-season increase in cards of one percent. Excluding rule of law, all the player i control variables remain statistically significant. Figure 3 (on the previous page) depicts the predicted number of total cards the average player in the data set is expected to receive per season, should the specified spatial effects be exerted upon him. This result is robust to estimation by way of zero-inflated negative binomial regression [Table 5, Column 3]. The spatial effect variable is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level, and every unit increase is responsible for a 0.0765 rise in expected log of total cards received by player i . Years of civil war in his home country are significant at a confidence level of 95 percent and have suffered a decrease in magnitude to 0.00567.

The outcome of the specification controlling for team I characteristics [Table 4, Column 6] echoes previous results. Since the average number of games as a starter, age, and goals scored among members of the team are the only statistically significant control variables, the spatial effect variable shoulders a greater degree of responsibility for the total cards per season issued to player i , precipitating an 80 percent rise with every unit increase. The coefficient of player j 's spatially lagged total cards (0.586) is significant at a confidence level of 99 percent. Player i 's civil war history has a coefficient of 0.00861, which is significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Its IRR is 1.00864, indicating that it barely makes a difference in how many cards player i receives, but, in all fairness, the other control variables have similar IRR values.

Thus, I am able to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the claim that team I 's aggregate violent behavior exerts a peer effect on player i 's behavior (H2).

Player j 's Civil War Exposure

There is scant evidence to support rejecting the null hypothesis in favor of my third hypothesis, "Player j 's exposure to civil war exerts a peer effect on player i 's behavior." Starting with yellow cards [Table 6, Column 1], the coefficient of years of civil war in player j 's home country is statistically insignificant and has a negligible value of 0.000223. Player i traits serve as control variables, and significance at the 99 percent confidence level is achieved for all of them excluding log of transfer fee, which is significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Likewise, there is no relationship between the player j 's conflict history and player i 's red cards [Table 6, Column 2]: the coefficient is insignificant and nearly zero with a value of 0.00371. All control variables are statistically significant at a confidence level of 95 percent or higher. The findings for total cards [Table 6, Column 3] offer more of the same. Years of civil war in player j 's home country has a miniscule, insignificant coefficient (0.000471). However, nearly all the controls are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level; the exception, log of transfer fee, is significant at a confidence level of 95 percent. Therefore, a player's conduct is not being acted upon by the peer effect of the culture of violence in which his teammate may have been socialized.

Player j 's Violent Behavior

Yellow cards issued to player i are not affected by the yellow cards issued to player j [Table 7,

Column 1]. The coefficient, though positive (0.00122), is insignificant and diminutive in magnitude. Log of transfer fee, as observed in previous specifications, is the sole control variable significant at the 95 percent confidence level while all the others are significant at the 99 percent confidence level. Similarly, player j 's red cards have no bearing on player i 's [Table 7, Column 2]: the coefficient, 0.00410, is slight and insignificant. Other than the statistically insignificant number of games played as substitute, all the control variables are significant at the 95 percent or 99 percent confidence level. The total cards results are a pleasant surprise, suggesting the sum of yellow and red cards an athlete receives is partly driven by his associate's totals. The coefficient, slight at 0.00157, is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level and arouses suspicion, compelling me to disregard this outcome. Players tend to obtain many more yellow than red cards, in which case a statistically significant relationship should have been observed between player j 's and player i 's yellow cards. The argument can be made that including red cards might have tipped the scale toward significance, but this is a weak claim since they were found to be insignificant when analyzed separately. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in favor of the contention that player j 's behavior influences player i 's behavior (H_4). Bearing in mind that a one-on-one peer effect was not observed, the null hypothesis continues to stand while hypothesis 5, "Peer effects exerted by player j will be stronger than peer effects exerted by team I ," is refuted.

The statistical analysis can be juxtaposed with the history and structural violence against refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2015) reported that 59.5 million people, the most since World War II, were forcibly displaced worldwide in 2014 and 13.9 million of them were "newly displaced due to conflict or persecution" (2). As if their plight was not trying enough, the men, women, and children fleeing bloodshed in their home countries face hostility from citizens of the nations to which they are trying to relocate. Right-wing groups across Europe have opposed accepting Middle Eastern migrants and refugees into their countries for various reasons, including the fear that an influx of people from war-ravaged areas will lead to increased crime in their communities and pass cultural influences to those native to these European countries (Yardley 2016). In light of the absence of civil war peer effects, these concerns are unfounded. If the asylum seekers have not previously engaged in combat, then there is no indication that they will induce their hosts to behave aggressively.

Conclusion

The findings regarding the existence of peer effects within European soccer teams are mixed. Although there is reason to believe aggressive actions spread from the group to each of its members, the other propositions are unsubstantiated: neither the team's overall exposure to civil war nor a teammate's exposure to civil war nor a teammate's violent behavior has any bearing on a single athlete's conduct.

The latter of these conclusions is the most surprising. Given the verification of team-to-player peer effects, one would anticipate an increase in the number of cards an athlete receives as a function of his one-on-one interactions with his colleagues. I concede that my empirical strategy,

regressing the cards received by player i on those received by player j , was not the best course of action because it did not account for spatial dependence between teammates. Ideally, an approach similar to the methodology of the team I specifications would have been taken. Spatial effect variables lagging the number of cards received by player j and weighting them by the extent of the “proximity” between players would once again be generated, but this time, the dyad is the unit of analysis, and the influence observed within each pair will be compared to the influence observed in the others. Such a technique furnishes the opportunity to estimate the degree of the hypothesized peer effect more precisely. This model was not pursued due to its relative complexity. While it may have restricted my own efforts, I urge others to take up the challenge.

The peer effect of team I 's aggregate violent behavior implies that a contagion of violence does spread among individuals, but it is not because some of its sources were exposed to civil war as impressionable children. Miguel et al. (2011) suggest growing up in a conflict-ravaged environment influences one's future actions, and this is corroborated by the continued statistical significance of years of civil war in player i 's home country across my models and specifications. Although this demonstrates that a player may be unable to escape his own past, we cannot assume that the experience has left a strong enough impression on him so that he may affect his teammate through the cognitive process of social learning or the biological processes underpinning mirror neurons. It is not culture—the ambiguous, broadly-defined amalgam of forces in which we live and participate—which diffuses among individuals, but behavior—the actions of the people with whom we interface on a regular basis.

Appendix

Table 1: Summary Statistics

VARIABLES	Source	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Sum
<u>Dependent</u>							
Yellow Cards Received by Player <i>i</i>	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	2.347	2.706	0	16	12,683
Red Cards Received by Player <i>i</i>	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.151	0.408	0	3	814
Total Cards Received by Player <i>i</i>		5,403	2.498	2.876	0	17	13,497
<u>Independent – Team <i>I</i> Model</u>							
Spatially Lagged Years of Civil War in Player <i>j</i> 's Home Country, Weight = Games Played Together		5,403	2.734	2.642	0	22	
Spatially Lagged Yellow Cards Received by Player <i>j</i> , Weight = Games Played Together		5,403	2.507	1.394	0	7.840	
Spatially Lagged Red Cards Received by Player <i>j</i> , Weight = Games Played Together		5,403	0.161	0.138	0	1.034	
Spatially Lagged Total Cards Received by Player <i>j</i> , Weight = Games Played Together		5,403	2.669	1.494	0	8.875	
<u>Controls – Player <i>i</i></u>							
Years of Civil War in Player <i>i</i> 's Home Country	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data	5,403	2.742	4.763	0	26	
Age	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	25.89	4.457	16	41	
Goalie	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.0763	0.265	0	1	
Defender	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.331	0.471	0	1	
Forward	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.237	0.425	0	1	
Midfield	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.356	0.479	0	1	
Number of Games as a Starter	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	13.32	11.47	0	40	
Number of Games as a Substitute	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	3.083	3.858	0	29	
Age	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	25.89	4.457	16	41	
Goals Scored	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	1.606	3.093	0	31	
Transfer Fee	<i>Football Manager 2005</i> ; <i>World Soccer Manager 2006</i>	5,072	6.305e+06	8.174e+06	3,000	7.800e+07	
Ln(Transfer Fee)	<i>Football Manager 2005</i> ; <i>World Soccer Manager 2006</i>	5,072	15.15	1.084	8.006	18.17	
Rule of Law in Player <i>i</i> 's Home Country	World Governance Indicators	5,403	0.831	0.901	-1.760	2.100	
<u>Controls – Team <i>I</i></u>							
Number of Games as a Starter – Team <i>I</i> Average		5,403	13.32	4.843	0.500	28.25	
Number of Games as a Substitute – Team <i>I</i> Average		5,403	3.083	1.207	0	12.50	
Age – Team <i>I</i> Average		5,403	25.89	1.406	20	31.75	
Goals Scored – Team <i>I</i> Average		5,403	1.607	0.759	0	8.750	
Transfer Fee – Team <i>I</i> Average		5,394	6.219e+06	4.197e+06	65,000	2.538e+07	
Ln(Transfer Fee) – Team <i>I</i> Average		5,394	15.14	0.554	11.08	16.67	
Rule of Law in Player <i>i</i> 's Home Country – Team <i>I</i> Average		5,403	0.830	0.377	-0.780	2.017	
<u>Soccer League</u>							
English Premiership	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.173	0.378	0	1	
French Ligue 1	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.157	0.364	0	1	
German Bundesliga	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.146	0.353	0	1	
Italian Serie A	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.174	0.379	0	1	
Spanish Primera Divison	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.165	0.371	0	1	
UEFA Champions League	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.185	0.388	0	1	
<u>World Region</u>							
Africa	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.0792	0.270	0	1	
Asia	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.00463	0.0679	0	1	
Eastern Europe	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.0690	0.254	0	1	
Latin America and the Caribbean	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.127	0.333	0	1	
OECD	ESPN <i>Soccer</i> net	5,403	0.726	0.446	0	1	

Table 2: The Effect of Player i 's Civil War Exposure on Player i 's Behavior
[Miguel et al. (2011) "Replication"]

VARIABLES	(1) Yellow Cards	(2) Red Cards	(3) Total Cards
<u>Independent</u>			
Years of Civil War in Player i 's Home Country	0.00762*** (0.00284)	0.0150** (0.00666)	0.00813*** (0.00286)
<u>Controls</u>			
Defender	1.716*** (0.116)	1.115*** (0.155)	1.672*** (0.117)
Forward	1.400*** (0.126)	0.710*** (0.179)	1.345*** (0.127)
Midfield	1.726*** (0.136)	0.882*** (0.199)	1.664*** (0.138)
Number of Games as a Starter	0.0677*** (0.00186)	0.0506*** (0.00275)	0.0676*** (0.00190)
Number of Games as a Substitute	0.0411*** (0.00364)	0.0125 (0.0124)	0.0404*** (0.00373)
Age	0.0138*** (0.00231)	0.0138* (0.00739)	0.0141*** (0.00228)
Goals Scored	-0.0226*** (0.00374)	-0.0285*** (0.00838)	-0.0231*** (0.00384)
Ln(Transfer Fee)	0.0333** (0.0141)	0.0613** (0.0296)	0.0376*** (0.0132)
Rule of Law in Player i 's Home Country		-0.142 (0.0958)	-0.0166 (0.0506)
Constant	-3.176*** (0.320)	-5.136*** (0.657)	-3.111*** (0.335)
Observations	5,072	5,072	5,072
League Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
World Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables are cards received by player i over the course of a season while playing for a particular team in a given league. Column 1 replicates the results of Miguel et al. (2011), Table 2, Column 1; Column 2 replicates the results of Miguel et al. (2011), Table 2, Column 4; and Column 3 presents the results of a specification similar to the one described in Miguel et al. (2011), Table 2, Column 4. All three specifications serve as baselines to which subsequent corresponding specifications can be compared. Columns 1 through 3 present the results of negative binomial regressions with robust standard errors (found in parentheses) clustered by player i 's nation. Goalie (field position) and English Premier League (league) are omitted in all specifications. Columns 1 and 2 omit OECD in their world region fixed effects, while Column 3 omits Africa in its world region fixed effects. The results for league and region fixed effects are not shown. Statistical significance is at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.

Table 3: The Effect of Team *I*'s Aggregate Civil War Exposure on Player *i*'s Behavior

VARIABLES	(1) Yellow Cards Individual Controls	(2) Yellow Cards Team Controls	(3) Red Cards Individual Controls	(4) Red Cards Team Controls	(5) Total Cards Individual Controls	(6) Total Cards Team Controls
Independent						
Spatially Lagged Years of Civil War in Player <i>i</i> 's Home Country, Weight = Games Played Together	-0.000840 (0.00980)	-0.00326 (0.0112)	0.0164 (0.0295)	-0.00160 (0.0299)	0.000204 (0.0104)	-0.00476 (0.0112)
Controls						
Years of Civil War in Player <i>i</i> 's Home Country	0.00796*** (0.00298)	0.00852* (0.00449)	0.0147** (0.00635)	0.0177*** (0.00629)	0.00833*** (0.00299)	0.00877** (0.00443)
Defender	1.716*** (0.117)		1.114*** (0.156)		1.671*** (0.116)	
Midfield	1.727*** (0.136)		0.880*** (0.200)		1.663*** (0.138)	
Forward	1.401*** (0.126)		0.709*** (0.177)		1.344*** (0.127)	
Number of Games as a Starter	0.0678*** (0.00186)		0.0504*** (0.00273)		0.0676*** (0.00189)	
Number of Games as a Substitute	0.0412*** (0.00364)		0.0128 (0.0124)		0.0405*** (0.00374)	
Age	0.0137*** (0.00230)		0.0140* (0.00740)		0.0140*** (0.00226)	
Goals Scored	-0.0225*** (0.00374)		-0.0282*** (0.00837)		-0.0229*** (0.00383)	
Ln(Transfer Fee)	0.0331** (0.0141)		0.0626** (0.0295)		0.0378*** (0.0131)	
Rule of Law in Player <i>i</i> 's Home Country			-0.160 (0.0987)		-0.0321 (0.0537)	
Number of Games as a Starter – Team <i>I</i> Average		0.0670*** (0.00572)		0.0914*** (0.0144)		0.0690*** (0.00586)
Number of Games as a Substitute – Team <i>I</i> Average		0.0534*** (0.0184)		-0.0481 (0.0569)		0.0474** (0.0190)
Age – Team <i>I</i> Average		-0.00868 (0.0156)		-0.0431 (0.0308)		-0.0101 (0.0157)
Goals Scored – Team <i>I</i> Average		-0.113*** (0.0342)		-0.207*** (0.0597)		-0.121*** (0.0356)
Ln(Transfer Fee) – Team <i>I</i> Average		0.0608 (0.0375)		0.0419 (0.0761)		0.0690* (0.0386)
Rule of Law in Player <i>i</i> 's Home Country – Team <i>I</i> Average				0.0517 (0.204)		0.0468 (0.0630)
Constant	-3.147*** (0.335)	-1.139 (0.790)	-5.367*** (0.712)	-2.703 (1.870)	-3.123*** (0.324)	-1.206 (0.834)
Observations	5,064	5,386	5,064	5,386	5,064	5,386
League Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
World Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables are cards received by player *i* over the course of a season while playing for a particular team in a given league. Columns 1 through 6 present the results of negative binomial regressions with robust standard errors (found in parentheses) clustered by player *i*'s nation. Goalie (field position), English Premier League (league), and Africa (world region) are omitted in all specifications. The results for league and region fixed effects are not shown. Statistical significance is at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.

Table 4: The Effect of Team I 's Aggregate Violent Behavior on Player i 's Behavior

VARIABLES	(1) Yellow Cards Individual Controls	(2) Yellow Cards Team Controls	(3) Red Cards Individual Controls	(4) Red Cards Team Controls	(5) Total Cards Individual Controls	(6) Total Cards Team Controls
Independent						
Spatially Lagged Yellow Cards Received by Player j , Weight = Games Played Together	0.155*** (0.0145)	0.624*** (0.0203)				
Spatially Lagged Red Cards Received by Player j , Weight = Games Played Together			0.427** (0.217)	1.570*** (0.183)		
Spatially Lagged Total Cards Received by Player j , Weight = Games Played Together					0.154*** (0.0124)	0.586*** (0.0178)
Controls						
Years of Civil War in Player I 's Home Country	0.00800*** (0.00284)	0.00827* (0.00426)	0.0150** (0.00664)	0.0173*** (0.00629)	0.00839*** (0.00290)	0.00861** (0.00425)
Defender	1.732*** (0.119)		1.117*** (0.156)		1.688*** (0.120)	
Midfield	1.755*** (0.137)		0.882*** (0.202)		1.691*** (0.141)	
Forward	1.416*** (0.127)		0.709*** (0.180)		1.359*** (0.128)	
Number of Games as a Starter	0.0582*** (0.00170)		0.0486*** (0.00275)		0.0574*** (0.00182)	
Number of Games as a Substitute	0.0271*** (0.00395)		0.0105 (0.0126)		0.0258*** (0.00381)	
Age	0.0128*** (0.00225)		0.0143* (0.00738)		0.0132*** (0.00220)	
Goals Scored	-0.0215*** (0.00355)		-0.0283*** (0.00846)		-0.0218*** (0.00363)	
Ln(Transfer Fee)	0.0318** (0.0142)		0.0646** (0.0300)		0.0371*** (0.0130)	
Rule of Law in Player I 's Home Country			-0.156 (0.0973)		-0.0258 (0.0521)	
Number of Games as a Starter – Team I Average		-0.0304*** (0.0102)		0.0557*** (0.0154)		-0.0318*** (0.0104)
Number of Games as a Substitute – Team I Average		-0.0101 (0.0250)		-0.00365 (0.0514)		0.00113 (0.0241)
Age – Team I Average		0.0218* (0.0127)		-0.0244 (0.0301)		0.0233* (0.0126)
Goals Scored – Team I Average		0.0658* (0.0384)		-0.156** (0.0632)		0.0619* (0.0371)
Ln(Transfer Fee) – Team I Average		0.0131 (0.0380)		0.0546 (0.0661)		0.0223 (0.0369)
Rule of Law in Player I 's Home Country – Team I Average				0.0565 (0.203)		0.00254 (0.0644)
Constant	-3.268*** (0.337)	-1.225* (0.697)	-5.308*** (0.618)	-3.283** (1.621)	-3.250*** (0.319)	-1.347** (0.636)
Observations	5,064	5,386	5,064	5,386	5,064	5,386
League Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
World Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables are cards received by player i over the course of a season while playing for a particular team in a given league. Columns 1 through 6 present the results of negative binomial regressions with robust standard errors (found in parentheses) clustered by player i 's nation. Goalie (field position), English Premier League (league), and Africa (world region) are omitted in all specifications. The results for league and region fixed effects are not shown. Statistical significance is at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.

Table 5: The Effect of Team *I*'s Aggregate Violent Behavior on Player *i*'s Behavior – Robustness Check

VARIABLES	(1) Yellow Cards Individual Controls	(2) Yellow Cards Team Controls	(3) Total Cards Individual Controls	(4) Total Cards Team Controls
Independent				
Spatially Lagged Yellow Cards Received by Player <i>j</i> , Weight = Games Played Together	0.0738*** (0.0105)	0.268*** (0.0116)		
Spatially Lagged Total Cards Received by Player <i>j</i> , Weight = Games Played Together			0.0765*** (0.00876)	0.257*** (0.0118)
Controls				
Years of Civil War in Player <i>I</i> 's Home Country	0.00529** (0.00226)	0.00546* (0.00304)	0.00567** (0.00222)	0.00591* (0.00312)
Defender	1.102*** (0.0515)		1.121*** (0.0541)	
Midfield	1.198*** (0.0633)		1.197*** (0.0679)	
Forward	1.035*** (0.0597)		1.028*** (0.0631)	
Number of Games as a Starter	0.0374*** (0.00157)		0.0372*** (0.00156)	
Number of Games as a Substitute	0.00158 (0.00325)		0.00105 (0.00332)	
Age	0.00417** (0.00185)		0.00384** (0.00188)	
Goals Scored	-0.0218*** (0.00356)		-0.0219*** (0.00354)	
Ln(Transfer Fee)	-0.00512 (0.0106)		0.000179 (0.0106)	
Rule of Law in Player <i>I</i> 's Home Country			-0.0190 (0.0345)	
Number of Games as a Starter – Team <i>I</i> Average		-0.0112* (0.00674)		-0.0121 (0.00764)
Number of Games as a Substitute – Team <i>I</i> Average		-0.00986 (0.0184)		-0.00174 (0.0180)
Age – Team <i>I</i> Average		0.00704 (0.00671)		0.00489 (0.00736)
Goals Scored – Team <i>I</i> Average		0.0311 (0.0309)		0.0303 (0.0315)
Ln(Transfer Fee) – Team <i>I</i> Average		-0.0377 (0.0240)		-0.0323 (0.0249)
Rule of Law in Player <i>I</i> 's Home Country – Team <i>I</i> Average				0.0297 (0.0528)
Constant	-0.968*** (0.192)	0.926** (0.398)	-1.028*** (0.202)	0.866** (0.442)
Observations	5,064	5,386	5,064	5,386
League Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
World Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables are cards received by player *i* over the course of a season while playing for a particular team in a given league. Columns 1 through 4 present the results of zero-inflated negative binomial regressions with robust standard errors (found in parentheses) clustered by player *i*'s nation. Goalie (field position), English Premier League (league), and Africa (world region) are omitted in all specifications. The results for league and region fixed effects are not shown. Statistical significance is at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.

Table 6: The Effect of Player j 's Civil War Exposure on Player i 's Behavior

VARIABLES	(1) Yellow Cards	(2) Red Cards	(3) Total Cards
<u>Independent</u>			
Years of Civil War in Player j 's Home Country	0.000223 (0.000788)	0.00371 (0.00259)	0.000471 (0.000807)
<u>Controls</u>			
Years of Civil War in Player i 's Home Country	0.00867*** (0.00299)	0.0164** (0.00728)	0.00918*** (0.00296)
Defender	1.730*** (0.120)	1.197*** (0.191)	1.692*** (0.123)
Midfield	1.745*** (0.144)	0.935*** (0.244)	1.687*** (0.149)
Forward	1.423*** (0.133)	0.724*** (0.209)	1.369*** (0.137)
Number of Games as a Starter	0.0692*** (0.00201)	0.0511*** (0.00237)	0.0690*** (0.00203)
Number of Games as a Substitute	0.0433*** (0.00363)	0.0168 (0.0119)	0.0427*** (0.00377)
Age	0.0141*** (0.00240)	0.0151** (0.00726)	0.0145*** (0.00232)
Goals Scored	-0.0235*** (0.00364)	-0.0281*** (0.00781)	-0.0239*** (0.00368)
Ln(Transfer Fee)	0.0278** (0.0140)	0.0679** (0.0301)	0.0326** (0.0134)
Rule of Law in Player i 's Home Country		-0.218** (0.100)	-0.0452 (0.0520)
Constant	-3.141*** (0.321)	-5.505*** (0.620)	-3.126*** (0.309)
Observations	117,512	117,512	117,512
League Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
World Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables are cards received by player i over the course of a season while playing for a particular team in a given league. Columns 1 through 3 present the results of negative binomial regressions with robust standard errors (found in parentheses) clustered by player i 's nation. Goalie (field position), English Premier League (league), and Africa (world region) are omitted in all specifications. The results for league and region fixed effects are not shown. Statistical significance is at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.

Table 7: The Effect of Player j 's Violent Behavior on Player i 's Behavior

VARIABLES	(1) Yellow Cards	(2) Red Cards	(3) Total Cards
<u>Independent</u>			
Yellow Cards Received by Player j	0.00122 (0.000775)		
Red Cards Received by Player j		0.00410 (0.0152)	
Total Cards Received by Player j			0.00157* (0.000828)
<u>Controls</u>			
Years of Civil War in Player i 's Home Country	0.00868*** (0.00298)	0.0165** (0.00732)	0.00920*** (0.00295)
Defender	1.730*** (0.120)	1.197*** (0.191)	1.692*** (0.123)
Midfield	1.745*** (0.144)	0.935*** (0.244)	1.687*** (0.149)
Forward	1.423*** (0.133)	0.724*** (0.209)	1.370*** (0.137)
Number of Games as a Starter	0.0692*** (0.00201)	0.0511*** (0.00237)	0.0690*** (0.00202)
Number of Games as a Substitute	0.0432*** (0.00363)	0.0168 (0.0119)	0.0427*** (0.00377)
Age	0.0141*** (0.00240)	0.0151** (0.00727)	0.0145*** (0.00232)
Goals Scored	-0.0235*** (0.00363)	-0.0281*** (0.00781)	-0.0239*** (0.00367)
Ln(Transfer Fee)	0.0278** (0.0141)	0.0677** (0.0301)	0.0326** (0.0134)
Rule of Law in Player i 's Home Country		-0.217** (0.100)	-0.0451 (0.0519)
Constant	-3.143*** (0.322)	-5.477*** (0.617)	-3.127*** (0.310)
Observations	117,512	117,512	117,512
League Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
World Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables are cards received by player i over the course of a season while playing for a particular team in a given league. Columns 1 through 3 present the results of negative binomial regressions with robust standard errors (found in parentheses) clustered by player i 's nation. Goalie (field position), English Premier League (league), and Africa (world region) are omitted in all specifications. The results for league and region fixed effects are not shown. Statistical significance is at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.

Table 8: The Effect of Team I 's Aggregate Violent Behavior on Player i 's Behavior – Incidence Rate Ratios

VARIABLES	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(5)		(6)	
	Yellow Cards		Yellow Cards		Red Cards		Red Cards		Total Cards		Total Cards	
	Individual Controls	Team Controls	Individual Controls	Team Controls	Individual Controls	Team Controls	Individual Controls	Team Controls	Individual Controls	Team Controls	Individual Controls	Team Controls
Independent												
Spatially Lagged Yellow Cards Received by Player j , Weight = Games Played Together	1.168	1.866										
	(10.69)**	(30.71)**										
Spatially Lagged Red Cards Received by Player j , Weight = Games Played Together			1.533	4.805								
			(1.96)*	(8.58)**								
Spatially Lagged Total Cards Received by Player j , Weight = Games Played Together									1.167	1.797		
									(12.44)**	(33.01)**		
Controls												
Years of Civil War in Player I 's Home Country	1.008	1.008	1.015	1.017	1.015	1.017	1.015	1.017	2.90**	2.03*	1.008	1.009
	(2.81)**	(1.94)	(2.26)*	(2.74)**	(2.26)*	(2.74)**	(2.26)*	(2.74)**	5.409	1.797	1.008	1.009
Defender	5.654		3.055		3.055		3.055		(14.09)**			
	(14.58)**		(7.15)**		(7.15)**		(7.15)**		5.423			
Midfield	5.783		2.417		2.417		2.417		(11.99)**			
	(12.76)**		(4.38)**		(4.38)**		(4.38)**		3.894			
Forward	4.122		2.031		2.031		2.031		(10.61)**			
	(11.19)**		(3.94)**		(3.94)**		(3.94)**		1.059			
Number of Games as a Starter	1.060		1.050		1.050		1.050		(31.57)**			
	(34.20)**		(17.67)**		(17.67)**		(17.67)**		1.026			
Number of Games as a Substitute	1.028		1.011		1.011		1.011		(6.75)**			
	(6.86)**		(0.83)		(0.83)		(0.83)		1.013			
Age	1.013		1.014		1.014		1.014		(6.02)**			
	(5.69)**		(1.93)		(1.93)		(1.93)		0.978			
Goals Scored	0.979		0.972		0.972		0.972		(6.01)**			
	(6.06)**		(3.35)**		(3.35)**		(3.35)**		1.038			
Ln(Transfer Fee)	1.032		1.067		1.067		1.067		(2.85)**			
	(2.24)*		(2.15)*		(2.15)*		(2.15)*		0.975			
Rule of Law in Player I 's Home Country			0.856		0.856		0.856		(0.49)			
			(1.60)		(1.60)		(1.60)		1.167			
Number of Games as a Starter – Team I Average		0.970		1.057		1.057		1.057		0.969		0.969
		(2.98)**		(3.63)**		(3.63)**		(3.63)**		(3.05)**		(3.05)**
Number of Games as a Substitute – Team I Average		0.990		0.996		0.996		0.996		1.001		1.001
		(0.40)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Age – Team I Average		1.022		0.976		0.976		0.976		1.024		1.024
		(1.72)		(0.81)		(0.81)		(0.81)		(1.85)		(1.85)
Goals Scored – Team I Average		1.068		0.855		0.855		0.855		1.064		1.064
		(1.71)		(2.48)*		(2.48)*		(2.48)*		(1.67)		(1.67)
Ln(Transfer Fee) – Team I Average		1.013		1.056		1.056		1.056		1.023		1.023
		(0.35)		(0.83)		(0.83)		(0.83)		(0.60)		(0.60)
Rule of Law in Player I 's Home Country – Team I Average							1.058				1.003	
							(0.203)				(0.04)	
Observations	5,064	5,386	5,064	5,386	5,064	5,386	5,064	5,386	5,064	5,386	5,064	5,386
League Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
World Region Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variables are cards received by player i over the course of a season while playing for a particular team in a given league. Columns 1 through 6 present the results of negative binomial regressions with robust standard errors (found in parentheses) clustered by player i 's nation. The incidence rate ratios are reported instead of the regression coefficients. Goalie (field position), English Premier League (league), and Africa (world region) are omitted in all specifications. The results for league and region fixed effects are not shown. Statistical significance is at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.

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THE INTERPLAY OF SECULARISM AND SOCIALISM IN MODERN INDIAN POLITICS (1947-2014)

SHIVANGI KHANNA

This paper argues that the victory of the Hindu right in the 2014 national election has less to do with religion than with economic disenchantment of socialist ideals espoused by the framers of the Indian state. Instead, Narendra Modi's victory in becoming Prime Minister marks an overthrow of entrenched elites and existing order. Since India's Independence from Britain, elites utilized the principles of secularism and socialism to advance economically debilitating corrupt political agendas. The public sentiments' departure from these two principles is marked by (1) the rise of the Hindu right; (2) the fall of the Nehru-Gandhi family in politics; (3) the economic reform of 'License Raj' policies; and (4) the election of Narendra Modi in 2014. The interplay of secularism and economic socialism throughout independent India proves that the political ascent of the anti-secular Hindu right implies widespread economic frustration rather than a populist wave against religious and social liberties.

Introduction

On May 17, 2014, Narendra Modi led the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies to the 300 parliamentary seats required to declare a majority electoral victory of India's highest governing body (Gupta, 2014). Far from an ordinary election, this victory marked the tipping point of a long-brewing political revolution—one whose origins can be traced back to India's post-colonial independence from the British Raj in 1947.

The socialist and secular principles of the Indian state originated from the framers of the Indian Constitution, which laid the foundation of the democratic state. Though the framers had benevolent intentions, weak economic and political institutions lacked the power to protect the sanctity of their goals. The implementation of a secular agenda has often served vote-mongering, while socialism has bred widespread corruption. Public sentiment toward secularism and socialism, according to voting records, have thus moved in tandem with Indian politics, and the electorate's expression of economic frustration has propelled anti-secular political movements. In the context of

India, an anti-secular agenda includes the promotion of policies that favored the Hindu population in place of the special attention to minorities that ruling parties historically administered. Modi captures both economic and social sentiments as the most market-oriented (anti-socialist) and openly Hindu (anti-secular) Prime Minister to date.

By analyzing the strategies of framers Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, the rule of Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi, corruption throughout the Indian government and its effects on government policies, and ultimately the rise of the BJP, this paper will demonstrate the link between economic strife and social upheaval and how the two coalesced into Modi's 2014 landmark victory after a troubling past in Gujarat. For a country founded so deeply in anti-sectarianism and minority inclusion—despite an overwhelming Hindu majority in population—how did this fall to Hindu nationalist forces? The rise of the Hindu right illustrates a populist backlash against political and economic corruption rather than a religious revival or a reflection of majoritarian interests presiding over pluralism.

Secularism: The Indian Model

Standing in Harmandir Sahib—the Golden Temple, the most sacred prayer ground for Sikhs around the world—one can hear the echoing loudspeaker of a nearby masjid (mosque) announcing Islamic prayers. This occurs five times a day, as the two places of worship coexist in harmony alongside Hindu temples in the city of Amritsar, Punjab. A similar scene of peaceful co-existence holds true throughout the Indian sub-continent from the everyday lives of the people up to the highest political institutions. The nation has sought to actively encourage religious diversity and sanctity of minorities in a majority Hindu state through national government since its formation.

On August 15, 1947, India formally declared independence from its British colonial rulers. The two champions of the independence movement, Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi, created the foundational political, economic, and social principles of their new nation. Among their concerns were the battered state of the economy, multiethnic and multi-faith population, widespread inequality, and varying levels of regional economic development.

The nation they inherited housed three hundred million people speaking over one thousand languages, practicing six major religions, with historical ties throughout Asia. The Hindu majority represented 84% per the 1951 Census (Government of India). The India facing Nehru and Gandhi bled with the pain of Partition¹ and dire poverty across all regions. Regardless, the Indian Constitution extended universal suffrage as a birthright for all Indian adults. In terms of personal and political freedoms, the framers instituted a constitutional republic and liberal democracy from their nation's birth (Center for Civil Society).

To address the social heterogeneity of India, especially in the wake of partition with Pakistan and ensuing religious violence, Nehru strongly advocated for political secularism to preside over India's overwhelmingly plural population. Gandhi and Nehru's claims to secular political thought originated back in the independence movement, with Gandhi's campaigns of mass civil disobedience

¹ Partition here refers to the split of India and Pakistan.

and solidarity against India's British captors. These campaigns championed the Indian people's ability to overcome sectarian divisions in organization for collective action toward a common goal against their imperialists (Kesavan, 62). To rally the nation behind a single identity, the framers of the Indian state often utilized rhetoric emphasizing the crippling de-industrialization and extortionate taxation undercutting agricultural prosperity. Thus, instead of focusing on language, culture, history, and religion, the framers stressed common economic exploitation. The common suffering provided a basis of economic nationalism that transcended social divisions, resulting in a truly secular sense of patriotism (63).

At the nation's founding, the Indian social identity was closely linked with its economic one. Despite great diversity in ethnicity and religion, the people shared a common history of economic exploitation against an outside enemy: the British Raj. Under that front, Nehru and Gandhi united the assorted shades of Indian demographics under their version of secularism—not removal of religion from political affairs, but rather the inclusion of all groups wanting representation and expression including and not limited to the majority religion, Hinduism. The Indian brand of secularism, therefore, did not mean the exclusion of religion but the opposite.

Thus, the Indian National Congress, the political party of Nehru, Gandhi, and all major Prime Ministers until 1977, consciously integrated its largely Hindu ranks with minorities, including Muslims, Christians, Dalits, Parsees, and Sikhs. Congress believed that this diversity legitimized its stake to rule the eclectic nation as a sum of its parts (Kesavan, 63). To avoid a majoritarian governance structure, promotion of pluralism demanded utmost importance in the Nehru government. The steadfast commitment to include various types of Indians within Congress became the guideline of nationalism. India's foundational social identity as set by Gandhi and Nehru already derived itself from a common economic identity of exploitation. This would ring true decades later again, though from a domestic entity rather than post-colonial one.

To legitimize his pluralist and secular republic, Nehru endorsed his system as "postcolonial modernization," bringing India out of the antiquated rule of the Raj into modern governance on a global stage (Kesavan, 64). Initially designed to present a united India opposite the British Raj, Gandhi and Nehru wrote Congress' brand of secularism into the Constitution to solidify their ideals in the future governance of their new nation. Article 44, which became the basis for applying secularism to law, states that "the State shall endeavor to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India" (Erckel). This assured religious minorities of their political rights to practice and propagate their faiths, establish educational institutions entitled to state subsidies, and actively participate in public office (Kesavan, 63-64).

Far from prioritizing Hindu customs and way of life, promotion of religious minorities was built into the fabric of India's political birth itself "subject to public order, morality, and health" (Ganguly, 13). Article 25 of the Constitution reiterates that nothing should "prevent the State from making any law... providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus". In fact, the Indian Constitution's intervention in and reform of religious practices reflect a commitment to social justice at the expense of Hinduism (Jacobsohn, 153). For example, Article 17 abolishes the institution of caste-based "untouchability",

and Article 46 protects these classes denoted “Scheduled Tribes” from the continuation of social injustice. Jacobsohn argues that the Indian model of positive secularism includes a constitutional commitment to impose social reform on inequitable religious traditions, even when those policies target one community over others. Legal requirements of secularism maintain sanctity as long as policy goals adhere to the promotion of social equality (151-152).

An important distinction must then be made from the Western application of secularism—absolute separation of religion and state forms a cornerstone of Western secularism alongside freedom of religion within private spheres. The law applies equally to all citizens regardless of spiritual practices and beliefs, as all are subject to the same laws (Smith, 2011). The French concept of *laïcité*, for example, calls for complete absence of religion within public institutions, such as government and public schooling, while rejecting public interference in religion (Hurd, 2008). In Indian government, however, secularism entails equal promotion of all religions rather than separation of religion (e.g. providing financial support to religious schools and permitting religious law to supersede personal law). Thus, the applicability of laws differs based on a citizen’s religion. Government policies both support and regulate religious entities, including Islamic Wakf Boards, Hindu temples, Buddhist monasteries, and Christian institutions. This direct intervention in religious affairs—the “ameliorative model”—starkly contrasts with traditional Western secularism (Jacobsohn).

Nehruvian Socialism & the License Raj

Alongside his view on Indian secularism, Nehru’s strong belief in economic socialism guided his vision of India’s planned economy, coined ‘Nehruvian socialism’. Hoping to ameliorate the economic disarray and massive inequality stemming from colonial rule, inclusivity was held paramount in Nehru’s new India—social inclusivity was promoted through Indian secularism and economic inclusivity through socialism. Sixteen years before formal independence, the Indian National Congress already committed to a socialist framework for economic development during the 1931 Karachi session. Two decades later, the Congress reiterated its early commitments to socialistic development goals in the 1955 Avadi Resolution. The second meeting foreshadowed the land reform and industrial regulations that would take place a year later. With these actions, the Congress Party formally adopted an official policy of a “socialist pattern of development”, though avoiding an outright declaration of a fully socialist system (Anant). Only decades later in 1976, during the reign of Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi, was the passage of the 42nd Amendment finally written into the Preamble of the Indian Constitution with the addition of the term “socialist” (Government of India).

The socialist pattern of economic governance began with the 1948 Industrial Policy Resolution, which established government monopolies in “armaments, atomic energy, railroads, minerals, iron [and] steel industries, aircraft, manufacturing, shipbuilding and telephone and telegraph equipment,” which were later extended to 12 other industries in 1956 to a total of 29. By 1973, during the term of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, life and general insurance businesses fell under government control in addition to large commercial banks. Government agencies were formed on both the national and regional levels to manage “finance, trading, mineral exploitation, manufacturing, utilities and transportation like Hindustan Insecticides, Ashoka Hotel Corporation,

Tyre Corporation of India, Air India, etc.” (Center for Civil Society) These measures culminated in the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act in 1970, which strengthened the government’s licensing system through information access to assets and investments of any firm with assets totaling Rs. 200 million (or roughly \$3 million USD). This act was often considered to be among the most detrimental of the socialist framework, undermining the private sector’s economic power and placing restraints on business “considered contrary to public interest” (Centre for Civil Society).

Motivated by optimistic intentions, the license system transformed from a tool of Nehru’s planned economy into the infamous ‘License Raj,’ a play on the previous imperial rulers, ‘British Raj’. The founder of India’s first market-oriented political party, Rajaji, coined the period ‘Quota-Permit-License Raj’ in the late 1950s to describe the devolution of these policies. Regulations from the License Raj required licenses for starting new business, producing new products, and expanding production capabilities. Even downsizing efforts required business owners to await sluggish government approval for workforce reduction. Meanwhile, the over-regulated private sector had to cooperate and compete with nationalized heavy industry and state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) in sectors from steel plants and jute mills to airlines and hotels.

Regarding external trade relationships, the Nehruvian economic model emphasized import substitution, which essentially cut imports through tariffs, quotas, and banned goods. In 1985, nominal tariffs ranged from 107.3% for capital goods to 146.4% for intermediate goods, the highest in the world. In 1960, this meant a 125% import tariff for cars (Centre for Civil Society). Tech and capital inputs also failed to pass the high tariff barriers, crippling the ability of small businesses to leverage foreign technological advancement and obtain cheaper inputs from abroad. Instead of growing businesses, these policies resulted in economic stagnation and government corruption at all levels. Table 1 in the Appendix depicts the abysmal economic growth during between 1960 and 1980 relative to India’s regional peers. India’s 4.6% growth in industrial production could barely compete with the double digits of the Asian Tigers (e.g. South Korea and Taiwan) and even fell flat against Pakistan’s 8% growth (Centre for Civil Society). Upon independence, India’s average annual income of \$439 was reasonable compared to its peers: \$619 for China, \$770 for South Korea, and \$936 for Taiwan. A half century later, India’s \$1,818 lost miserably to China’s \$3,259 and even further against South Korea and Taiwan at \$13,317 and \$15,720 respectively (Desai, 2003). A dire and significant consequence of the so-called ‘Hindu Rate of Growth,’ poverty remained salient with little alleviation.

Indira Gandhi and the Emergency period (1966–1984)

The crumbling of these socialist economic promises would begin to tear down Nehru’s notion of secularism. The government’s failure to lead India toward economic prosperity “eroded its claim to be progressive and modern. The failure of the planned economy discredited as well the secularism to which the economy had been linked” (Kesavan, 65). In the late 1960s, Indira Gandhi emerged as Congress Party leader during a schism within the party. Campaigning with populist, reformist promises to end poverty, her policies largely failed to address these promises (Ganguly, 14). In the tumultuous political climate that followed, institutional weakness was apparent in Gandhi’s undermining of the very institutions her father had put in place,

“she saw established institutions—including the independent judiciary and civil service as well as the democratic internal procedures of her party itself—as barriers to her goal of prevailing politically at the head of a securely dominant Congress party...her willingness to thwart the rule of law when votes were at stake...created space for the rapid rise of an anti-secular alternative” (Ganguly, 15).

Gandhi’s initial 11-year term included the nationalization of the banking sector, the passing of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, and the declaration of the Emergency rule. The enactment of emergency from 1975 to 1976 extended her power over civil liberties and democratic institutions, “setting off nearly two years of widespread arrests, censorship of the press and severe curtailment of civil liberties to India’s millions of citizens” (Iyengar). Several opposing politicians, including future Prime Ministers Morarji Desai and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, were jailed (Ghosh). Desai would lead a short term during the Janata Party’s fleeting control of Parliament before Gandhi regained control for her second, four-year term. Three weeks into Gandhi’s declaration of emergency rule, TIME Magazine expressed concerns in its July 14, 1975 issue over the profound repercussions “imperious” Prime Minister Gandhi’s rule and “dictatorial powers” would have on “political freedoms”.

The suspension of parliamentary procedures allowed Gandhi to pass the highly controversial 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, which severely diluted the power of the Supreme Court, shifting the balance of power toward parliamentary sovereignty. Parliament gained the ability to surpass judicial review in passage of any amendment, extraordinarily extending its previous mandate. India’s federalist structure also felt severe blows as power of the states were curbed and centralized (Walker).

This move was particularly detrimental given India’s history of loosely-connected states with little collective identity aside from their anti-imperialist anger. In fact, local and state elections remained heavily dominated by regional parties that frequently secure majority victories within their regions. The Amendment also added the phrase “sovereign, socialist secular democratic republic” to the Constitution’s Preamble, formalizing the pretense under which Gandhi declared the emergency period in the first place. In the five-year term that followed Gandhi’s



Front page of the Indian Herald on June 26, 1975

tenure, her son, Sanjay Gandhi, continued this legacy in the amendment of the Representation of the People's Act in 1989. The new regulation mandated all political parties to align their party platforms with the commitment to socialism expressed in the new Preamble (Rajagopalan).

The legislation and abuse of power during the Emergency exemplified the extent to which political elites could utilize protection of socialism and secularism to cement their own political standing and justify the incarceration of political adversaries—the jailing of Janata Party leaders including Desai and Vajpayee is a clear reflection of such. The surmounting political and economic losses gave rise to the Janata Party (directly translated to 'People's' Party), which is a merger of the Jana Sangh and other political groups. During the 1977 elections, the Janata Party, a loose collective of opposition parties under the Jana Sangh umbrella, campaigned with the promise to reverse the Constitutional amendments of the Emergency and restore the Indian government to its original state (Walker). By rejecting the encroachment of the people's democratic liberties, the Janata Party rose in popularity as the strongest alternative to the Congress, despite its lack of a commitment to strongly secular governance that the Congress championed. The Janata Party, under Desai, kept together an unsteady coalition government during its two-year term before Gandhi's re-election in 1980. She remained in power until being assassinated in 1984 by her Sikh bodyguard amongst a national spike in religious conflict.

Economic Reforms and Crash (1980-1991)

Through the 1980s, India's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth began to accelerate from an average of 2.9% in the 1970s to almost a double at 5.6% in the 1980s (Center for Civil Society). The Gandhi governments under Indira Gandhi and her successor Rajiv Gandhi oversaw the beginnings of the reforms, coupled with heavy government expenditure financed through overseas borrowing. The reforms gradually opened the Indian economy to foreign trade through import tariff reductions, export incentives, weakened regulatory controls over industrial production, and exchange rate stabilization. For example, the freely-traded Replenishment Licenses awarded exporters with tariff exemptions on imports required for Indian production needs. These exemptions came in excess to the broader Open General License List that relaxed tariffs on items such as sewing machines and chocolates. These measures were crucial initial steps in dismantling the looming License Raj.

By 1991, public sector foreign investment rose significantly. However, this came with consistently high fiscal and current account deficits, with the latter reaching 43.8% of exports. Simultaneously, foreign debt grew from \$20.6 billion in 1980 to \$64.4 billion at the precipice of the crash (Center for Civil Society). With unsustainable foreign and domestic deficits, the Indian economy failed to withstand several macroeconomic blows. The collapse of the Soviet Union, fall of the Iron Curtain, and economic crises in the former Soviet Bloc were detrimental to India's current account—exports to Eastern Europe, which totaled to 22.1% of total exports in 1980 were cut almost in half to 10.9% by 1991. Furthermore, India's main sources of oil exports, Iraq and Kuwait, fell into war in 1990 and required India to pay high premiums for short-term contracts in the spot market. These factors delivered the final blows to the India's economy, sending the nation to the Balance of Payments Crisis in June of 1991.



Source: TIMES OF INDIA, 1979

"Don't be ridiculous! Do you seriously believe that you have enjoyed no benefits at all from our economic policies?"

While these macroeconomic concerns mounted in a period of global economic weakness, India's political landscape was extremely hectic with three changes of Prime Minister in the two years leading to the crash.

Rising public frustrations ended Rajiv Gandhi's five-year term and created two variations of the Janata Party, which took the Congress Party's place. The instability of having three coalition governments in a one-and-a-half-year span only exacerbated the accumulation of economic pressures and weakened investor confidence both in India and abroad. India's deficits instigated a credit downgrade from rating agencies and accelerated capital outflows. Even worse, high oil prices raised overall good prices and businesses could no longer access short-term funding. Three weeks from declaring default on its deficits, the Indian government secured a \$22 billion emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund against 67 tons of gold as collateral (Center for Civil Society).

P.V. Narasimha Rao: Ending the Socialist License Raj (1991–1996)

Champion of Indian economic reform and the dismantlement of the License Raj, P.V. Narasimha Rao became Prime Minister in June 1991 with a minority government. Often either overlooked in Indian history or called "The Father of Indian Economic Reforms," Rao reversed many of his predecessor's socialist policies and set a precedent that future Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh would carry forward. Though a representative of the Congress Party, Rao significantly departed from the Gandhi dynasty that had governed India since her founding for almost half a century. Hailing from the non-Hindu south of the subcontinent, Rao represented diverse demographics, which are traditionally dominated by northern elites. His removal of many License Raj barriers in the name of socialism illustrated his divergent economic policies.

Rao, who had no previous record of market-friendly policies, worked alongside his Finance Minister Manmohan Singh to enact liberal economic policies and promote privatization (Harikrishnan). Rao and Singh slashed the budget to reduce the fiscal deficit and took stride to reform the banking and capital markets (Center for Civil Society). His banking sector reforms include revised accounting guidelines and procedures for opening new private banks, liberalized interest rates independent from the Royal Bank of India, and reduced liquidity and reserve requirements. The administration also built upon previous industrial policy reforms, repealing Indira Gandhi's Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, and abolishing license requirements for 80% of

the firms in the industry. As a result, private sector involvement expanded and the remaining public sector actors were granted greater operational autonomy.

The 1991 reform agenda also included trade and investment-centric policies, including drastic reduction in import duties, abolishment of tariffs and quotas, and establishment of trading houses. To promote the transfer of technology from abroad, foreign investors in high technology and high investment sectors received instantaneous permissions to control, in some cases, 100% equity from the previous 51% cap. In addition, exchange rate policy reforms were implemented to prevent another crisis—the rupee was devalued by 20% to enhance competitiveness of Indian exports to re-establish payment balances. In general, these reforms benefited existing, large-scale players but failed to address the needs of the urban poor, small and medium-sized enterprises, and the agricultural sector. The free market policies tailored to macroeconomic crisis took precedence over social reforms, specifically efforts to increase employment, education, and health. Meanwhile, Indian states with strong infrastructures benefited the most, resulting in the widening of the inequality gap. Still, the 1991 reforms heralded a landmark shift in the Indian government's economic approach, which were continued by future governments.

From Fringe Hindu right to Election-Sweeping Victory


In the early days of Indian independence, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh—different from the current Bharatiya Janata Party—formed the original, anti-secular opposition party to Congress (Ganguly, 14). The party began as the “nationalistic alternative” to the existing order with ties to the militant Hindu organization Rashtriya Swayam Sevak (RSS) (Gupta). Amidst the massive popularity of Congress and the Jana Sangh's identity as a political extension of the fringe Hindu right, the party never quite gained mainstream popularity. Opposite Congress's socialist stance, the Jana Sangh favored open market economic policy. The party adopted an anti-Muslim, anti-Pakistan position in both foreign and domestic policies, and had limited success from 1951 until its merger in 1977 with numerous other fringe groups spanning the left, right, and center of Indian politics (Ganguly, 15).

In the 1977 elections that followed Indira Gandhi's Emergency rule, the Congress Party lost to a coalition of parties, which includes the Jana Sangh and ultimately consolidated into the new Janata Party. The backlash to the Emergency catalyzed pent up frustration towards failed socialist economic policies from Nehru and the License Raj and fueled the rise of the anti-secular right. After the Janata Party's brief two-year rule, Indira Gandhi re-emerged as Prime Minister in 1980, at which point the coalition Janata Party fell apart. In its wake, many of its former leaders re-formed the party as the contemporary Bharatiya Janata Party.

While the BJP maintained popularity in some regional and state governments, the party did not secure a significant number of seats in the Lok Sabha—or lower house of the Indian Parliament—until the 1998 general election. Because the BJP could not secure a majority win at that time, the party assembled a coalition government under Vajpayee called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The messily-cobbled grouping of parties had little in common, thus, the NDA nearly fell apart in 1999. However, after another round of elections, the reassembled NDA won 303 seats (marginally above a majority win), including 183 from the BJP, marking the party's highest seat count

in general elections. Vajpayee then served a full five-year term until he suffered a surprising defeat to a Congress-backed coalition in 2004 led by Sonia Gandhi, the late Rajiv Gandhi's wife.

Modi's Gujarat Transformation: Prosperity and Violence



Prime Minister Narendra Modi's legacy over the state of Gujarat varies from criticism for his alleged support of sectarian violence to praise for his economic policies. As the Chief Minister of Gujarat from 2001 to 2014 as, Modi led the state with GDP growth and abundance of jobs that outpaced that of the nation (*The Economist*). In his first decade, GDP growth averaged around 10% within the state, and Gujarat accounted for about 7.6% of India's overall GDP despite having only 5% of the population and 6% of the land mass. Even more impressive was that Gujarat produced 22% of the nation's exports.

Though Modi's administration fell short in addressing poverty, the Gujarat model stressed infrastructure and successfully restructured an

electricity generation deficit to a surplus, granting its 18,000 villages with access to power and modern technology.

Gujarat's rebuilt roads and abundant water supply further incentivized companies like Tata Motors to relocate government-supported manufacturing plants to Gujarat with promises to avoid the messy land disputes they faced in other states. While the World Bank ranked India 142 out of 189 countries in terms of "ease of doing business," businesses in Gujarat enjoyed expedited processes for licenses, permits, and economic clearances even before Modi took office (*The Economist*). Modi further promoted bureaucratic accountability and clamped down on corruption by integrating advanced technological platforms, which tracked state finances, government documents, and tax payments, and created a paper trail behind procedures.

Despite his victory, Modi and his controversial past shifted public opinion toward anti-secular Hindu nationalism. Coming from humble beginnings selling tea with his father and brother, Modi rose to political power without any familial connections or powerful backings. As a child, he discovered the RSS and joined the Hindu nationalist organization as a junior cadet (Marino). Modi maintained his affinity with the RSS throughout his career, publicly congratulating the organization on its 91st anniversary in 2016. From his early days as a junior cadet, he rose through the ranks of the BJP—commonly considered to be affiliated with the RSS—to his 2001 victory as Chief Minister of Gujarat. Though he campaigned for Chief Minister as a civil servant for all citizens of the state, he

faced a critical test of secular leadership in 2002 that continues to be hotly controversial, criticized, and cited as evidence for his stance on Hindu nationalism and religious conflict.

Four months into Modi's term, Gujarat erupted into chaotic violence over the construction of the Babri Masjid on the sacred Hindu site of Ayodhya, an incident that claimed over 1,000 lives (BBC). The Babri Masjid has routinely sparked Hindu-Muslim violence and is an ongoing conflict that originated under the Mughal Empire: in 1992, a mob of Hindu rioters, fueled by right-wing Hindu groups including the BJP, tore down the mosque and sparked a chain of violence; in February 2002, a train of approximately 60 Hindu passengers returning from a pilgrimage to Ayodhya was burned in Godhra, Gujarat (New York Times). Violence erupted across the state, with mobs of Hindus rampaging through towns in abhorrent cases of looting, murder, rape, and mutilation of Muslims, causing horrible scenes of "mothers being skewered, children set afire and fathers hacked to pieces" (New York Times). The violence lasted over two months and displaced about 150,000 refugees.

Though the government rejected any and all accusations of involvement, scholars and journalists alike reported heavily on widespread allegations of complicity and, in some cases, encouragement of the mobs. Martha Nussbaum² summarized, "there is by now a broad consensus that the Gujarat violence was a form of ethnic cleansing, that in many ways it was premeditated, and that it was carried out with the complicity of the state government and officers of the law". It has been further revealed that law enforcement and the police failed to address the violence until the situation had brutally escalated, and a senior state official, who was later murdered, disclosed to an investigation committee that Modi initially ordered officials to allow the rioters to continue (New York Times). Yet, judiciary courts have since acquitted the then Chief Minister of any wrongdoing. The final death toll as per the state government was 790 Muslims and 254 Hindus.

Beyond Gujarat's borders, calls for Modi's resignation rang from all corners of the subcontinent. Vajapayee, then Prime Minister, chose not to dismiss Modi from his position as Chief Minister. Modi's own resignation was even rejected at the BJP national meeting in Goa that year. Subsequently, the party called for early elections while promoting a campaign centered around Hindutva, or Hindu-ness (New York Times). Modi's rhetoric frequently alluded to the Hindu lives lost in the Godhra train fire while failing to include the Muslim lives taken in the ensuing riots. The BJP campaign successfully consolidated Gujarat's Hindu votes, earning Modi a landslide re-election victory. Meanwhile, foreign political states such as the U.S. and the U.K. imposed a visa ban and diplomatic boycott, respectively, that would remain in place for a decade until Modi's success in Indian national elections.

During the rest of his tenure as Chief Minister, Modi pivoted between reinventing his image as a business-friendly, anti-corruption leader representative of the *aam admi*, or alternatively as a strident Hindu nationalist with emotional ties to the common man. The BJP's campaign platform veered from its previous emphasis on Hindutva, though it retained allusions to Hindu nationalism.

² Martha Nussbaum is the Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago.

Modi's economic success, despite the sectarian challenges, helped launch his career on the national platform and led to his victory in 2014 as Prime Minister. His campaign platform of relating to the common man inspired hope that his term will ameliorate the conditions of "hundreds of millions of people in forgotten rural populations [who] struggle to survive in the face of a regulatory regime that doesn't understand their needs or protect their rights" (Bandow). Modi's election addressed a broader desire to remove entrenched elites from political power and restore economic growth, even at the expense of reversing India's secular and socialist founding principles.


Persistent Vestiges of Corrupt 'Socialism'

A Google search for 'corruption scandals in India' returns a seemingly never-ending list of incidents, year after year, across industries, and alarmingly replicable at all levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy. Whether it is a \$40 billion loss related to telecom licenses, a \$2.7 million bribe for defense contracts, allegations of US officials presenting "chests of cash" to Indian MPs, or a budget for the Commonwealth Games that ballooned from \$270 million to \$4.1 billion, the number of cases keeps climbing (BBC). According to Transparency International, India ranks abysmally at 94 of 176 in its 2012 International Corruption Perceptions Index and 19 of 28 in its Bribe Payers Index. This sentiment is echoed by domestic citizens—in a 2014 poll by *The Economist*, "96% of Indians said corruption was holding their country back, and 92% thought it has got worse in the past five years". Raghuram Rajan's words describe India's state of corruption succinctly—before becoming the head of the Reserve Bank of India, he warned, "too many people have got too rich based on their proximity to the government" (*The Economist*). For general citizens, wages in general have increased and been engulfed by an even sharper rise in inflation and cost of living.

Prime Minister Modi's election in 2014 provided hope for the eradication of the remnants of archaic legislation such as annual boiler checks dating back to the nineteenth century, as well as broader, systematic alterations to India's economic model. Whereas Modi's changes to policies may take time to materialize, his government has certainly taken steps toward cutting down the thick forest of tangled legislation weighing down growth. Sonal Varma, chief economist at Nomura, expressed her confidence in Modi's early actions, "it seems to me they have a grand plan. The changes so far are quite micro in nature, rather than macro, but if you put them all together, there is a method in the madness" (*Financial Times*, 2014). So far, Modi's government has eliminated over 1,000 regulatory laws, with some dating back to colonial

1 Nothing going up but the rent

Indian billionaires' wealth by source, as % of GDP



Sources: Forbes; IMF; *The Economist*

times, though these are only “small steps below a mountain” (Bandow). He also improved the national e-governance platform and incorporated a biometric identification system into welfare distribution to eliminate “leakage”, mirroring elements in his success in Gujarat. Even more significant changes include his reforms removing certification and minimal capital requirements to propel entrepreneurs and small businesses investment (Bandow). Despite these changes, both domestic and foreign critics have expressed frustration with the slowing momentum of policy changes and lack of large-scale actions.

On November 8, 2016, the Prime Minister released his ‘demonetization’ plan, sparking controversy among economists around the world who disputed the effectiveness of removing two of the largest-denominated currency notes from circulation (Dhume). This campaign resulted in long lines at banks, massive ATM-overhauls, and unintended repercussions on women and the elderly. However, the campaign also illustrated Modi’s unabashed shrewdness in combatting corruption in any way he can, regardless of transitional pains. While corruption still holds back national economic growth and slows businesses, Modi’s economic record in Gujarat inspires confidence in his ability to rehabilitate India.

Conclusion

Britain’s hasty decolonization of India left behind a thorough but weak institutional infrastructure. The framers of the new Indian democracy adopted Western liberal democracy without an institutional framework strong enough to ensure its own integrity. The absence of any safeguarding measures exposed the system to rampant corruption that leached economic growth and fostered widespread inequality. Social backlash manifested in a surge of political anti-secularism and the rise of the Hindu right, including the Bharatiya Janata Party and its allies, culminating in Narendra Modi’s election as Prime Minister in 2014. Thus, the Hindu revival in mainstream Indian politics was a social backlash against corrupted elites and economic inequality rather than a call for a Hindu majoritarian government.

Some conjecture that the popular acceptance of the Hindu right signals a breakdown of Indian secularism that shakes the core of the nation’s foundation. Sumit Ganguly believes that “the rise of a purely majoritarian democracy amid India’s cultural, religious, and ethnic heterogeneity” spells “the rise of illiberal democracy” though some would argue the opposite (12). Prime Minister Modi’s victory, though with only 8% of the Muslim vote, reflects less of a penchant for Hindutva than a rejection of embedded corruption and entrenched institutional failures (BBC). The BJP represents a cry for change, the same sentiment that sparked the Arab Spring, Barack Obama’s campaign, and many other shocks to political inertia. The BJP platform pivots from India’s longstanding commitments to secularism and socialism, but the party’s success does not translate to a populist desire for illiberal capitalism. President Pranab Mukherjee, Modi’s Congress Party colleague in Parliament, asserted that his nation is “‘substantially free’ from the globally witnessed menace of homegrown terrorism because citizens possess ‘ethnicity in mind and have faith in pluralism’”. He quoted India’s diversity and strong Constitution as champions of its secularism, adding that “secularism is part of the life”

for citizens of the subcontinent (Times of India). Despite the President's optimism, critics warn, "[The BJP's] nationalism—of a type familiar in Europe—slips easily into intolerance and bigotry" (Kesavan, 65).

India's relationship with secularism has been messy, at best. Appeals on sectarian divides have been utilized to consolidate political power and advance economic interests throughout the reigns of various controlling parties, Prime Ministers, and elites. To say there has been a single policy on secularism would be generous—instead, India's heterogeneity has been a political and economic tool for those in power. The political landscape contains a more nuanced reality than the binary 'religious' and 'nonreligious' divides. Each party has both benefited and clashed from ethnic conflicts—from the Congress Party's problematic relationship with the Sikh community both leading to and after Indira Gandhi's assassination by her Sikh body guard, to the BJP's early origins as an ardent, fringe Hindu nationalist groups like the RSS.

As the socialist machine unravels, Indian citizens and the rest of the world will be watching and hoping for an economic revitalization parallel to that of its northern neighbor, China. With a population of over one billion people, high literacy rates, industrial growth, abundant resources, and a strong government with ever-increasing political acumen, India has the potential to emerge as a global power. While Modi's overhaul of the political system has yet to be answered, he represents an India breaking the chains that have confined its growth for decades. The threat of illiberal democracy is still populist pressure and India's fate will depend on how it balances its social and economic transformation at this crucial turning point in India's history.


Appendix

Table 1: Comparative Growth Rates of Developing Economies Average Annual Rates 1960-1988
(Impact of License Raj)

Country	Growth Rate of Industrial Production		GDP	
	1960-1980	1980-1988	1960-1980	1980-1988
India	4.6	7.6	3.5	5.4
South Korea	15.2	12.6	8.8	10.1
Taiwan	12.8	7.2	9.6	7.4
Singapore	12.1	4.5	9.2	6.9
Pakistan	8.0	7.2	4.4	6.3
Thailand	10.3	6.6	7.4	6.5
Hong Kong	10.3	7.5	9.9	7.4
Indonesia	8.9	5.1	5.9	5.7

Source: Centre for Civil Society

Figure 1: Sector-Based Distribution of Corruption Perception



Source: Ernst & Young Survey

Figure 2: Political Cartoons



Father, I've again failed! Now could I drop out and enter politics, please?

Source: TIMES OF INDIA, 1980

“Father, I’ve again failed! Now could I drop out and enter politics, please?”



I am setting aside all my principles, ideals, loyalties, conscience and defecting only to serve my people and the nation!

Source: TIMES OF INDIA, 1979

“I am setting aside all my principles, ideals, loyalties, conscience and defecting only to serve my people and the nation!”

Figure 3: Indian Growth Summary 1990 to 2010

An Indian summary		
	1990	2010
Population, m	839	1,186
GDP, \$bn (2010 prices)	433	1,538
GDP per person, \$ (2010 prices)	503	1,265
GDP world ranking (current \$)	12	10
GDP world ranking (\$PPP*)	9	4
Exports, as % of GDP	6.9	21.5
Gross saving, as % of GDP	21.9	34.7
Adult literacy rate, %	48.2 [†]	68.3
New official poverty rate, % (Tendulkar method)	45.3 [‡]	32.2 [§]
Urban population, % of total	26 [†]	30
Share of world market capitalisation, %	0.41	2.88
Number of billionaires in <i>Forbes</i> rich list	1	49

Sources: Central Statistics Office; CEIC; C. Ravi; *Forbes*; Haver Analytics; IMF; UN; World Bank; *The Economist*

*Purchasing-power parity
[†]1991 [‡]1993-94
[§]2009-10 estimate

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IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES OF SHANGHAI'S GAOKAO REFORM: A POLICY ANALYSIS EXERCISE OF THE NATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION ENTRANCE EXAMINATION

JOHNSON HANTAO HUANG, JENNY XI CHEN, AND OSMAN SYED

Prepared for the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission

In September 2014, the State Council of China published the new reform guide for the College Entrance Examination (Gaokao) System. Shanghai Municipal Education Commission (SMEC) issued its own new reform and implementation plan in late September based on the national guidelines, sketching out an experimental blueprint for Gaokao reform in Shanghai that aims to alter the existing exam culture. The reform plan, which will influence the high school class graduating in 2017 and onwards, promises to profoundly reshape existing high school curriculum and teaching within Shanghai, as well as college admissions of universities nationwide. However, implementation of the reform plan faces profound institutional inertia in the educational system and internalized negative perceptions of the exam, as well as capacity deficits at various levels. This client-based Policy Analysis Exercise aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the purpose and potential implementation problems of the aforementioned policy, and ultimately policy recommendations to the SMEC before the reform plan takes effect.

Introduction

In September 2014, the State Council of China published the new reform guide for the College Entrance Examination¹ (Gaokao) System. Shanghai Municipal Education Commission (SMEC) issued its own new reform and implementation plan in late September based on the national

¹ State Council Guide (《国务院关于深化考试招生制度改革的实施意见》)

guidelines, sketching out an experimental blueprint for Gaokao reform in Shanghai that aims to alter the existing exam culture. The reform plan, which will influence the high school class graduating in 2017 and onwards, promises to profoundly reshape existing high school curriculum and teaching within Shanghai, and college admissions of universities nationwide by diversifying college admission criteria and exam structure. Standing at the forefront of socioeconomic and ideological reforms in China, the Shanghai model, though still pending adjustment, will serve as a testing ground for nationwide reforms set for implementation in 2020. Detailed analysis of the plan provides rich Policy Analysis Exercise materials for policy recommendations and outcome predictions of the top-down educational reforms led by local governments.

This client-based Policy Analysis Exercise aims to examine the Shanghai reform with a combination of stakeholder analysis, forward mapping, disconnection framework, and scenario analysis. Institutional inertia, rigid public opinions, and capacity deficits on different levels could lead to many conceivable challenges in the implementation process that call for a variety of insightful recommendations. Our key recommendations are as follows:

- Increasing the number of SMEC personnel overseeing the policy implementation
- Clarifying the criteria of the Comprehensive Quality Evaluation (CQE)
- Conducting a reliable survey of high schools across Shanghai and adjusting resource allocation accordingly in the face of the changes required by the reform
- Establishing an external admissions review board of SMEC members, gradually devolving this power to universities as well as a board of randomly-selected student and faculty volunteers
- Creating an Information Management System database containing student admissions materials with redundancies across the various involved agencies
- Increasing instructor compensation
- Removing “merit pay” schemes outside of “exemplary” schools
- Implementing a public feedback and corruption reporting system
- Establishing a rating system to grade schools on reform compliance and anti-corruption measures

Reform Under the Spotlight: Background, Mechanisms and Goals

The National Higher Education Entrance Examination (Gaokao)

The National Higher Education Entrance Examination (or NCEE, the National College Entrance Exam), commonly known as the Gaokao, has been the most important criterion for college admissions in China since its creation in 1952. Although the system was practically suspended during Cultural Revolution, it is still the primary avenue through which Chinese high school graduates

have entered higher education institutions throughout the years². The contemporary Gaokao system was finalized in the late 1970s as part of a wider package of reforms to reconfigure the country's crumbling social order after a decade of political turmoil, where the political background of candidates overrode academic performance as criteria for university admission. The Gaokao in contemporary times professes to return to a meritocratic ideal³ deeply rooted in China's 13-century long imperial examination tradition; a high-stakes, rigid but unbiased national exam through which candidates can succeed regardless of family pedigree⁴.

Supporters of the Gaokao often paint the test as a meritocratic institution that promotes social mobility, but recently, the Gaokao has come under fire for its emphasis on disciplined learning and standardization of exam questions to ensure fairness and equity while trying to select innovative individual talents best suited for college education. Although a student's Gaokao score is expected to faithfully reflect their academic performance in high school, the Gaokao system's overemphasis on exam scores has long been criticized for overlooking students' talents and interests. In an overly dominant exam culture, high school students in China are often pressured to study for the sole purpose of being tested on specific materials before they have the opportunity to explore personal interests. Educators, students, and parents have criticized the Gaokao's emphasis on rote memorization as being detrimental to critical thinking skills. In addition, both the examination itself and the college admissions process are sometimes subject to wider political influences and corruption, as well as the scourge of regional disparities in education capacity and arbitrary score inflations/deflations for athletic achievements, artistic prowess, etc. (although this has been trimmed back in recent years)⁵.

Gaokao reforms started as early as 1985, when the Ministry of Education gave Shanghai the autonomy to conduct an independent exam. Education policy in Shanghai is managed by the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission, which has significant discretion in setting Gaokao policies. Shanghai has had this authority since 1985; however, the central government's Ministry of Education has been slow to provide these privileges to other provinces and cities. Despite this discretion, Shanghai is not exempted from including the three subjects (Chinese, English, and mathematics) that are compulsory in all versions of the Gaokao.

Major reform efforts to improve the content and form of the test took place at the beginning of the new millennium and showed two tendencies targeting the aforementioned new developments in a changing educational landscape. 16 provinces and municipalities, including Beijing, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, have been granted the freedom to reform and design independent exam papers of the Gaokao under the provision of the Ministry of Education. These adjustments of exam structure have

2 Heidi Ross, Yimin Wang (2011), *Reforming the College Entrance Examination: Epicenter of Tension, Change, and Resistance*, in Tiedan Huang, Alexander W. Wiseman (ed.) *The Impact and Transformation of Education Policy in China* (International Perspectives on Education and Society, Volume 15) Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.210

3 Ross and Wang, 211

4 Ross and Wang, 211

5 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-07/02/content_17636393.htm

focused primarily on altering the exam-oriented high school curriculum to one that values the “all-round development” of students. However, these attempts have been unsuccessful and no substantial change has been realized in actual high school education. In September 2014, the State Council of China issued guidelines on future Gaokao reform that aim to fundamentally reconstruct the Gaokao system and college admission, and by extension, the nature of secondary and higher education.

The Experimental Reform in Shanghai

As the most populous city in China, Shanghai is at the forefront of Gaokao reform nationwide. A detailed plan released by the SEMC sketched out a timeline for Shanghai’s Gaokao reform: pilot reforms launched in 2014 will first alter high school curricula to prepare the incoming freshman class for the new Gaokao in 2017. Full-scale reform will be implemented in 2017; by 2020, Shanghai will have fully established a creative and contemporary Gaokao system tailored for the city’s specific needs—adjusting the exam’s content and improving the synergy between the High School Academic Proficiency Examination (Huikao)⁶ and the Higher Education Entrance Examination (Gaokao), and eventually establishing a transparent system of holistic academic evaluation with diversified admission opportunities and methods. With over 150,000 students enrolled in Shanghai’s high schools and almost 370,000 in undergraduate programs, Shanghai’s education system and the institutions it includes are enormous in enrollment and number. Thus, any attempt at overhauling the Gaokao will have to factor in the vast scale of the system in question.

This topic will shape the future of the Chinese economy’s sustainable development and Chinese society, as changes in the Gaokao plan will profoundly influence both high school education as well as the transitional stage from high school to college. With the diversification of the exam structure itself, and the diversification of college admission criteria, high school students in China will ideally be able to spend less time preparing for the Gaokao examination itself, and instead will discover fields they are personally interested in and gain more relevant knowledge in those fields to better prepare themselves for higher education.

Diversifying the exam structure: “3+1” to “3+3”

By moving from the “3+1+X” structure to “3+1” structure in 2011 (See Table 1), Shanghai’s earlier Gaokao reform removed the 30 points of integrated examination scores from the two day exam layout in order to lessen the burden on high school seniors to prepare for more subjects (See Table 2). The “3+3” structure to be implemented in 2017 reconfigures the entire exam framework. The reform touches on two areas that have always been left intact in past reform attempts, and have remained essential to the national Gaokao guidelines: the compulsory Chinese, Mathematics and English tests, and the separation of Arts and Science Curricula in high schools. The Science curriculum allows students to study physics, chemistry, and biology, while the Arts curriculum pigeonholes students into history, politics, and geography. This clear-cut separation of two curricula corresponds with the strategy used in universities admitting students into specific majors. The curriculum students

⁶ Figure 2 and Figure 3 are the illustration of the Huikao Structure

choose in high school functions as a prerequisite that makes students eligible to apply for a major in a university where their Gaokao score meets the university's minimum threshold. In Shanghai's new reform plan, English will now be "degraded" to a test of lesser status that candidates are eligible to take twice, the higher score of which will be counted towards a student's overall Gaokao score. Instead of basing students' choice of electives on the Arts versus Science dichotomy, students will gain the freedom to take three out of six subjects of their choice as electives, hence the "3+3" moniker.

The new policy will more comprehensively accommodate the personal academic interests of students into the traditionally rigid exam structure. Providing students with the freedom to choose elective subjects allows them to develop skills in the subjects they prefer, rather than struggling with subjects they have little interest in. This change is designed to push high school students to consider future major choices long before post-Gaokao college admission. High schools will have to re-configure faculty and teaching resources to provide a diversified curriculum to students as well as encourage personal development outside of exam preparation in the classroom. Students can specify three more flexible course requirements for different majors rather than the fixed Arts or Science curriculum requirement in the past. The requirements will grant academic departments in universities further autonomy to select students with talents or interests in particular disciplines.

Diversifying college admission criteria: Comprehensive Quality Evaluation System (CQE)

The Shanghai Gaokao Experimental reform proposes a bold complement to the university admission criteria, the "Comprehensive Quality Evaluation system" (CQE System, further elaborated on in this paper). Theoretically, the system will operate with a constantly updating evaluation document that reflects a student's personality, interests and extracurricular activities during high school. This would provide alternatives to the exam-score-only admission criteria, facilitating the selection of the most suitable candidates. In cases where the university needs to choose between candidates with similar Gaokao scores, the CQE document is able to represent students' academic skills and personality outside of the Gaokao.




Figure 1: The National University Entrance Examination System in China Post-Reform⁷




Figure 2: High School Academic Proficiency Examination (Huikao) Subject Structure⁸

⁷ This The National University Entrance Examination System in China Post-Reform illustrates the Gaokao system reform and processes that exam-takers go through

⁸ This High School Academic Proficiency Examination (Huikao) Subject Structure illustrates the subject that are counted into the Huikao dispersed across three years




Figure 3: Grade Distribution of High School Academic Proficiency Examination (Huikao)⁹

⁹ This figure illustrates the distributions of the different letter grades, which would be recorded in students' CQE portfolio and counted into the evaluation process

	Existing Policy	Experimental Policy
Exam structure	<p>"3+1+X" Structure, up until 2011</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chinese, Mathematics, English <i>150 points each (3)</i> Elective, one from Physics, Chemistry, Biology, History, Politics, Geography <i>150 points (1)</i> Integrated examination arts or science curriculum <i>30 points (X)</i> 	<p>"3+3" Structure,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chinese, Mathematics <i>150 points each</i> English, students can take the exam twice. The higher score is counted towards the total score. <i>150 points (3)</i> Three electives from Physics, Chemistry, Biology, History, Politics, Geography; <i>Letter graded, with an A+ counting as 70 points and an E as 40 points (3)</i>
	<p>"3+1" Structure, 2012 - present</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chinese, Mathematics, English <i>150 points each (3)</i> Elective, one from Physics, Chemistry, Biology, History, Politics, Geography <i>150 points (1)</i> 	
Admission criteria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gaokao score, determining factor Separation of Arts and Science curriculums: college majors requires candidates to have experience in one of the curriculums; Independent admission system* for certain key universities Two-tier exam system—spring and autumn (the former is considered less prestigious) If two candidates score the same overall (and the university must choose one over the other): they look into the candidate's scores in Chinese, followed by English, then Mathematics (arts curriculum); Mathematics, English, and finally Chinese (science curriculum) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gaokao score No separation of Arts and Science curriculums Record of "Comprehensive Quality Evaluation" (CQE), which records comprehensive assessment of a student's personality, interests, and extracurricular activities

Table 1: Current Policy and Reform Policy Comparison

Note: Many top Chinese universities are permitted to create tests independent from the Gaokao to select students with particular talents. Most of these universities ended up joining one of the three independent admission blocs to conduct such assessments: the Peking Union, the Tsinghua Union, or the Excellence Union. These institutions are at the top tier of Chinese universities. Only a modest portion of students can be admitted through this channel in most of these universities. Therefore this development in Chinese university admission is not representative of the admissions system as a whole.

Reform goals

Major areas of the experimental reform, as indicated in the SMEC implementation plan¹⁰ include changes in exam layout and the establishment of a “Comprehensive Quality Evaluation system” (综合素质评价体系 *zonghe suzhi pingjia tixi*) as well as its application in college admission. Through diversifying exam structure and admission criteria, the SMEC’s reform blueprint pins down the organization’s specific reform objectives to the following:

- Diverting the focus of high school education from exam preparation to personal development to prepare students for higher education
- Encouraging young talented individuals to discover their interests and having them recognized in college admission process
- Promoting an optimized system for universities to select the most suitable talents
- Eventually changing the culture of rote exam preparation

Holistic evaluation

The main aim of the experimental reform is a more holistic evaluation of high school students, which addresses the longstanding concerns of students, parents and educators that a Gaokao score alone cannot faithfully represent a student’s quality. The short exam period is not considered to be an accurate reflection of a student’s academic performance throughout high school, let alone the overall quality of a student.

A once-and-for-all exam score fails to do justice not only to students whose intellectual talents cannot be given credit in the existing exam structure, but also students who consistently excel in academics in high school but fail to do well during the Gaokao due to stress or other factors. By diversifying the exam’s structure and college admission criteria, the reform endeavors to take into consideration students’ individual talents and extracurricular achievements outside of their Gaokao exam score.

Individual development and talent selection

The new policies also deal with the tension between fairness and attempts at “all around development” experienced in unsuccessful past reforms that only pressed high schools and students to adopt a broader curriculum without altering the exam structure of the Gaokao. The overarching social objective of the exam (meritocratic equality of opportunity) conflicts with the educational objectives internal to the Gaokao: on the one hand, a nondiscriminatory exam is the major tool to promote greater equality and social mobility in China’s increasingly stratified society; on the other hand, the educational objective of the exam—to select the most suitable students for higher education—calls for fundamental reform that deemphasizes the test-taking ability of students in

10 Official full-document of the new policy of Gaokao in Shanghai: Shanghai Municipal Reform and Implementation Plan for College Entrance Examination <http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2319/node12344/u26ai40261.html>

deference to critical thinking skills and unique talents.

At the high school end of the reform, these new policies aim to provide students with more channels to be evaluated in the college admission process and more opportunities to experiment in different fields of study before they select their college majors. On the university end, the reform aims to assist schools in selecting students with talents they think are best fitted to each individual academic environment and university culture. However, to a large set of high school students who lack access to resources that cultivate abilities essential to these new criteria (more teachers, competent administrators, technology, etc.), the reformed Gaokao threatens opportunities for higher education, as these new criteria move away from the standardized, objective exam questions and resulting score.

Ideological education

The official reform guideline issued by the State Council lists eight more general goals at the social impact level: to improve on past reforms; to improve the quality of education; to improve social consciousness; to promote social mobility; to fit into the larger picture of modernization; to improve the maturity of students; and to develop the talents of young people that will “make historical contributions to Chinese society”. These objectives answer to all the existing general concerns of Gaokao expressed over the years but all fall into efforts to address the two aforementioned main tensions.

Implementation Problems

Stakeholder analysis: dissatisfaction, reluctance and support

Prevailing dissatisfactions prior to reform

The new plan involves a variety of stakeholders from high school students to college admission officers whose interests towards the existing system has motivated the new round of reform. As illustrated in Table 2, the primacy of the exam as the only standard of college admission has long been a factor in the dissatisfaction experienced by almost all stakeholders. Students, parents, teachers and administrators in high schools and colleges are all part of the deeply rooted exam culture, which places success in the Gaokao above any other student qualities; students are willing to sacrifice other personal interests outside of academics for more time spent preparing for the exam, especially for subjects tested on the Gaokao that do not overlap with their academic interests or talents.

High school teachers discourage students’ engagement in any activities that would not be helpful in bringing up their overall Gaokao score, advising students to choose easier subjects on the Gaokao and spend more time on their “weaker” subjects. Recent changes that rolled back past policies of adding points on the basis of athletic or artistic prowess have only exacerbated this problem¹¹. College educators and administrators have stated that although the Gaokao score is an incomprehensive indicator of students’ actual ability, they have to rely on and make use of the existing Gaokao system for the time being as there are no better alternatives to select candidates.

¹¹ <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/09/opinion/china-education-opinion/>

Although the reform goal seems to be addressing issues that greatly overlap with these dissatisfactions in general, stakeholder perceptions of the new policies do not look overly optimistic.

Students and parents: reluctance to be the “lab rat” (Xiaobaishu)

Many students and their parents might resist change. The reform has pushed high school students graduating in 2017 and their academic future to the frontline of Gaokao reform. As it remains a high stakes exam, the reformed Gaokao puts these students, and by extension their parents, into an unfamiliar situation where educators, administrators, students, and admission officers are all facing a drastically reformed exam and a corresponding admission criteria. Usually, change in exam structure incurs unpredictable change in materials covered by the exam, making the first ever exam much harder to prepare than an exam in place for more than three years. Although there has been long term dissatisfaction towards Gaokao and the rigid exam culture it has imposed on society, most students would still prefer an exam which has been tested and therefore carefully regulated to a completely new exam. However, there may still be a substantial number of students who are likely to support the use of the reformed and more flexible new exam system, considering it a better alternative worth experimenting with as opposed the old system, with which they have expressed the greatest recorded dissatisfaction¹².

Although students and parents do not have much of a choice as the Gaokao remains the only channel to higher education in mainland China, the aforementioned reluctance might motivate them to approach the reform negatively through overturning wider objectives of the reform to obtain higher exam scores. For example, students and parents have more incentives to choose elective subjects that appear to be “easy” in order to score well instead of the ones they are genuinely interested in. Similarly, they might also choose subjects according to the old science and arts curriculum to avoid the risk of being excluded from a prestigious college major. As specific regulations on the CQE system are still under review, parents may be motivated to pay bribes to school officials for a better CQE assessment in order to secure their children’s success in college admission.

Teachers and high school administrators: practical challenges

High schools will face fundamental challenges in resources and curricula in order to accommodate changes in the Gaokao system. As the curriculum now provides more than twenty combinations of subjects, the conventional model of Chinese classes, where teachers come into fixed classrooms to teach fixed groups of students, will no longer be valid. Alternatively, high schools will need to invest large amounts of resources in restructuring class models and arranging students to go to different classrooms to take classes of their choice. Considering the size of the student body in Chinese high schools, the incurred transactional cost of the reform appears to be extremely high even for resource-abundant high schools as almost all operating procedures in high schools will have to be

12 Cockain, Alex. "STUDENTS' AMBIVALENCE TOWARD THEIR EXPERIENCES IN SECONDARY EDUCATION: VIEWS FROM A GROUP OF YOUNG CHINESE STUDYING ON AN INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION PROGRAM IN BEIJING." *The China Journal* No. 65 (2011): 101-18. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2015.

reformed. Teachers in particular have to adjust to the new “walking class” model of teaching and will be teaching far more students than they are used to. Similar to students, teachers and administrators too cannot explicitly reject the mandated reforms. However, high schools might restrict students’ choice of subjects to the several most common combinations and retain the old model of classes due to resource constraints.

	Actors	Motivation	Beliefs About the Current Gaokao system
High School	High School Students	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Get into elite universities • Get good Gaokao scores • Accommodate personal interests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gaokao score is not a comprehensive measurement of intellectual skills and talents but is essential to college admission • Personal interest can be sacrificed to achieve better grades in high school or enrollment into a major with good job prospects in college admission • Enrollment into a top-tier university sometimes is more important than enrollment into a good major with job prospects at a less prestigious university • Family support is important
	Students' parents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Help students to get into good universities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gaokao score is not a thorough measurement, but students should do whatever it takes to score well • Enrollment into a prestigious university or a promising major can promise the students a stable income in the future
High School	Teachers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facilitate students to get into good universities • Help top students to get into prestigious top universities • Facilitate students to get high Gaokao score • High performing students' contribute to teachers' performance evaluations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gaokao score is not a comprehensive measurement of students' academic and intellectual performance and talents but is fair enough. • It is the teacher's job to help students succeed in the exam regardless of their other talents • Enrollment in either a prestigious university or a major with good job prospects can lead to better outcomes for students
	Administrators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raise students' college enrollment rate • Increase admissions of their students to prestigious universities • Raise average Gaokao score of their students 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High college enrollment rate increases school's reputation • Students enrolled at top universities serve as advertisements for the school
Universities	Professors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Teach students with talents that match their discipline • Teach motivated students 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gaokao score is not a faithful representation of students' intellectual skills and homogenizes students with drastically different personalities and interests • High school students should discover their interests and talents and choose areas of study accordingly
	Admission officers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Select students that are best suited to their university in terms of talents and interests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gaokao score is not a comprehensive measurement but is the only available measure of a student's ability

Table 2: Stakeholders' Pressures and Motivations Behind the Current Reforms

University educators and administration: potential support

Admissions directors and other university personnel, in line with current and past initiatives, will most likely support the movement towards a more international model of education as part of wider goals in this arena¹³.

Scenario analysis - disconnection framework

In a 2012 analysis of Chinese educational reforms, Walker and Qian use what they term the “disconnection framework” to dissect several past attempts at reform implementation. The disconnection framework refers to the lack of clear linkages between the various goals and tools of educational policies and has been used in the past to analyze Hong Kong’s school system and the IB system. Applying this framework to Shanghai’s reforms will allow us to demonstrate some key weaknesses of the reform as it stands while also providing some specific recommendations. We identified five major categories of disconnection in Walker and Qian important to the reform:

- Instrumental disconnection: disconnection between the reform design and the realities of learning and teaching in leading schools.
- Intellectual disconnection: disconnection between purpose, thrust, and content both within and between different reforms. This type of disconnection has at least two faces—lack of coherence and lack of consistency. Coherence relates to whether different reforms are explicitly linked to one another. Consistency refers to the uniformity of the messages conveyed by individual reforms and the extent to which they are open to interpretation by the various actors involved.
- Cultural disconnection: disconnection between what the reforms demand and the cultural realities of teaching in and leading schools. It differs from instrumental disconnection in that it focuses on values and ingrained understanding and behavior rather than the more overt structural features of schools.
- Political disconnection: disconnections between the reforms, broader governance and political structures, and the established order underpinning life in the Chinese education system. It also refers to disagreement over the political rationale and ideology behind the reforms. Political disconnection also occurs at the micro-level within the school.
- Communicative disconnection: deficiencies in how reforms and their outcomes are explained, communicated, and sold within and outside the education community.

Instrumental Disconnection

Current reforms demand the implementation of the “walking class” system, where students rotate between classrooms and are given a greater degree of flexibility in selecting courses. Street-level bureaucrats—in this case, teachers—may exhibit the type of tokenism described in Weimar and Vining. In this situation, the merit-pay system may actually help enforce compliance. Assigning

13 Levin, Benjamin. "Knowledge Mobilisation and Education Policy Making in China." *The Impact of Research in Education: An International Perspective*.

specific merit incentives as part of the reform package may help foster adoption, or alternatively, altering the initial focus of the policy to only target high-performing “exemplary schools” where instructors are already treated well may help as well. Building in a training period so that teachers can adapt to the new system is another potential adoption incentive, although the logistics of this solution are difficult and vary from school to school. The SMEC should provide instructors with appropriate training and not leave them high and dry when it comes to implementation, well worth the additional expense.

Intellectual Disconnection

Coherence and consistency are not major issues with Shanghai’s reforms, with the exception of two nebulous goals: “political/ideological education” and “strengthening social consciousness.” The SMEC’s policy document lays these out as part of the CQE, but does little in the way of connecting the CQE and these goals. Subjectivity may play a significant role in these two criteria. These goals also may conflict with the SMEC’s stated goals of increasing social mobility and modernizing China as a whole. A potential scenario where this plays out problematically follows. If a student’s political leanings are not in line with those of his or her CQE evaluator, what options are available to the student? Social mobility is also compromised by these two criteria, as political leanings are heavily influenced by socioeconomic factors. These criteria potentially put poor migrant students at an even greater disadvantage relative to their peers, as they may be economically unable to perform the community service that serves as one of the criteria for “social consciousness.” As such, redundancies should be built into the CQE system along the lines of the above suggestions concerning this issue to prevent delegating too much discretion to individual actors.

Cultural Disconnection

Chancellor Yu described a cultural disconnection during our interview—the fact that the Chinese educational system is enormous and as such, simple numbers like the Gaokao score are seen as a more suitable way to gauge a student’s abilities than the complementary methods proposed by the reform. Resolving this disconnection is not possible through direct intervention or changes to the policy. The only solution is to allow the reforms to play out and allow stakeholders to witness improved outcomes, thus changing the cultural attitude surrounding the Gaokao.

Forward mapping (top-down analysis)

The forward mapping model of implementation analysis helps to generate insightful observations of the reform policy that allow us to discover potential implementation problems within the reform plan. SMEC, the major actor in the reform, bears two parts of responsibilities: devising policies and local decrees for implementation, and supervising the adoption of the reform in both high schools and universities. The SMEC relies on the Shanghai Municipal Education Examinations Authority (SMEEA) to implement the reform in the content of the Gaokao exam and the college admission process. Although independent from SMEC, the SMEEA is still a governmental agency expected to implement the technical aspects of educational policies regarding Gaokao as an exam and college admissions, and has very clear boundaries to its duties.

The SMEC has a number of tools available to ensure compliance from high school administrators and college admission officials, ranging from institutional pressure, threats of dismissal, and revoking accreditation. On the non-coercive (i.e. incentive) side, administrators are incentivized to implement the reforms to ensure good admissions outcomes for their pupils, while admissions departments desire the prestige that comes with the label of a “progressive admissions policy.”

The reform package itself targets mainly high schools, as the SMEC considers universities to be more set in their ways and not under the SMEC’s absolute authority. Below this level, the control that the SMEC wields over the implementation process breaks down. There is no direct way for the SMEC to guarantee that students adjust to the new policies, nor can they directly control the actions of parents who prefer the old system. Universities outside of Shanghai may not adopt the progressive admissions policy, which discourages students from applying to these institutions and thus limits the reform’s effects only to schools in the city. Additionally, pushback from third-party educational services—a highly influential bloc—is almost inevitable, as their business models depend on preparing students for the old iteration of the Gaokao exam. In some cases, schoolteachers have been found to leave out large portions of Gaokao-based materials from class time in an effort to push students into their own after-hours prep programs, supplementing their incomes¹⁴.

An additional enormous problem in implementing the reforms is their lack of clarity. In a March 2015 interview, Chancellor Yu Lizhong described the SMEC’s current stance as more “a set of guidelines than a concrete set of new policies.”¹⁵ Incremental change is the initial objective, while the overall aim is to move the focus away from small adjustments to the exam and ultimately changing the overall culture of secondary and higher education. One of the SMEC’s first concrete steps to this end is boosting the prestige of the spring term Gaokao, traditionally considered to attract lower-quality applicants and fewer students. By allowing currently enrolled high school students to take the spring Gaokao, the SMEC aims to equalize the status of the spring and autumn exams, which creates a more level playing field while also reducing the enormous pressure on students the two-tier Gaokao system produces. However, it is still necessary for the reforms to be clarified, especially in the area of the Comprehensive Character Evaluation, as unclear directives inevitably lead to unclear results.

The extensive projected time frame of the reforms is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the SMEC is afforded a longer period to adjust and implement the reforms, as well as more time to deal with problems that may emerge. On the other hand, the policies will take a long time to bear fruit, which provides a longer time frame for critics to attack the policy as ineffective.

The transformation in examination content would result in some significant changes in high school education; it is one of the main targets of the reform, because universities are more set in their ways and the strengths and resources they offer. The original purpose of the new policy is to expose high school students to different academic areas, providing a liberal arts and science focused education. Moreover, the policy aims to help them find the subjects that they are truly interested in and encourage them to further develop these interests in university; this promotes an interest

14 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/world/asia/in-china-schools-a-culture-of-bribery-spreads.html?_r=0

15 Yu, Lizhong. Personal Interview. Mar. 2nd, 2015.

driven selection of undergraduate majors, which eventually leads to better academic and career development. By giving students more leeway to select their area of specialization, the SMEC aims to create a new class of civil servants and professionals that are passionate about their work. However, the actual implementation of this new policy faces many difficulties and challenges, some of which might harm its actual objectives. After interviews with headmasters of several major senior high schools in Shanghai as well as some randomly selected current high school students and parents, our research team has summarized three major potential problems of implementation.

Unequal resources distribution

A report¹⁶ in Wenhui News interviewed high school freshmen graduating in 2017 from Jianping High School. Theoretically, the ongoing reform allows students to choose their electives from more than 20 combinations of elective courses. Traditional Chinese high schools are facing severe challenges in accommodating policy changes into pedagogical practice. Normally, a Chinese high school would allocate its faculty resources directly to a number of classes; each of which has a fixed schedule, amount of students and classroom location. Students' newly gained freedom to choose elective courses outside of Chinese, Mathematics and English leaves high schools with two options: either to completely redesign and reconfigure the way high school teaching is set up—adopting the Western model where students move between classrooms while there are still mandatory courses to be taught—or maintaining the old model of grouping students with the same course intent into fixed classes¹⁷.

The first option no doubt incurs tremendous transactional cost. Administration at Jianping High School had an extremely hard time planning the schedule for the entire school in order to provide all students the combination of courses they choose while making sure every student would not scheduling conflicts with mandatory classes. Both students and faculty seem to be very confused at the beginning of the semester when trying to figure out where classes are held. Faculty members now have triple the amount of classes to teach, which according to a teacher interviewed in the Wenhui report, makes it impossible for her to focus on teaching, get to know her students and even to collect homework. Jianping has it better. As one of the better schools in Shanghai, they have the resources to fully implement the reform in changing class structures.

To many of the smaller schools, the second option would seem much more practical. However, schools facing a lack of deployable resources to accommodate all students' needs have to make the decision of what combination of classes will be available based on the school's assessment of how hard the corresponding Gaokao exam is likely to be. In the implementation process of the reform, diversification of exam structure will most likely boost the quality of teaching in high schools with enough resources. In those without sufficient resources, the reform's positive impacts are likely to

16 http://whb.news365.com.cn/whjy/201503/t20150320_1770162.html

17 Peng, Zhang. "上海高中课堂，走班真的来了" 上海高中课堂，走班真的来了
Wenhui News, 20 Mar. 2015. Web. 22 Apr. 2015.

be minimal.

Students' choice of subjects remain exam-oriented. The first two potential problems are closely connected: many students may choose the subjects that have relatively easier tests, instead of their subjects of interest in order to receive better grades that count into the total Gaokao score, which deviates from the original purpose of the experimental policy. It is also one of the major causes of the unequal distributions of academic resources, because the biased subject selections would result in harmful changes to the composition of academic departments at high schools. For example, if chemistry is considered to be a comparatively easy examination, demand for that course will rise in high schools, affecting funding allocation for other departments. This subsequently subverts the reform's intent of creating not only more well-rounded students, but also students who can further develop their interested subjects at university.




Figure 4: Scenario Analysis: High Schools

Unclear definition and maneuverability of the proposed Comprehensive Quality Evaluation system. The third main problem, that of the CQE, is not so easily addressed. Criteria for this assessment have not been yet fully articulated, and the SMEC's own documents do not delve into the specifics. To some, this is an intentional move to allow universities more autonomy in selecting their students; but to others, the movement away from a quantitative assessment to a qualitative model is fundamentally against the meritocratic intent of the Gaokao, which potentially creates unfairness and corruption problems. Ideally, the content of the CQE will be compiled fairly and impartially by high schools and sent to universities for review, but the nature of this content has not been set. The text of the SMEC's reform roadmap vaguely describes "Chinese traditional culture accomplishments," and "moral and political character" as essential elements, but does not clarify further. The incentive for high schools to conduct this process impartially is significant, as their reputation is at stake if a pattern of inaccurate reporting emerges.

Nonetheless, the problem of corruption cannot be totally ignored. As universities are given

more discretion in addition to the monopoly they already have, the potential for corruption will rise. Students from wealthier or strong governmental family backgrounds may use their money and political power to unduly influence admissions decisions or use connections (*guanxi*) with university administrator, potentially creating the possibility for unfair evaluation (*zhaogu*) as the SMEC does not seek to reform the opaque nature of admissions deliberations. According to the Deputy Director of the SMEC, “there are all kinds of techniques that universities can design to avoid these potential problems and the policy makers know these techniques well. The real difficulty is not the techniques; it is whether the policy makers intentionally leave a flaw in the policy to benefit him/herself, and how the implementation takes place under his/her management and control.” Compliance will be difficult to ensure in this regard. The qualitative nature of the CQE assessment makes it easier to justify questionable admissions, but a movement towards more transparent admissions may counteract this; as such, we encourage movement towards this type of transparency.

Insufficient personnel allocation from the SMEC Our interview with a senior official at the SMEC revealed some larger structural issues within the organization and the policy. While the policy itself seems to have been drafted by an expert panel (as other interviewees informed us), the implementation at the SMEC level has been left to a skeleton crew. Currently, fewer than ten members of the SMEC are responsible for implementing the policy, which may lessen the effectiveness of what may be an otherwise sound plan.

The policy’s flexibility here becomes a liability, as there is not sufficient infrastructure for review and implementation monitoring/evaluation. As a small set of actors, the SMEC personnel left in charge may be too powerful, and if changes are subject to the whims of two or three highly-placed individuals, the policy may become inconsistent with its initial vision and statement of purpose. Lack of redundancy and accountability in this area is a serious problem. This is a worst-case scenario, but not beyond the imagination. It is necessary to increase the number of personnel dedicated to overseeing and implementing the reforms in this area.

According to our interview with Chancellor Yu, there are always enough techniques for anti-corruption and ensure the fairness; the real problem is “holes” that provide opportunities for corruption are usually left intentionally by policymakers. If power is left in the hands of only a few highly-placed officials, corruption is more likely but still not certain to occur. To mitigate this possibility, the SMEC must increase their personnel.

Policy Recommendations

The Comprehensive Quality Evaluation (CQE) system

The two ends of the CQE have potential problems, especially in ensuring the fair evaluation of candidates and anti-corruption measures. Nevertheless, it is a paradox. Mandating a rotating system of admissions officers may prevent corruption, as people seeking to pay rents may not be able to get into contact with the figures of influence they seek to bribe; yet, this may adversely affect the consistency of admissions decisions, as rotating officers may not be fully familiar with institutional culture and the criteria desired for candidates. These admissions officers should be made aware of CQE requirements, enabling them to identify corrupt discrepancies between the CQE’s description

of the applicant and the reality of the situation at hand. A robust and accountable interview process is absolutely necessary, and thus the SMEC should include this requirement.

Admission officers should be cautiously selected

Half of the admission officers should be picked from the university admission office who are experienced enough to maintain both the consistency and the university culture in its admission policy; moreover, at least one university professor that is not usually on the university's admissions board should join the team, in order to diversify the perspectives and increase the credibility of these boards. The other half of the admission personnel should be randomly selected from a pool of qualified admission staff coming from all parts of the city, via computerized random selection. In this regard, the admissions decision makers are different each year and difficult to predict and track, which enhances not only the fairness of the admissions, but also maintains institutional standards for admission.

Alternatively, a more collaborative solution to the CQE issue can be attained through close cooperation with universities. Consulting representatives of all admissions offices that the reform will affect to create a unified, citywide policy for the role of the CQE would make admissions decisions more transparent. The CQE and interview process should be considered almost distinct entities, where discretion in interview content is allocated mainly to admissions officers and the CQE considered separately.

Lessons can be learned from other models of university admissions; for instance, according to Zhengji Wang, Deputy Director of Chinese Admissions of NYU Shanghai—the first American university in Mainland China—using “an external supervision committee in New York to review admissions decisions and prevent corruption is very effective.”¹⁸ Despite the fact that it is not possible for Chinese universities to have a completely separated supervising committee without internal administrators and staff at this stage, implementing a similar review board system across all universities may help minimize corruption in the admissions process. Making the standard admissions procedures known publicly—perhaps published through a central SMEC publically accessible database and advertising it through the official Shanghai government website—would introduce a greater deal of accountability and allow students, administrators, and parents to help identify inappropriate or corrupt behavior. This database would potentially include the names of students who were successfully admitted, assuming they consent, allowing both the media and the general public to help police the system; this is currently one of the most effective methods of anti-corruption supervision in China. While privacy is a concern in this type of system, the pendulum of anti-corruption and privacy in China swings firmly in the direction of anti-corruption.


Nevertheless, the ultimate goal of the supervision aspect of the our solutions to the potential corruption problems of the CQE System is to establish an effective internal supervising committee, but it would take time, experiments and go through a certain procedure that our PAE team has designed, as the following flowchart shows.

¹⁸ Wang, Zhengji. Personal Interview. Mar. 2nd, 2015.

Our Recommendation for this Issue

Stage 1

The establishment of a SMEC CQE Evaluation Committee would take up a large amount of government resources; during our interview with the deputy director, we discovered that the SMEC's personnel and resources are not sufficient for this to permanent since the Higher Education Division's Gaokao Policy core team has no more than ten members. If the newly established SMEC CQE Evaluation Committee members are fixed over a number of years, it would be difficult to ensure that they are scrupulously fair as well. Moreover, this committee would be less familiar with each university's admission criteria and their unique models of nurturing talent. Hence, our team believes that it would be a good idea to gradually devolve the SMEC committee's power; the ideal structure of this initial supervisory committee is having a sub-committee from the local Education Commission of each district, in charge of their respective districts; this would add to the system's accountability, avoiding potential corruption problems and setting a precedent of accountability from the very beginning.



Stage 2

The role of SMEC committee switches to a supervisory role, which gradually grants institutions full rights to select students. This solution mitigates the policy paradox between maximizing the autonomy of universities while ensuring fairness in selection; this step ensures a smooth transition of the SMEC and its sub-committee's role from a fully involved role to a supervisory role, which conforms to the policy reform guidelines issued by the State Council.

Stage 3

The student and faculty supervision committee takes over supervising responsibilities; students and faculty voluntarily sign up for positions on the board, filled through random selection by the SMEC before the admissions process starts, reporting internally to the SMEC committee. This new supervising System (监督机制 Jiandu Jizhi) would not only enhance the efficiency of the CQE evaluation and admissions process, but also make the system more sustainable over time as the SMEC reduces the amount of resources dedicated to the process. Moreover, since Chinese universities have an administrative structure where the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committee is separated from university leadership, the CCP division could also join the supervising system to ensure the fairness of the CQE system in the realm of ideological politics.

In short, the SMEC should at first take an aggressive and highly involved role in the selection committee process, eventually devolving this role to representatives from the district's Education Commission, university officials, and university CCP representatives.

Resource allocation

As discussed above, schools without sufficient resources to implement the policy will most likely not see much positive impact and be negatively affected. As a result, we recommend that the SMEC conduct a survey/study of resource allocation for secondary schools across the city before the reforms are fully rolled out. Should certain schools be found to have insufficient resources to implement the reforms, their personnel and resource budgets should be increased accordingly. The details of this survey would be highly provisional, but it is necessary that school's self-reported needs are audited in order to prevent the reform from becoming too costly. Additionally, this resource allocation will level the playing field to some degree and potentially lead to overall better educational outcomes across the board in the city. Creating greater equality of opportunity in high schools may also allay fears about the decay of the Gaokao as an ostensibly meritocratic process. The distinction between "exemplary schools," the title applied to elite schools by the SMEC, and ordinary schools is important in this particular area, as resource allocation differs across these designations in the current system.

Potential multi-level corruption

Potential participants in corrupt activity can be broadly categorized as government officials at different levels, ultra-wealthy individuals, members of the middle class, and education domain insiders; there are many different levels of people from different backgrounds in this way. The SEMC and its Sub-Committee, High School and College Leadership, and instructors are all also potentially

susceptible to graft. Hence, our team analyzes them specifically and respectively, in order to make it easier for our clients and other readers to understand our policy recommendations in latter section.

SMEC and Local-level Subcommittee Corruption

Since the SMEC has been the policy maker and one of the main supervisors of Shanghai's Gaokao system for more than fifteen years, its officials have may receive bribes and submit to pressure for "special considerations" by friends and higher level government officials. Before the reform in 2014, the SMEC and its sub-committee were criticized for not only providing fake and illegal "special considerations" and "extra bonus credits" to specific students from powerful or wealthy family backgrounds, but also their lack of supervisory power over university admissions decisions. However, our team's interviews with Chancellor Yu Lizhong shows that the vast majority of avoidable corruptions are through high school and college leadership, mainly because they are a set of main stakeholders and policy implementers in admissions and in decision-making regarding "extra bonus credits."¹⁹

Moreover, Chancellor Yu informed our team that many instances of corruption in the SMEC or at higher levels are difficult to detect because not all actions are necessarily cash-to-cash trades; some corruption takes the form of trading for long-term political *guanxi* maintaining and long-term potential mutual benefit in lieu of one-time exchanges. In a hypothetical example, the Director of A Committee would help the son of the Director of B Committee get 10 extra credits in the CQE or Gaokao this year; in exchange, some time in the future, the Director of B Committee will help the daughter of the Director of A Committee get a well-paid job in a leading state-owned corporation under his administration, and vice versa. Furthermore, some instances of unfair and/or illegal treatment result from Chinese cultural traditions of "face" (面子 *mianzi*), which refers to the connections and relations between people that make refusing requests difficult and embarrassing in a social context.

High School and College Leadership Corruption

As mentioned previously, high school and college leadership are the main stakeholders and policy implementers in admissions materials collection and decision-making, respectively. On the high school end, leaderships might be called on by their supervisors—for instance, executives of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission or even higher level administrators—which puts pressure on them to provide some special regards to specific students, because of the aforementioned mutual benefits. Given the political structure of China, leadership in high schools and colleges are part of the political system; hence, it is very difficult for them to turn down their requests in consideration of their future career. High school leadership, for instance, add such students' names onto the honors list even after the list has been finalized to help them get extra credits. Similarly, in colleges, when leaders from upper administration request special consideration, they have to add several students' names in the admitted students list even if it has already been finalized.

¹⁹ Yu, Lizhong. Personal Interview. Mar. 2nd, 2015.

Since there might not be direct one-time money-power exchange, it is not an easy task to establish a simple supervisory committee. The key problem is the Chinese college and high school leaderships' involvement with the political system; which despite our PAE team's desire to address this, the SMEC's capacity is far from enough ameliorating this. Hence, a simple supervisory system (Jiandu Jizhi) might not be effective enough. Thus, there are two courses of action that are important for the prevention of corruption: publicizing results and a computer-based systematic entry system. Further details and policy recommendations will be explained in the latter section.

Instructor corruption

Instructors are the stakeholders that directly connect with students and submit instructor evaluations that are part of the CQE system. In order to discourage instructors from neglecting portions of the curriculum to boost cram school sign-ups, wages for instructors should be increased across the board. The average high school teacher in Shanghai makes roughly 5,000 RMB per month, which coupled with Shanghai's rapidly rising cost of living, makes it difficult for teachers to survive on their government salaries. Increasing salaries to reflect the cost of living will discourage instructor corruption in all its forms, from cram school sideline businesses to outright bribery. Additionally, the merit pay system currently in place could be removed at least outside of "exemplary schools," as it contributes to the cycle of low-performing schools attracting low-quality instructors, creating a linkage between corruption and resource allocation²⁰.

Our Recommendations for Multi-Level Corruption

According to official document, SMEC will establish a high school students' comprehensive quality assessment information management system (referred to as the Information Management System or IMS after this point), containing the high school records of students, objective data, and other CQE data in order to objectively record student performance. Below, we provide two sets of recommendations to prevent corruption in the documentation process, with positive effects spilling over into other areas as well:

Checklist One

- *Ensuring a fair, detailed, and realistic appraisal of student performance* Teachers should monitor students to create an objective record of specific extra-curricular activities and enter this information into the IMS. High schools participating in the IMS should record students' military training, participation in civil defense activities, personal honors, discipline violations, curriculum performance, and research activities. Students' basic information, high school proficiency test scores, "National Student Physical Health Standard" test composite scores, and volunteer service (community service) should also be recorded.
- *Supervising selection* Students should create a profile with a writing sample and basic information about themselves, linked to the assessment inputted by their instructors.

20 Walker, Allan, and Haiyan Qian. "Reform Disconnection in China." *Peabody Journal of Education* 87.2 (2012): 162-77. Web.

Additionally, they should include whatever activities, especially research or papers they consider to be exemplary of their own work, in this self-created profile.

- *Public review* All information should be recorded in the IMS. Students should be able to view their self-made profiles without being impeded. All edits to the records should be logged and linked to unique login credentials for each IMS participant, creating an accountable paper trail.
- *Standardized format* The IMS should automatically compile all entered data for students during the application process. Students should sign and verify their records, as should their administrators and head instructor, before the materials are sent to the universities they are applying to in a sealed envelope to prevent tampering.

Checklist Two

- Establish a transparent information record and management system. Instructors should tutor students to record their academic achievements, extra-curricular activities and experience honestly and accurately in the CQE IMS. Moreover, all departments and government administrations that are related to students' extra-curricular activities—namely the Shanghai Municipal Civilization Office, Shanghai Municipal Science and Technology Commission, Shanghai Municipal Sports Bureau—should liaise with each other and ensure the information and programs provided to students from different schools are identical and that evaluation standards are unified. This would discourage both individual corruption and group (school-wide) corruption effectively, but would also provide students more opportunities for volunteer service, (community service), sports, arts, and technology activities (extra-curricular), and research opportunities, in order to support experiential learning outside the classroom. Also, SMEEA, SMEC and district sub-committees should all have separate, redundant IMS databases in order to discover potential discrepancies and prevent unfair tampering with the database. Additionally, instructors and high school administrators should guide their students through the process of collecting their self-submitted IMS materials across all four years of school in order to avoid a last-minute stressful scramble.
- Establish an auditing system. Relevant social agencies may provide comprehensive quality assessment information, potentially involving shequ 社区 neighbourhood organizations. There should be the establishment of a mandating that IMS entries for competitions and honors projects be reviewed by the relevant administrative departments; schools, social agencies, county and municipal departments responsible at multiple levels of the process incorporates an additional layer of redundancy.
- Establish a rating system to grade schools on their compliance with reforms. This would be run by the SMEC as an additional layer of oversight in concert with student committees, further discouraging corruption. Schools' grades would be made publically available, adding a layer of accountability to the process.
- The establishment of a public complaints system. Avenues to report potential corruption

or half-hearted compliance with the reforms must be put in place. Additionally, feedback on the reforms themselves will be of great value to the SMEC as it moves forward, so this system is necessary to the reform's success. Universities that find they have been provided with false information should report complaints to the SMEC Student Affairs Office. Should high school and community agencies report a complaint, the SMEC should act to lower the school's rating or take action against whatever individuals were responsible once the complaint is verified.

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WATER FLOWS FROM INDIA, PAKISTAN DRAWS BLOOD

AMY WANG

Introduction

In September 2016, a series of cross-border skirmishes in Kashmir raised an uproar for retaliation against Pakistan from Indian civilians. The escalation of attacks and threat of nuclear war between the neighboring states over Kashmir mark a growing trend toward violence over one resource: water. Demand for fresh water increases and supply decreases; in turn, upstream India has incentive to hoard water and downstream Pakistan becomes desperate to attain fresh water. Defiant rhetoric from both sides pointedly addresses the tension. The slogan touted by the Pakistani militant group serves as prime example: “Water must flow or else blood will flow”¹. The rhetoric was met with a fiery response from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi after a terrorist attack on India-controlled Uri that killed 18 Indian soldiers. Modi announced the suspension of water allocation talks between India and Pakistan, saying, “Blood and water cannot flow at the same time,”² said Modi, as he announced the suspension of water allocation talks between India and Pakistan. Water scarcity, used as a diplomatic weapon, is the brutal consequence of power and politics. Historic publications and news coverage frame the Kashmiri conflict as a geopolitical issue exacerbated by a dissident people. However, intermittent clashes in Kashmir over the last fifty years shed light on a larger political hand at play. It is the control and usage of water in the Indus River Basin that motivates the recurrent violence in Kashmir today.

This paper focuses specifically on the implications of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), the predominant water allocation agreement signed in 1960 on political action in the region. Accredited as one of the “world’s most lopsided and inequitable water pact[s],” the Indus Waters Treaty grants over 80 percent of total waters in the Indus system to Pakistan. Yet, accounting for Pakistan’s geographical position, the Treaty also appears to give India a disproportionate amount of power. According to former World Bank Senior Water Expert, John Briscoe, the Treaty lays a “very uneven playing field. The regional hegemon is the upper riparian and has all the cards in its hands.”³ This dichotomy of viewpoints sets the narrative behind the fierce rhetoric and political action taken on the issue today.

The geopolitical atmosphere that led to the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty dates back to 1960. Threats toward India, both internal and international, divided the nation’s attention from the

1 Pakistani militant fringe group, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), adopted water scarcity as a main issue in their extremist agenda. In 2009, co-founder and chief Hafiz Saeed paraded the street of Kashmir touting their slogan.

2 Indian PM Modi’s blistering response to the Uri attack in a meeting to review the Indus Water Treaty on September 26, 2016.

3 Riparian rights are the rights of people who own land that run into a body of water, such as a stream, lake, river, et. al.

bilateral water dispute. Religious violence in Jammu and Kashmir, an unresolved territorial dispute with China, and international pressure precluding the Cold War ultimately forced then Prime Minister Nehru's hand. Brokered by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty seemingly pacified Pakistan and brought a brief stint of peace to the Kashmir region. However, the growth of urbanization, industrialization, and population has shifted Pakistan's political standpoint: Islamabad in the last few years has placed water in the center of its political agenda, threatening to bring international attention back to this bilateral issue. Accounting for India's consequential retaliation and power play in hydropolitics, this paper analyzes the influence of water on the relationship between these two nations.

Origin of the India-Pakistan Water Conflict

The India-Pakistan Water Conflict began at independence in 1947. The land partition under the Indian Independence Act divided India and Pakistan along religious lines, disregarding resource allocation. Over 85 percent of the irrigated breadbasket of Punjab became Pakistan, while the source of the Punjab rivers became India-controlled Kashmir. Both Indian Punjab and Pakistani Punjab had roughly 25 million civilians, and less than 20 percent of the 105,000 km² irrigated from the Indus Basin went to East Punjab.⁴ Lacking a clear water sharing agreement, on April 1, 1948, India cut off water supply from the west-flowing tributaries to Pakistan's West Punjab. Due to the fact that India could stop water flow to Pakistan during sowing season placed, Pakistan was in an extremely vulnerable position. In an early attempt to grab control of eastern headwaters, Pakistan armed religious rioters in Kashmir to destabilize northern India and exert political influence in the water-rich region.

Conflict between the upper and lower riparian states snowballed as India claimed the eastern rivers, the Ravi, Sutlej and Beas, for agricultural development. Pakistan, fearing the stoppage of water to West Punjab, escalated attacks in the Kashmir region. In response, India invited the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to mitigate the territorial dispute. By April 21, 1948, the UNSC called a ceasefire and withdrawal of troops from both India and Pakistan. Originally treating the Kashmir territorial dispute and West Punjab water conflict as two separate issues, the UNSC recognized the strategic importance of Kashmir and the water-rich Indus River Basin. A 1951 communique from the British High Commissioner's office in Karachi, the old capital of Pakistan, neatly summarized the issue.

“One assumption [Pakistan] refused to entertain: that India should have control over Kashmir. By having such control, India could ruin Pakistan, simply by refusing to operate Mangla at the head-works. It is almost certain therefore that Pakistan would reject any solution of the Kashmir problem which would give these powers; she would rather embark

⁴ Published in “Indus Water Treaty between Pakistan and India: From Conciliation to Confrontation” by Dr. Raja Nazakat Ali and Dr. Faiz-ur-Rehman, both Assistant Professors at the Institute of Kashmir Studies in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), India.

on a war which she fully understood to be suicidal.”⁵

India controlled the headwaters of the Jhelum and stored 9.12 km³ of potable water in the Mangla Reservoir. Water resources were vital to the survival of a budding Pakistan, motivating the persistent territorial clashes over Kashmir. Both nations recognized Kashmir as a geopolitical keystone. In 1950 amid ongoing hostilities, India and Pakistan froze talks of a second Standstill Agreement on shared water usage.

In 1951, David Lilienthal, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, published an article in *Collier's Magazine* proposing India and Pakistan jointly develop the Indus river system under the guidance of the World Bank. Persuaded by the influential article, then World Bank President Eugene R. Black gathered a Working Party of Indian, Pakistani, and World Bank engineers to figure out the logistics of a formal water sharing agreement. Under growing international pressure, the Indus Waters Treaty was signed by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Pakistani President Ayub Khan, and World Bank President W.A.B. Illif in September 1960.

Despite the fifty year peace between Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)—maintained by the Indus Waters Treaty—lingering hostile sentiments, an imbalance of power, and unforeseen water stress has led to its abrogation today. The Treaty portrays that India wields water control as a political weapon while Pakistan lashes out against the ceaseless threat of water scarcity, perpetuating mutual mistrust. The next section explains the reality of the Treaty and the deepening political partition between India and Pakistan.

The Indus Waters Treaty and Mistrust

<i>Western Rivers</i>	<i>Eastern Rivers</i>	<i>Total Indus System Flows</i>
167.2 billion cubic meters (m ³)	40.4 billion m ³	207.6 billion m ³
Pakistan's share of total Indus system waters: 80.52%	India's share of total Indus system waters: 19.48%	100%

Note: Figures represent mean yearly flows.

Source: The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty.

Figure 1. Pakistan and India's Shares of the Indus River System Waters

The IWT divided the use of rivers in the Indus Basin along the Line of Control. On the eastern side, India claimed unrestricted use of the eastern rivers, the Beas, Sutlej, and Ravi; on the western side, Pakistan received the lion's share with control of the Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum rivers. Two provisions were agreed upon: 1) the Kashmiri people received a small percentage of

⁵ Mangla refers to the Mangla Dam at the head of the Jhelum River in what is now Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

I first accessed this quote from an Al Jazeera article published in 2011, but it has since been mentioned and requoted often in many recent publications in reference to the geo-political value of Kashmir for both India and Pakistan.

allotted river water, and 2) India received control over upstream headwaters for hydropower, irrigation, and water storage. Despite Pakistan’s paranoia over India’s newfound power, the Treaty restricted India from harnessing water for hydropower at specific quantities and times at the upper riparian. The Treaty also sets aside a precautionary mechanism. Should India disregard Pakistan’s decision to reject its hydropower proposal, the matter falls to mediated negotiations or into the hands of an internationally appointed expert. Should that fail, the issue then falls to the Permanent Indus Commission or the Court of Arbitration under the World Bank.

Despite the tentative success of the IWT, water discourse quickly turned militant in Kashmir. The informal line splitting Kashmir became a de facto military border between India-held Kashmir to the East and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to the West. In 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, a clandestine mission designed to infiltrate eastern Jammu and Kashmir and incite an insurgency against Indian rule. According to Indian pundit Brahma Chellaney, the IWT only roused Pakistan’s “territorial revisionism”. Chellaney sited the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 as a territorial grab by Pakistan for water in Kashmir – yet Pakistani leadership spun the war as a Kashmiri insurgency against Indian rule. As India once controlled Pakistan’s water supply, Islamabad feared they needed sovereignty in Kashmir to resist Indian subjugation. It was unlikely that India would violate the terms of the Indus Waters Treaty. However, religious differences, nuclear capabilities, and water conflicts compounded the mistrust between the two countries, and opened the door for extremist groups to deepen the divide.




Figure 2. Map of Kashmir with LoC

Jammat-ud-Dawa (JuD) is one of the loudest defenders of Pakistan's claim to Kashmir.⁶ JuD is also the front for predominate Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a South Asian terrorist group responsible for the 2001 Indian Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Territorial expansion is one of JuD's core political issues: JuD chief Hafiz Saeed openly attacked the Indian "occupation" of Kashmir and stated that India's restrictionary water flow is cause to wage jihad. Prior to the recent attack on India-controlled Uri in eastern Kashmir, Saeed demonstrated through Kashmir shouting the infamous "water or blood" slogan. Using the water issue as anti-India propaganda, JuD claimed new evidence of New Delhi sabotaging Islamabad's water supply under the IWT.⁷ The emotive message nonetheless resonated with Kashmiri separatist groups, allowing the LeT to fuel a resurgence of violence in the region.

Indian Prime Minister Modi called a press conference in September 2016 to review the Indus Waters Treaty and put pressure on Pakistan. Broadcasted throughout India and Pakistan, Modi delivered a blistering critique of Pakistan's use of terrorism to blight Indian innovation since independence. Modi threatened to deploy drastic action – by revising or nullifying the Treaty, India can control the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers that sustain most of Pakistan's agriculture. Alternatively, Uttam Sinha from the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA) proposed a less severe course of action, "India can rather go for the extreme option of suspending the meeting of the Commission. However, the more realistic option would be to use water of the western rivers of the Indus system, which is well within the framework of the treaty."⁸ By invoking its right to harness the western rivers for hydropower, water storage and irrigation, India can effectively pressure Pakistan without triggering international involvement.

Such problems have threatened the future of Kashmir, and therefore of Pakistan. Since 2002, Kashmiri separatists and nationalists repeatedly clashed with New Delhi over cries for secession. While insurgent forces sought political alliance and military supplies from Pakistan, Kashmir's regional administration remained loyal to Indian authority. Yet underpinning the local unrest and political tension was the fear of a dwindling water supply. Kashmir was unintentionally barred from harnessing hydropower from the Indus River Basin due to the IWT. Moreover, its supply of potable water has been falling yearly due to a lack of rainfall and increased reliance on Pakistan. In 2011, the Kashmiri government reportedly sought to hire a multi-national consultant firm to quantify the Kashmir's loss from the IWT, thus bringing the case to New Delhi. Despite the 'great loss' caused by the Treaty, J&K Deputy Chief Minister Nirmal Singh fully supported the Indian government following the Uri attack, stating "We will support any move which will benefit the people of the state and any step that puts Pakistan under pressure," in late September 2016. Singh condemned terrorist efforts in J&K and noted that disorder in Kashmir would cause India to tighten its hold on the water supply. Speaking for Kashmir, Singh highlighted the counter-productivity of extremism and military occupation in the Kashmir Valley, as they deteriorate the possibility of a binding water-sharing accord.

Questions arise when examining water control positions of India, Pakistan, and Kashmir.

6 JuD is founded largely on an Anti-India platform, "charitable organization".

7 India's Ministry of External Affairs has since debunked the evidence.

8 Water experts and political minds agree with this "tit for tat" course of action proposed during the September meetings. Diluting the Treaty is meant to punish Pakistan economically as retaliation for the Uri attack on Kashmir.

What conditions in Pakistan created such desperation for water security? What has changed since 1960 that has pushed Pakistan towards inciting a water war today? The next section addresses Pakistan's water stress and regulatory shortcomings.

Pakistan's Big Thirst

Pakistan relies heavily on reservoir water, which drains water stores for future shortages, due to its low level of 1,000 cubic meters of water per person per year.⁹ A 2013 report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) named Pakistan as one of the most water-stressed countries in the world. Based on Pakistan's current usage rate and water storing capability, the ADB estimated the country has only thirty days of water stored for emergency—33 percent less water compared to the average 1,000 days of similarly arid nations.¹⁰ Reports indicate that since the signing of the IWT in 1960, water availability per-capita has dropped by 75 percent.¹¹

Although Pakistan blames India for its water woes, they largely stem from poor water management and lack of effective allocation nationally. Pakistan has done little to control its water supply: over the last 40 years, it built two dams while India erected 4,000. Consecutive plans to build more dams have been thwarted by inter-provincial disputes. Like India's famines resulting from colonial rule, Pakistan's droughts and starvation are products of poor planning and government negligence. With few water storage facilities and fresh water reservoirs, Pakistan can barely sustain economic growth and civilian necessities. Its economy is heavily dependent on agriculture, which employs 50 percent of the Pakistani population and contributes 25 percent to annual GDP. Yet the three major crops—wheat, cotton, and rice—use close to 90 percent of Pakistan's water supply, largely irrigated from the Indus River Basin. According to Punjab Irrigation Department groundwater expert Muhammad Javed, "There is no planning and regulation for farmers vis-à-vis water usage" to address water waste in agricultural practices. In 2011, Pakistan lost 18 million gallons of potable water as run-off.¹² The little water left for civilian use is severely polluted, due to treatment of less than one-tenth of industrial waste and sewage water. Consequently, 40 percent of Pakistanis die from polluted drinking water and water-borne diseases.

9 This is the same level of water per person as Ethiopia.

10 This is an estimate made by the World Wildlife Fund.

11 Ghosh, Palash. "What Are India And Pakistan Really Fighting About?"

12 Wyatt, Oree. "Pakistan and India's Need for Water, Cooperation."




Figure 3. Water Availability vs. Population Growth in Pakistan

Source: Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources 2002.

According to Pakistan's Minister of Water and Power Khawaja Muhammad Asif, the country's laissez-faire water management, antiquated farming methods, and lack of environmental regulation, while coupled with Pakistan's rapid population growth, are the perfect storm for a catastrophic drought in the next 10 to 15 years. Water scarcity in mind, he considers the grave ramifications for Pakistan if it loses its diplomatic discourse with India or rights to the Indus River Basin. Thus, in addition to reforming and enforcing environmental protection standards, Pakistan maintains its interests in curbing aggression with India and reinstating cooperation over water resources.

Aside from its preventable measures, climate change also primarily contributes to shifts in water levels in the Indus Valley. Both Pakistan and India are reliant on glacial run-off from the Himalayas to replenish river waters. Yet, a study by Dutch scientists Walter Immerzeel, Ludovicus van Beek, and Marc Bierkens cautions that water supply in the Indus River Basin will decrease by eight percent by 2050 due to melting glaciers.

Pakistan is not the only country affected by these factors. According to ADB estimates, potable water levels in India will become "water-stressed" by 2025.¹³ With its own ongoing water deficit, India incentivizes to build more dams, hydropower plants, and water storage facilities beyond political reasons. While Pakistan faces water allocation inefficiencies and a growing population, India encounters a significantly higher demand for water resources per capita because of net population growth.

¹³ Asian Development Bank. *Economic Trends and Prospects in Developing Asia: Pakistan*.

Hydropower and Pressure

Recent conflicts surrounding India's river basin development projects have raised serious questions about the sustainability of the IWT. Pakistan challenged and impeded the 27 projects India intended to pursue in J&K. Arbitration proved a lengthy and costly process as Pakistan stalled project implementation, ultimately inhibiting the infrastructural development of Kashmir. The three most scrutinized developments—the Baglihar Hydel Power Project (BHP), the Tulbul Navigation Project (TNP), and the Kishenganga Project—are examples of standoffs between an adamantly defensive Pakistan and an increasingly frustrated India.

The BHP conflict emerges as the first to be sent for international arbitration under IWT's dispute resolution options. The hydropower plant at the mouth of the Chenab River was designed to generate 900 megawatts (MW) of energy. Pakistan was wary of the possibility that the BHP would divert downstream flows and cause floods in the western banks.¹⁴ The International Court of Arbitration (ICA) found Pakistan's fears improbable, as committing such actions contradicted the Geneva Conventions' rules of war and invite diplomatic denunciation in the international community. Yet, India agreed to amend the designs, which resulted in severe structural problems during construction in 1982. This time, India refused to halt construction work, arguing that the water used for power generation would fully be returned to the river. A neutral expert was invited to break the stalemate: they ruled in favor of India's position and helped tweak design to placate Pakistan. The BHP case is often cited as a prime example of the IWT's success in conflict resolution.

The Tulbul navigation project (TNP) of 1984 was originally designed as a barrage by India on the Jhelum, a river unnavigable for a few months out of the year due to low tides. The TNP, capable of storing up to 0.30 million acre-feet of water (MAF), was intended to regulate water currents and allow navigation of Jhelum in dry months. Again, Pakistan feared that India's potential use of water current control would become a geostrategic weapon. India maintained that the barrage did not impede the water flow into Pakistan's Upper Chenab and Lower Bari Canals. However, when Pakistan moved to take the case to Arbitration Court, India backed down and abandoned the project. The Kishenganga Project was a dam designed to store 140,000 MAF of water and usher water flow from a tributary off the Jhelum toward Wullar Lake in West Punjab. Allowed under the IWT, inter-tributary transfer for irrigation purposes fell within India's provisional use of the western rivers. Pakistan contended that redirecting the water flow would flood Wullar Lake and risk water waste before returning to the Jhelum. However, India was already constructing an irrigation network from the Kishenganga tributary when it disclosed plans of the dam to Pakistan. This detail, the "existing use" of the Kishenganga, fell under a gray area due to legal jargon and was then set aside by the IWT, which stalled approval of the project. Despite the ongoing negotiations, India laid groundwork and began excavation of the Kishenganga Dam. Witnessing the deliberate disregard of its veto power, Pakistan became increasingly paranoid of India's geopolitical motives. Thus, Pakistan ignored India's request for a neutral expert opinion and appealed directly to the World Bank in early 2016.

The unwarranted involvement of the World Bank distorted bilateral negotiations. The dispute escalated to an international affair when the World Bank agreed to process Pakistan's request without India's participation. In November 2016, Prime Minister Modi met with World Bank officials on the proceedings: senior advisors were rumored to have encouraged India to distance itself from negotiations until the World Bank agreed to rectify its favorable actions toward Pakistan. The latest

¹⁴ In 1978, Pakistan raised similar concerns over a 480 MW hydroproject on the Chenab River, Salal.

arbitration magnified the IWT's limitations—further compounded by the recent outburst of violence in Kashmir—and lent a critical eye to the effectiveness of the Treaty.

India currently sees the interference of the World Bank as a blow to its sovereignty or an overstep by the international community in dealing with a regional dispute. Though there have been moderated talks by politicians and water experts of abrogating the Treaty, India is still on the precipice. A round-table gathering of Indian, Pakistani, and World Bank officials may be fast approaching. Pakistan needs release from the pressure India has placed through increased hydropower construction; India needs an effective dispute-management tool and promise of goodwill from Pakistan to continue cooperative efforts. But, as both nations continue to grow economically while external factors further constrict the water supply, dry seasons could trigger blame, droughts could beget resentment, and water deprivation could ignite armed conflict.

Rethinking the Indus Water Treaty

The IWT does not provide an adequate system for India and Pakistan to reach a compromise under today's circumstances. The incentives for each state set up by the IWT do not align; each side only sees its own advantages, and neither side is satisfied with the compromise. Pakistan remained vulnerable to water manipulation from India despite retracting its claim to East Punjab, while India lost sovereignty over its northern rivers in exchange for provisional rights it cannot fully exercise.

Considering the circumstances, a publication in the *Tulane Environmental Law Journal*, "Reconsidering the Indus Waters Treaty," offered an interesting and alternative model. The proposed model returns to the original intent of the World Bank when brokering the IWT: for India and Pakistan to develop the Indus Basin through a joint management system together. The current system partitions Kashmir and the river basin to de facto regions of operation. It also cuts off chances for joint development and discourages the possibility of necessary cooperation. The new model suggests a pooling of resources and a reduction of geostrategic scheming over Kashmir, all through a simple realignment of incentives.

The proposed integration model is comprised of two goals. First, managing the rivers must be "according to the natural geographical and hydrological unit, instead of according to the administrative or political boundaries," where the Indus Basin is the focus of developmental efforts.¹⁵ Moreover, the water-sharing model aims to use water cooperation as a trust building tool and actively strengthen bilateral relations. The publication further explains that in practice, the approach is nuanced and tailored to Indo-Pakistani relations. Considering upward population growth as well as fluctuations in water supply and demand, both India and Pakistan must explicitly understand the necessity of looking for other water sources to satiate demand. Diversifying water dependency seems to be a logical step to reducing tension and water stress in Kashmir. There is potential for India to siphon from its working treaties with Nepal, Bangladesh, and China; there is possibility for Pakistan to invest in raising the quality of its current water sources, such as in sewage and silt treatment facilities.

The second goal of strengthening Indo-Pakistani relations is met through energy cooperation. India's current rate of economic growth can be sustained by dramatically increasing its annual electricity growth rate. A joint effort from both countries to increase India's electricity capacity will divert sources away from hydropower and free up water resources. The ingenious piece of this suggestion is Pakistan's role for a transnational natural gas pipeline in the Iran-Pakistan-India

¹⁵ Bhatnagar, Manav. "Reconsidering the Indus Waters Treaty."

negotiations. Pakistani cooperation in guaranteeing security and promising a lower transit fee of the pipeline through its territory will facilitate transport of natural gas from Iran to energy-hungry India. The last proposed cooperative effort is a new water-sharing agreement that focuses on the development of J&K to leverage the competitive advantages of both countries. Given India's experience in harness hydropower and Pakistan's financial support benefits each country through either profit or access to energy.

The last proposal placates the relationship between India and Pakistan while it also stabilizes Kashmir, allowing both countries to pour resources without fear of escalating violence or ceding Kashmir. Hyper-tailored to the needs of India and Pakistan, the proposal introduces the collective interest of preserving water resources. Despite the attractiveness of such an idea, India is unlikely to negotiate away its position of power under the IWT in its current position. Vying for international recognition, India would rather maintain the Indus Waters Treaty for as long as possible. As the Treaty is currently lauded as long-standing and successful by the international community, India may not be keen on giving up a seat at the table, based explicitly on the trust of an untrustworthy neighbor. Given Prime Minister Modi's adamant condemnation of Pakistan's tacit acceptance of terrorist organizations and militant government strategies, the likelihood of setting it all aside for peace talks is low under the current administration. Pakistan may also be hesitant to cooperate as past mistrust and ideological differences could shift support away from such a concept. Sharing energy resources, giving India access to Pakistani territory, and relying capital investment to solve water stress would require deep-rooted trust in the ally, progressive government planning, and provincial peace within Pakistan for effective execution. Pakistan's weak state, not to mention the insurgent LeT functioning as a legitimate political entity through JuD, is away from carrying out those suggestions.

Despite these realistic shortcomings, redesigning the relationship between India and Pakistan through a reimaged water-sharing treaty is necessary. The Kashmir conflict is nearly eight decades old. Effectively disentangling water control from political strife and extremist insurgency could be the key to bringing peace to the region. As Pakistan and India mend relations, military spending can be allocated to infrastructure, renewable energy, and infant industry support. Though the Kashmir conflict is a deeply complex and multifaceted issue, there is no harm in entertaining such a solution. In fact, the Indus Waters Treaty was similarly birthed from a simple article. Amendments to the arbitration framework or to the water sharing boundaries could originate from another pivotal publication that sways the World Bank.

Conclusion

It is incredible how something as rudimentary as the geopolitics of water can create bias and pool power in the hands of one state to another. Kashmir is defined by its tributaries: the Indus, Chenab, Jhelum, Beas, Ravi, and Sutlej carved their landscapes and gifted them with value. Kashmir dictated the relationship of its neighboring hegemony and caught the attention of the most powerful countries around the world.

In the game of power and politics, the great equalizers are obtaining and maintaining basic needs. Without water security, nations react instinctively. Once stripped to their primal impetuses, states clutch onto their possessions, grab at what they need, and desperately guard against their vulnerabilities. The story of the Kashmir conflict is primarily this concept: a clash between Pakistan's need to maintain a stable water supply and India's need to safeguard its water rights. The resulting water wars are muddied by external considerations: India also shares water treaties with China,

Nepal and Bangladesh. If India retreats from Kashmir, what signal would India send to its neighbors? If Pakistan retaliates, will another Indo-Pakistani war ensue? How will the international community react?

Therefore, representatives should consider the mutual benefit of both countries to ensure de-escalation when discussing any suggestion of abrogating or revising the Indus Waters Treaty. Since Indian Independence, no issue has harbored such long-standing hostility and deep-seated mistrust as water control has in Kashmir. Any forward momentum on water sharing between India and Pakistan must cautiously proceed and equitably accommodate the needs of both nations.

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