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STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The *Journal of Politics & International Affairs* at New York University is a student-run publication comprised of original student research on relevant, thought-provoking topics in the global landscape. Student submissions are evaluated on their critical analysis as well as their ability to stimulate scholarly discourse. Editors select respected academics, prominent public figures, and thought leaders to headline each issue with an article of their choosing. The rest of the articles are written and edited exclusively by NYU students. The *Journal* provides a forum for students, believing their contributions to be not only legitimate, but also crucial to the intellectual growth of students at New York University and of students nationwide.

CONTRIBUTIONS

The Journal of Politics & International Affairs will consider proposed or completed unpublished articles of any length that concern domestic politics, international affairs, or derivative subjects for publication. Proposals should be submitted via e-mail at jpia.club@nyu.edu.

NOTES

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An Interview with M. Ishaq Nadiri

Conducted By Devika M. Balaram

Professor Nadiri emigrated from Afghanistan to the United States at the age of 19 and received his B.S. from the University of Nebraska, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley. He joined New York University in 1970 and has been the chairperson of the Economics Department and director of the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics. He was named a Jay Gould Professor of Economics in 1975. Professor Nadiri has actively been involved with the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Professor Nadiri has served as a consultant to a number of corporations, governments and international organizations. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. From 2005-2008, Professor Nadiri was a senior economic advisor to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, lead by President Hamid Karzai.

JPIA: Throughout your extensive career you've explored so many opportunities as a researcher, professor, and political advisor. At this juncture, what sticks out to you the most as you look back?

NADIRI: As far as the past is concerned, I've been a professor at various universities: UC Berkley, University of Chicago, Northwestern University, Columbia University, and now at NYU. I've been named the Jay Gould Professor of Economics here and was previously the Chairman of the department. I've also been a member of the National Bureau of Economic Research for a long time – almost too long to mention – nearly 40 years. I've done research in investment modeling, productivity growth, producer's theory, and monetary and aggregate economy. In 2005, I went to Afghanistan and was appointed as the Senior Economic Advisor to the President (SEAP) of Afghanistan, where I developed the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). I wanted to create a coherent system through which foreign countries can channel various forms of aid to restore Afghanistan to a stable state. I returned to the U.S. in 2008 because I was on a temporary leave of absence granted by NYU. Since then, I keep track of what's going on in Afghanistan.

I had also established an organization, with the help of friends here in the U.S., called the Global Partnership for Afghanistan (GPFA). It basically works in the rural areas of Afghanistan and its main purpose is to provide resources to farmers for planting trees and building irrigation systems. Since its founding in 2002, GFPA has planted over 10 million trees throughout the country and has developed a working relationship with 425 villages. We've started a very important program of training women farmers as well

as introducing solar power as a source of energy in certain villages.

JPIA: So what questions are guiding you as you try and establish this framework?

NADIRI: I am deeply concerned and working on issues on how Afghanistan can be stabilized and how to keep it stabilized. This stability will not come about in one or five years—it will take a long time, will not be easy, and will require substantial resources. However, the benefits of it would be substantial. Afghanistan, basically sits at the center of Asia. It connects China to the Middle East, and Central Asia and Russia to Pakistan and India; its stability and prosperity is a central issue to most of the countries around it and also for the world powers like the U.S., NATO and others. Many countries have tried to dominate Afghanistan—like the British, the Russians, and the Americans—yet they've not been able to do it right or they've not been able to sustain it right.

Since 1979, when the Russians invaded the country, the costs of conflict in Afghanistan have been extremely high for everyone, most of all to the Afghans themselves. The population of Afghanistan has suffered millions of deaths and injuries and the country has been totally destroyed – its economic foundation has been razed and the solidarity of the people, which existed before 1979, has dissipated totally.

JPIA: In December of 2001, and in the earlier months of 2002, you were a participant in many important conferences and meetings that ultimately lead to the creation of the Afghan government. Could you provide some context to our readers about the process through which the current government of Afghanistan was established?

NADIRI: I was one of the signatories of the Bonn agreement, which came about after the Taliban government was overthrown by the Americans and when Al Qaeda was pushed from Afghanistan into Pakistan. This was the basis of creating a new government in Afghanistan and it had three stages. The first was that an emergency period was created for 6 months so that we could collate activities taking place throughout the country. This was followed by a period of a year during which a temporary government would be empowered so that we could allow the country to prepare for elections and draw a constitution.

This certainly was a very positive beginning for the Afghans. There was a great deal of international concern on how to develop Afghanistan. President Bush was talking about having a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan. The Afghan population was looking for a revival of their standard of living and wanted to re-establish the kind of a harmony, which the country had experienced for a century or more before 1979. Though Afghanistan has many different tribes and ethnicities it was one of the most peaceful countries in the world prior to 1979. There's a false idea that if you're "tribal" you're always fighting each other; however, that was not the case in Afghanistan.

So this period of evaluation and investment was at that time very good; Afghans managed to participate in the election that was organized—both men and women participated—and constitutional changes that were implemented evoked fundamental changes. For example, the Afghan constitution made it mandatory that 25 percent of the members of the House of Representatives in Afghanistan should be women. I don't think any other country in the world can show that.

JPIA: And actually 28 percent of the House of Representatives in Afghanistan are women delegates, cor-

rect?

NADIRI: Yes, 28 percent of the Afghan House of Representative are currently held by elected women politicians, and they're very articulate and doing an excellent job of representing their constituents! So the foundation established at the time was extremely important. It constituted a set of major moves both domestically and internationally. But, the basic problem was that at the time of the first election— in which an unprecedented 10 million Afghans participated—the attention of the United States was diverted to Iraq. The U.S. pulled most of its resources from Afghanistan and ignored the fact that the Taliban had gone to Pakistan and reassembled themselves with the aid of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Pakistani intelligence agency. This allowed them to come back into Afghanistan by 2005 to engage in a debilitating insurgency which continues to this day.

JPIA: There's been a great consensus in the United States that the country does need to pull out of Afghanistan; as of now, the "phase-out" is scheduled to end in 2014, when all American forces will be leaving the country. What does Afghanistan need to operate successfully, without the help of the Americans?

NADIRI: There are three things that need to be in place solidly for the Afghans to meet the challenges of the "phase out" and the transfer of power that is about to occur in 2014. The first is to have an effective army and police; the second is to have good governance and justice system; and the third is that the country has to have economic development of a fairly sizable degree to make up for the losses that have occurred in the past and meet the needs of its current population. All this has to be led by the Afghans since it is their home and they are mainly responsible to build it. But, the Afghans do not have the resources to do this on their own. This is where the Americans and the international community must keep a watchful eye on the country and they must also continue to help. As the international troops withdraw, the U.S., NATO, UN and others have the obligation to make sure that the interferences of the neighboring states will be kept minimal while the Afghans build their country. If this does not happen, the whole transition process will not be sustainable. The world must also invest heavily in capacity building in Afghanistan by mobilizing Afghan ex-patriots all over the world who have technical knowledge to contribute and also by mobilizing young Afghans who have been trained in Afghanistan. Another important condition for a successful transition is for Afghanistan and the world to work on eliminating the narcotics trade and opium production in Afghanistan. This industry is a great source of corruption and provides finance to the insurgency, and it is destroying the whole fabric of the Afghan society. This should be the joint project of the international community and Afghanistan. The majority of Afghan farmers are willing to shift production away from opium to an alternative crop provided that it's profitable. But, they need help and resources to do so.

The other thing that is a source of big waste and ineffectiveness is that every foreign country's aid to Afghanistan is controlled by different foreign bureaucracies; there are too many cooks in the kitchen. Coordinating aid efforts is a huge task that Afghans and the international community must deal with as soon as possible.

JPIA: What does the international community stand a lot to lose if Afghanistan is remains unstable?

NADIRI: If Afghanistan gets stabilized, the benefits to its neighboring countries and the world at large will be tremendous. The billions of dollars that have been spent and continues to be incurred on this conflict

will be reduced significantly. The long term costs of war and instability are quite real—for example, each time an Afghan or an American soldier gets wounded, their health costs increase and may linger for as long as fifty years—imagine the costs borne by their families and the cost to the countries. If Afghanistan remains unstable; the conflict will spill over to other areas. It has already spilled over into Pakistan. In the long term, the spillover effects of conflict will be heavily felt by other countries, including the U.S. as well.

On the other hand, if stability comes about slowly, Afghanistan can connect the countries that surround it. It would sit at the center of Asian trading activities, as it did for centuries. There has to be targeted investments that will allow Afghanistan to perform that role. It is essential that the country and its citizens are guaranteed protection from the interfering elements of the neighboring states; otherwise, Afghans will have difficulty with establishing stability in their own country.

JPIA: Following an incubation period in Pakistan, the splintered but rather advanced network of actors that make up the Taliban have emerged stronger than ever before. What is the extent to which the Taliban might be viable political force in the near future?

NADIRI: It all depends on what aid and instructions the Pakistanis will give to the Taliban. The Taliban fight in Afghanistan in the spring and summer and then they recuperate during the winter in Pakistan. That's where they train. If they come without this Pakistani backing, they will be forced to transition back into Afghan society. They have two ways of navigating through this. They could fight their way to the top; the question is whether or not they can win this way, and then what they can offer the country to stay at the top. The other option is that they compromise and see a way to engage the rest of the Afghans and participate constructively in the building of their country.

A SWEET FUTURE FOR UAE'S ECONOMIC HEALTH?

Ladan Manteghi

Executive Director, Global Social Enterprise Initiative

Snapshot of key report findings:

Study: Exploring the Growing Challenge of Diabetes across the GCC and within the United Arab Emirates Medical expenditures for those with diabetes are on average 2.3 times higher than for those without the disease. In 2011, diabetes-related costs amounted to $6.6 billion, or 1.8 percent of the nation's GDP, higher than any other country in the GCC Treatment of diabetes accounts for approximately 40% of the nation's overall healthcare expenditures

It's 90F degrees outside in early November when I arrive at my hotel in Abu Dhabi. I am greeted with the gracious hospitality that Middle Easterners are known for – an earnest "Welcome to Abu Dhabi," a glass of date juice laced with rosewater, and an offer of Arabic sweets like baklava and macaroons. To reject the offer could be considered insulting.

But so sets the scene for the warm traditions and culture of the Arab world plagued with one of the highest levels of diabetes and co-morbidities of countries around the world.
If the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are to remain economically and globally competitive, then they must address the health crisis they face due to the cost and exponentially growing rate of diabetes according to a report by Global Social Enterprise Initiative partner Booz Allen Hamilton. Government and employers will bear the brunt of the diseases costs. Yet they also have the ability to trigger actions to mitigate negative impacts in order to remain competitive in the global economy.

More than 27% of Emiratis age 20-79 today have pre-diabetes or stage I or II diabetes, with treatment constituting 40% of all health expenditures in the country, the highest in the entire GCC region. "Rapid economic development has led to lifestyle changes that resulted in low levels of physical activity, unhealthy nutrition, and increased obesity, all key risk factors for the disease," according to a report unveiled on November 5, by Booz Allen. "Left unchecked, the spread of diabetes portends devastating social and fiscal investments in the MENA region."

At a simulation exercise with large UAE employers such as Nestle, Rotana, Daman, and medical experts from the Cleveland Clinic and other leaders, we evaluated various levers to activate investments in workplace benefits to limit diabetes progression. General agreement coalesced around screenings needing to be offered to create awareness and serve as a baseline for triggering effective steps employees can take to mitigate or manage their health.

With limited investment resources allocated in five year increments over fifteen years, working in teams at the simulation, participants found agreement around three main triggers for concentrated investment:

Disease management programs could offer immediate health and financial impact. This would include partnering with pharmacies to auto fill prescriptions and send reminders; waving co-pays for screening and adherence to medication/treatment; and assigning wellness coaches who can offer counsel and support, while guarding privacy.

Fitness programs such as on-site gyms, memberships to gyms or sports complexes, and personal trainers, particularly to address female modesty concerns, would be most effective.
Targeting ex-patriots who constitute 80% of the UAE's workforce and who also contribute to the diabetes epidemic, cash incentives were thought effective for regular screenings and maintaining healthy weights and lifestyles.

Simulation participants, however, highlighted additional social norms that are important considerations when shaping any programs or benefit offering. Emiratis and expats alike are contributing to the spiking diabetes rates and corresponding expenditures. For employer based programs to have positive impact, cultural context and appropriateness needs to play a role. What draws in Emiratis may not draw in expats, and vice verse.

First, women play a vital role in how the diabetes landscape is shaped. Female incidence of diabetes is significantly higher than men, and by 2030, double the number of women than men could die of the disease or related complications. Modesty laws and norms contribute to how women think and behave when it comes to physical activity. Heat and dress codes limit their ability to openly and regularly exercise, so safe and enabling environments need to be created.

Second, cooks and the lead female in a household are the main nutrition influencers and decision makers. Nutrition programs can have greatest impact if cultivated in the home where immediate and extended families participate. Often diabetics are prepared a "diabetic meal" which comes with stigma and segregation from others in one's family or friends' circle. Food is a catalyst for socializing, especially in countries where entertainment is limited and regulated by religion and law. Therefore healthful foods should not be labeled and targets for stigma. Eating habits need to be created with a multiplier effect in mind to be adopted by diabetic and non-diabetics alike.

Third, participants in the room called for a collaborative and integrated plan to tackle the diabetes issue. "We need the employers, the regulators, the health experts and the educators to be a part of developing a plan to tackle this issue at a national level," said one participant and echoed by others.

Leaders in the UAE are at a critical moment in time. They have the opportunity to decide whether and how they change their health trajectory and remain economically competitive in the global market.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE WORKERS IN THE UNITED FARM WORKERS' ORGANIZING EFFORTS

Dylan J. Anderson

As the United Farm Workers moved from its first two decades of successful organizing, from the 1980s through the 1990s, and finally into the 2000s, the workers experienced a shift in their role in the organizing process. The UFW moved from a collective model of organizing to a segmented approach, in which actors take on work designated to their positions. The workers are still on the precipice of the initial organizing stages, but as the organizing process moves into deliberation and action, the UFW organizes more on behalf of the workers. While working with the UFW on a specific unionization effort, I used ethnographic methods and interviews of the other team members to analyze the workers' role in relation to the campaign. I combine this work with a historical review of the UFW, the workers' traditional role in organizing, and a tension within the organization between framing itself as a union or as a social movement. I argue that two factors have contributed to the changing role of the workers: the segmentation of work created by the Internet and a shift towards advocacy framework.

Introduction

When I began my study of the UFW, with particular focus on organizational methodologies, I was originally interested in two components of the United Farm Workers' (the UFW) efforts: incorporation **and** representation of race and ethnicity in their media material. I initially targeted these two components to examine whether or not the UFW's intent in regards to portraying Latino farm workers mattered. More specifically, I sought to understand whether or not the intention to incorporate and use race or ethnicity in their media and communications was conveyed in their final product.

Yet, as I began my research and worked more closely with the UFW, I found a discussion of the racial or ethnic identity of the workers to be absent from media creation discussions. My research question began to evolve into an examination of why this discussion was absent from an organization so closely linked to the concept of racial justice. As I continued to work with the UFW, I began to notice that along with the absence of race and ethnicity from media discussions, the presence of the workers seemed to be restrained as well. My research focus further developed to include an examination of the role of workers identities in the UFW's media organizing. Combining my ethnographic work with the UFW with a historical review of the workers' roles in organizing and the structure of the UFW, my research ultimately focuses on the changing role of the workers and the factors that contribute to that change.

Hypothesis

As the Internet is so far removed from the physicality of the field, using it as an organizing tool would also presumably distance the organizing process from the workers in the field. Since the Internet requires very few resources, in comparison to other physical organizing methods, it is a cost effective tool for the UFW, allowing the organization to reach more potential supporters in less time. However, as the organizing process becomes more reliant upon the Internet, incorporating workers online will become increasingly more difficult.

As the Internet is still relatively young and continuously evolving, examining how it is changing the organizing processes is very sociologically important. We increasingly witness older models created by Saul Alinsky or Cesar Chavez being replaced by newer models with the Internet at the focal point of these changes. These developments have political impact, as we saw in the way Howard Dean in 2004, Barack Obama in 2008, and other candidates in 2012 reached voters in presidential elections. It is critical to examine both the emergence of new models and how key stakeholders are being filtered through or incorporated into these models.

By examining these emerging models further in depth and looking at how stakeholders are incorporated, we can develop a deeper understanding of how these emerging political processes affect the people involved and their livelihoods. In Cesar Chavez's early organization of the UFW, he placed a heavy emphasis on not only labor justice, but racial justice as well. In creating such a large, collective movement, Chavez was able to give farm workers the traction necessary to advocate for their own living standards and win unionization efforts that transformed their daily lives. Through this process, he contributed to the emerging Latino identity in the United States, and continues to act as a symbol of pride for Latino Americans. It is not yet clear whether or not the Internet can be used to sustain a justice or social movement for a subgroup of people in the United States over a longer period of time.

My research is centered around the emergence of new media, in particular, the Internet. I hypothesized that growing use of the Internet would be the most significant contributing factor to the changing role of the farm workers within the UFW.

Research Methods

Working with the UFW Communications Team

To understand how workers' roles have changed, I used a mixed method approach. First, as a working member of the UFW Communications team, I used ethnographic methods to examine the process of how the UFW creates media. All team members were aware of my research conduction. My contact with the team relied predominantly on weekly team conference calls and emails with individual members in which we discussed the progress, made in our campaign and strategy moving forward or individual projects and questions.

I acknowledge the limitations of the research as a result of my remote location. While not being on site with the other team members may have prevented me from observing a fuller scope of operations, none of the team members consistently worked at the same location with each other either. Thus, since none of us were consistently in one location together, my interactions were fairly representative of interactions across the entire team.

At times, I sought to review and analyze campaigns by mapping out the goals of the campaign,

how the strategy changed along the way, when different actors were brought in, and how those different actors were utilized. Team members consistently provided their reasoning for wanting to pursue a certain strategy. If they did not have a specific strategy in mind, they did have specific goals and asked the team about the best way to achieve those goals. When team members described different groups they wanted to mobilize or include in the campaign, they provided justification by describing the characteristics of the group, the utility they would bring to the campaign, and how we would have needed to contact to them in order to gain their help. These descriptions were incredibly important; they were telling as to which groups the team devoted conversation time, which groups were absent, and how the team members held different thoughts about different groups.

Qualitative Interviews with the UFW Communications Team

In order to gain a fuller picture of how the team members thought about their work with the union and its members, I combined ethnographic methods with interviews of team members. The interviews were designed to understand the individual team members' constructions of certain topics, allowing me to develop a better picture of the roles of the workers. Through the interviews, I also developed a better understanding of each team member's relationship with the UFW. The interviews were conducted in an unstructured format, in which I let the team members self report what they found important. I asked them generally about different subtopics, allowed them to express their thoughts, and then followed up with questions that were specific to the conversation. In general, I asked team members about their personal history with the UFW, the roles of the workers during our Ruby Ridge campaign, the roles of the workers in general in the UFW's work, organizing against a private entity, the use of the Internet in organizing, and their thoughts on successful campaign strategies.

The United Farm Workers Today

Founded in 1962 by Cesar E. Chavez, the United Farm Workers of America was the United States' first successful union specifically for farm workers. The UFW now conducts union activities in ten states (though predominantly in California), with some other efforts across the country and internationally. According to the UFW, they currently hold contracts with some of the largest strawberry, rose, winery, and mushroom firms in California and the United States. Currently, 75% of California's mushroom industry is under union contract (The United Farm Workers 2012d). However, as Ganz (2009) notes, the UFW "is a former shadow of itself. It represents no more than 5,000 workers and holds some 33 contracts as compared with the 60,000 to 70,000 workers that it once represented and the 200 contracts that it held in the late 1970s." By 2006, the UFW also no longer held any table grape contracts, which had been the crux of their organizing efforts at the start of the union in the 1960s (Shaw 2008; The United Farm Workers 2012e).

The UFW is also no longer just a union entity, but rather anchors 14 nonprofit organizations (Ganz 2009). These organizations are known as their "Movement Offices" and focus on operations like radio broadcasting, medical plans, and pension plans (The United Farm Workers 2012b). The focus of the UFW's activities has also changed from organizing for union contracts, to lobbying for legislation and endorsing political candidates. While the UFW still undertakes unionization efforts, most of their recent efforts and successes have revolved around passing legislation that imposes stricter labor regulations for

workers (Ganz 2009; The United Farm Workers 2012c; The United Farm Workers 2012a). So what happened? Why has the UFW undergone such drastic change in the past few decades? Why do their organizing efforts look different today than they did in the 1960s and 1970s? In order to answer these questions it is important to look at the early organizing methods the union utilized during those first two decades, and the internal changes that occurred to shift the focus of the UFW.

The United Farm Workers: Selected Historical Examples

The Start of the Union

Chavez began his organizing career during a time of great political neglect of and racism towards Mexican Americans. Congress ignored many of the problems Mexican Americans faced, including being denied voter registration, access to public schools, and patronage at private businesses. The government was not friendly to tackling labor problems facing Mexican Americans.

In 1952, Chavez was recruited by Fred Ross of the Community Services Organization (CSO), a group affiliated with Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation. CSO was designed to combine various efforts of grassroots organizing, while securing the support of religious groups and labor unions, to bring Alinsky's successful model to California's Mexican American communities. Alinsky was never very open to the idea of organizing farm workers; he suggested that rural Mexican Americans should be "retrained for urban living." As a result, CSO focused on voter registration drives, offering citizenship classes, and promoting Mexican American interests in city affairs, much as it had done with other groups in other urban areas. In 1962, Chavez offered a proposal to CSO for a pilot farm worker organizing program, but membership wanted to focus on urban residents, and voted it down. As a result, Chavez resigned and launched his own organizing drive to correct the problems he felt were being ignored by Congress and other grassroots organizations ignoring. (Shaw 2008).

An Analysis of Three Consistent Strategies

As Shaw (2008), Ganz (2009), and Bruns (2011) outline in the details of the history of the UFW, three strategies – boycotts, coalition building, and electoral pressure – were consistently used during the beginning and peak of the union. From 1965 to 1979, boycotts were consistently used to put pressure on growers. In order to form coalitions, the UFW made consistent efforts to find allies and recruit other organizations. And ultimately, the UFW used its size and electoral power to pressure and support politicians. Within these strategies, the workers played key roles. The boycotts were dependent upon the workers and volunteers to continue day-to-day striking, to talk with other groups and mobilize their support, and to talk with the public and mobilize the support of individuals. To put electoral pressure on politicians, workers marched and rallied together in huge numbers, voted for or against candidates, and rallied others to vote for or against candidates (Shaw 2008; Ganz 2009; Bruns 2011).

The Delano Grape Boycott: Building a Union of the Workers

Chavez had no master plan for organizing farm workers, but by 1965 he had made enough person-to-person and house-by-house contact with workers to develop a sense of community among them. His organization, the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) had amassed twelve thousand members, though only two hundred paid dues (Shaw 2008). In order to create a successful union, Chavez

thought members needed to be experienced activists, with the ability to articulate their goals, share connections between each other, and share their own stories (Bruns 2011). While the organization was still young, Chavez began his biggest undertaking yet by lending support to Filipino workers of the AFL-CIO-chartered Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC) during the Delano grape strike to raise wages. Knowing the NFWA and AWOC could not raise wages through the strike alone, the UFW branched out to recruit student, labor, and religious volunteers to join the strikers (Shaw 2008).

However, after growers reported a record grape harvest at the end of the season, Chavez escalated their efforts to a boycott. In order to counter the growers' "superior economic power," The UFW mounted public economic pressure against Delano, targeting two Delano growers. Workers and supporters spread out across over 100 cities nationally, asking people to send pledges to growers with refusals to buy their products until workers were unionized. Workers also approached Teamster truck drivers who supplied the grapes. Many drivers refused to cross the picket lines outside of distribution centers, shutting facilities down. By 1967, growers on DiGiorgio farms settled and agreed to hold a union election. The workers, in striking against the farms and recruiting supporters to boycott them, made the campaign successful. They developed networks and mounted the pressure against Delano farms (Shaw 2008: 19-21).

The Importance of Alliances

Shaw (2008) argues that in order for the boycott to be effective, additional help was needed to maintain support. The UFW sent workers and volunteers out across the country to convince shoppers to stop buying grapes. Churches, students, and community groups not only provided additional personnel for the effort, but also provided institutions, resources, and organizational requirements for the volunteers to continue to operate in distant cities. Shaw argues that the UFW actively created the first American student-labor coalition, providing them opportunities to work full time in a social change movement with direct training and resources from expert organizers. Additionally, endorsement from religious groups made the movement mainstream and safe for community members to express support, and gave the movement moral authority and social legitimacy to workers and volunteers talking to shoppers.

The Peregrinación: Expanding to an Electoral Model

Though DiGiorgio farms held a union election, the boycott against Delano grapes and its other growers continued into 1966. In order to reduce the day-to-day grind of the strike and boycott, Chavez decided to adopt the civil rights tactic of a long march, stretching from Delano to the state capitol, Sacramento. The tactical purpose of the march was to put pressure on Governor Edmund Brown to show support for the workers against the growers. Brown initially rejected Chavez's request to meet. As a result, Brown was the target of the UFW at the rally on Easter Sunday that ended the pilgrimage. If Brown came out in support of the workers, Chavez would use the UFW to turn out immense electoral support for him in his upcoming reelection. In this instance, the numbers and physical presence of the workers proved to be both a political threat and a useful political tool (Shaw 2008).

Analysis of Historical Organizing Techniques

These three strategies continued to provide the UFW with a large amount of success throughout the 1970s, as their political clout grew and they signed increasing numbers of contracts. And as seen in all three strategies, these tactics were successful because of the strong personal relationships built between workers, supporters, and volunteers. They provided the physical ground work, broadened support networks, and drawing greater attention to their efforts. However, by the end of the 1970s, an internal change occurred that altered these strategies, refocusing the purpose of the UFW and repositioning the workers in the organizing process.

1977-1981: A Turning Point
"Are We A Union? Or, Are We a Movement?"

In the late 1970s, Chavez seemed to undergo a philosophical switch. LeRoy Chatifield, one of the clergymen who joined Chavez's early efforts, phrased the emerging tension best when he asked, "Are we a union? Or, are we a movement?" After the passage of the 1975 California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, Chavez had to now deal with the growing complexity of the union's administrative and political duties. In looking for models for organizational transformation, he turned to Charles Dederich, the founder of Synanon, a Los Angeles based drug rehabilitation program that evolved into a cult-like group, and later a quasi-religion. Dederich's model for transformation involved turning the UFW "into a community of unpaid cadre, loyal to a single leader, governed by groupthink rituals, and enjoying the apparent efficiency of unquestioning obedience."

Within an organization's frame, there are a few variables that change across movements and organizations. The first, and most simple, is the problem identification, for what the organization in mobilizing. This problem can be characterized by its flexibility, scope, and resonance. This problem may be considered either flexible or rigid in terms of the themes and ideas the organization incorporates and articulates. Most problems' scopes do not extend far beyond the organization or the movement, rendering scope specific to the organization and its motives. Finally, problems vary in terms of their resonance, which depend upon the credibility of its frame and relative saliency (Benford and Snow 2000). Chavez's shift in frame identified a new problem that was rigid, with a limited scope, and failed to have the same resonance with supporters and organizers. In 1978, Chavez terminated the UFW's organizing and boycott apparatus; with the passage of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act, the union had to focus on maintaining new contracts. However, boycotts had traditionally broadened the union's base and gave "the UFW a closer relationship with the general public than other unions and organizations working for social change" (Shaw 2008). By altering the framing process to focus on Chavez's version of reality, the problem the UFW addressed also diverged from expanding farm labor protections. In turn though, this new process and new problem excluded much of the UFW's internal and external support.

Examining this shift in direction of the UFW is important; the shift altered the staff makeup, the type of actions undertaken by the UFW, and the overall goals the organization strove to achieve. The tension between being a union and being a social movement had been present throughout the UFW's history, especially as racial justice was imbued into the labor justice components. However, as Ganz (2009) argues, by altering the organizational structure in the late 1970s, the UFW lost the strategic capacity to balance this tension and continue being successful. While the UFW became less successful, this organizational change also impacted how the workers fit into the organization. The workers, who had (Anjana left off here) been such an integral part of the UFW's organizing strategies before, were now removed from the core of the UFW's structure, and now they faced potential repercussions for trying to insert themselves into the new

rigid organizational structure. Without the worker' collective involvement, the UFW no longer looked and acted like a union. Rather, the divide between the workers and management resulted in the UFW beginning to look more like a social justice or advocacy organization. Going forward into my research of the UFW today, this tension is still very present. The framing of the UFW and its efforts – whether it is a union or social movement – will help dictate the workers' position in the organization and their roles in the organizing process.

Background Of The Campaign For Analysis
Ruby Ridge

The primary campaign I worked on with the UFW and analyzed for my research was unique in that it focused on unionization efforts. Most of the UFW's campaigns now focus on lobbying to pass legislation that would impose stricter labor regulations for workers in place of working to unionize and subsequently institute benefits (Ganz 2009). This campaign reflected campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s, as it confronted a farm entity. In order to understand how the workers fit into a modern campaign that reflected earlier problems, it is also important to understand the workers' role in the problem on the farm. The problem occurred at Ruby Ridge, a dairy farm in Washington State, as well as the corporation it is a part of, Darigold. Darigold is a large dairy cooperative, in which independently owned farms sell their milk to the company, and Darigold processes, distributes, and markets the milk under their label. Ruby Ridge was one of those independently owned farms. The UFW provided the following background material:
Ruby Ridge is a large dairy located in Eastern Washington. An overwhelming majority of workers employed at the dairy signed union authorization cards asking the UFW to represent them. Workers complained about not being allowed to take breaks, eat lunch, and having to drink water out of a hose used to wash cow manure off the dairy floor. The workers say they continue to not to have any benefits beyond an hourly wage. And, workers report that owner Dick Bengen has often carried a rifle with him on his large dairy farm that he uses to scare the workers into line. Mr. Bengen made a point of explaining the special purpose of this rifle to worker Miguel Cuevas, when he told him, "This rifle is for those people with the union."

After negotiations failed, UFW approached the cooperation Ruby Ridge is a part of:
Ruby Ridge is part of the Darigold cooperative, a large dairy processing company headquartered in Seattle, WA. The milk the dairy produces is marketed under the Darigold brand. UFW has brought reports of the abuses at Ruby Ridge to Darigold, but they have failed to respond and ensure workers are treated with respect, with basic benefits, and with safety precautions. Last month, close to 200 people gathered in front of Darigold's headquarters in Seattle. Labor leaders, including the Secretary-Treasurer of the WA State Labor Federation and Michael Beranbaum of the Joint Council of Teamsters, who represents Darigold employees at their processing plants, joined the call for justice for Ruby Ridge workers. (That's right, Darigold processing plant workers have a union; the workers who milk the cows don't.)

It is important to note that this background material comes from campaign materials against Ruby Ridge, so the language is persuasive in nature and comes from the UFW perspective. However, everything stated was approved by the UFW legal team, with the idea that these claims would hold up in court, should they be contested.

The Team Members

As previously noted, I worked on a team with three other members. It will become increasingly important later on in my analysis, but each member fulfilled a different role during the campaign and has a different relationship with the UFW. A Vice President at UFW managed the campaign, finalizing strategy and guiding the organizing process. I will refer to this team member as "the campaign manager" during my analysis. The Internet Communications Director managed all online communication and media for the UFW, including this campaign. I will refer to this team member as "the Internet director" during my analysis. The Regional Director of the Pacific Northwest acted as our contact with the workers during the campaign, obtaining declarations and information from workers at Ruby Ridge, and organizing physical demonstrations. I will refer to this team member as "the regional director" during my analysis.
Unlike the rest of the team members, my work predominantly focused on the Ruby Ridge campaign, as I was not a full time staff member. This is important to keep in mind, as my only interactions with the UFW centered on this one, specific campaign. The observations I have made may not hold valid across all of the UFW's efforts. And since I did not work as a full time staff member, my observations did not include interactions the other team members had between each other while I was not present. However, in a different vein, since the other team members worked on the Ruby Ridge campaign part time, my part time interactions of the campaign may very well be representative of the other members' interactions with the campaign.

The Development from Researching Race and Ethnicity to Researching Workers

The trajectory of my research and observations evolved as the campaign progressed. When the campaign started, we had two goals. First, our target became not just Ruby Ridge, but the practices of Darigold overall. Second, we wanted to capitalize on a market that had never really been approached by the UFW before. In examining these goals, and the action designed to meet these goals, our initial efforts were removed from the field: We were asking individuals and groups who had no previous interactions with the UFW to communicate with the corporate entity that is removed from Ruby Ridge.

During the team's conversations at the beginning of the campaign, there was a noticeable absence of acknowledgement of the demographics of the farm workers. As I continued to try to discern comments on the workers' racial or ethnic identity in our conversations, and as the topic remained absent, I eventually pointed to the subject myself. In one early conversation, as we discussed types of groups to contact to sign the petition, we did not discuss Latino groups (who we have often targeted in the past). But since I had received no indication of the demographics of the workers in the Pacific Northwest, I wanted to ensure they were also Latinos, as in California, and pointedly asked about the workers' race. There was also a lack of knowledge regarding where the dairy workers stood in regards to class. As we contemplated a communication piece that referenced the workers' class, the campaign manager requested the regional director clarify their living conditions and obtain more information.

I began to see consistent patterns in how the team members spoke about different actors involved with the Ruby Ridge campaign. They talked about Darigold with specific class identifiers ("corporate," "greed," "making money," etc.); they spoke about Ruby Ridge and the farm owners with identifiers in regards to their actions ("violent," "rifle," "abuses," etc.); and they spoke about the workers strictly along labor lines ("work conditions," "forced to work," "no benefits," etc.). With these patterns, I began to see

that a discussion of the workers' racial or ethnic identity would be hard to discern from my interactions with the team members. As such, I began to focus more on how the workers functioned in the organizing process.

Since the one of the campaign goals was to focus on new markets, and since we had few existing networks of dairy farms or groups to help us mobilize the efforts, the bulk of my initial work on the campaign was devoted to outreach to groups that have never been involved with a farm worker campaign. We targeted predominantly student groups on the presumption that they are plentiful in number, open to helping advocacy causes, and can use their networks to get others involved. The UFW has always sought the support of other groups beyond itself and has always invited participation from passionate volunteers. What surprised me about the direction the organizing was taking was that I could not clearly see how the workers fit into the organizing picture, and found them lacking.

Furthermore, as I discovered in my review of the literature, the position of the workers in regards to their racial or ethnic identity has changed significantly within the UFW. At its inception, the UFW focused on organizing Chicano farm workers in California, and often found itself at odds with temporary workers who came from Mexico (Bruns, 2011). By 2000, the UFW had refocused on the broader Latino community, even amending its constitutional mission to replace the "organizing" of farm workers with "protecting and insuring" the rights of Latinos (Ganz, 2009). With this realignment of focusing beyond a specific ethnic group of farm workers, it perhaps is not surprising then that a discussion of the workers' racial or ethnic identity was absent, or that the workers themselves appeared to be absent from organizing. As such, my research focused on the changing role of the workers, and factors that may have contributed to that change.

Analysis Of The Role Of The Workers Today
"The Internet is What Used to Be Our Boycotts"

Combining my work with the UFW, my interviews with team members, and historical research on the organization, I have observed a shift in the organizing model with the inclusion of the Internet. In Figure 1, I have outlined the three-step organizing process of the UFW, comparing the position of the workers pre and post-Internet organizing. Keep in mind this is a simplification, which I explain in greater detail.

Step One: Identifying the Issue

As outlined previously, during the Delano grape strike, the union was built upon the workers' actions. As Bruns (2011) stated, in order to create a successful union, Chavez thought members needed to be experienced activists, with the ability to articulate their goals, share connections between each other, and share their own stories. While the UFW may have initiated the conversation about rectifying situations, the workers had to be an active part in setting forth the goals of a campaign.

In my interviews with the team members, each person indicated this dynamic still holds true. It starts with the regional director's work. He works out on the field with workers, talking with them about their conditions. As he stated, "we can't do anything if the workers don't want us to do anything," and that campaigns are "workers' campaigns." As he continued, "I always stress it's their campaign, the UFW is here to support them with knowledge, resources, strategy. [It's about] organizing amongst each other." The campaign manager elaborated, stating, "the workers are the decision makers." He discussed how once a problem is identified, it is the workers who set the stage for the campaign. The UFW can put forth a plan of action to rectify the situation, but the workers ultimately decide whether or not to pursue the plan. He provided one example of a mushroom farm the UFW organized against. The UFW told the workers that if they went ahead with their plan, there was a good chance the farm would be totally shut down and they could lose their jobs. The workers held justice for the labor abuses greater than just keeping their jobs, and told the UFW to go ahead with the plan. These discussions are held in person with the workers. Much of the regional director's work involves face-to-face time with workers, discussing labor conditions, obtaining information from workers, and assessing problems on farms.

Both the Internet director and the regional director touched upon how the information the workers provide the UFW drives their campaigns. The regional director emphasized how workers' willingness to put their names on their own declarations, providing firsthand accounts about the abuses is central to the campaign. They can urge other workers to do the same, provide a fuller story of what happens on farms, and capture public support. The Internet director heavily emphasized the importance of putting a "face," not a "theory" of what's happening on a farm, in front of the public. She stated, "Workers are critical, we need to work [their] voice out there for a campaign to work. We can't tell the workers' stories, I don't want to tell someone what to believe. When you hear their stories, faces, pains… It's easy to close your ears and eyes, but when it's a person and a face," the public is much more likely to lend their support.

Step Two: Deliberation

This step in the organizing process is where I discovered the most change with the use of the Internet. The organizing process during the 1960s and 1970s had a collective focus. Boycotts, building allies, and using electoral power all involved creating personal networks, supporters talking to other people, and collectively setting the stage for the action the UFW planned.

Today, as the Internet director put it, "the Internet is what used to be our boycotts." The Internet is an incredibly effective tool, especially in regards to the optimal utilization of resources. The Internet director stated, "I used to be one of those people standing outside of stores, [saying] 'sign my petition.' Now I can do something, and I can get petition numbers in minutes, not days… I can get a story out nationally, pull in money quickly… [In one campaign], when the growers were going to speak somewhere,

I got supporters out to counter." The campaign manager noted that the Internet "brings in more groups and voices" as a supplement and can "create community around an issue."

In regards to the role of the workers in all this, the process does not reflect the collective nature of the past. While in the first step the UFW makes physical contact with the workers, and the workers then make decisions, create goals, and provide information, the action is taken beyond the UFW in the second step. Since the Internet is the predominant and cost-effective tool, the team members figure how to reach the workers' goals and how to use the workers' information online.

For instance, during the Ruby Ridge campaign, our main action was a petition. The goal was to get supporters to sign the petition, requesting Darigold to intervene at Ruby Ridge and enforce unionization. In order to achieve that goal, we heavily targeted student groups across the Pacific Northwest to sign the petition, send it to their group members, and send it through their other social networking websites. Aligning with students has always been a central component to the UFW's strategy. However, in the past, students, workers, volunteers, would be working collectively to reach out to potential supporters. With the Internet, the UFW went directly to the potential supporters.

Step Three: Action

With pre-Internet organizing, boycotts, building allies, and using electoral power required everyone's presence in order to achieve these large-scale actions. Today, as the Internet director noted, in using the Internet as an organizing tool, the team members can segment their campaigns and only send certain communications to certain people. In regards to the workers, this also segments who participates in which actions.

For instance, after we finished pushing the petition and getting signatures, our next action was to deliver the petition in person to the Darigold headquarters, with the idea of drawing broader media and public attention. On this day, workers joined with other supporters, leading a march through Seattle to the headquarters. Workers gave speeches and one worker's son delivered the petition inside. In this sense, the action is very similar to the actions taken before the Internet: workers and supporters joined together in a large-scale, physical demonstration. However, the petition led up to this action, which was driven by students and other supporters, not the workers themselves. While the Internet is providing more direct support with potential supporters at a more efficient cost, it also removes the workers from certain aspects of organizing action.

Internet Organizing Overall

With the introduction of the Internet, there is a significant change in the general three-step process the UFW takes in regards to organizing. Before, workers were included in a collective process, building at each step. Now, the workers initiate the process, are generally absent in the middle stages, and then may be brought back in for the final action. The Internet is segmenting who completes what work. Workers initiate the first step and bring forth a problem; the team members figure out how to use the Internet to achieve the workers' goal; the team members directly contact other supporters, with more effective resource use; the workers and other supporters are brought back in for the final action. Instead of a continual group movement, the Internet is turning organizing into something more like an assembly line, with actors using their expertise at different steps.

While this process is limiting the workers' work at different points, it is also limiting the social aspect of organizing and movements. As previously stated, Bruns (2011) argues that the UFW was built "on plain hard work and these very personal relationships." And as Shaw (2008) argues, when Chavez transformed the organization structure, eliminating many of these personal relationships, the organizational frame resonated with organizers to a lesser extent. After this point, organizers were less invested and the UFW's membership experienced a steep decline over the next few decades.

The segmentation of work the Internet is creating is potentially preventing the rebuilding of those personal relationships and investments. When the campaign manager described his organizing strategy, he stated he looked for "points of convergence" between the UFW and other organizations. He provided an example: an environmental organization might care about labor abuses on a particular farm, if that farm is also producing waste; an animal protection organization might care about labor abuses on a particular farm, if that farm is abusing its livestock. However, he also stated that he "makes it very clear where we can work together, and where we cannot." He approaches other stakeholders telling them how they can work together regarding a certain farm, but the UFW cannot help in with other efforts the organization is pursuing. This may prove to be an effective strategy for exposing an issue to a broader public and winning a singular campaign. But, in terms of building the strong personal relationships the UFW built itself upon, segmenting work and pursuing occasional coalitions through the Internet prevents long-term relationships between the UFW, workers, and other supporters consistently and continually working towards a broader goal.

Pull from the Audience

While the Internet may be segmenting the organizing work, the optimization of resources may not be the only factor driving its use. During a planning meeting for our next action after the petition delivery, the Internet director stated, "know that if people go offline, participation goes really low… Going offline doesn't make sense… Offline options make us look weak because so little people are going to do it." The Internet has created a dependency on it, not only among the UFW, but among their potential audience as well. If the UFW attempted to return to their older model, would it actually work? Could they undo the effects that the Internet has had on the participation levels of supporters?

This pull from the audience also operates also under the assumption that the UFW's audience goes beyond the workers. The campaign manager spoke about the importance of borrowing from business practices and language, and focusing efforts outward. Comparing the UFW to other unions, he claimed the labor sector as a whole is stagnant because they are focusing "inward." They are only "preaching" to their members, without trying to build larger support for labor issues among the more general public. As a result, he claimed, the labor sector is experiencing a great amount of failure. The UFW has always sought out coalitions among other supporters (religious, labor, students, etc.). However, it could be that since their intended audience is outside of the UFW, and that audience requires Internet communication to such a large degree, that the UFW cannot direct its organizing resources towards its internal audience – the workers.

Organizing Against a Private Entity

My analysis of the use of the Internet may also be specific to the Ruby Ridge campaign and may

not necessarily hold valid across all of the UFW's organizing efforts. As noted by the campaign manager, in Washington (Ruby Ridge's home state), there fewer state laws than in California that protect farm workers. On the federal level, farm workers are excluded from many of the protections given to other sectors. As a result, farm workers infrequently report abuses, as it is easy for farm owners to retaliate and fire them from their positions.

With this dynamic in mind, all the team members noted that it is hard to include the workers in every step. The campaign manager explained it best by noting there was a scale of the types of workers involved with Ruby Ridge. On one end of the scale, there were workers who were fired and ready to take active action against Ruby Ridge. On the other end of the scale, there were workers still employed by Ruby Ridge who could have faced firing if they spoke out. In the middle, there were workers who were still employed, but were willing to provide the UFW information and declarations. The campaign manager noted that in order to protect all of these workers, he created a certain distance between the organizing process and the workers.

Framework of the UFW

Another component of the changing role of the workers involves the key tension demonstrated by Chavez in the late 1970s: framing the UFW as a union or as a social movement. Among the team members, this tension over framing the UFW as a social movement versus as a labor union still persists. Each team member has a different relationship with the UFW and a different orientation in regards to their work. And as argued by Benford and Snow (2000), organizations are not the carriers of ideas that automatically grow out of structural arrangements. The organizational actors are involved in a dynamic framing process that continuously evolves and may challenge existing frames as new ideologies are brought forth. It is a contested process, with each person trying to construct his or her version of reality.
The campaign manager came to the UFW after 15 years at a different labor union. The position he holds now is an elected position, in which he is accountable to the workers who elected him to it. And his main efforts involve instituting the UFW labor efforts on farms abroad. When he spoke, in both the planning meetings and one-on-one interview, he was analytical, academic, and strategic in nature. For instance, in one planning session, he said, "One of the dangers of this type of campaign is doing the same thing over and over again. To your adversary, this is a sign of weakness." During the interview, he made constant comparisons between the UFW and the labor sector as a whole. He spoke about strategy models he created to win campaigns.

The Internet director has a deep relationship with the UFW that extends her entire lifetime. The organization has had a strong presence in her life: she had a personal relationship with Cesar Chavez, she has made her entire career at the organization, and she initiated and built the UFW's Internet division. In both the planning meetings and one-on-one interview, she often borrowed language from Chavez and older campaigns, talking about grassroots organizing and the ideals of the UFW. For instance, in the interview she said, "We might not have the money, but we look for the most creative ways to do things, using our experience from before… branching out beyond normal methods." Also in the interview, she frequently used examples that focused on the human aspect of workers' stories and talked about creating an emotional connection with the public. This is in line with her position; her job is to obtain support and resonate with supporters during campaigns.

The regional director occupies an orientation between the manager and director. He too had a relationship with the UFW in high school and in college, and has made his career with the organization. His position mixes the duties of the campaign manager and the Internet director: He focuses on ensuring good working conditions and addressing worker issues, but he also organizes campaigns, holds press conferences, and draws attention to issues. He is accountable to the workers and promotes union practices, but he also must generate outside support for issues. His speech patterns displayed both union and justice qualities. When he spoke he often focused on the technical components of tasks that needed to be completed, but he also frequently referenced power dynamics between the workers and the farm owners, and the workers and Darigold. In the interview he said, "The company has done everything in its power to ensure the workers are silent, including a class action suit. I'm sure it has silenced some of the workers who haven't come out. They might start doubting the campaign, we might not have the entirety of the workers' support. That's true in every campaign, especially because the most vocal supporters get fired."

These different orientations the team members have to the UFW matter because they are reflective of the changes in the organization that occurred in the late 1970s and the tension between framing as a union or advocacy group. As Chavez changed the direction of the UFW, the organization's labor practices steadily declined (Shaw 2008; Ganz 2009; Bruns 2011). As Ganz (2009) notes, the vote to stop organizing in 1977 "made it harder to retain contracts in industries that were only partially organized." By 1983, Ganz characterizes the UFW as turning "to public advocacy in lieu of organizing." In 2000, the UFW refocused on the broader Latino community, even amending its constitutional mission to replace the "organizing" of farm workers with "protecting and insuring" their rights. Ganz argues that in the 2000s, the "UFW leaders moved into the kind of advocacy, services provision, and public policy work that other nonprofits had done for years," losing "the capacity to operate as a union." The campaign manager and, to some degree, the regional director speak about the campaign in labor terms; the Internet director, and to some degree, the regional director speak about the campaign in impassioned, social justice terms. While the UFW's operations do not reflect the union efforts of its first two decades, the tension over the frame still persists.

While Ganz argues that the UFW has essentially stopped acting as a union, this is not entirely true. There are still unionization efforts, like in the Ruby Ridge campaign. They just are not as large-scale as in the past. However, the continuing tension between focusing on unionization versus advocacy or social justice has reflected the changing position of the workers during the organizing process. The Internet segments the work done by people during the process and allows for the team members to organize on behalf of the farm workers instead of with them. The organizational change that Chavez implemented in the late 1970s eliminated the usual democratic processes a union operates through. Those democratic processes have not been reinstated. By acting on the advice of the workers instead of directly working with them, the team holds the power in the organizing process. In the 1960s and 1970s, the UFW worked to empower workers to organize for labor rights. Even though the workers initiate a campaign and decided whether or not to go forth with a campaign, that decision transfers power from the workers to the team. The assembly line of the current organizing process also segments the power of who is in control.

While the Internet is a contributing factor in the change of organizing on behalf of workers, the UFW's frame in introducing more advocacies also reflects the change to organizing on behalf of workers. In essence, it may not be that the Internet is forcing the team members to distance the workers from the

second step of the organizing process; it may be that their advocacy frame has allowed them to distance the workers from the second step in Internet organizing.

Conclusion

As the UFW moved from its first two decades of successful organizing, the workers experienced a shift in their role in the organization. The UFW has moved from a collective model of organizing into a segmented approach, in which actors take on work designated to their positions. The workers are still the focal point of the initial organizing stages. As the organizing process moves into deliberation and action, the UFW organizes more on behalf of the workers. I have put forth two factors that have contributed to this change: the segmentation of work the Internet creates and the shift towards an advocacy frame.

The Internet is dividing the labor of who completes what work. Workers initiate the first step and bring forth a problem; the team members figure out how to use the Internet to achieve the workers' goal; the team members directly contact other supporters, with more effective resource use; the workers and other supporters are brought back in for the final action. Instead of a continual group movement, the Internet is turning organizing into something more like an assembly line, with actors using their expertise at different steps.

The Internet, however, brings demands from the general public to shape how workers will be incorporated in the organizing process. While the older collective models incorporate the workers heavily, these models may no longer applicable to the digital age. Consumers of media may be bound to online activity, leaving low participation rates for physical demonstrations. These consumers may be forcing the UFW to switch to Internet organizing, which in turn, segments the organizing work and distances the organizing process from the fields and the UFW's internal audience, the workers.

The ideological shift Chavez created in the late 1970s has continued since. The UFW gradually minimized organizing and union efforts, switching to efforts like lobbying for legislation to achieve its goals. In turn, the UFW has switched from a union frame to an advocacy frame, organizing on behalf of workers, instead of with workers. This switch to advocating on behalf of workers' benefit may also be driving the segmentation of organizing work. Since the advocacy frame has minimized the personal relationships the UFW was built upon, there may not be room for collective group organizing within such a frame.

This work has wider implications for emerging organizing models. The earlier collective models of the UFW allowed the organization to continually operate under an overarching goal. Today, campaigns and support during campaigns are not necessarily carried over into new organizing efforts. If the segmentation of work seen with the UFW's use of the Internet is found in other organizations or movements, the Internet may not be an effective platform to sustain long-term efforts. If social movements and organizations are beholden to the Internet audience's demands and short-term efforts, this raises the question of what happens to the stakeholders – in this case the workers – in such organizing efforts? Can advocacy and social groups bring about large-scale change for stakeholders without their direct involvement? The Internet is still constantly developing. As researchers study the emerging organizing models the Internet is producing, they should not lose sight of the actual impact Internet organizing is having on the stakeholders involved.

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The Impact of US Military Intervention on Trade Flows

Akshay Anantharaman

The ethics and legality of foreign military intervention have been substantially explored, but there is little empirical literature on the impact of such intervention. This is somewhat troubling in the advent of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and widespread use of intervention as a policy tool. Given past studies on the role of political influence in trade and the significant cost of military action, we expect supportive intervention by the United States to disproportionately benefit the United States. Due to the ill effects of conflict on economic infrastructure and political relations, hostile intervention is expected to impair bilateral trade flows and the target state's trade with the world as a whole. This quantitative study reveals that supportive intervention results in an increase in the US share of a target state's imports and a fall in the target state's exports to the world. Hostile intervention significantly damages US-target bilateral trade and the target state's imports and exports with the world. This has strong implications for nations considering military intervention as a policy tool and the increasingly vociferous calls for 'humanitarian' intervention in foreign countries.

Introduction

In 2006, the United Nations (UN) officially accepted the R2P doctrine and legalized military intervention for 'humanitarian' purposes. Not only did this violate the very foundations upon which modern nation states were created, but it also legalized intervention prematurely and without consideration of the true intentions size and impact of military intervention. While the literature on the ethics and legality of intervention is voluminous, little attention is paid to the motives and impact of intervention. There is room to build upon the understanding of the role of political influence and conflict in trade presented in past studies. We seek to substantiate the existing literature on military intervention and trade flow determinants by focusing on the link between American military intervention and the target state's trade flows. By examining the bilateral and global economic implications of intervention in an empirical study, we can better understand the motives and impact of military intervention (by the United States) and examine the lasting effects that such intervention has on target states' dyadic and national trade.

Our line of thought draws on the Selectorate Theory (Mesquita, Downs 2006) and the premise that the United States uses covert foreign intervention to promote its economic interests (Berger et al 2010). We consider exports to be a public good; export levels may be used by leaders to 'pay off' domestic voters to ensure political survival. The United States uses supportive military intervention as a tool of influence to expand foreign markets for American exporters, with little regard for the economic consequences for the target state and the world as a whole. Given that leaders are accountable only to their domestic voter

base, we have no reason to expect that they would act 'benevolently' for the cause of global free trade, democratization, or human rights, unless domestic voters have a strong demand for such policies. Given the significance of exports to the economy and the daily life of numerous Americans, voters are likely to have a stronger preference for US-skewed trade policies than for altruistic 'crusades'. We also argue that hostile military intervention has a severe negative effect on bilateral economic relations and the target state's total national trade flows (i.e. with the world). As this entails military action against an enemy regime, the US cannot use influence over the target to control the impact of such action.

We test our theory using an OLS regression model with robust standard errors, and find evidence that the United States uses supportive military action as a means of promoting American exports to the target state without reciprocating in kind with US imports from the target state. Such action does not benefit the target state's national trade prospects, and actually damages the target state's absolute level of exports to the world as a whole. Hostile intervention has a strong negative effect on bilateral trade between the US and the target state and severely damages the target state's overall trade levels with the world. Indeed, we find that US military intervention is more economically destructive than civil or international war. Our findings have significant implications for the scholarship on trade and intervention. We add to the modest literature on the role of political influence in trade, substantiate the literature on determinants of trade flows, and raise serious questions about the motives and impact of foreign military intervention.

The first section of our paper considers the existing literature on trade flows, military intervention, and the relationship between political influence of domestic political actors and international trade. In the second and third sections, we proceed to elaborate on our theory and formulate hypotheses based on our assumptions. We then describe our data, variables and estimation procedure. We test our predictions and analyze our findings from the regression model. In the final section of the paper, we summarize the implications of our findings and provide suggestions for further research on the subject.

Literature Review

Determinants of Bilateral Trade Flows

There appears to be little contention that the gravity model of trade is broadly effective in explaining international trade. This model suggests that trade increases with partner countries' size (GDP, population) and decreases with transaction costs (geographic distance, absence of a common border). Since this theory was first espoused by Tinbergen (1962), there have been numerous studies that build upon this model and studies that seek additional explanations for bilateral trade flows.

Some academics have considered the relative factor endowments – land, labor, and capital – of trade partners (Ohlin 1933) to be most relevant, while others have conducted comprehensive studies of other factors that may influence trade. Many historical and contemporary factors, including colonial infrastructure, migration patterns, corporate networks, protectionism, economies of scale and the cost of production may also positively or negatively influence absolute bilateral trade levels (Eichengreen, Irwin 1998). In some cases, past trade patterns appear to have a self-reinforcing effect on the future. Aside from socio-economic and historical factors, the political systems of partner countries impact the level of free trade between them. It has been found that pairs of democratic nations have freer trade than autocracy-democracy pairs (Mansfield, Milner, Rosendorff 2000). This difference arises from the presence of a legislature in democratic systems, providing democratic leaders with a 'credible threat' that autocrats

lack during negotiations. Due to fears of a massive trade war between two 'protectionist' legislatures, democratic nations actually end up having freer trade than autocracy-democracy pairs.

Brian Pollins looks at the level of 'amity' and 'enmity' between nations, and finds that political allies tend to trade more than do political enemies (1989). Due to higher goodwill, lower economic risk and a tendency to reward friends, higher bilateral cooperation is associated with increased bilateral trade flows. Similarly, pairs of countries in political-military alliances, especially bilateral ones, see higher levels of dyadic trade (Gowa, Mansfield 1993). In such cases, allies with different factor endowments tend to experience greater trade benefits than allies with similar factor endowments. Academics generally agree that political alliances, joint membership in a trade zone, and a history of warm political relations promote bilateral trade flows, while hostile relations hinder the flow of goods and services between pairs of nations (Keshk, Pollins, Reuveny 2004).

While these ideas are useful in determining absolute bilateral trade levels and predicting how they vary in the medium to long run, they do not account for sudden changes that may occur from conflict, military intervention or war. While the theories thus far have been widely acknowledged, there is a little more contention when it comes to the relation between conflict and trade flows. Barbieri & Levy argue that there is no "consistent, systematic or even significant fall in trade during wars" (1999). They argue that it is not in states' interest to reduce bilateral trade even when at war with one another, primarily due to the significant gains from trade and domestic political and economic consequences of lower trade. Militarized interstate disputes (MIDs—armed confrontations between states falling short of war—are also alleged to have no statistically significant effect on trade flows between pairs of relevant countries (Mansfield, Pevehouse 2000).

Not unexpectedly, numerous scholars have taken exception to the above lines of thought. A great number of studies strictly contradict that by Mansfield & Pevehouse, and have found that MIDs do indeed reduce trade flows between contesting parties (Keshk, Pollins, Reuveny 2004; Oneal, Russett, Berbaum 2003). War has also been found to cause a decline in trade relative to pre- and post-war periods (Anderton, Carter 2001; Mansfield, Bronson 1997). Wars appear to have a large and persistent negative effect on trade, national income and global economic welfare. In fact, a fairly recent study found that these trade costs might be at least as large as the 'direct' costs of war and they might also affect neutral countries as well (Glick, Taylor 2005).

Studies supporting the view that war reduces trade flows between belligerents are not only greater in number, but are also more comprehensive, compelling, and empirically sound than those by Barbieri & Levy (1999) and Mansfield & Pevehouse (2000). Given the massive human, physical and political cost of war, it is not surprising that trade-facilitating networks and infrastructure should also be destroyed in wartime. Trade routes might come under attack, deterring trade between even belligerents and neutrals. Economies are re-geared towards war and may begin to rely more on local production. War also creates significant 'enmity' between nations. Based on Pollins' study (1989), this would be another significant effect of war on trade flows, at least between belligerents.

Most of the existing literature deals primarily with historical influence, political relations, and socio-economic factors that surround war, alongside variations of the gravity model. There is little consideration of whether a country benefits more than another from a particular trade relationship, or whether there are any instances of states using influence to affect bilateral trade flows. Given the significant

economic gains from trade, especially to exporters, powerful nations may be tempted to use undue influence to alter bilateral trade flows. To address this gap in the literature of bilateral trade flows, I will explore a specific manner in which states may influence bilateral trade for domestic gains. I will examine whether the United States – the world's foremost political, economic and military power – uses military intervention in foreign countries as a means of influencing bilateral trade flows.

Foreign Military Intervention

Foreign military intervention refers to instances in which states deploy troops to foreign nations in a peacekeeping, disaster relief, security, logistical support or combat capacity. Such intervention may occur either with or without the permission of the target state's government. Notwithstanding the technical definition of military intervention, the debate in recent years has centred on intervention for 'humanitarian' reasons. In the advent of the R2P principle there have been strong calls for foreign military intervention, in states that fail to uphold human rights, for political, legal and ethical reasons (NY Times 2003; Molier 2006). Given that a sovereign state has the responsibility to protect its subjects from genocide and mass atrocities, a failure to do so suggests that this duty passes to the international community (Evans 2007). Oftentimes, such intervention leads to action against the target state's government and regime change.

It was illegal for a state to intervene in the internal affairs of another state without permission, for whatever reason, especially if such action involved force. The strongest argument against allowing for 'humanitarian' intervention was based on the sacrosanct concept of state sovereignty, dating back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). There is continued debate on the legality and ethicality of humanitarian military intervention, even though the UN's official adoption of the R2P principle (2006) legalized intervention for 'human rights.' It has been argued that intervention should be used sparingly and is ethically justifiable only when "domestic turmoil threatens regional or international security [or] when massive violations of human rights occur" (Hoffmann 1995).

The ethicality and legality of military intervention are not the focus of this paper, but exploring the debate on this issue yields a valuable insight. There is an implicit assumption that intervention will be used for 'good' purposes such as the promotion of democracy or defense of human rights. Far too often, the most ardent advocates of humanitarian intervention fail to consider the actual impact of military intervention and do not conduct empirical analyses to support their arguments. Fortunately, there is a small but growing empirical literature on the real effects of foreign military intervention.

In a broad study on the effects of intervention, Pickering & Kisangani find that large-scale military action has no effect on political systems, economic growth or the physical quality of life in developing democracies (2006). Hostile intervention results in more democratic autocracies, while rival interventions promote long-term economic growth in autocratic nations (Pickering, Kisangani 2006). Hostile intervention involves military action against an incumbent government, while rival action occurs when an intervener responds to a third party's involvement in a country. Given the lack of diverse literature on this subject, most of these assertions remain uncontested.

In a focused study conducted by Bueno de Mesquita & Downs, we find that intervention by democratic nations actually has a negative effect on democratic target states (2006). Due to the policy preferences of domestic voters, democratic interveners tend to install a friendly autocratic leadership in the

target state to ensure that the target state follows certain policies even after the intervention (de Mesquita, Downs 2006). Autocratic interveners, on the other hand, are found to have little impact on the political system of the target state. Thus, military intervention does not likely promote the spread of democracy and, in some cases, may actually work against democratization.

In a study more relevant to 'humanitarian' intervention, Peksen finds that whether or not intervention is supportive, neutral, or hostile, human rights in the target country are likely to deteriorate in some form or another (2012). Military intervention negatively affects human rights regardless of whether an intergovernmental organization or liberal democracy is involved. In another study, it was found that unilateral US intervention negatively impacts women's political and economic status, but is unlikely to affect their social rights (Peksen 2011). Even if nations militarily intervene in other countries, human rights do not improve in the target state and often take a turn for the worse. The empirical literature on military intervention undermines popular calls for 'ethical' intervention and casts doubt on the expected consequences of R2P-related military action.

Once the consequences of military intervention are considered, the prospect of 'humanitarian' missions and moral 'crusades' appears much less attractive. Military intervention may be used as a tool by the intervening country to politically influence the target country. de Mesquita's and Downs' view of domestic politics is of particular interest. Democratic leaders, such as those in the United States, are drawn to interventions that are directly tied to the provision of a public good (national security, resources, trade) to their domestic populace (de Mesquita, Downs 2006). The president of the United States has little incentive to commit the time and resources to 'democratizing' Iraq or preventing massacres in Libya unless there is a tangible benefit to American voters. Although war and even small-scale military action have been found to negatively impact the overall trade levels of an affected state (Anderton, Carter 2001; Glick, Taylor 2005), military action may be used to positively impact bilateral trade between the target and the intervener. Military intervention may be deliberately used as a tool of influence to increase the US share of a target state's total imports.

Intervention and Trade

Existing studies by academics have speculated that political influence, in some cases through intervention, plays a role in bilateral trade (Hirschman 1945; Berger et al 2010). The most relevant study to this paper deals with the impact of US influence, as measured by CIA intervention, on bilateral trade flows. The United States appears to have greater influence over foreign leaders installed and backed by the CIA. US exports to the target nation increased significantly after an intervention and were concentrated in industries in which the US had a competitive disadvantage. There were no significant changes in US imports from the target state or in the target nation's overall trade patterns with the rest of the world, suggesting that the US did indeed use the CIA to create a larger foreign market for US products (Berger, Easterly, Nunn, Satyanath 2010).

In exploring the impact of military intervention on bilateral trade flows, this paper will largely follow the methodology of Berger et al (2010). Rather than using CIA intervention as a measure of influence over target states, certain types of military action will be used to ascertain American influence. Overt military intervention is of a markedly different nature than covert CIA action. Military intervention, when compared to CIA intervention, is more public, time consuming, costly, and politically sensitive, and

may well have very different effects on trade flows.

In addition to considering positive influences on bilateral trade flows, we also examine instances in which military intervention results in reduced trade flows between the intervener and the target. This theory is based on existing studies pointing to inter-state 'enmity' (Pollins 1989) and the ill effects of conflict on bilateral trade between contesting parties (Keshk, Pollins, Reuveny 2004; Oneal, Russett, Berbaum 2003). This paper not only adds to the existing literature on the determinants of bilateral trade flows, but also substantiates the Selectorate Theory, explores the impact and motives of intervention, and further examines the possibility of political influence in trade flows.

Theory

The United States has been the most frequent intervening nation state in foreign countries since the end of the Second World War. From evacuation and disaster relief missions to regime change, the superpower has been militarily involved in foreign nations on over a hundred different occasions. While military operations related to evacuation and disaster relief are relatively straightforward, other kinds of intervention can be difficult, expensive, and contentious. It only follows that non-neutral operations (logistical support, combative action, regime support or change, 'humanitarian' intervention) require greater justification to undertake.

Based on the Selectorate Theory, democratic leaders – such as those in the US – are accountable to a large winning coalition (de Mesquita, Downs 2006). In order to maintain the support of their winning coalition, democratic leaders must enact policies that provide 'public goods' to the winning coalition (made up of the most robust group of constituents, their voters). As such, it has been argued that intervention by democracies is carefully selected so as to be linked to the provision of a public good to domestic voters (de Mesquita, Downs 2006). Public goods are non-rivalrous and non-excludable, and may include roads, clean water and national parks. This notion may also extend to national benefits such as defense, trade, and friendly diplomatic relations.

The world's largest economy, the United States is also the largest exporter of goods and services in the world, with over $1.55 trillion in exports in 2009. Over 50 million Americans are involved with international trade in some capacity. Exports are particularly vital to the economy, being linked to 40% of private sector jobs, 33% of agricultural activity and 25% of the manufacturing sector. It should come as no surprise, then, that Presidential elections are almost always influenced by economic conditions. It is well known that exports not only support jobs, and contribute to national income, but also increase firms' competitiveness, promote diversification and allow access to foreign markets. Imports, though not as much of a 'public good' or as vital to the economy as exports, do increase product variety, reduce prices faced by consumers, and may also promote competition. While exports are undoubtedly a key public good for American leaders and voters, the classification of imports as a true 'public good' is somewhat less certain. Though some academics have explored the role of political influence in bilateral trade flows (Hirschman 1945; Galtung 1971; Antràs & Padro-i-Miquel 2008), this paper is closest to the empirical study of American economic 'imperialism' by Berger et al (2010). In this recent study, the United States was found to have used political influence, through CIA intervention, to increase exports to foreign countries. There was a smaller positive, but statistically insignificant, effect on bilateral imports. CIA intervention did not have a positive effect on the target state's trade with the world as a whole, suggesting that this form of

intervention was used to the benefit of the US economy and, in turn, American voters. I expect a similar mechanism in the case of military intervention, though a more nuanced approach is needed when deciding exactly what kinds of military action to include in the analysis.

Given that the United States has greater influence over target state leaders kept in power by the CIA (Berger et al 2010), we could expect the same of leaders kept in power by military intervention. US influence over a target state's leader would be present when military action is aimed at installing or maintaining the leader in power. This may involve logistical support (advisors, transport) or direct combative action (land, naval or aerial). 'Peacekeeping' operations that aim to keep a particular regime in power also fall under this category. Military action supports the target state's incumbent leader and attacks rebel groups or third party countries. Alternatively, in cases of successful intervention-driven regime change, we would expect strong US influence over the leader installed after intervention. These kinds of military action may all be classified as 'supportive'.

Such intervention may influence the target state through reciprocity and coercion mechanisms. When a leader is put or maintained in power by the actions of an intervener, he may well feel the need to 'return the favour' by enacting trade policies that benefit the United States. This normative concept is driven by the notion that the political subject often feels the need to reward friendly actions and punish unfriendly ones. It may also be argued that a target leader's survival depends upon the intervening country. In the absence of the US military, rivals or rebel groups may well remove the leader from power. The sheer presence of US military power could also be seen as an implicit threat to remove the leader from power if he does not enact friendly bilateral trade policies. These coercion tools are not limited to periods of continued military intervention, but can instead be extended to threats of a leader being removed from power during his tenure, even in times of non-intervention.

Supportive military intervention may thus be used as a tool to further American economic interests. Given the direct significance of exports to a large proportion of the U.S. workforce and to the economy as a whole, it follows that the United States may use military intervention to influence a target state to import more goods and services from the United States. The United States may not necessarily use military action as a tool to increase the target state's exports to the United States, as imports are not as essential to the U.S. economy and bear fewer characteristics of a public good. However, as imports do benefit the economy we certainly should not expect a decrease in target exports to the U.S.

Military intervention is not always supportive in nature and may not, in fact, be amenable to a target state's incumbent leader or to an opposition leader. The United States might intervene in opposition to an incumbent regime, for example, and in support of rebel groups or third party countries. Such operations may involve logistical support (advisors, transport) or direct combative action (land, naval or aerial). Military operations that aim to remove a particular regime from power but fail to do so, as in the case of overt military action against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, also fall under this category. These kinds of military intervention may all be classified as 'hostile'.

Hostile intervention does not result in US 'influence' over the target state and may negatively affect trade through the reciprocity mechanism. Such intervention might also lead to collateral damage and deteriorating political relations. When a leader feels threatened by the actions of an intervener, he may feel the need to retaliate by enacting bilateral trade policies that harm the US. This normative concept is supported by the notion that the target leader feels a need to punish 'bad deeds' and avenge offenses to his

regime. As hostile military action is directed against established institutions, intervention may also damage economic infrastructure and trade networks. Though this may not be the US's aim, impaired bilateral and national trade flows are a consequence of such militarized disputes (Keshk, Pollins, Reuveny 2004; Oneal, Russett, Berbaum 2003). Lastly, 'hostile' military strikes would worsen political relations, thereby creating 'enmity' and damaging bilateral trade (Pollins 1989). The effects of hostile intervention are not under the control of the United States, and have a significant negative impact on bilateral imports and exports with the target.

Based on our theory, the impact of American action is not limited to periods of continued military intervention, but can be extended to times of non-intervention during the target state leader's tenure in power. Moreover, the impact of military action, whether positive or negative, exists only in those years in which the concerned target leader is still in power. For instance, the United States intervened in support of the Kuwaiti monarchy in 1991 and the Emir of Kuwait remained in power until 2006. The US had influence in Kuwait from 1991 to 2006, when a new Emir inherited the throne. In this instance, we did indeed observe a significant increase in US exports to Kuwait.

Our theory is focused on the impact of military intervention on bilateral trade flows between the intervener (i.e. United States) and the target state. The United States has no material incentive to influence a target state's trade with the world as a whole. The public good benefit to domestic voters arises from increased US exports to foreign states, and not from higher trade between two third party states. Hence, we have little reason to believe that supportive military intervention positively affects a target country's total imports from, and exports to, the world as a whole. In cases of hostile military action, the collateral damage to incumbent institutions and infrastructure suggests that there may actually be a negative effect on the target state's total imports and exports with the world.

American leaders are accountable to voters – their winning coalition – and must enact policies that benefit constituents. Given the cost, effort and controversy of military intervention, such action must be carefully chosen so as to relate to the provision of a public good, such as exports, to the American population. Domestic voters are unlikely to have a strong preference for 'altruistic' military intervention, as export-oriented interventions are considerably more meaningful for the well being of individuals and the US economy. There is precedent for the use of political influence to further economic interests (Berger et al 2010), and it may reasonably be expected that military intervention is another form of gaining influence over foreign leaders. Supportive intervention should positively affect the US share of a target state's total imports but have no significant effect on the US share of a target's total exports. Hostile intervention should reduce the US share of the target state's total imports and exports. Supportive action does not have a positive effect on the target nation's total trade (imports, exports) with the world as a whole, while hostile action may in fact have a negative impact on a target state's total imports and exports with the world.

Hypothesis

We focus our hypotheses on the bilateral trade relations between the United States and the target country. Supportive military intervention is expected to protect or promote US trade interests, regardless of whether the total trade levels of a target state increase or decrease after intervention. To isolate the impact of military action on trade between the intervener and target states, we look at the United States' share (%) of the target nation's total imports or exports with the world. The American winning coalition

wants this number to increase. Assume that Chad imports $100 in goods from the United States and $1000 from the world, giving the US a 10% share of Chadian imports. If the United States intervenes in support of the Chadian government in Year 2, a rise in the 10% share would reflect a disproportionate benefit to American voters (as expected by our theory).

Intervention in a foreign state is more justifiable if there is an increase in the share of imports. If supportive intervention causes an increase in Chad's absolute trade levels but no change in the US share of trade, other countries in the world have benefitted just as much from US military action. This may upset voters as American resources (human, military, etc) were used to benefit third party countries just as much as they were used to benefit the United States. This sentiment has most recently been exhibited in the public outcry against US military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The perception of using precious American resources to benefit the target state or even the world as a whole is unthinkable to domestic constituents. Moreover, opponents of military action may argue that intervention by a third party nation, such as Britain or France, would have had the same benefit to the United States without the associated cost. In the event that absolute bilateral exports to Chad fall but the American share of Chad's total imports from the world increases, voters would be just as satisfied as supportive military action was used to ensure that the United States lost less trade than third party countries did.

We have strong reason to believe that the United States uses supportive military intervention to further its economic interests. Supportive military action is used to expand foreign markets for US exports, a key public good for American firms and voters. There is not, however, a similar increase in US imports from abroad, as imports are not as vital to the American populace. In this manner, we expect supportive military intervention to disproportionately benefit the United States economy and, in turn, the winning coalition.

Hypothesis A: Supportive military intervention has a significant, positive effect on the United States' share of the target state's total imports (from the world).

Null A: Supportive military intervention has no significant effect, or a negative effect, on the United States' share of the target state's total imports (from the world).

Hypothesis B: Supportive military intervention has no significant positive effect on the United States' share of the target state's total exports (to the world).

Null B: Supportive military intervention has a significant negative effect on the United States' share of the target state's total exports (to the world).

In cases of hostile intervention, focusing on the US share allows us to isolate any disproportionate loss to the United States from undertaking such military action. Even though collateral damage is expected to reduce the target state's absolute trade levels with the world as a whole, the reciprocity mechanism and deteriorating political relations would cause the United States to lose more trade than other nations. Although the United States does not intend this to happen, there should be a strong negative effect on the US share of a target's total imports and exports in the event of hostile US military action.

Hypothesis C: Hostile military intervention has a significant, negative effect on the United States' share of the target state's total imports (from the world).

Null C: Hostile military intervention has no significant effect, or a positive effect, on the United States' share of the target state's total imports (from the world).

Hypothesis D: Hostile military intervention has a significant, negative effect on the United States' share of the target state's total exports (to the world).

Null D: Hostile military intervention has no significant effect, or a positive effect, on the United States' share of the target state's total exports (to the world).

The United States is concerned only with the disproportionate trade benefit to the American economy and domestic voters. It is not in the United States' direct interest to bring about increased trade between Chad and the world as a whole or to fulfil a 'moral' role as a champion of global free trade. Therefore, we have no reason to expect that supportive military action will cause an increase in the target state's total imports and exports with the world. Although the United States does not intend for this to happen, the collateral damage associated with hostile intervention may well reduce the target state's trade with non-belligerent third party nations (i.e. the rest of the world).

Hypothesis E: Supportive military intervention has no significant positive effect on the target state's total imports and exports (with the world).

Null E: Supportive military intervention has a significant positive effect on the target state's total imports and exports (with the world).

Hypothesis F: Hostile military intervention has a significant, negative effect on the target state's total imports and exports (with the world).

Null F: Hostile military intervention has no significant effect, or a positive effect, on the target state's total imports and exports (with the world).

Research Design

Independent & Dependent Variables

Based on our theory, non-neutral (supportive or hostile) military intervention by the United States impacts bilateral trade flows with the target state for so long as the relevant target leader is in power. US influence over the target state's leader begins with the initiation of military action and ends with the leader's departure from power. In cases where military intervention spans the tenure of two or more leaders, American influence is present for the duration of military operations and persists throughout the tenure of the leader in power during the final year of military intervention. The independent variable is not military intervention per se, but the presence of positive US influence (arising from supportive military intervention) and negative US influence (arising from hostile military intervention) over the target state. Positive and negative influence over a target state cannot occur simultaneously in a given year. In cases of non-neutral intervention, the United States openly supports either the incumbent regime or rebel groups. Unlike in cases of covert double-dealing (e.g. Iran-Iraq War), there is rarely confusion about the US position in cases of military intervention. It is also not politically or logically feasible for the US to militarily support opposing sides in a given conflict. Influence over the target state is either positive in cases of supportive intervention or negative in cases of hostile intervention. The two scenarios never overlap. Although we use different variables to account for positive and negative influence, we can run a regression

with both terms simultaneously. To account for positive influence and negative influence, we code our independent (dummy) variables as '0' for years in which there is no influence and '1' in years of influence. Our primary dependent variables are the US share (%) of the target country's total imports (from the world) and the US share (%) of the target country's total exports (to the world). In a bilateral trade relationship, US exports to a target state are also the target state's imports from the US, while a target state's exports to the US are also the US imports from the target state. Positive US influence should have a strong positive effect on the target's imports from the United States but no significant positive effect on the target's bilateral exports, while negative influence should have a strong negative effect on the target country's imports from and exports to the United States.

Although using the US share of trade (as opposed to absolute bilateral trade levels) successfully isolates the impact of military intervention on the United States, we also look at the total absolute trade levels of the target country to determine whether US influence is used to promote international trade and well-being. We can also look at whether American military intervention creates, maintains or destroys a target state's non-bilateral trade levels. We consider the effects of US influence on the target country's total imports (from the world) and the target country's total exports (to the world). Our theory gives us no reason to believe that US influence will be used for any other purpose than to advance the interests of the American president's own winning coalition. As such, positive influence does not cause an increase in the target state's total imports and exports with the world. Collateral damage means that negative influence may actually result in reduced imports and exports between the target state and the world.

Controls

Aside from isolating the effects of intervention on the United States, using the US share of a target state's trade controls for both gradual and shock effects on overall trade levels. For instance, if the GDP of Liberia rises over a five-year period, we would also expect to see an increase in Liberia's trade levels with other countries. Although Liberian imports from the United States may rise, so too do Liberian imports from other countries of the world. However, we would expect the US share of Liberia's imports to remain approximately constant over this same period. In this manner, we are able to control for a number of factors that affect trade levels with all countries in a more or less equal manner (GDP, population, economic shocks, state capacity). Our focus is on factors, such as US military intervention, which may disproportionately benefit or disadvantage the United States.

Based on the study on CIA intervention by Berger et al (2010) and past literature on trade flows, we account for certain factors that could affect the US share of a target state's trade. We employ a fixed-effects model to account for time and country-specific factors such as physical distance, colonial status and culture. Using a lagged dependent variable allows us to mimic a difference-in-difference equation and account for historical influences on trade. Dummy variables are used to control for GATT/WTO membership and ratification of the New York Convention (NYC). Since states party to these US-dominated institutions may well trade more with the United States than otherwise expected. We also include dummy variables to account for the possibility that (civil) war and the Polity level (democracy/autocracy) of target states affect the US share of trade.

As our theory posits that the United States intervenes to further its own trade interests, it is worth considering the impact of third party interventions on US trade levels. If Britain were to militarily intervene in Egypt, and thereby gain some form of political influence, we would look at whether the United States' share of Egypt's imports/exports is altered. To ensure that it is indeed US influence, and not third party intervention, that results in trade benefits to the United States, we include a dummy variable to account for positive British/French influence and negative British/French influence. Britain and France are both democratic P5 nations and are, after the US, the most frequent military interveners in foreign nations. Lastly, the regression analysis will test counterfactual scenarios in which there is no US influence to determine 'normal' trade levels, comparing instances of '0' influence to years of positive/negative influence.

Estimation Equation

In our actual regression equation, we use the natural log of our dependent variables, instead of their absolute value, to reduce massive fluctuations in numbers over years and between countries. Given that most of the independent or control variables in the estimating equation are dummy variables, using the natural log allows for a precise regression equation that allows us to more confidently state the relevance and impact of our right hand-side terms. Before taking the natural log of our variables we add '1' to the dependent variable term to account for instances of zero trade.

The estimation equation is as follows:

$$\ln(1 + \text{US \% of Target Imports})_{t,c} = \alpha_t + \alpha_c + \beta_1 \textit{Influence}_{t,c}^{Positive} + \beta_2 \textit{Influence}_{t,c}^{Negative} + \gamma \cdot X_{t,c} + \lambda_1 \ln(1 + \text{US \% of Target Imports})_{t-1,c} + \lambda_2 \ln(1 + \text{US \% of Target Imports})_{t-2,c} + \varepsilon_{t,c}$$

Note: the first two terms in the equation denote year and country fixed effects, respectively. The third and fourth terms reflect positive influence (from supportive action) and negative influence (from hostile action), respectively. The term is a vector of control variables relating to the target, including GATT/WTO membership, NYC ratification, democracy/autocracy, inter-state war, civil war and controls for British and French interventions. The last two terms are one/two year lags of the dependent variable.
The above estimation equation is for Hypotheses A and C. The equation is used to test the other hypotheses by replacing "US% of Target Imports" with "US% of Target Exports," "Total Target Imports" or "Total Target Exports" in all instances. For a full version of the equation, with all the control variables specified, see the Appendix.

Summary Statistics & Data Set

Our data set includes select observations from existing scholarly databases and new, individually coded fields. Each observation contains an intervener-target country pair and year. As the only intervener in question is the United States, this is equivalent to examining the trade flows of individual countries over a period of time. In addition to the year and country in question, each observation includes trade, intervention, war, polity and treaty ratification data. In cases of incomplete or missing data on intervention and leaders, additional research was conducted in order to complete as many observations as possible. The full data set consists of a cross section and time series, and will be analyzed using OLS regression. Summary statistics are as follows:

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum
Target Imports From World[A]	8,967	16,680	59,256	0.3	1,131,920
Target Exports To World[A]	8,968	17,069	64,054	0.1	1,429,340
US Share Of Target Imports[B]	8,530	14.20	16.42	0	100
US Share Of Target Exports[B]	8,402	16.76	20.20	0	100
Positive US Influence	9,421	0.04	0.19	0	1
Negative US Influence	9,421	0.03	0.16	0	1
GATT / WTO Membership	9,421	0.55	0.50	0	1
NYC Ratification	9,421	0.38	0.49	0	1
Democracy	9,421	0.32	0.47	0	1
Autocracy	9,421	0.35	0.48	0	1
War	9,421	0.04	0.19	0	1
Civil War	9,421	0.07	0.26	0	1
Positive British/French Influence	9,421	0.05	0.21	0	1

Note: The presence of US influence, GATT/WTO membership, NYC Ratification, Democracy, Autocracy, War, Civil War or British/French Influence is indicated by a dummy variable value of '0' or '1'.
A: Absolute trade levels are expressed in millions of 2005 US Dollars.
B: US shares are expressed as a percentage, ranging from 0 – 100%.

Our data set has been compiled and coded based on a number of sources. The International Military Intervention (IMI) data set contains a detailed list and classification (duration, nature of action, casualties, direction of support) of military intervention by all, and in all, countries between 1946 and 2005. Together with the Congressional Research Service report on foreign military action by the United States (2010), this forms the base of our intervention data on the United States, Britain and France (the latter are used as controls in our analysis). The Correlates of War (COW) project provides us with data on bilateral and national trade flows for all nations between 1940 and 2009. Based on this, we derive the United States' share of countries' imports and exports from 1940 to 2009.

As previously mentioned, we expect the United States to have either positive or negative influence on a target state only during a particular leader's tenure. Influence is present if military intervention occurred during that leader's time in power and is sustained until there is a change in the target state's leadership. By including the Archigos data set on world leaders from 1940 to 2004 and cross-referencing this with instances of military intervention, we are able to code individual observations to account for American influence on a target state. To account for the divergent effects of military intervention, we use separate dummy variables for positive and negative US influence. A value of '0' is assigned to country-year pairs in which there is no positive US influence, while a value of '1' is given to observations that are affected by positive influence. The same coding procedure is carried out for the negative US influence

variable.

We use Polity scores for countries (from 1940 to 2009) to code target nations as being democratic or autocratic. States with a Polity score greater than or equal to 6 are assigned a value of '1' for being democratic, while states with a score of less than 6 are coded as '0'. Countries that score -6 or lower are given a dummy variable value of '1' for being autocratic, while those with a score greater than -6 are coded as '0'. We account for other controls in a similar fashion. Years in which countries are GATT/WTO members and signatories to the New York Convention (NYC) are coded using a dummy variable value of '1'. We also look at the COW data on inter-state and intra-state (civil) wars between 1940 and 2009 as a control measure, coding each year of conflict as '1'.

Results

The results of our first regression analysis show, as proposed by Hypothesis A, that supportive military intervention does indeed have a significant positive impact on US exports to the target state. When the United States intervenes in support of an incumbent regime, we see a 2.32% increase in the US share of the target state's imports (refer to the appendix for the methodology used to calculate level of impact). Given the coefficient's significance level of 1%, we may be fairly certain of our findings. Military action results in positive influence on the target state's leader through the reciprocity and coercion mechanisms. The target leader may subsequently bring about an increase in American imports through direct government purchases, favourable trade policies or the encouragement of local businesses to buy from the United States. While Berger et al find evidence that increased imports from the United States are a direct result of government purchases (2010), the exact means by which supportive military intervention results in increased imports from the United States is not within the scope of this paper.

Table 2 also shows us that supportive military action has no significant effect on US imports from the target state, supporting Hypothesis B. Although the coefficient is marginally positive, supportive intervention has no statistically relevant impact on the US share of the target state's exports. Although it does have influence over the target leader, the United States does not have a strong interest in increasing the level of imports from the target state. As imports are less vital to the US economy and do not qualify as a public good, US leaders are less likely to use their influence to impact this trade flow. Moreover, anticipated reaction by powerful protectionist lobby groups may provide a disincentive for US leaders to interfere with bilateral imports from the target state.

The results further show, as proposed by Hypothesis C and Hypothesis D, that hostile military intervention has a significant negative impact on US imports and exports with the target state. When the United States intervenes in opposition to an incumbent regime, we observe a 4.68% fall in the US share of the target state's imports and a 1.96% fall in the US share of the target state's exports. Both values are accorded a significance level of 1%. Through a combination of the reciprocity mechanism, collateral damage and worsened political relations, bilateral trade flows between the United States and the target state are severely impaired. This finding is consistent with the existing literature on the ill effects of militarized disputes (Keshk, Pollins, Reuveny 2004; Oneal, Russett, Berbaum 2003) and 'enmity' (Pollins 1989) on bilateral trade flows between contesting parties.

Table 2: Regression Results for US Share of Target State's Imports & Exports

Variable	ln (1 + US Share of Target Imports)	ln (1 + US Share of Target Exports)
Positive US Influence	0.144***	0.064
	(0.039)	(0.040)
Negative US Influence	-0.375***	-0.345***
	(0.063)	(0.072)
GATT / WTO Membership	0.016	0.047*
	(0.019)	(0.025)
NYC Ratification	0.036**	-0.018
	(0.014)	(0.022)
Democracy	-0.022	-0.052**
	(0.017)	(0.026)
Autocracy	-0.026	-0.023
	(0.019)	(0.022)
War	-0.028	-0.040
	(0.040)	(0.032)
Civil War	-0.014	-0.070***
	(0.027)	(0.026)
Positive British/French Influence	0.038	0.033
	(0.029)	(0.043)
Negative British/French Influence	-0.039	-0.082
	(0.052)	(0.055)
ln (1 + US Share Of Target Imports)	0.605***	-
- Lagged 1 Year	(0.031)	
ln (1 + US Share Of Target Imports)	0.131***	-
- Lagged 2 Years	(0.027)	
ln (1 + US Share Of Target Exports)	-	0.661***
- Lagged 1 Year		(0.026)
ln (1 + US Share Of Target Exports)	-	0.130***
- Lagged 2 Years		(0.021)
Number of Observations	8,139	7,968
R Squared	0.875	0.866

Note: The table above shows the results of OLS regression to determine the impact of US military intervention on the US share of the target state's total imports and exports. The data includes cases of intervention and counterfactual non-intervention scenarios for all countries between 1940 and 2009. In addition to the control variables in the equation, the regression analysis includes country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels are indicated by the following: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.

It should come as no surprise that the lagged dependent variable has a significant influence on the dependent variable. Past trade patterns have a self-reinforcing effect on the future due to factors such as established trade infrastructure, corporate networks and economies of scale (Eichengreen, Irwin 1998). We rarely observe massive fluctuations in trade levels absent of shock influences such as intervention, war, or natural disasters. The US share of the target state's imports and exports at time T-1 accounts for a large part of the same value at time T. As we extend the lag, the influence of past trade flows on future ones becomes increasingly irrelevant. We do not observe significant changes in the span of a few years, but it is reasonable to expect significant variation over longer periods of time.

Only a few control variables have statistically significant effects on the US share of the target state's imports and exports. The US holds 0.55% more of a target state's imports if the target state has ratified the New York Convention (NYC) and 0.31% more of the target state's exports if the target is a GATT/WTO member. Although civil war is expected to harm all countries equally (and hence not the US share of trade), our results indicate that civil war reduces the US share of a target state's exports by 0.45%. The US share of the target country's exports is 0.34% lower if the target country is a democracy, which could indicate a US preference for imports from low-cost or resource-rich non-democratic states such as China or Saudi Arabia. Overall, however, the impact of these control variables is low (<1%) and much weaker than that of intervention.

From our results, we may also conclude that military intervention per se, even by close allies such as the United Kingdom and France, does not disproportionately affect the United States' trade interests. War, as expected, has no effect on the US share of trade but may well have a consistent negative effect on all countries. Similarly, the level of autocracy neither encourages nor deters bilateral trade with the United States. The main tenets of our theory are strongly supported by our results. The United States does appear to use military intervention as a tool to expand foreign markets for its products. Exports are emphasized over imports due to the former's importance to the US economy and status as a public good. Moreover, hostile intervention disproportionately harms US trade interests by severely reducing the US share of the target state's imports and exports.

Table 3: Regression Results for Target State's Total Imports and Exports with the World

Variable	ln (1 + Target Imports From World)	ln (1 + Target Exports To World)
Positive US Influence	-0.031	-0.105***
	(0.025)	(0.030)
Negative US Influence	-0.157***	-0.160**
	(0.053)	(0.065)
GATT / WTO Membership	0.020	0.013
	(0.016)	(0.016)
NYC Ratification	0.014	0.022
	(0.015)	(0.016)
Democracy	0.024*	0.015
	(0.013)	(0.016)
Autocracy	0.000	0.006
	(0.014)	(0.017)
War	-0.054**	-0.093***
	(0.025)	(0.034)
Civil War	-0.046***	-0.057***
	(0.014)	(0.017)
Positive British/French Influence	-0.011	-0.030
	(0.023)	(0.028)
Negative British/French Influence	0.004	0.065
	(0.038)	(0.067)
ln (1 + Target Imports From World)	0.757***	-
- Lagged 1 Year	(0.033)	
ln (1 + Target Imports From World)	0.067**	-
- Lagged 2 Years	(0.031)	
ln (1 + Target Exports To World)	-	0.771***
- Lagged 1 Year		(0.040)
ln (1 + Target Exports To World)	-	0.091***
- Lagged 2 Years		(0.034)
Number of Observations	8,572	8,573
R Squared	0.971	0.974

Note: The table above shows the results of OLS regression to determine the impact of US military intervention on the target state's imports from and exports to the world. The data includes cases of intervention and counterfactual non-intervention scenarios for all countries between 1940 and 2009. In addition to the control variables in the equation, the regression analysis includes country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels are indicated by the following: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.

The results of our second regression analysis show, as proposed by Hypothesis E, that supportive military intervention does not have any significant positive effect on the target state's total imports and exports (with the world). In the case of imports, we do not observe any statistically significant effect, supporting the view that the United States does not have any incentive to support trade between third party countries. Supportive action does, however, cause a $90.81 million fall in the target state's exports to the world (1% significance level), indicating trade destruction. This does not contradict our theory as we only posit that the United States will not improve a target's overall trade levels. Exports are dependent on domestic infrastructure, economic conditions, available labour, stability and other factors that may well be disrupted more than import networks during a conflict. As the US share of exports is unaffected (Table 2) by supportive action, all countries, including the US, face lower absolute imports from the target after intervention.

Table 3 also shows us that hostile military intervention has a significant negative effect on the target state's total imports and exports (with the world), corroborating Hypothesis F. When the United States intervenes in opposition to an incumbent regime, we see a $176.12 million fall in the target state's imports from and $134.72 million fall in the target's exports to the world. Given the significance levels of 1% (imports) and 5% (exports), we may confidently conclude that hostile US military action not only worsens US-target trade relations but also significantly destroys trade between the target state and third party countries (i.e. the world). This may not be a result of US intentions, but rather an inevitable result of the collateral damage and destruction of trade networks in times of conflict. Our findings are consistent with the literature on the negative consequences of military action on belligerent and third party nations (Glick, Taylor 2005).

Based on our findings, democratic countries import $29.44 million more from the world than do non-democracies. Aside from the lagged dependent variables, which again have a strong effect on imports and exports, war and civil war are the only other factors that have a statistically significant impact on absolute trade levels. War causes a $63.72 million fall in the target state's imports from the world and an $80.91 million fall in the target state's exports to the world. Exports may be more affected than imports because export-related trade networks, infrastructure and resources sustain serious damage in times of military conflict. Imports are more flexible and depend only on transportation or access to the state, rather than on conditions within the state. Civil war causes a $54.49 million fall in the target state's imports and a $50.48 million fall in the target nation's exports. International war appears to be more economically destructive than civil war.

It is interesting to note that supportive military action harms the target's absolute level of exports more than either war or civil war. In the event that a country is engaged in a civil war our findings suggests that exporters would be better off if the incumbent regime did not accept US military assistance. Our results also show that hostile military intervention destroys significantly more trade (imports and exports)

than either international war or civil war does. Military conflict with the United States seems to be a more economically costly proposition than a war with third party countries or internal factions.

Conclusion

Our regression analysis provides us with strong, statistically significant results to support our theory on US military intervention and trade flows. Supportive intervention is used as a tool of influence to increase US exports to the target state, thereby allowing the US democratic leader to fulfil a public good obligation to his winning coalition. There is no significant impact on US imports from the target state. Supportive intervention does not have any significant effect on the target state's imports from the world, but destroys trade by causing a fall in the target state's exports to the world. American intervention in support of the incumbent regime in target states is conducted with the sole intention of expanding foreign markets for US products, with little concern for the ill effects such action might have on the target state's economic well-being and global trade.

Existing studies have already shown that military intervention has a negative impact on human rights (Peksen 2012) and democratization (de Mesquita, Downs 2006). The effect of military intervention on bilateral trade has major implications for the school on R2P and humanitarian intervention. If military intervention is consistently followed by altered trade flows to the benefit of the intervener, there are serious questions about the intervener's motives. Not only would intervention not be effective in improving human rights, it may also not have been intended to improve human rights. It is entirely possible that states use military force to further their economic interests in what could be seen as modern economic 'imperialism'. Such a finding also adds credence to the Selectorate Theory by providing further evidence of military intervention being linked to the provision of a public good (trade) to the intervening state leader's winning coalition.

The results of our study also show that hostile military intervention has significant negative effects on bilateral trade relations and the target state's trade with the world as a whole. While the negative impact on US-target trade relations is to be expected, hostile military action by the US destroys significantly more trade (in absolute terms) than war or civil war. We have not explored the reasons for this in detail, but it is possible that this is a result of being attacked by the world's most powerful military and/or simultaneous economic warfare through sanctions and blockades. Moreover, the fact that intervention occurs within a target state's borders suggests that the consequences can be devastating.

There is already a large literature on the impact of MIDs and war on trade flows. Foreign military intervention differs in that it is focused, likely to occur in a different timeframe and scope than traditional interstate disputes and wars, and has well-specified objectives. In the case of hostile intervention, operations are intrusive, impermissible, and associated with an anti-government stance. If we take our findings to be true, hostile military intervention has enormous economic costs for the intervener, the target state and global economic welfare. Such considerations need to be weighed carefully before conducting any sort of operations. Just as war is seen as a costly tool to achieve policy objectives, so too should military intervention.

Future studies on the matter may consider different parameters in the regression analysis. For instance, instead of evaluating intervener influence over a target state based on the leader in power, we could look at the political party in power. Another alternative would be to evaluate the impact of intervention for a fixed number of years (e.g. five, ten, 15 years) rather than for the duration of a target state leader's tenure. Such measures may be more appropriate for the study on absolute trade patterns. Inquiries can also be made into the exact mechanism by which intervention results in increased trade (e.g. government purchases, favourable policies). We might also try to determine the mix of goods being imported/exported by the target state and examine whether any industries (metals, oil, agriculture) are more affected than others. We could conduct a wider study on interventions by the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and other countries in the world to determine a broader pattern. Lastly, we could make a distinction between autocratic and democratic interveners and target states to look at the situations in which the intervener is able to extract the most out of the target state. This study is by no means comprehensive, but does make a significant effort to better study the determinants of bilateral/national trade flows and initiate a better understanding of the motives and consequences of foreign military intervention.

Not only is military intervention likely to be carried out with ulterior motives, it is also expected to result in significant trade destruction in the target state. Interveners such as the United States probably anticipate the bilateral consequences of either supportive or hostile action, but in our study we have shown that regardless of the intervener's motives or direction of intervention, military intervention has significant economic costs. The recent intervention in Libya seems to be a success, but we need to evaluate the long-term economic consequences of the action before we can comment on the matter. Given our findings, we should not be surprised to learn that the 'humanitarian' Libyan intervention had disproportionate economic benefits for the interveners but negative consequences for the overall trade levels of the target and third party countries. Existing findings that show that intervention negatively affects human rights and democratization makes military intervention, even for 'humanitarian' reasons, seem all the more an unattractive prospect.

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Appendix

1. Estimation Equation

Note: the above estimation equation is for Hypotheses A and C. The equation is used to test the other hypotheses by replacing

$$\ln(1 + \text{US \% of Target Imports})_{t,c} = \alpha_t + \alpha_c + \beta_1 Influence_{t,c}^{Positive} + \beta_2 Influence_{t,c}^{Negative} +$$
$$\gamma_1 GATT/WTO_{t,c} + \gamma_2 UNCITRAL_{t,c} + \gamma_3 Democracy_{t,c} + \gamma_4 Autocracy_{t,c} + \gamma_5 War_{t,c} +$$
$$\gamma_6 CivilWar_{t,c} + \gamma_7 BritishFrenchInfluence_{t,c}^{Positive} + \gamma_8 BritishFrenchInfluence_{t,c}^{Negative} +$$
$$\lambda_1 \ln(1 + \text{US \% of Target Imports})_{t-1,c} + \lambda_2 \ln(1 + \text{US \% of Target Imports})_{t-2,c} + \varepsilon_{t,c}$$

"US% of Target Imports" with "US% of Target Exports", "Total Target Imports" or "Total Target Exports" in all instances. This is a full version of the estimation equation displayed in the Research Design section.

Table A: Accounting for US influence arising from supportive or hostile military action

Note: The United States had influence over the Chadian government as a result of supporting the leader in a struggle against

Country	Year	US Influence		Description
		Positive	Negative	
Chad	1982	0	0	Habré takes power in a military coup.
Chad	1983	1	0	US military support for Habré against rebel groups.
Chad	1984	1	0	
Chad	1985	1	0	
Chad	1986	1	0	
Chad	1987	1	0	
Chad	1988	1	0	
Chad	1989	1	0	
Chad	1990	1	0	Habré deposed by Déby in a military coup.
Chad	1991	0	0	
Iran	1979	0	0	Khomeini comes to power after Iranian Revolution.
Iran	1980	0	1	Failed military operation to rescue American hostages.
Iran	1981	0	1	
Iran	1982	0	1	
Iran	1983	0	1	
Iran	1984	0	1	
Iran	1985	0	1	
Iran	1986	0	1	
Iran	1987	0	1	
Iran	1988	0	1	
Iran	1989	0	1	Khomeini dies of natural causes.
Iran	1990	0	0	

rebel groups (also a proxy war with Libya). In the other case, the failed US attempt to rescue hostages was a case of (failed) hostile military intervention directed against the Khomeini regime. This would severely damage trade flows in the years to come. The coding methodology used to denote influence was also applied to all control variables in the regression analysis.

2. Accounting For Influence

3. Measuring the Impact on Trade

Since the dependent variables used in our regression analysis are the natural log of the terms and not the terms themselves, we need to make some calculations to arrive at the impact (%) of intervention on the terms. Since we use a dummy variable to code our independent variables, we cannot use margins or take the derivative to determine the effect. Instead, we must estimate the impact of intervention by looking at the difference in the dependent variable in cases where there is intervention, and cases where there is no intervention. We use the following approximation to determine the impact:

X

$$\ln(1 + \text{US \% of Target Imports})_{\text{Influence Exists}} = (\alpha_t + \alpha_c) + \beta_1 \left\{ Influence^{Positive}_{Exists} (=1) \right\} +$$
$$\gamma_1 GATT/WTO_{\text{mode}} + \gamma_2 UNCITRAL_{\text{mode}} + \gamma_3 Democracy_{\text{mode}} + \gamma_4 Autocracy_{\text{mode}} + \gamma_5 War_{\text{mode}} +$$
$$\gamma_6 CivilWar_{\text{mode}} + \gamma_7 BritishFrenchInfluence^{Positive}_{\text{mode}} + \gamma_8 BritishFrenchInfluence^{Negative}_{\text{mode}} +$$
$$\lambda_1 \ln(1 + \text{US \% of Target Imports})_{\text{mean}} + \lambda_2 \ln(1 + \text{US \% of Target Imports})_{\text{mean}}$$

Y

$$\ln(1 + \text{US \% of Target Imports})_{\text{No Influence}} = (\alpha_t + \alpha_c) + \beta_1 \left\{ Influence^{Positive}_{Non-Existent} (=0) \right\} +$$
$$\gamma_1 GATT/WTO_{\text{mode}} + \gamma_2 UNCITRAL_{\text{mode}} + \gamma_3 Democracy_{\text{mode}} + \gamma_4 Autocracy_{\text{mode}} + \gamma_5 War_{\text{mode}} +$$
$$\gamma_6 CivilWar_{\text{mode}} + \gamma_7 BritishFrenchInfluence^{Positive}_{\text{mode}} + \gamma_8 BritishFrenchInfluence^{Negative}_{\text{mode}} +$$
$$\lambda_1 \ln(1 + \text{US \% of Target Imports})_{\text{mean}} + \lambda_2 \ln(1 + \text{US \% of Target Imports})_{\text{mean}}$$

=>

$$(e^X - 1) - (e^Y - 1) = \Delta \text{US\% of Target Imports}$$

We use the mean of all continuous variable terms (lagged dependent variable) and the mode of dummy / binary terms (influence, GATT/WTO, NYC, democracy, autocracy, inter-state war, civil war). The coefficients are estimated by our regression model. The equation shown is used to determine the impact of supportive military intervention on the US share of the target state's imports. The same equation and logic applies to the US share of the target state's exports and all other relations we have investigated, but we must substitute the dependent variable and lagged dependent variable terms, and the coefficients to account for the different analyses.

When we look at the target state's total national trade flows (with the world) this equation yields the absolute amount of trade (in millions of 2005 US Dollars) created or destroyed by military intervention. We may also use this equation to estimate the impact of various control variables on the US share of the target state's imports/exports and the target state's total national trade with the world.

investigated, but we must substitute the dependent variable and lagged dependent variable terms, and the coefficients to account for the different analyses.

When we look at the target state's total national trade flows (with the world) this equation yields the absolute amount of trade (in millions of 2005 US Dollars) created or destroyed by military intervention. We may also use this equation to estimate the impact of various control variables on the US share of the target state's imports/exports and the target state's total national trade with the world.

Multivalent Nationalism in the Golan Heights[1]

Julian Cole Phillips[2]

When Israel occupied the Golan Heights in 1967, the Syrian town of Majdal Shams came under Israeli jurisdiction. In the following decades, Tel Aviv pressured the community to adopt an Israeli national identity, while Damascus promoted a continued identification with Syria. At the same time, many members of the community joined Palestinian social and cultural networks. This article surveys the construction of national identity in a community where multiple national valences vie for residents' support. It argues that, in Majdal Shams, the development of national identity has been a continual and personal act.

A few years ago, a young film producer from the town of Majdal Shams conducted an on-camera interview with two local hip-hop musicians. The producer and the musicians were children of Syrian citizens, lifelong holders of Israeli permanent residency, and carriers of identity cards that read "Nationality: Undefined." Their national self-identifications were complex—a subject that arose during the interview:

> *Producer:* "You and I, we know that we are Syrians"
> *Musician I:* "Syrians? Not Syrians…"
> *Producer:* "But… what then?"
> *Musician II:* "The land is Syrian, but you were born after the occupation of the land. So you are not from here [gesturing, Israel], and not from here [gesturing, Syria]"
> *Musician I:* "Because we are not defined as Israelis, and not Syrians; nothing. From an occupied area; closed."

The interviewer believed that he and his interlocutors were Syrian; the rappers declared that they were "not… Israelis, not Syrians; nothing."[3] The dispute was deeply rooted in the history of Majdal Shams—a community that, over the preceding decades, had formed relationships with several nation-states. Between 1922 and 1967, the town was located within the international borders of Syria, and many of its residents

felt integrated into the Syrian national community in fundamental ways. In 1967, however, Israel captured the town in a conflict with Syria. Over the following 45 years, the population of Majdal Shams maintained and built upon links to Syria while forming additional connections to Israel and Palestine. Each of these states constituted a valence around which individuals constructed their own identities. Individual residents identified themselves with one of the three nation-states, to a greater or lesser degree, based on their life experiences. Many residents continued to declare themselves to be Syrian and argued that their experiences in Israel did not undermine their essential identity as such. This category included the film producer cited above.[4] 1,500 accepted Israeli citizenship, a symbolic act that Israeli authorities often interpreted as an adoption of Israeli national identity.[5] And some felt alienated from both Israel and Syria, including the hip-hop artists who identified themselves in the opening quotation as "From an occupied area; closed." Over the 45 years, no nation-state has been hegemonic in Majdal Shams—and consequently, no state has monopolized the community's national identity.

This essay reviews case studies of nation-building processes that connected Majdal Shams to three states in the 20th and 21st century. It begins with the period from 1925 through 1967, when the community integrated into Syria while maintaining a place in extra-state regional networks. It then reviews a series of state-centered or bordered processes that affected the community between

Figure 14. Demographic Transformation on the Golan: Population Distributions, 1960, 1967, 1975, 1978.

1967 and 2012. These included economic and educational "pilgrimages" within Israel and Syria, kin connections within both states, and cultural and institutional links to the Palestinian quasi-state in the West Bank. The primary argument holds that, because these nation-building networks centered in Damascus, Jerusalem, and Ramallah, the population of Majdal Shams did not adopt a single unambivalent national identity. Rather, each national community constituted a valence around which an individual could identify. These identities were often fluid, with valences rising and falling in prominence under the mediation of personal experiences and geopolitical forces. For many residents, the three valences were forged into hyphenated identities that were rooted directly in the Golan Heights. Rather than adopting a communal alignment with a single nation-state, the individual members of the community crafted hybrid identities that drew on—but were ultimately independent of—state-sanctioned nationalism.

Review of Literature and Field Research

In recent decades, scholars have identified particular historical processes that generated feelings of national identity across populations. Benedict Anderson summarizes several of these processes in Imagined Communities. Anderson begins his text by paraphrasing the prevailing scholarly argument that "in the modern world everyone could, should, would 'have' a nationality the way he or she 'has' a gender." [6] According to this theory, the planet's billions of individuals have come to identify themselves with particular nation-states under the influence of a series of state-centered and/or bounded experiences. Anderson discusses four specific nation-forging activities: the consumption of print-capitalism in vernacular languages, restrictions on economic activity across set borders, employment "pilgrimages" through state bureaucracies, and attendance at standardized schools or military institutions.[7] Anderson argues that individuals recognize that they share common experiences with others who consume the same mews, apply for the same jobs, and study the same curricula—and associate these common experiences with an "imagined community" of co-nationalists.

Anderson and other scholars have also explored alternative processes by which individuals and communities develop national identifications with nation-states in which they do not reside. This phenomenon is most evident in diaspora communities, which build ties between widely dispersed individuals who share a country of origin.[8] Anderson argues that, for members of diaspora communities, identification with a country of origin is promoted by travel to that country, receipt of photographs or videos, and communication with relatives who have never emigrated.[9] Some members of diaspora communities cultivate active relationships with their countries of origin. Khachig Tölölyan writes that these individuals "want to preserve the values of the homeland in exile" and believe that such values "can be maintained… by contact with the homeland."[10] These members of diaspora communities employ modern travel and communication to maintain active relationships with nations in which they do not

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4 Ben Hartman, "Not on the Fence: Druse in Majdal Shams," Jerusalem Post (30 March 2011)
5 Idan Avni, "Nobody's Citizens," YNET (16 October 2006)

6 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, Verso: 2006 [1983]), 5
7 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 35, 52-3, 57, 120-122
8 James Clifford, "Diasporas," Cultural Anthropology 9.3 (August 1994), 304
9 Benedict Anderson, Long-Distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics (Amsterdam: Center for Asian Studies, 1992), 8
10 Khachig Tölölyan, "Beyond the Homeland: from Exilic Nationalism to Diasporic Transnationalism," in Allon Gal et. al. eds. The Call of the Homeland: Diaspora Nationalisms, Past and Present (Leiden: Brill Press, 2010), 28 and 34

reside.

Communities located along international frontiers may not assimilate harmoniously into a single nation. Because many members of these communities regularly cross international borders, they experience what Anselem Frank describes as "a process of radical desubjectification—a (temporary) loss of 'identity'" in moving between nation-states.[11] Michael Baud adds, moreover, that frontier communities develop relationships with multiple state governments, in part because states make a special effort to impose national culture on contested regions.[12] Perhaps most important, frontier communities often develop unique cultures and identities defined, in part, by cross-border exchange.[13] Gloria Anzaldúa memorably describes the area along the Mexico-United States border as "where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds. And before a scab forms it hemorrhages again, the lifeblood of two worlds merging to form a third country—a border culture."[14] Anzaldúa argues that individuals who live adjacent to international frontiers simultaneously identify with and feel alienated by nearby nations.[15] In consequence, they may develop a unique culture and identity that draws from both sides of the frontier.

This article uses the theories of Anderson, Tölölyan, Frank, Baud, and Anzaldúa as a lenses to understand the development of national identities in Majdal Shams between 1925 and and 1967. Majdal Shams first entered the Euro-American historical record in the 1920s, when the community played an important role in the 1925 Syrian uprising against French colonial rule (Bokova 1990). The community also began to appear in 20th century Zionist archives after playing a minor role in the 1948 Israeli-Arab War (Gelber 1995; Parsons 2000). During these decades, Majdal Shams was integrated into the commercially and culturally vibrant Golan Heights region and experienced broader changes in contemporary Syrian society (Abu Fakhr 2000; Davis 1981). Between 1925 and 1967, the sources reveal Majdal Shams to have experienced state-sanctioned Syrian nationalism while remaining integrated into the broader region.

After Israel conquered the Golan Heights, Majdal Shams was subject to competing pulls from Israeli and Syrian society. The initial years of Israeli rule were rife with conflicts between local residents and Tel Aviv (Tarabieh 1995; Tarabieh 2000; Mara'i and Halabi 1992; Gannon and Murphy 2008; Hanlon 2012). Over decades, however, the Israeli state actively attempted to integrate Majdal Shams into Israel's economy and education system (Molony 2009; Fakher Eldin 2011; Shamai 1990; Hajjar 1996; Stroker 2012; Kirrish 1992). Even as the community developed closer ties with Israel, residents maintained connections to Syria (Russell 2010; Kennedy 1984; Al-Jazeera 2007; Lubbe Bakker and Gould 2010). Links to the two neighboring states did not prevent the community from building independent institutions and developing a vibrant local culture (Fakher Eldin 2012; Fakher Eldin 2011; Hajjar 1993; Beardsworth and Walsh 2012). These sources reveal the simultaneous development of Israeli national identity, Syrian national identity, and local identity in Majdal Shams.

Beginning in the 1990s, a number of institutions in Majdal Shams developed close ties with Palestinian organizations in the West Bank. Information about this trend was collected during a field research trip to Majdal Shams. The trip included a series of nine interviews with community leaders conducted in June, July, and August 2012. Eight of the interviews were conducted in English, and one was conducted in Arabic with the assistance of a paid interpreter pre-approved by the subject. Four of the interviews are preserved in audio recordings, and five are documented in typed summaries based on notes written during the conversation. The subjects were asked prepared questions on the timeline of institution building in the community since the 1980s, organizations' community programs, and relationships between non-governmental organizations in the Golan Heights and the West Bank. The interviews indicate that, although Palestinian nationalism is not a significant mode of self-identification in Majdal Shams, the relationship between the community and Palestine is a significant influence on local culture and identity.

The arrival of internet access in Majdal Shams permitted residents to cultivate relationships with Syria outside of traditional channels. This trend was evident during field research into local opposition to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad conducted in the summer of 2012. The research included observation at more than six weeks of organizing meetings and five street protests. It also included analysis of political discourse in local graffiti and on community Facebook pages. This research underscores the degree to which, despite state pressures, local residents experience considerable agency in developing their national identities.

Majdal Shams in National and Regional Networks, 1925-1967

In the decades after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, Majdal Shams integrated into the nation-state of Syria while remaining connected to local and extra-national regional networks. A number of distinct events and processes incorporated the town into Syria: the 1925-27 Syrian popular uprising against French colonial rule, the centralization of state services and economic opportunities in the nearby provincial capital of Qunaitra, and the extension of state services and political networks to the town. In the same period, residents worked in economic networks that extended north into Lebanon and south and west into other regions of Syria, while local leaders concerned themselves with political developments across the nearby border with Israel and Palestine. For the community, incorporation into the state forged a potent modern national identification, while integration into extra-state networks continued pre-national regional links.

Majdal Shams's first significant interaction with Syrian nationalism—the anti-French revolt of 1925-27—grew out of the town's pre-national centrality to local wartime defense networks. Because of its geography—Majdal Shams was built at a high elevation a short distance from a major water source—the town was well positioned to withstand outside attacks. In addition, most village residents were members of religious minority groups, Druze and Maronite and Greek Orthodox Christians.[16] Coreligionists in nearby communities maintained close links to Majdal Shams through kinship and solidarity networks and would have felt comfortable seeking shelter in the town when conflict threatened their own homes. As early as the late 19th century, residents of surrounding villages and countryside traveled to Majdal Shams in times of strife for safety and to coordinate defensive forces. During the winter of 1895, for example, Druze residents of neighboring communities sheltered in Majdal Shams during a local conflict between

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11 Anselm Frank, "The Spectral Presence of the Modern Border," in Tessa Praun ed., Smadar Dreyfus (Stockholm: Magasin 3 Stockholm Konsthall, 2009), 55-67

12 Michiel Baud, "Towards a Comparative History of Borderlands," Journal of World History 8.2 (Fall 1997), 215 and 233

13 Baud, "Comparative History," 216

14 Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1999 [1987]), 25

15 Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera, 85 and 101

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16 Fadwa N. Kirrish, "Druze Ethnicity in the Golan Heights: the Interface of Religion and Politics," Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 13.1 (1992), 126

irregular Druze and Circassian militias.[17] By 1925, the community was accustomed to sheltering soldiers and civilians in times of strife—an experience that prepared residents for the Syrian revolt.

In October 1925, violence erupted between the Druze community in Majdal Shams and French security forces after a group of local Druze looted their Christian neighbors' property. Fighting between Syrian Druze and French colonial forces had begun some months earlier in the nearby province of Jabal al-Durūz, and a group of Druze irregulars from the region traveled to Majdal Shams to assist the town's defense. Several days later, local leaders contacted the central command of the national revolt to request further military assistance.[18] Rebel commander Zaid al-Atrash (the brother of Sultān Bāsha al-Atrash, the revolt's leader) led a contingent of 1000 rebel troops to Majdal Shams, after cancelling a planned attack on French-held Damascus because of concerns over potential civilian casualties.[19] Al-Atrash's drove French troops from the town's immediate vicinity and, after meeting with local leaders, established a rebel garrison in Majdal Shams. The garrison—which eventually housed more than 10,000 rebels—protected the nearby road between Damascus and the southern Lebanese town of Marj'ayūn.[20] Remaining in Majdal Shams for more than six months, the garrison made the pan-Syrian rebellion a major presence in the town.

The presence of the rebel garrison forged nationalist sentiments in Majdal Shams, in two ways. Firstly, many of its thousands of troops hailed from other regions of Syria. The resultant interactions between the local population and rebels from disparate regions widened residents' social circles beyond pre-national networks of proximity or kinship. Secondly, in April 1926, a large force of French troops attacked Majdal Shams to destroy the rebel garrison. During the attack, French soldiers destroyed the town and killed nearly 80 residents.[21] This communal sacrifice of lives and property in defense of the rebels— and, by extension, for Syria—forged emotional ties between the town and the nation.

Institutions of the Syrian state, which gained independence from French rule in 1946, provided another channel for Syrian national consciousness to tangibly affect Majdal Shams. By the mid-1950s, children from Majdal Shams could attend a public elementary school in the town that followed a standardized national curriculum.[22] By the mid-1960s, local supporters of the Ba'ath party could join a community chapter, and victims of crimes could receive assistance at the Majdal Shams police station.[23] Residents accessed other state services in the nearby town of Qunaitra, including religious courts to register marriages and the regional public secondary school.[24] These institutions reshaped the population's behavior. In earlier generations, residents would have sought education, remediation of injustices, and political influence through kin and religious networks. In the nation-state period, they operated within institutions that based their jurisdiction on state and provincial borders, rather than cultural or genealogical relation.

The growth of Syrian state bureaucracy also reshaped the town's social and kin networks. Because most residents were either Christian or Druze, they tended to migrate to population centers with significant communities of their coreligionists in the pre-state period. Qunaitra was not a common destination because its population was largely Circassian Muslim.[25] The arrival of state institutions— including the central command of the Syrian military and, in 1964, the seat of the provincial government— produced an economic boom in Qunaitra that drew residents of Majdal Shams to resettle in the nearby town.[26] (This migration was in keeping with broader trends in Syrian society: between 1947 and 1967, the number of Syrians living in urban centers swelled from 31.5% to 41.6% of the total national population.[27]) The migrants included many of the town's Christian residents, who disproportionately worked in craft industries that were in high demand in the provincial capital. Members of the community who resettled in Qunaitra often retained ownership of agricultural land or houses in Majdal Shams and returned to the town on weekends and holidays.[28] The relationship between Majdal Shams and Qunaitra, therefore, was based on both national and kin community.

Even as the Syrian nation-state grew in importance for Majdal Shams, members of the community remained integrated into economic networks that pre-dated the state. One trade network spanned the 50 kilometers between Majdal Shams and the Syrian town of Fīq, exchanging the former community's grapes for the latter's olives.[29] Until the early 1950s, a second trade network linked the cedar forests of southern Lebanon to Majdal Shams and, 100 kilometers distant, the southern Syrian city of Suwaida. Men from Majdal Shams would cross the nearby Lebanon-Syria border to harvest wood, which they would manufacture into plows. They would then transport the plows to Suwaida for sale.[30] Beginning in the 1950s, a third economic network linked manual laborers in Majdal Shams to construction jobs in Lebanon.[31] These workers tended to live and work in Lebanon during the winter months and return home

17 Drummond Hay, "Despatch No. 76 from Mr. Drummond Hay, Consul-General, Beyrout, to Sir Philip Currie, British Ambassador, Constantinople, 6 December 1895, regarding the fears of the Druzes of Mount Hermon of an attack by the Circassians and Kurds," in Bejtullah Destani ed., Minorities in the Middle East, Druze Communities 1840-1974, Volume 3: 1866-1926 (London: Archive Editions, 2006), 192-194

18 Lenka Bokova, La confrontation franco-syrienne à l'époque du mandat, 1925-1927 (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1990), 220-221

19 Bokova 221; Michael Provence, The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Arab Nationalism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 110

20 Bokova, La confrontation, 223

21 Tayseer Mara'i and Usama R. Halabi, "Life Under Occupation in the Golan Heights," Journal of Palestine Studies 22.1 (Autumn 1992), 78-93; Hassan Khater, Monument to the Maryrs of the Great Syrian Revolt, 1925, Buq'ātha, Golan Heights

22 Munir Fakher Eldin (resident of Majdal Shams and Professor of History, Birzait University), in discussion with the author, 1 and 15 July 2012

23 Bashar Tarabieh, "The Syrian Community on the Golan Heights," The Link 33.2 (April-May 2000), 3; Samir Ayub (history teacher, Majdal Shams High School), in discussion with the author, 6 July 2012

24 Aharon Layish, Marriage, Divorce and Succession in the Druze Family: A Study Based on Decisions of Druze Arbitrators and Religious Courts in Israel and the Golan Heights (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1982), 36; Sakr Abu Fakhr, "Voices from the Golan," Journal of Palestine Studies 29.4 (August 2000), 15

25 G. Schumacher, C.E., The Jaulan: Surveyed for the German Society for the Exploration of the Holy Land (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1888), 207

26 Martin Seymour, "The Dynamics of Power in Syria since the Break with Egypt," Middle Eastern Studies 6.1 (January 1970), 35; Uri Davis, "The Golan Heights Under Israeli Occupation, 1967-1981 [working paper]" (Durham: University of Durham, Department of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1984), 2

27 Onn Winckler, Demographic Developments and Population Policies in Ba'athist Syria (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), 62-64

28 Shahādhi Naṡrāllah (descendant of Christian residents of Majdal Shams), in discussion with the author, 16 and 31 July 2012

29 Abu Fakhr, "Voices," 28

30 Abu Fakhr, "Voices," 14

31 Munir Fakher Eldin, "Art and Colonial Modernity in the Occupied Golan Heights" (Lecture, Fatah Mudarris Center, Majdal Shams, 28 June 2012)

during the agricultural season.[32] The passage of capital, goods, and people along these networks indicates that the Syrian nation-state did not totally delimit the community's behavior.

In the 1930s and 1940s, community leaders in Majdal Shams maintained relations with their counterparts in nearby Palestine for both economic and political reasons. In 1936, for example, an important community religious leader named As'ad Kanj Abū Ṣālaḥ proposed forming a local militia to assist Palestinian rebels battling British colonial rule. Abū Ṣālaḥ's plans did not come to fruition—according to conflicting accounts, he either decided against forming the militia or organized only a single symbolic attack on the Palestine-Syria border.[33] Ten years later, in 1947, a second conflict erupted between Palestinians and local Zionist settlers. Two of Abū Ṣālaḥ's grown sons, Kamāl and Sulṭān, attempted to ally themselves with Zionist forces to gain political and financial capital. In January 1948, Kamāl met with Zionist leaders in Haifa and offered his services as a paid spy among Palestinian paramilitary forces. (The Zionists rejected the offer.[34]) In March, Sulṭān mobilized a militia of 300 Syrian-Druze men and offered them as mercenaries to fight alongside Zionist forces. When Zionist leaders rejected the offer, many of the would-be mercenaries remained in Palestine under Kamāl's leadership to voluntarily assist Palestinian and allied forces.[35] Five months later, in August 1948, two additional community leaders named Farhan Sha'alan and Muḥammad Ṣafadī met with Zionist leaders in Palestine independently of the Abū Ṣālaḥ family. The two sought to built amicable relations between the community and Tel Aviv in the event that Zionist forces invaded Syria.[36] They also proposed that Zionist authorities hire them to organize an intelligence network in the Syrian army. As with Kamāl Abū Ṣālaḥ, the Zionists rejected the offer.[37] Such cross-border negotiations indicate that, decades after the division of the region into nation-states, community leaders in Majdal Shams did not feel that their Syrian citizenship precluded them from forging business or political relationships across state lines. Moreover, there is no indication that they regarded such relationships as contradictory or threatening to Syrian national identity.

It is difficult to determine the potency of Syrian nationalism in Majdal Shams during the four decades between the 1922 division of the Ottoman Empire and Israel's 1967 conquest of the community. Although interactions with Syrian state institutions significantly shaped daily life, the nation's borders did not restrict residents from involving themselves in the economy or politics of neighboring countries. It bears special mention, however, that it became extremely common for male residents of Majdal Shams to attend public schools and serve in the Syrian military in the 1950s and 1960s.[38] These individuals spent thousands of hours in school or military service developing commonalities and/or mixing with co-nationalists from other regions.[39] Benedict Anderson has argued that such experiences have been potent builders of national

consciousness. He has written that, in nation-state public schools, "[u]niform textbooks, standardized diplomas and teaching certificates, a strictly regulated gradation of age-groups, classes and instructional materials… created a self-contained, coherent universe of experience." He has further argued that, when students from multiple public schools encountered one another at state secondary schools or universities, they "knew that from wherever they had come they still had read the same books and done the same sums."[40] For residents of Majdal Shams, experiences of education and military service (alongside those of other state institutions such as political parties and the legal system) made the Syrian nation a tangible presence in the community. Memories of communal sacrifice during the 1925 revolt indicated, moreover, that Syria was, in Anderson's words, a "fraternity" that members of the community would "willingly… die" for.[41]

Integration of Majdal Shams into Israel, 1967-present

The Israeli takeover of the Golan Heights in 1967 severed Majdal Shams from many of its previous economic, political, and social networks. The Israeli invasion drove the civilian population of 160 of the region's 165 communities into Syrian-controlled territory.[42] The depopulated towns included Fīq, which had had economic relations with Majdal Shams, and Qunaitra, where members of the community had traveled frequently to conduct business or access state services. The Israeli army destroyed many of the communities in the immediate vicinity of Majdal Shams—including the villages of 'Aīn Fīt, Banias, Jubāth az-Zait, and Za'ura, whose residents had sheltered in Majdal Shams during the invasion.[43] The communities that survived included the largely Druze villages of 'Aīn Qinīa, Buq'āthā, and Mas'ada, whose residents had extensive relations with Majdal Shams through geographic proximity, marriage, and religious solidarity. The towns' survival permitted the community's kin and religious networks to remain partially intact. Because many members of the community had previously resettled in other parts of Syria or fled the war, however, the Israeli occupation separated most residents from relatives in Syria proper. According to one estimate, the Israel-Syria ceasefire line separated half of the town's residents from a member of her or his immediate family.[44] Maintaining a state of cold war, Israel and Syria heavily fortified the ceasefire line between the Golan Heights and the remainder of Syria—concretizing the break in these networks.

Israeli institutions and networks inserted themselves into the Golan Heights to replace their Syrian predecessors. Israel extended the jurisdiction of its military to the region, and later civilian law. The population began to access Israeli state services, including public schools. Under economic duress, many residents of Majdal Shams sought employment in Israeli companies. Members of the community formed

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32 Winckler, Demographic Developments, 195-196

33 Laila Parsons, The Druze Between Palestine and Israel, 1947-49 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 31; Yoav Gelber, "Druze and Jews in the War of 1948," Middle Eastern Studies 31.2 (April 1995), 234

34 Gelber, "Druze and Jews," 232

35 Gelber, "Druze and Jews," 233; Kais M. Firro, The Druzes in the Jewish State: A Brief History (Brill: Leiden, 1999), 43-44

36 Firro, Druzes in the Jewish State, 100

37 Gelber, "Druze and Jews," 243

38 Munir Fakher Eldin (resident of Majdal Shams and Professor of History, Birzait University), in discussion with the author, 1 and 15 July 2012

39 Munir Fakher Eldin (resident of Majdal Shams and Professor of History, Birzeit University), in discussion with the author, 1 and 15 July 2012

40 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 120-122

41 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7

42 Davis, "The Golan Heights Under Israeli Occupation," 2. It is difficult to precisely determine the process by which local civilians became refugees because neither the Israeli nor the Syrian armed forces have released their records of the conflict. Eyewitness accounts suggest, however, that most civilians fled population centers for nearby countryside during the initial Israeli incursion and that Israeli troops gradually forced the population across the ceasefire line by denying residents return to their homes. For a recent analysis of the dislocation see Shay Fogelman, "The Disinherited," Haaretz (30 June 2010)

43 Mara'i and Halabi, "Life Under Occupation," 79

44 Peter Ford, "Families Long for an End to Shouting," Christian Science Monitor (27 October 1992), 7

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social relationships with Israeli citizens, including through marriage. Although coerced, this integration into Israel replicated many of the conditions that had forged the community's Syrian nationalism in preceding generations.

Public education was the first state institution that Israel extended to Majdal Shams. In the immediate wake of the occupation of the Golan Heights, the Israeli army assigned an officer to administer the public primary schools that served students from Majdal Shams and the surrounding communities. The officer replaced Syrian state curricula with Arabic-language courses designed for Palestinian citizens of Israel.[45] He also hired residents of the surviving Syrian communities, including young secondary school students, as teachers to replace staff displaced by the Israeli invasion. In 1968, military authorities opened a public secondary school in Mas'ada to serve students from Majdal Shams who had previously studied at a regional public school in Qunaitra.[46] The Israeli-run education system continued to expand in the following decades. By 1990, it included five primary schools, three junior-high schools, and one secondary school that enrolled a total of 5,000 students.[47] An additional secondary school serving students from Majdal Shams opened in the community in 2000.[48] By 1994, the schools both enrolled thousands of students and employed more local residents than any other company or organization.[49]

In 1976, the Israeli Ministry of Education implemented an alternative curriculum in the Golan Heights that was tailored for Druze students.[50] The Ministry designed the program to cultivate ethnic particularist sentiments among Druze individuals—effectively discouraging identification with the Arab World generally and Palestine and Syria particularly.[51] The curriculum promoted the idea that Arab Christians and Muslims had historically persecuted Druze communities, while Jews had historically befriended them.[52] Although some local teachers disagreed with this narrative, Israeli policy discouraged teachers from disputing the curriculum in the classroom. Through the 1990s, school employees were hired on a yearly basis and did not receive long-term employment protection. A number of teachers whose contracts were not renewed suspected that the Ministry based its hiring decisions, in part, on compliance with curricula and public expressions of anti-Israeli political sentiments.[53] The schools' influence on the community was twofold. Generations of students learned that their religious identity encouraged a national self-identification with Jewish Israel, rather than a hostile Arab state such as Syria. And hundreds of local employees of the schools avoided publically expressing pro-Syrian political sentiments for fear of termination. Consequently, the public schools reduced overt Syrian nationalism among adults even as they increased students' commonalities with their Israeli counterparts.

Some students chose to remain in the Israeli education system past secondary school by enrolling in Hebrew-language universities. This trend began in the mid-1970s because earlier classes of students did not have the opportunity to master the Hebrew language prior to graduation. In the later part of the decade, small numbers of (mostly male) students began to enroll in undergraduate programs in northern Israel, particularly in the city of Haifa.[54] University enrollment among both female and male students continued to increase through the 1980s. By 1993, a total of 300 individuals from in and around Majdal Shams had enrolled in Israeli universities, including dozens of women.[55] A 1990 poll in the Mas'ada secondary school indicated that 78% of female students and 53% of males hoped to enter Hebrew-language undergraduate programs.[56] In the Golan Heights, students from Majdal Shams attended schools with largely Syrian staff and student bodies. In Israeli universities, in contrast, these students studied and socialized extensively with Jewish- and Palestinian-Israelis. These interactions reminded students from Majdal Shams that their primary and secondary education had followed a parallel trajectory to that of their Israeli peers, as well as assimilating them to Israeli society.

Beginning in the early 1970s, men from Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages began to seek employment in Israeli companies and communities. Israeli restrictions on local access to land and water were an important impetus for this trend.[57] In the years after the occupation began, the Israeli state confiscated large swaths of private agricultural land and communal grazing areas from community residents, largely to build military installations or Jewish agricultural settlements. Some households lost close to 50% of their landholdings. The land confiscations were particularly devastating for local dairy and meat producers, who depended on communal grazing land to feed their flocks.[58] By 2012, only a single member of the community worked full-time as a shepherd.[59] The state also restricted farmers' access to water. In an attempt to attract Jewish-Israeli citizens to settle in new agricultural settlements in the Golan Heights, Israeli agricultural policymakers allocated a disproportionate percentage of local water to the area's small Jewish communities. In some years, Syrian farmers received approximately one fifth the amount of water per dunum as their Israeli counterparts. Farmers who still possessed significant landholdings, therefore, struggled to grow sufficient quantities of produce to fully support their households.[60] As early as 1973, men whose agricultural yields were insufficient began to supplement their incomes by working as builders for Israeli construction companies.[61] Over the following decades, the number of local men working in the Israeli construction sector grew significantly in what Majdal Shams-

45 "The Struggle of Identity Between the Israeli Education System and the Syrian Arab Programs: Paper Presented By Al Marsad, the Arab Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Syrian Golan, on Behalf of the Convenio 2015 at the WEF Forum, Haifa, 30 October 2010" (Lecture, WEF Forum Haifa, 30 October 2010)
46 Bashar Tarabieh, "Education, Control, and Resistance in the Golan Heights," Middle East Report 195/195 (May-August 1995), 44
47 Shmuel Shamai, "Critical Sociology of Education Theory in Practice: the Druze Education in the Golan," British Journal of Sociology of Education 11.4 (December 1990), 453
48 Tarabieh, "The Syrian Community on the Golan Heights," 7
49 Tarabieh, "Education, Control, and Resistance," 43
50 Mara'i and Halabi, "Life Under Occupation," 81
51 Firro, Druze in the Jewish State, 225-230
52 Shamai, "Critical Sociology," 458
53 Shamai, "Critical Sociology," 454

54 Tarabieh, "Education, Control, and Resistance," 44; Tayseer Mara'i (General Director, Golan for Development of Arab Villages), in discussion with the author, 7 August 2012
55 Hammood Maray, "The Case of Education," Proceedings of the First Study Day on Twenty Five Years of Israeli Occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights ed. Lisa Hajjar (Jerusalem: the Arab Association for Development, 1993), 52; Tarabieh, "Education, Control, and Resistance," 45
56 Shamai, "Critical Theory of Education," 459
57 Fakher Eldin, in discussion
58 Al-Marsad: The Arab Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Syrian Golan, "The Occupied Syrian Golan: Background" (Majdal Shams: Al-Marsad, The Arab Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Syrian Golan, 2010)
59 Beardsworth and Walsh, Apples
60 Jonathan Molony et. al., From Settlement to Shelf: the Economic Occupation of the Syrian Golan (Majdal Shams: Al-Marsad, The Arab Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Syrian Golan, 2009), 73
61 Molony et. al., Settlement to Shelf, 73

based scholar Munir Fakher Eldin labeled a "large scale proletariatization" of the community.[62] The trend also affected local women. Whereas relatively few women had worked outside of the community in 1990, by 2011 a significant number had secured seasonal employment on Israeli farms.[63] Israeli jobs spurred working-class members of the community to gain proficiency in Hebrew, interact extensively with Israeli citizens, and travel throughout the country. Workers' resultant familiarity with Israeli society paralleled that of local students enrolled in Israeli universities.

Movement in the Israeli economy and education system caused residents of Majdal Shams to build social relationships with Israeli citizens. On occasion, these relationships developed into marriages. Residents of Majdal Shams who married Israeli citizens usually married members of the country's Arab-Druze community, who had held Israeli citizenship since 1948. This community was reasonably well-assimilated into Israeli society, in part because male Druze citizens were subject to military conscription. Between 1967 and 1980, approximately 300 Druze Israeli citizens migrated to the Golan Heights, probably largely for marriage.[64] A handful of residents of Majdal Shams and the surrounding communities also married Israeli citizens of different religious extractions. Between 1967 and 1998, nine members of the community registered conversions to Judaism, Christianity, or Islam.[65] Only religious leaders (rather than civil courts) possessed the authority to perform marriages in Israel—and, consequently it was extremely difficult for a state resident to marry a partner who practiced a different religion.[66] It is likely that desires for marriage across religious lines drove some of the conversions in the Golan Heights. Interfaith marriages were rare, moreover, because religious Druze members of the community opposed such matches. Druze religious tradition frowned upon intermarriage, in part because endogamous marriages preserved the continuity of the minority community.[67] The town's influential religious committee (al-hī'a al-dīnīa), which regularly issued advice to the community on secular matters, was a leading opponent of mixed marriages. After 2000, the committee expelled two mixed Jewish-Druze families from the town. Other mixed families settled outside the community because of local hostility.[68] Religious tradition was the primary force motivating local opposition to mixed-religious marriages. The religious taboo, however, effectively limited the community's integration into secular Israeli society.

It bears special mention that many members of the community actively resisted integration into the Israeli nation-state because of Syrian nationalist sentiments. In December 1971, for example, a

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62 Munir Fakher Eldin, "Art and Colonial Modernity in the Occupied Golan Heights" (Lecture, Fatah Mudarris Center, Majdal Shams, 28 June 2012)
63 Shamai, "Critical Theory of Education," 460; Munir Fakher Eldin, "The Syrian Golan: 44 Years of Illegal Israeli Occupation" (lecture, Vienna, 4 March 2011)
64 Mara'i and Halabi, "Life Under Occupation," 83
65 Nissim Dana, The Druze in the Middle East: Their Faith, Leadership, Identity, and Status (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2003), 17
66 Many commentators have debated the Israel's lack of a civil marriage system, which leftist activists often cite as a problematic barrier to religious intermarriage. The policy derives from the Ottoman "millet" system, which granted religious communities total autonomy over marriage practices, in part, to avoid friction between minority groups and the majority-Sunni Muslim imperial administration.
67 Nora S. Alamuddin and Paul D. Starr, Crucial Bonds: Marriage Among the Lebanese Druze (Delmar: Caravan Books, 1980), 40
68 Masri Feki and Nathalie Szerman, "Les druzes du Golan," Israël Magazine (9 July 2007); Beardsworth and Walsh, Apples

"great majority" of the residents of Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages signed a manifesto that announced a collective refusal to pay Israeli taxes. The document stated that, as signatories were Syrian citizens living under foreign military occupation, they were not obligated to pay taxes to Israel.[69] Many members of the community did not pay their Israeli tax bills through the end of the decade—when, in 1977 and 1978, squads of tax collectors confiscated expensive appliances from at least four households for nonpayment.[70] A significant number continued to avoid paying Israeli taxes through 2000, although most began to pay in the following decade.[71] The refusal to pay Israeli taxes indicated that, although most members of the community accepted Israeli education and jobs for pragmatic reasons, many did not believe that they were subject to the same obligations as Israeli citizens.

A mass refusal to accept national citizenship in the early 1980s was the most striking example of the community's resistance to assimilation into Israel. In 1980, the Israeli parliament amended the national citizenship law to permit the state to extend citizenship to non-Jews—including Druze-Syrians in the Golan Heights.[72] After the amendment's passage, approximately 100 community members submitted applications for Israeli citizenship. These individuals chose to become Israeli citizens, in part, because Israeli citizenship granted holders significant benefits. Unlike their non-citizen neighbors, Israeli citizens were able to travel freely throughout Israel and the occupied territories and pass in and out of the state through standard visa procedures. Local school employees who became citizens qualified for long-term employment protection, while their noncitizen colleagues were guaranteed employment for only a single year. In response to the small wave of local citizenship applications, concerned residents of Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages organized a town hall meeting. A majority of the meeting's estimated 6,000 attendees—half of the local population—endorsed a written manifesto declaring collective opposition to the extension of Israeli citizenship to the community. The document stated that residents remained Syrian, and endorsed a return of Syrian state control of the Golan Heights. The meeting's attendees decided, furthermore, to punish neighbors who applied for Israeli citizenship with social ostracization.[73] More than a decade after the Israeli takeover of the Golan Heights, a significant percentage of the local population believed that their community could not include individuals who exchanged Syrian for Israeli nationality.

The Israeli state issued a major challenge to the communal rejection of Israeli citizenship the following year. In December 1981, the national parliament passed a bill legally annexing the Golan Heights to Israel (previously, national law had defined the area as 'military administered territory').[74] The parliament's move was fairly radical, because it violated international laws prohibiting the annexation of territory acquired during warfare. One of the bill's provisions extended Israeli nationality to the residents of Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages, regardless of whether or not they had applied for citizenship.

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69 Felicia Langer, With My Own Eyes: Israel and the Occupied Territories 1967-1973 (London: Ithaca Press, 1975), 118-119
70 "Appendix: Testimonies from the Occupied Golan Heights," Journal of Palestine Studies 8.3 (Spring 1979), 129
71 Samir Ayub (history teacher, Majdal Shams High School), in discussion with the author, 6 July 2012
72 During the 1970s, some residents of Majdal Shams had endorsed this amendment, including an important traditional leader named Sulimān (also called Salmān) Abū Ṣāliḥ (Mordechai Nisan, "The Druze in Israel: Questions of Identity, Citizenship, and Patriotism," Middle East Journal 64.4 [Autumn 2010], 591
73 Mara'i and Halabi, "Life Under Occupation," 83
74 R. Scott Kennedy, "The Druze of the Golan: A Case of Non-Violent Resistance." Journal of Palestine Studies 13.2 (Winter 1984), 51

Community leaders responded by sending letters of objection to the national government and the United Nations. They also organized a series of protest actions that culminated in community-wide general strike that continued for nineteen weeks. The strike required major collective sacrifice. In an attempt to force residents to return to work—often for Israeli companies—the Israeli army blockaded the area and severely restricted the population's access to food and medical care.[75] Armed soldiers visited private homes to issue citizenship cards to unwilling residents. During confrontations with demonstrators, troops arrested nearly 200 members of the community and injured several dozen.[76] The community performed these sacrifices in defense of the Syrian nation—reinforcing their Syrian national identity, even as their integration into Israel increased.

Relationships Between Majdal Shams and Syria, 1967-present

In the years after Israeli troops occupied the Golan Heights, the ceasefire line between Majdal Shams and the remainder of Syria was permeable. Members of the community were able to cross the line (largely at night) to visit relatives or provide intelligence to the Syrian state. Around 1975, however, the Israeli military erected a high fence along the ceasefire line and planted landmines in a 200 meter-wide secure zone along the edge of this barrier.[77] Nonetheless, substantial relations between Majdal Shams and Syria continued across the fortified line. This section surveys three of the community's links to Syria since 1967: the (licit) passage of people across the ceasefire line, a local tradition of shouting between the Golan Heights and Syria proper, and the recent spread of Syria's "Arab Spring" political uprising to Majdal Shams. These three links forged Syrian national consciousness in the Golan Heights in the same years that the community integrated into Israel.

After 1967, civilian crossings between the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and other parts of Syria were strictly regulated. Individuals who traveled between the two areas applied for permission from both the Israeli and Syrian governments with assistance from the tracing department of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which facilitates the unification of conflict-divided families. Because the two states remained in a state of cold war and did not communicate directly, would-be crossers reached out to the ICRC in Damascus or Tel Aviv, which forwarded the request to the Israeli and Syrian governments.[78] The two states permitted civilians to cross for particular activities, which varied between two distinct periods. Between 1967 and 1981, civilians were permitted to cross the line for temporary visits to relatives, permanent resettlement with relatives, or university education. From 1990 through the present, all but a handful of the civilian crossers made the trip for purposes of marriage, religious pilgrimage, or university education.[79] Altogether, between 1967 and 2012, well over 3,300 individuals crossed the

ceasefire line with official permission—serving as an essential channel of communication between Majdal Shams and Syria writ large.

The first civilians to cross the ceasefire line after 1967 made the trip to reunite with relatives. Many were permanent residents of Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages who had been in other parts of Syria during the Israeli conquest of the Golan Heights. The precise number of town residents displaced into other parts of Syria is unclear—estimates range from 200 to 600 individuals.[80] In the immediate wake of the war, individuals began to submit applications to the Israeli army commander with authority over the region for permission to rejoin their relatives in Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages. Those whose applications were approved returned to the occupied Golan, but waived their right to re-cross the ceasefire line into the rest of Syria.[81] Individuals continued to apply for one-way passage through the 1970s. Between 1976 and 1979, families divided across the ceasefire line had the additional option of applying for an hour-long reunion in the United Nations-monitored demilitarized zone on the Syrian side of the ceasefire line. When both the Israeli and Syrian government approved such an application, families would gather in one of two tents operated by the ICRC, the first in close proximity to Majdal Shams and the second in the ruins of Qunaitra.[82] Family reunions, both through resettlement across the ceasefire line and brief meetings in the demilitarized zone, permitted members of divided families to maintain pre-war relationships with their relatives.

A third crossing program, in contrast, permitted residents of Majdal Shams who had been children in 1967 to experience other parts of Syria for the first time. Between 1976 and 1981, 65 students from the Golan Heights enrolled in undergraduate degree programs at the University of Damascus. These students received permission to cross from the Golan Heights into Syria proper for a sustained period. The Syrian state granted them full-tuition scholarships.[83] Admission to the program was highly competitive, and a disproportionate percentage of the students were well-connected relatives of community leaders.[84] Although the student crossing program did not initially influence a wide swath of Majdal Shams society, it introduced Syria to young men whose families had groomed them for local leadership roles.

Throughout the 1980s, the Israeli state did not grant permission for residents of Majdal Shams to cross the ceasefire line, in part because of increased tensions with the community in the wake of the 1982 general strike. Crossings for the purposes of family reunification resumed in 1990 after ICRC-brokered negotiations. Throughout that year, families from Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages could apply for permission to visit relatives in Syria proper. Those who received approval crossed the ceasefire line and spent two weeks with relatives before returning to the Golan Heights.[85] In 1991, the Israeli government ceased approving families' petitions to cross the ceasefire line for temporary family visits.[86] Because the program was short-lived, it permitted relatively few families to cross the ceasefire line.

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75 The Bitter Year: Arabs Under Israeli Occupation in 1982 (Washington, D.C.: Arab-American Anti Discrimination Committee, 1983), 16
76 Mara'i and Halabi, "Life Under Occupation," 83-84
77 Mara'i and Halabi, "Life Under Occupation," 81
78 As'ad Safadī (Director, Majdal Shams Office of the International Committee of the Red Cross), in discussion with the author, 14 August 2012
79 145 additional individuals received permission to cross the ceasefire line after 1990 for humanitarian reasons—including emergency visits to a dying relative, funeral attendance, and to obtain organ donations (Anna Rivkin [Tracing Officer and Data Administrator, Tel Aviv Office of the International Committee of the Red Cross], in discussion with the author, 16 August 2012).

80 Abu Fakhr, "Voices," 16; Mara'i and Halabi, "Life Under Occupation," 80
81 Hannah Russell ed., Breaking Down the Fence: Addressing the Illegality of Family Separation in the Occupied Syrian Golan (Majdal Shams: Al-Marsad, The Arab Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Syrian Golan, 2010), 49
82 Russell ed., Breaking Down the Fence, 60-61
83 Tarabieh, "Education, Control, and Resistance," 44
84 Tarabieh, "The Syrian Community in the Golan Heights," 8
85 Russell ed., Breaking Down the Fence, 64
86 Safadī, in discussion

Unlike other members of the community, however, these families were able to visit Syria collectively. In previous programs, a would-be crosser was required to provide a specific justification for her or his desire to cross the ceasefire line. Residents of the Golan Heights who did not wish to enroll in a university program or could not cite an immediate relative in Syria were not able to cross the ceasefire line. Under the family visit program, in contrast, Israel and Syria approved would-be crossers on the basis of heredity. Individuals who had been born after 1967—and, therefore, did not have personal relationships with Syrians across the ceasefire line—were permitted to travel to Syria on the basis of their parents' or grandparents' kin networks. In effect, the two states defined members of the community's younger generation as Syrians, although they had been born under Israeli jurisdiction.

Early in the 1990s, the Israel and Syria approved an alternative "family reunification" program for women who wished to marry men living on the opposite side of the ceasefire line. Men did not receive permission to travel between the two lines for marriage, possibly because it was conventional for a young couple to settle close to the husband's family. Many of the first women to petition passage between the Golan Heights and Syria for marriage had, for various reasons, struggled to find husbands in their immediate area. These women turned to kin networks, which stretched across the ceasefire line, to arrange suitable endogamous marriages.[87] The frequency of such marriages increased in the late 1990s because students from the Golan Heights began to study at the University of Damascus (see below) and date women living in Syria proper. Cross-border couples arranged their engagements from afar, and then submitted applications for the bride-to-be to 'reunite' with her family-by-marriage. If both states approved the crossing, the ICRC coordinated a meeting between the two families in the UN-monitored demilitarized zone at Qunaitra.[88] The couple and their families dressed in formal wedding attire for the rendezvous and carried out celebratory traditions in the demilitarized zone, including the consumption of sweets and singing of nuptial songs. [89]The couple then traveled with the groom's family to their side of the ceasefire line to complete the ceremony. Such marriages were bittersweet because the brides, like individuals who had resettled under the 1970s family reunification program, waived their right to return to their original side of the line. Between 1990 and 2007, 82 women crossed the ceasefire line for marriage—the vast majority into the Golan Heights.[90] The program ceased for four years after 2007, when the Israeli parliament amended the state's Nationality and Entry law to prohibit the extension of Israeli citizenship or permanent residency to non-Jewish citizens of Syria and other states engaged in cold war with Israel.[91] In 2011, however, cross-line marriages resumed when the Israeli Interior Ministry granted special permission for a Syrian woman to marry a resident of the village of Buq'āthā, a short distance from Majdal Shams.[92] Over two decades, the number of individuals who married across the ceasefire line was relatively small. The program was symbolically significant, however, because it allowed the community to forge relationships with Syria through marriage—much as marriages with Israeli citizens had facilitated

integration into Israel.

In 1994, Israel and Syria began to permit secondary-school graduates from Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages to enroll in undergraduate programs at the University of Damascus. Following an application process, these students received approval to cross the ceasefire line twice yearly, at the start of the academic year and at the completion of end-of-semester examinations.[93] The Syrian state granted students from the Golan Heights full-tuition scholarships and waivers of departmental entrance examinations—permitting beneficiaries to enter highly competitive programs such as medicine and engineering.[94] The program was extremely popular in the community and brought more than 1,500 local students across the ceasefire line between 1994 and 2012—many more than had crossed under family reunification programs since 1967.[95] Study in Damascus forged relationships between the Golan Heights and Syria in three distinct ways. Firstly, more than 1,000 individuals who had spent their entire lives under Israeli rule resided in Syria for a sustained period of time. These members of the community traveled throughout the country, learned to navigate Syrian society, and shared formative experiences with peers from throughout the nation. Secondly, enrollment at the University of Damascus re-inscribed students' primary and secondary education in Israeli state schools as preparation for advanced study in Syria. These students understood their education in the Golan Heights as following a parallel trajectory to that of their peers on the opposite side of the ceasefire line—reinforcing commonalities with Syrians, rather than Israelis. Finally, the program provided members of the community with a major opportunity for upward economic and social mobility. Many local students who studied in Damascus earned degrees in lucrative and well-respected fields such as dentistry, engineering, medicine, and pharmacy. They and their families felt grateful to the Syrian state for the opportunity to earn such degrees free of charge. For many members of the community, the program represented a generous gift from the Syrian state to the local population and indicated a continued relationship between the national government and the community. Student crossings, therefore, forged significant links between Majdal Shams and Syrian society and state.

Religious pilgrimages to Druze holy sites in Syria—the most numerically significant of the crossing programs—began in 1994. Both religiously learned ('uqqāl) and secular (juhhāl) adherents of the Druze faith venerated the graves of prophets or religious leaders—several of which are located in close proximity to Majdal Shams. To visit other sites across the ceasefire line, religious members of the community applied to Muwaffaq Ṭarīf, the head of a council of Druze religious leaders that the Israeli state created in the 1950s. The council was primarily responsible for overseeing Druze holy sites and marriage practices in accordance with Israeli law, and the Israeli government recognized its leadership as the 'spiritual head' of adherents who lived within the state's borders.[96] If Ṭarīf approved an applicant's religiosity, the applicant would submit a second application to the Israeli government to attend a pilgrimage. The earliest pilgrims were exclusively male and received permission to remain on the Syrian side of the ceasefire line for an unlimited period—permitting them to travel throughout the country and visit family for weeks or months.[97]

87 Tarabieh, "The Syrian Community in the Golan Heights," 8

88 Ṣafadī, in discussion

89 Beardsworth and Walsh, Apples

90 Rivkin, in discussion; Linda Quiquivix, "Nationality Undefined: the Politics of Place-Making Through Spaced-Subjects in Riklis's The Syrian Bride," Ather: the Journal of Media Geography (Winter 2011), 44

91 Russell, Breaking Down the Fence, 32

92 "M'abir al-qunaitra: 'abūr al-'arūs samir khayāl" [Qunaitra Crossing: The Crossing of the Bride Samir Khayāl], Dalilik 2011, accessed online at http://www.daliluk.com/news/read_article.asp?sn=6522

93 In exceptional situations, such as the "Arab Spring" unrest in Syria in 2011 and 2012, some students received
permission to return to the Golan Heights prior to the end of the semester (Ṣafadī, in discussion)

94 Shout dir. Sabine Lubbe Bakker and Ester Gould (Amsterdam: Pieter van Huystee Film and Television, 2010)

95 Rivkin, in discussion

96 Dana, Druze in the Middle East, 80-81

97 Russell, Breaking Down the Fence, 66-67

In later years, the program evolved in two significant ways. In 2008, women received permission to apply to conduct pilgrimages. In 2010 and 2011, women formed a numerical majority of approved pilgrims.[98] By 2010, the Israeli government had restricted the length of pilgrimages to six days at a designated time of year.[99] Altogether, pilgrimage crossings enabled more than 1,500 members of the community to cross the ceasefire line between 1994 and 2012.[100] Because a significant percentage of pilgrims visited relatives in Syria during their religious visits, the program maintained kinship networks across the ceasefire line.

Restrictions on civilian crossings of the ceasefire line paralleled de-facto limits on interpersonal communication between the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and other parts of Syria. Because of the ongoing cold war between Israel and Syria, the two states did not establish telephone lines or mail service across the ceasefire line. From 1967 until the late 1990s, when Majdal Shams received access to cellular telephone and internet service, members of the community routed communications with relatives in Syria through third countries.[101] Such communication was prohibitively expensive for many households: in 1995, telephone calls between Majdal Shams and Damascus cost up to two U.S. dollars each minute.[102] Consequently, the community developed an alternative method of communication between the Golan Heights and the remainder of Syria. After the fortification of the ceasefire line in the mid-1970s, Syrians began to gather on a small hill facing Majdal Shams across the Israeli barriers and minefield with binoculars and megaphones.[103] On clear days with low wind, they were able to shout audibly to the town and hold lengthy conversations with friends or relatives in the community. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, conversations at the Tala Ṣurākh (Shouting Hill) occurred on a weekly basis. Some individuals who lived in close proximity to the ceasefire line (particularly residents of the majority-Druze village of Hadar, fewer than five kilometers east of Majdal Shams) communicated with relatives via the Tala Ṣurākh nearly every Friday.[104] Others, who lived in other parts of the country, traveled to the Tala Ṣurākh several days each year, particularly on national holidays.[105] Over the decades, shouting across the ceasefire line evolved from a quotidian method of communication between individuals to a communal ritual that forged strong links between Majdal Shams and the Syrian nation.

Many of the conversations at the Tala Ṣurākh were quotidian. In 1991, Muḥsain Mughrabī shouted with his brother Maḥmūd, a resident of the village of ʿAin Qinīa near Majdal Shams. Muḥsain shared news about his children before asking his brother for a cash loan.[106] (Most likely, an individual permitted to cross the ceasefire line for a family reunion would have transferred such a loan in his luggage.) In 1994, Laṭīfa Jūnblaṭ and her family traveled to Majdal Shams from one of the surrounding villages to meet her in-laws at the Tala Ṣurākh. Jūnblaṭ shouted a varied register of news to her relatives: the

birth of five kittens, a neighbor's death, her daughter's recent marriage.[107] In 1999, Madhat Abū Ṣālaḥ visited the Tala Ṣurākh to chat with his mother, on the Syrian side of the ceasefire line, about her recent eye appointment.[108] These banal conversations indicate the degree to which residents of Majdal Shams maintained quotidian relations with individuals on the opposite side of the ceasefire line.[109]

Other meetings at the Tala Ṣurākh built solidarity across the ceasefire line on the basis of kinship links. This category of communication included commemorations of births and deaths. When a child was born into a family with branches in both the Golan Heights and other parts of Syria, relatives sometimes gathered at the ceasefire line to celebrate. Some families practiced a distinctive tradition of holding a megaphone to the infant's mouth to make her or his cries audible to relatives on the opposite side of the line. Similar gatherings occurred with the death of an individual whose relatives lived both in the Golan Heights and Syria proper. During such events, families gathered at the Tala Ṣurākh to shout condolences. In 1998, for example, the al-Ḥalabī family mourned the death of a relative in the Golan Heights:

> Relative 1, Syria: "We are sad that you have lost your mother. We hope God gives you a long life."
> Adība al-Ḥalabī (daughter of the deceased), Majdal Shams: "Thank you for your condolences. We pray to God this situation will end and we will be able to embrace all of you."
> Relative 2, Syria: "I pay condolences for those who died."
> Ḥammad al-Ḥalabī, Majdal Shams: "This is God's will, we cannot do anything about who dies."[110]

Adība al-Ḥalabī's prayer for "this situation to end" and desire to "embrace all" of her relatives on the Syrian side of the ceasefire line melded mourning for her deceased father with the sustained sadness that the family's division had produced. Commemorations of births and deaths served as family reunions that reinforced kin networks across the ceasefire line.

The Tala Ṣurākh was particularly significant during the community's annual commemoration of Mothers Day on 21 March. On this date, it was traditional for mothers to shout back and forth with their offspring on the opposite side of the ceasefire line. Over time, the Mothers Day shouting evolved into a ritualized ceremony—particularly after 1995, when the opportunity to study at the University of Damascus separated hundreds of students from their families in the Golan Heights. The ceremony would begin with the Syrian national anthem and a poetry recitation.[111] Next, the students (who had traveled to the Tala Ṣurākh on chartered buses) formed a cue and individually shouted greetings to their families and friends gathered in Majdal Shams. Finally, the students' mothers formed a cue in Majdal Shams and individually greeted their children across the ceasefire line.[112] The event subsumed the individual experiences of separated mothers and offspring into a public performance of kin links between Majdal Shams and Syria.

98 Ṣafadī, in discussion
99 Russell, Breaking Down the Fence, 7
100 Rivkin, in discussion
101 Russell, Breaking Down the Fence, 58
102 Toussef M. Ibrahim, "When Nations Draw Lines, the Druse Find a Way," New York Times (20 April 1995), A-4
103 Russell, Breaking Down the Fence, 53
104 Terence Smith, "So Near but So Far: Druse Families Separated by the Golan Truce Line." New York Times (2 December 1975), 82
105 Khalil E. Hachem, "Family ties bridge chasm of time, space," St. Petersburg Times (21 November 1994), 1-A
106 Sally Jacobs, "On the Golan Heights, a Druse Clamour Arises for Family Reunions," Boston Globe 14 March 1991

107 Hachem, "Family Ties"
108 Nomi Morris, "For Golan Refugees, New Hope of Return Decades After They Were Forced to Flee, Deal Talk Has Many Looking Homeward," Philadelphia Inquirer (8 December 1999), A03
109 Ibrahim, "When Nations Draw Lines"
110 Susan Taylor Martin, "Separated Syrians shout across heights," St. Petersburg Times (9 November 1998), 1-A
111 "A Conversation Between Tessa Praun and Smadar Dreyfus," Tessa Praun ed., Smadar Dreyfus (Stockholm: Magasin 3 Stockholm Konsthall, 2009), 21
112 Bakker and Gould dir., Shout

On certain occasions, communication at the Tala Ṡurākh melded kin-based relationships with Syrian nationalism. In 1993, for example, a divided family gathered at the site to mourn the death of an elderly resident of the Golan Heights (here referred to by the honorary title "Abu Rabeah," literally "father of Rabeah"):

Brother-in-law of the deceased, Syria: "The daughter of a men and the sister of men. May God console us by keeping you safe, you, and everybody. My sister Um-Rabeah, the dead is alive. Abu-Rabeah is dear to all of us. The kindness of Abu-Rabeah cannot be replaced,   but   by patience. There is no help or strength but by God. God will compensate you with patience."
Widow, Majdal Shams: "By the glory of God, I consider myself the daughter of every old man in this land, the daughter of every old woman in this land, and I consider myself the sister of every young woman who stands beside me. I will pray to God to help me carry and protect the fidelity. Carrying and protecting the fidelity doesn't mean bringing up my children. It means cultivating in them all the good and patriotic characteristics of their father, the noble, the generous, the pure, the helpful. God have mercy upon him, and keep him a symbol and treasure to me, and to this blessed country."
Relative 1, Syria: "And thus our struggling president, Comrade Ḣāfadh al-Assad, said that Golan is the heart of Syria, and this heart will always throb and be protected by the help of these turbans, and these heroic men who sacrifice for the sake of their Syrian nationalism, identity, their land, their honor, and their life."
Relative 2, Syria: "Oh, my sister, Um-Rabeah. Everybody is thinking about you, our relatives, neighbors and friends. They have asked us to convey their condolences to you. Also, all your sisters in love, here, convey their deep condolences. God bless you, and keep you for the sake of your children, and the family, and for the people of Golan, who will always raise their heads with pride." [113]

During the ritualized shouting of condolences, the widow in Majdal Shams praised her deceased husband for his "good and patriotic characteristics" and as a "symbol and treasure… to this beloved country." A relative on the Syrian side of the ceasefire line celebrated the deceased's "sacrifice for the sake of… Syrian nationalism." He also invoked Syria's then-president Ḣāfadh al-Assad—linking the nationalist sentiments at the Tala Ṡurākh to support for the sitting regime. Such events melded kin connections across the ceasefire line to a community relationship with the Syrian state.

Shouted communication between relatives served as a model for overtly nationalist political events at Tala Ṡurākh. On 17 April, for example, the community organized an annual commemoration of Syria's 1925 revolt against French colonialism. At the 2008 ceremony, an estimated 2,000 residents of Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages gathered at the ceasefire line to greet a similarly sized crowd on the Tala Ṡurākh. The two crowds listened to political speeches endorsing an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Massive Syrian flags and a photograph of sitting president Bashār al-Assad decorated both sites. Attendees also listened to a performance by Samīḣ Shūqair, a popular Syrian singer who had been born in the Golan Heights but had been driven from the region during the Israeli conquest. Shūqair's

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113 Jack Lyden, "A Border Proves No Obstacle at the Shouting Valley," All Things Considered (14 November 1993)

songs included "Ya Jawlān" (Oh Golan) and "Ya Zahr al-Rummān" (Pomegranate Blossom), which called for the return of the Golan Heights to Syrian control.[114] The patriotic event re-inscribed the Tala Ṡurākh as a symbol of the communal link between Majdal Shams and the Syrian nation—drawing an implicit parallel between kin connections across the ceasefire line and the community's national consciousness.

The arrival of internet service in Majdal Shams in the late 1990s permitted members of the community to engage with Syria in new ways. Families continued to commemorate deaths at the Tala Ṡurākh, and the community continued to organize cross-ceasefire line events on Mothers Day and national holidays.[115] Email messages, instant message services, and eventually video conversations, however, replaced many meetings at the Tala Ṡurākh. Residents who were able to access the internet regularly were able to follow news from Syria much more closely than in previous decades. During the 1970s and 1980s, residents of Majdal Shams accessed the news through Israeli publications in Hebrew or Palestinian newspapers from the Galilee and the West Bank.[116] These publications were usually unable to report directly from Syria because of restrictions on travel between the two countries. The internet, however, permitted residents of the Golan Heights to read (and occasionally write for) Syria-based blogs and digital newspapers.[117] The internet also provided a platform for residents of Majdal Shams to meet and interact with Syrians outside of their pre-existing kin networks—a crucial feature for a group of local critics of Syrian president Bashār al-Assad. When an anti-regime uprising began in Syria in spring 2011, Assad opponents in Majdal Shams organized a solidarity movement in the community that grew to encompass street protests, graffiti, a written manifesto, and the production of art and video for online consumption. Significantly, organizers in the Golan Heights worked in tandem with their counterparts across the ceasefire line—building relationships on the basis of national and political solidarity, rather than kin links. The anti-Assad political movement in Majdal Shams, therefore, built both political solidarity and tangible interpersonal relationships between the community and Syria proper.

Anti-regime discourse in Majdal Shams forged imagined community between local political activists and Syrian civilians living under Bashār al-Assad. In public statements, organizers in the Golan Heights frequently cited their Syrian national identity as a crucial motivating factor for their political activity. The group's first significant project, a written manifesto released online in late March 2011, declared opposition to al-Assad with the statement that "everyone who kills our people, the Syrians, is an enemy."[118] The statement indicated that membership in Syria's national community compelled residents of Majdal Shams to oppose their conationalists' enemies. In late June, the group opened a Facebook page and composed a mission statement that argued, "As an undividable part of the Syrian homeland and its social structure, we share the same… duties." The Facebook mission statement indicated that Syrian identity required the performance of tangible "duties" in addition to emotional solidarity. For the group, such "duties" included activism against the Assad regime. Organizers painted a graffito that

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114 Martin Asser, "Golan Druze Celebrate Across Barbed Wire." BBC News (18 April 2008), accessed online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7353494.stm
115 Praun ed., "A Conversation"
116 "Appendix: Testimonies," 128
117 Wahib Ayub (resident of Majdal Shams, representative to the Coalition of Secular and Democratic Syrians), in discussion with the author, 15 July 2012
118 "Bayān as-sūrīn min al-jawlān al-maḣtal" [Declaration of the Syrians of the Occupied Golan], 24 March 2011, accessed online at http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=252088

entreated residents, "You are the homeland, be the revolution" (inta al-watan, kan al-thawra), on several walls in Majdal Shams in the summer of 2012. At a series of weekly protests during the summer of 2012, organizers frequently chanted the slogan "the Syrian people are united" (al-sha'b al-sūrī wahid). Such rhetoric entreated members of the community to engage in revolutionary activism on the basis of their Syrian national identity. The discourse linked Syrian national consciousness, solidarity with co-nationalists' suffering, and anti-regime political activity.

Organizers' rhetoric also associated opposition to the regime with support for an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. This discourse argued that Bashār al-Assad and his predecessor (his father, Hāfadh al-Assad) had proved unable or unwilling to reclaim the territory and, therefore, obstructed local desire for a return of Syrian control. During several of the summer 2012 rallies, organizers chanted that the Assad regime had "sold the Golan" (ibn al-harām, bā' al-jawlān). The slogan referenced a popular local theory that the Israeli and Syrian governments had secretly agreed to exchange Israeli control of the Golan Heights for peaceful relations between the two countries. The group's public statements argued, furthermore, that al-Assad's violent crackdown on the recent uprising demonstrated a noteworthy disregard for citizens' concerns. At a rally on 6 July, activists prepared a sign reading "he who kills freedoms doesn't free nations" (man yaqattal al-ahrār, la yahrar al-awtān). The slogan suggested that al-Assad's repression of political dissent deafened the dictator to his constituents, including residents of Majdal Shams. The activists argued, furthermore, that regime opponents in Syria genuinely desired a reunification with the Golan Heights. The group's Facebook mission statement decried the "inability of the regime to reclaim a single piece of the soil of the Golan Heights" and stated that "[t]he liberation of the Golan Heights will not be possible if the nation is not liberated, as the oppressed people in Syria will not be able to liberate their occupied land." The mission statement argued that, in contrast to Bashār al-Assad, "the oppressed people in Syria" (e.g. regime opponents) sought to "liberate" the Golan Heights. Such discourse suggested that residents of Majdal Shams could best express their opposition to Israeli rule through support for Syria's anti-regime uprising.

Political activism brought anti-regime organizers in Majdal Shams into digital proximity with their counterparts in other parts of Syria. Some Golan-based activists contacted compatriots across the ceasefire line and volunteered their services editing and publicizing amateur video footage of protests.[119] Local artists designed digital posters in opposition to the regime and uploaded them to revolutionary Facebook groups. Rally organizers searched YouTube for video recordings of street protests in Damascus, Dar'a, Hums, and other cities to learn anti-regime chants and songs. Such activities represented indirect interactions across the ceasefire line between activists in the Golan Heights and their counterparts in other parts of Syria. Organizers in Majdal Shams identified this digital relationship as a central to their political movement and prioritized online publicity of their activities. After the group staged its first anti-regime rally in Majdal Shams on 16 April 2011, organizers uploaded photographs of the event on Facebook. Thousands of Syrians consumed the images, and many posted laudatory digital comments. The organizers were particularly struck when activists in Syria cited the rally in Majdal Shams as an inspiration for their own activism.[120] In response, the group performed a series of symbolic anti-regime actions for online

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119 Shahādhi Nasrāllah (lead organizer of anti-Assad protests in Majdal Shams), in discussion with the author, 16 and 31 July 2012.
120 Nasrāllah, in discussion

consumption. Activists posed Syria's pre-1963 flag, the standard flown by anti-regime militias of the Free Syrian Army, at various sites in Majdal Shams and the ruins of nearby communities depopulated during the 1967 war. They circulated images and video footage of these flags on Facebook and YouTube to demonstrate the spread of revolutionary sentiment to the Golan Heights. A group of 40 staged a small rally at an abandoned complex in Qunaitra that, prior to the Israeli occupation, had housed the Syrian army's central command. Unlike demonstrations in Majdal Shams, the Qunaitra rally did not target a local audience. Rather, activists designed the event for a network of political sympathizers that stretched across the ceasefire line and throughout Syria. Such exercises reminded Syrians that their compatriots in the Golan Heights remained a part of Syrian national community.

Palestine and Institution-Building in Majdal Shams, 1983-present

As Israel extended state services to the Golan Heights in the 1960s and 1970s, it concentrated its institutions in the Syrian town of Mas'ada. Mas'ada was half the size of Majdal Shams by population, but was situated at the geographic center of four of the region's five remaining Syrian communities. After 1967, residents of Majdal Shams and the surrounding communities traveled to Mas'ada regularly to attend secondary school, mail letters or packages, and visit the local courthouse or police station. Despite the centralization of Israeli services in the town, however, Mas'ada did not replace Majdal Shams as the region's cultural and economic hub. Rather, members of the community built locally-based institutions, centered in Majdal Shams, which matched or exceeded the importance of their Israeli counterparts. The institutions required resources that were not available locally, but their leadership desired to remain independent of the Israeli state. Rather than soliciting assistance from the Israeli state or private Jewish-Israeli organizations, institutions in Majdal Shams established relationships with Palestinians in Israel and the West Bank. They built networks between the Golan Heights and Ramallah (the Palestinian Authority capital and the major regional hub for non-governmental organizations) to share ideas, programs, and resources. This section surveys three interconnected institutions in Majdal Shams that emerged in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s: the Golan Academic Association, Golan for Development, and the Fātah Mudarris Center. It places particular emphasis on the cultural and interpersonal connections between Majdal Shams and Palestine that these organizations facilitated.

The Golan Academic Association (GAA), the first significant non-governmental organization in Majdal Shams, formed in the early 1980s. GAA grew out of broader trends in education and politics in the Golan Heights and among Palestinians in Israel. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, increasing numbers of students from Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages had enrolled in Israeli undergraduate programs, particularly in Haifa. In 1981 and 1982, many of these students developed political consciousness through their experiences of the community's anti-occupation protests and general strike. In the same year, Israel's unpopular invasion of southern Lebanon prompted Palestinian students in Haifa and other cities to form new student political organizations. Students from the Golan Heights joined such organizations, and some concluded that a student organization would permit university students and graduates to exert a positive influence on their community. In 1983, approximately 75 local university students and graduates formed the GAA as a student organization that, following the Palestinian model, would engage the community in educational and political activities. The group's declared goals were to increase university enrollment rates among local students and to "empower" residents through community

projects.[121] They also hoped to develop community solidarity and independence in opposition to state attempts to integrate the population into Israel.[122] Although the organization's model was Palestinian, its immediate goals were rooted in the particularity of the Golan Heights.

Several GAA programs instilled Syrian national consciousness in participants. In 1986, the organization commissioned one of its members, a Damascus-educated artist named Ḥassan Khāṭar, to craft a monument to Syria's 1925 anti-French revolt. Khāṭar produced a larger-than-life bronze statue titled al-Masīra (the March) that combined a portrait of revolt leader Sulṭān Bāsha al-Aṭrash brandishing a sword with images of schoolchildren and a young man carrying an armful of books. The statue linked the community's history of Syrian nationalism to education—implying that academic study could serve as a form of nationalist resistance.[123] The statue was erected in the main square of Majdal Shams and became an important symbol for the community. Between 1985 and 1990, GAA organized summer camps in an orchard outside Majdal Shams that enrolled an average of 400 local children every year.[124] GAA designed the camp curriculum to build Arab and Syrian nationalist sentiment among participants. For at least one session, counselors named participants' tents after Arab nationalist activists and fighters, including a militant from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a Palestinian nationalist group allied with the Syrian state. The militant was most famous for crossing the Israeli-Lebanese border in 1987 on a hang-glider and attacking an Israeli army base near Majdal Shams.[125] Other years, counselors named the tents after historical sites and cities in Syria.[126] Participants learned Syrian nationalist songs and slogans and toured the ruins of Syrian communities depopulated during the Israeli conquest of the Golan Heights.[127] Both the summer camp tents and al-Masīra imbued public space with Syrian nationalism. Such GAA programs promoted Syrian nationalism in the community.

A second category of GAA activities cultivated relationships between Majdal Shams and the Palestinian West Bank. The association organized trips for local secondary school students to visit Palestinian refugee camps, much as camp participants had visited the ruins of Syrian towns in the Golan Heights. The GAA invited Palestinian intellectuals to speak in the community as part of a lecture series that educated the local population about politics, religion, and the sciences. The association also conducted clothing and food drives for indigent residents of Palestinian refugee camps.[128] Such activities reminded members of the community that they shared a common experience of Israeli conquest and occupation with Palestinians. GAA's Syrian nationalist programs indicated, however, that local opposition to Israel's occupation should not follow the same trajectory as the Palestinian liberation movement. Whereas Palestinians sought to establish an independent state, GAA promoted Syrian nationalism as an outlet for local political energy.

In the early 1990s, GAA evolved into a registered non-governmental organization named Golan

for the Development of the Arab Villages (GFD). GAA began to struggle to continue its activities, in part because it depended entirely on local volunteers and funding sources.[129] In the same period, educated Palestinians in Ramallah, Jerusalem, and other cities formed a significant number of non-governmental organizations. Palestinian institution-building grew out of the population's "intifada" revolt against Israeli occupation in the late 1980s—which spurred negotiations for the formation of an independent Palestinian state and significant international investment in the region. Closely monitoring developments in Palestine GAA leaders adopted the belief that a registered NGO would advance their long-term social goals more effectively than a volunteer-based membership organization.[130] The organization's leadership recognized that residents' use of Israeli state services integrated the population into Israel, threatening the community's Syrian national identity. They developed a goal of forming locally based, independent institutions that would lessen the community's dependence on the Israeli state. In contrast to Palestinian institution-builders—who often imagined their organizations as groundwork for state structures that would develop after independence—the founders of GFD understood their work as "preserving" the community's "existence and… Syrian identity" in preparation for an eventual Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights.[131] In a similar manner to the Golan Academic Association, GFD styled itself after Palestinian organizations but adopted a unique agenda.

GFD's first major program was the establishment of a local health clinic. During the 1970s and 1980s, the community had depended on local government-run clinics for basic medical treatment and had travelled to Jewish-Israeli cities such as Safad and Kiriat Shmona for advanced care. In the early 1990s, GFD conducted a detailed survey of the local population to identify the community's particular medical needs. In 1993, the organization opened a clinic in Majdal Shams that offered treatments for common ailments identified in the local survey. Because residents often struggled to access medical care during evenings and weekends (the closest hospital was located nearly 30 kilometers away), the GFD clinic remained staffed 24 hours a day. The clinic was not entirely independent of the Israeli health care system, as it employed some Israeli-Jewish doctors and referred patients to Israeli hospitals for advanced treatment.[132] Unlike state medical facilities, however, the GFD clinic was tailored to serve the local population and defined itself as a community-based initiative—emphasizing the community's particularity over its integration into Israel.

Other GFD programs worked to reduce Israel's control of local education and the economy. GFD revived the GAA summer camp program in 1991 and organized annual summer camps until 2011.[133] The summer camps grew in size, enrolling up to 450 children in certain years.[134] To serve older children and adults, GFD sponsored classroom courses in foreign languages, music, and the plastic arts. These programs broke the Israeli monopoly on education in the community and allowed residents to study locally developed (rather than state) curricula. GFD also reached out to local farmers by funding an agricultural research laboratory. The program studied local use of fertilizer and pesticides and examined

121 Mara'i, in discussion
122 Munir Fakher Eldin, "How Syrian Artists Shape Cultural Practices in a Communal Context: the Case of Fateh al-Mudarris Center for Arts and Culture in the Occupied Golan Heights" (lecture, Columbia University, 7 May 2011)
123 Fakher Eldin, "How Syrian Artists Shape Cultural Practices"
124 Tarabieh, "Education, Control, and Resistance," 46
125 David Rudge, "More 'Intifada' Summer Camps Uncovered," The Jerusalem Post (24 July 1989), O2
126 Joel Greenberg, "The Druse of Golan Stay Loyal to Syria," New York Times (9 August 1999), A-9
127 Rudge, "More 'Intifada' Summer Camps Uncovered"; Greenberg, "The Druse of Golan Stay Loyal to Syria"
128 Mara'i, in discussion

129 Mara'i, in discussion, Tarabieh, "Education, Control and Resistance," 46
130 Fakher Eldin, "How Syrian Artists Shape Cultural Practices"
131 Lisa Hajjar ed., Proceedings of the First Study Day on Twenty Five Years of Israeli Occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights (Jerusalem: the Arab Association for Development, 1993), 2
132 Mara'i, in discussion
133 Greenberg, "Druze of the Golan Stay Loyal"; Mara'i, in discussion
134 Tarabieh, "The Syrian Community in the Golan Heights," 13

the possibility of expanding local agricultural production to alternative crops, such as mushrooms.[135] Such research sought to improve local agriculture, reducing the community's economic dependence on Israeli companies. These activities both provided tangible benefits to the community and built local intellectual and economic independence from Israel.

A series of GFD programs in the late 1990s and the early 2000s promoted the growth of a locally based cultural scene. In the early 2000s, GFD published a bi-monthly journal named al-Ruwāq to showcase local prose, poetry, and visual art. In 2003, the organization purchased a local news website named MajdalNet and developed the site into an online hub for the community at the URL www.jawlan.org.[136] On the site, members of the community were able to access local and international news, articles about the history of the Golan Heights, and information about GFD activities. Al-Ruwāq and www.jawlan.org encouraged the community to consume art and media that had been produced locally, rather than in Israel or Palestine.

GFD also cultivated local art production by sponsoring a local art school and cultural center named Bait al-Fann (Art House). In 1996, a small group of local artists and musicians proposed developing a private arts education program to compensate for perceived inadequacies in the Israeli public schools' art curriculum. The group approached GFD for financial assistance, and the organization provided Bait al-Fann with classroom space and a secretary to provide administrative support.[137] In 1999, GFD's leadership began to exert greater control over Bait al-Fann, including influence over curricula. The program's founders opposed GFD's inroads—in part because of a principled belief in artistic independence—and resigned from Bait al-Fann en masse in 2001.[138] Although short-lived, the program played a significant role in local culture. Bait al-Fann provided residents of the Golan Heights with a unique opportunity to formally study the arts outside of Israeli institutions—cultivating a small community of artists with a local education base. Moreover, two offshoots of Bait al-Fann offered arts education to the community throughout the early 2000s. GFD incorporated arts education into its mission and organized youth programs in music, theater, and visual art.[139] And in 2004, Bait al-Fann's former leadership established an independent local arts collective, the Fatah Mudarris Center for Arts and Culture (FMC). This Majdal Shams-based organization developed a strong local art scene and linked the Golan Heights to Palestinian artistic production.

FMC balanced financial autonomy with integration into regional artistic movements. Between 2004 and 2012, the center paid its operating expenses with the revenues of a café in downtown Majdal Shams. To maintain a flow of artistic ideas in and out of the community, however, FMC built relationships with Palestinian arts organizations in the West Bank. In 2007, FMC partnered with three Ramallah-based arts associations to curate a group exhibition of visual artists from the Golan Heights in the West Bank. The partner organizations—the Qattan Foundation, the Khalil Sakakini Cultural Center, and Birzeit University's Ethnographic and Art Museum—arranged for the exhibition to travel to several galleries in Bethlehem and Ramallah. Through the exhibition, artists from Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages developed relationships with Palestinian artists and audiences. In some instances, artists entered Palestinian art competitions and arranged further solo or group exhibitions in the West Bank. In 2008, FMC partnered with the Qattan Foundation and Khalil Sakakini Center to introduce Palestinian artists to an audience in the Golan Heights. The three groups organized a 10-day festival that exhibited the work of Palestinian visual artists in Majdal Shams and brought Palestinian musicians and poets to perform in the community. Approximately 2,000 residents of the Golan Heights attended the festival's events, including the hundreds of children attending the GFD summer camp.[140] The festival introduced Palestinian art to local audiences and permitted artists and musicians in the Golan Heights to build relationships with their counterparts in the West Bank. The circulation of artworks between Majdal Shams and Ramallah integrated the two sites into a single network of artistic exchange. Artists from both communities influenced the style and themes of one another's work, and audiences consumed the art from both sites together through group exhibitions. For residents of Majdal Shams, this network emphasized the community's intellectual independence from Israel and common experiences with Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.

FMC also linked art in the Golan Heights to Syrian culture across the ceasefire line. The organization took its name from a 20th century Syrian modernist painter named Fatah Mudarris, who FMC founders viewed as a "model" of artistic independence. FMC introduced contemporary Syrian art to a local audience with a 2010 film series showcasing the documentaries of 'Umar Amīrālāy and a 2012 exhibition of work by 'Alī Farzāt, a prominent political cartoonist.[141] The choice of Amīrālāy and Farzāt was significant, as both were prominent opponents of the Assad regime. Amīrālāy's most well-known documentary, A Flood in the Ba'ath Country, focused on the regime's indoctrination of Syrian children in a rural public school. Farzāt's cartoons about the Arab Spring drew the ire of regime supporters in Syria. In 2011, unknown assailants attacked Farzāt on the street in Damascus and broke his hands, allegedly to deter the artist from producing pro-uprising drawings. The two exhibitions differed fundamentally from other local programs that built links between the Golan Heights and Syria. Whereas events at the Tala Ṣurākh and the GAA/GFD summer camps promoted nationalist sentiments that included support for the standing regime, the Amīrālāy and Farzāt exhibitions promoted Syrian culture without endorsing Bashār al-Assad. The FMC programs indicated that residents of Majdal Shams and the surrounding villages could forge a Syrian identity that was independent of the state.

Several FMC projects engaged with the particularities of the relationship between the Golan Heights and Syria. In 2010, two members of the collective partnered with a Ramallah-based publishing house to produce an illustrated children's book titled 'Asfūr wa Samaka (Swallow and Fish). The volume allegorically portrayed the experiences of individuals in the Golan Heights and Syria who established relationships across the ceasefire line but could not freely travel between the two territories. In the text, a fish falls in love with a swallow after hearing him sing on the riverbank—much as individuals built and maintained relationships through voice at the Tala Ṣurākh. At the book's climax, the swallow declares, "I want us to… live together… in one house," but the two realize that no location exists where they can both live. The book's final lines describe the fish and swallow parting, while the closing image shows the

135 Mara'i, in discussion
136 Nabih 'Awidat (Founding Director of Jawlany.com), in discussion with the author, 1 August 2012
137 Wa'al Ṫarabīah (founding director, the Fatah Mudarris Center for Arts and Culture), in discussion with the author, 9 July 2012
138 Fakher Eldin, "How Syrian Artists Shape Cultural Practices"
139 Mara'i, in discussion

140 Ṫarabīah, in discussion
141 Ṫarabīah, in discussion

two creatures hovering in an undefined celestial space outside of the physical riverbank.[142] 'Asfūr wa Samaka portrayed the emotional links stretching across the ceasefire line with ambivalence. Although the swallow and fish were able to form a powerful bond, physical realities tragically blocked the relationship's fulfillment. The text indicated that, although it was possible for residents of the Golan Heights and Syria to maintain emotional ties across the ceasefire line, such relationships were deeply tragic.

In 2012, several members of the FMC collective collaborated on an art video focusing on the relationships between contemporary residents of the Golan Heights and the civilians exiled from the territory in 1967. Titled "Afaq Khafīf" (Light Horizon), the film documents an artist symbolically restoring a terrace in a ruined home in the empty village of 'Aīn Fīt, a short distance from Majdal Shams. The artist sweeps and mops the terrace before installing pure white carpeting, curtains, and furniture. She then sits in the cleansed space and gazes into the horizon.[143] The artist's cleaning and furnishing of the terrace emphasizes the space's emptiness and many Syrians' continued desire to return to the Golan Heights. It is possible to read the gesture as a symbolic preparation for the return of the house's pre-1967 inhabitants. In this reading, the artist serves as a caretaker of the Syrian presence in 'Aīn Fīt. In cleaning and furnishing the terrace for the exiled owners, she re-inscribes their existence on the physical space of their property. This tangible inscription of ownership is symbolically significant. The Israeli government has argued that uninhabited land and structures in the Golan Heights are legally abandoned—and, therefore, have become the property of the Israeli state. In serving as a present proxy for the terrace's absent owners, the artist refutes the state's labeling of the property as abandoned by re-inscribing humanity into the space. The act of mopping the terrace is particularly symbolic. In Majdal Shams and the surrounding communities, it is conventional for each home to include an outdoor seating area and for residents to wash this area each morning. This local practice likely predates 1967 and represents an indigenous Syrian tradition. The mopping of the terrace performs Syrian culture in 'Aīn Fīt and symbolically claims the site for all Syrians, alongside the building's former residents.

Conclusion

This article surveys the influence of Israel, Palestine, and Syria on Majdal Shams in the 20th and 21st centuries. In consequence of this multiplicity of national influences, residents of Majdal Shams identified themselves through a complex set of ethnic, religious, and national valences: Israeli, Syrian, Arab, and Druze. The degree to which an individual fore-grounded or hyphenated one or more of these valences depended on her or his generation, life experience, and cultural practices. Consequently, individuals' self-identifications varied widely, even within families. Certain members of the community distinguished between their religious status as Druze and their ethno-national identities. Many identified themselves ethno-nationally as 'Syrian,' particularly individuals who had reached adulthood before 1967 or had been involved in pro-Syrian political activity. Others considered themselves 'Israeli,' especially members of families that had intermarried with Israeli citizens. It was possible for a single individual to identify unselfconsciously as both 'Israeli' and 'Syrian.' Most considered themselves 'Arabs' in reference

to their use of the Arabic language and Arab cultural practices or because of extensive contacts with Palestinians. Some individuals linked their ethnic, national and religious identifications and described themselves as 'Druze-Israeli,' 'Arab-Israeli,' 'Druze-Syrian' or 'Arab-Syrian.' Perhaps most important, the community's ambivalence in its relationships to Israel, Palestine, and Syria permitted the existence of a strong locally-rooted communal identity. Despite increased freedom to relocate to Israel and Palestine after 1982 and to Syria after 1991, a relatively small number of residents left the Golan Heights. During field research in the summer of 2012, invocations of local attachment and regional pride co-existed with expressions of nationalism. It was not unusual for a resident to declare her or his affection for Majdal Shams in casual conversation. In many instances, residents declared attachment to the community with greater force than they claimed identification with a particular nation-state. Although nationalism served as the single most potent valence of identity in the 20th and 21st centuries, the failure of nation-states to dominate Majdal Shams permitted the community to retain a complex and multivalent identity.

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142 Iyād Mdāh and Akram al-Ḥalabī, 'Asfūr wa Samaka (Ramallah: Tamer Institute for Community Education, 2010), 14-21

143 "Afaq Khafīf" dir. Randā Mdāh (Golan Heights, 2012), accessed online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eNKCRimo3j0

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Lok Sabha Elections in India

Harini Dedhia

When analyzing elections in a country as economically, politically, and socially diverse as India, a number of variables have an effect on the outcome of the voting process. This study attempts to explain the outcome of the Lok Sabha elections in India by estimating the dependent variable 'percentage of seats won by the Indian National Congress and its allies' as a linear function of various explanatory variables. I assess and incorporate circumstantial, economic, social and regional factors in the model, attempting to explain the outcome of the Lok Sabha elections in India. Using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method on a classical linear regression model, the most appropriate model is established, including consumer price index (CPI) inflation, regional trend factor, and literacy rate as explanatory variables and dummy variables for isolated events including the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the liberalization of the Indian economy. The assassination of Indira Gandhi in office and the regional trend factor are found to be the most significant factors in determining the outcome of the elections. The number of Hindu-Muslim riots and the literacy rate were found to be the most insignificant explanatory variables in this endeavor.

Introduction

This study aims to create an econometric model that can be used to explain and possibly predict the outcome of the elections to the Lower House of Parliament (Lok Sabha) in India. India's government system is a parliamentary democracy in which the people elect representatives from their respective constituencies to form a legislative body called Lok Sabha. The government is formed from this elected body by whoever gains the support of the maximum members of the Lok Sabha. Thus understanding the government and the possible policies of the future for the largest democracy in the world entails being able to understand and explain the outcome of the Lok Sabha elections, which is what my model attempts to achieve.

Previous studies on general elections[1] in India have focused on the country's electoral structure and effectiveness, as well as voter participation (or voter turnout) in elections. This study draws from such previous studies and aims to construct a linear regression model explaining the outcome of the general elections. India is a diverse and a young country; with this in mind, a number of independent variables ranging from economic and socio-political to circumstantial in nature have been incorporated in this study. CPI inflation rates[2], literacy rates, time elapsed between two consecutive elections and the number of Hindu-Muslim riots are some of the quantitative variables that have been considered for this model. Furthermore, dummy variables representing circumstances such as the assassination of Indira Gandhi in

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1 'General elections in India' is another phrase used to describe the election to the lower house of the Parliament, Lok Sabha.

2 Consumer Price Index (CPI)

office[3], post economic liberalization election years, etc. have also been incorporated in the study to assess the effect of isolated events.

These explanatory variables have been considered for a model that is derived using OLS[4] regression for the purpose of this study. The results of this study show that regionalism and sympathy votes shave the largest and the most statistically significant impact on the outcome of the Lok Sabha elections. Contrary to expectations of a typical developing country, inflation of consumer prices is found to have a negligible impact on the outcome of the Lok Sabha elections.

Literature Review

There have not been many attempts to model the outcome of the Lok Sabha elections, as only fifteen of them have taken place so far. Research has instead focused on theoretical arguments about the impact of various economic variables on the outcome of the elections. A National Election Survey [5] carried out in 2004 shows the leftward leanings of the Indian National Congress (INC)[6]. 42% of those who stated their political alignment with the INC and its allies believed that only the rich benefit from economic reforms. In contrast, 59% of National Democratic Alliance (NDA)[7] supporters believed that these reforms benefit the entire nation. This shows the center-left political orientation of INC and its allies and the center-right orientation of NDA.

Many researchers are reluctant to undertake the construction of a model explaining and estimating the outcome of the elections. Suri (2004) argues that it is futile to attempt to look for macro, national indicators to explain the outcome of the elections in India, and that it is far too diverse a country where people are not concerned about national statistics. With respect to the impact of liberal economic reforms on the outcome of the connections, he says that "most of the voters in India are not even aware of the reforms and are not bothered about larger issues."[8]

Some cross-sectional empirical studies have also aimed at studying the electoral turnout and possible outcomes for a particular general election in India. Kondo (2003) empirically shows that there is a higher correlation between explanatory power of variables and socio-economic variables that aim to explain voter turnout than when the model attempts to gauge the political affiliations of voters. Thus, scholars have shown a general disinterest in using socio-economic variables to demonstrate the outcome of the elections to the Lok Sabha in India.

Taking from the previous studies a general understanding of the politics in India and the political orientation of various groups of the electorate, I go on to establish a model using macro variables, contrary to conclusions laid out by Suri (2004) as explanatory variables of the outcome of the Lok Sabha elections in India.

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3 Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister of India (chief executive of the Government of India) when she was assassinated in 1984. She was also the President of the Indian National Congress Party and the daughter of India's first Prime Minister, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru.

4 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)

5 The National Election Survey is the largest social scientific study of political attitudes and behavior of Indian electorate till date. It is based on surveys of a nationally representative sample of the electorate.

6 Center left government currently governing India.

7 Center right opposition to the current government.

8 Suri, K. C. "Democracy, Economic Reforms and Election Results in India." JSTOR. Economic and Political Weekly, Dec. 2004. Pg. 5406. Web. 04 Dec. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4415923?seq=3>

The Model

The model aims to gauge the impact of various independent variables on the outcome of the Lok Sabha elections in India. To gauge the direct impact of the collective independent variables on the outcome on the elections, an OLS linear regression model is used.

The dependent variable considered for this study is the percentage of the total contested seats won by the Indian National Congress or its allies. A percentage and not the number of seats is considered for this study because the number of seats in the Lok Sabha has changed over time and stands currently at its highest capacity yet: 552 seats. It is crucial, however, to remember that only the outcome of the general elections is being studied here and hence only contested seats are taken into consideration. Furthermore, the seats won by the Indian National Congress (INC) and its allies are considered because the INC is still a very formidable force in Indian politics and is a national party currently leading the center-left coalition. The INC has been one of the two leading political parties in India since independence. For the purpose of this study, allies are taken to be only those members that are a part of the coalition government and not those who merely lend external support to the government.

The model tests for several quantitative variables and several dummy variables. CPI inflation rate (CPI) is one of the key independent variables included in the model. This indicator measures the annual inflation rate in December (year-over-year) prior to the election. As India is a developing nation in which a middle class is just beginning to emerge, fluctuations in the price levels of common consumer goods and services affect the average voter. The relationship between CPI inflation rate and percentage of seats won by INC and allies is demonstrated in Graph 1 (see below).


Graph 1: CPI inflation rate and % of seats won by INC and allies

As seen in Graph 1, CPI inflation does not seem to have any effect on the percentage of seats won by INC and its allies in the Lok Sabha elections.

However since our dependent variable is the percentage of seats won by INC and its allies, the CPI inflation rate is adjusted (CPI*I) for the incumbency factor (I) using a multiplicative dummy variable. This dummy variable assigns the value of 1 to an incumbent INC government and a value of -1 to a non-INC incumbent. Hence inflation with an incumbent INC government will have the opposite effect as should be the case with inflation. The relationship between CPI*I and percentage of seats is demonstrated in Graph 2.

Graph 2: CPI*I and % of seats won by INC and Allies

There is a positive relationship between CPI*I and percentage of seats won by INC and its allies. This implies that as inflation under an INC incumbent government increases, so does the percentage of seats won by INC and its allies. The opposite is true when the inflation under a non-INC incumbent government increases. This positive relationship seems to make no logical sense. This result implies that if there were higher inflation rates with an incumbent INC government, they would fare better at the general elections, which appears to be a counterintuitive effect.

Hindu-Muslim tensions have dominated Indian politics even before the nation's formal creation in 1947. To account for these tensions, an independent variable, the 'number of Hindu Muslim riots,' has been included in the model. This indicator is defined to include any incidence of group violence that is defined by the court and the Indian news media to be a riot. Legal classification demonstrates the legitimacy of the tension and definition as such by the media ensures that voters most likely perceive the conflict in a similar fashion. Since Indian politics has been dominated by a secular front represented by INC and allies generally and a right-wing pro Hindu bloc, Hindu Muslim (HM) riots that took place between Y_t election

and Yt-1 election could have an effect on the outcome of the elections. The relationship between the number of Hindu Muslim riots and the percentage of seats won by INC and allies is depicted in Graph 3.

Graph 3: # of Hindu Muslim riots and % of seats won by INC and allies

# of Hindu Muslim riots between the previous election and this election

The negative trend line once again does not make any logical sense just as is the case with the trend line for CPI*I. This suggests that since the outcome of the elections is dependent on multiple factors, an appropriate combination of those factors must be found so that the individual coefficients of the explanatory variables also make logical sense in the model.

Along with regional divides, India has been faced with growing regional social cleavages. Given the emerging trend of regionalism and regional politics in determining the strategies, alliances and the policies at the Centre, a regional trend factor must also be computed. Every state has its own language, food, culture, predominant religious belief, diverse economic sectors, etc. To account for regional politics, I computed the regional trend factor by assimilating the data on the State Legislatures[9] in the country at the time of the Lok Sabha election. To compute this regional trend factor, I determine the number of states with an INC or an INC ally government at the time of the general election. Since each state has a distinct number of seats assigned to it in the Lok Sabha based on its population, I determine the number of seats allocated to the states with INC or INC ally's government. This summation was then divided by the total number of contested seats in that election to obtain the regional trend factor (RTF). The relationship for the RTF thus derived and percentage of seats won by INC and allies is shown in Graph 4.

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9 The State Legislatures in India are organized in the same manner as the Lok Sabha. They are popularly elected democratic body of representatives from the various constituencies.

∴Regional Trend Factor=$\frac{\text{(\# of seats held by States with an INC (or ally)government)}}{\text{(Total \# of contested seats)}}$

Graph 4: Regional Trend Factor and % of seats won by INC and allies

Regional Trend Factor

The positive trend line in Graph 4 shows that as INC and its allies gain more favor in regional elections (State legislature elections), they also win a higher percentage of seats in the next Lok Sabha elections, whenever they are held.[10]

Along with accounting for social cleavages, one must also take into account societal changes as a whole. The emergence of an educated middle class best shows the change in modern Indian society. Hence literacy rates have also been considered for the model. India has always experienced a rise in the popularity of the left in states with higher literacy rates. For example: Kerala, a southern state in India, has the highest literacy rate (93.1% according to the 2011 census[11]) since independence in 1947, and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI(M) has ruled the state for over three and a half decades in the period since independence[12]. Hence changing literacy rates (LITERACY) would have an effect on the outcome of the elections given the leftward policy leaning of literate and educated people. The relationship between literacy rates and percentage of seats won by INC and allies is demonstrated in Graph 5.

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10 Election to the State Legislatures and Lok Sabha are not coordinated to occur at the same time. States have elections as and when needed. For example a state can have elections 3 years before the Lok Sabha elections. The timing for both is not related.

11 "Provisional Population Totals Paper 1 of 2011 : Kerala." Census of India : Provisional Population Totals Paper 1 of 2011 : Kerala. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Dec. 2012. <http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/prov_data_products_kerala_.html>.

12 Stancati, Margherita. "Kerala: The End of Communism?" India Real Time RSS. Wall Street Journal, 13 May 2011. Web. 04 Dec. 2012. <http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2011/05/13/kerala-the-end-of-communism/>.

Graph 5: Literacy rates and % of seats won by INC and allies

The negative relationship between these two variables does not say much because while literacy rates have been improving since independence the power of INC has been diluted, resulting in the negative relationship portrayed in the graph above. However, literacy is still a variable that must be considered for the model as its effect in conjunction with the other explanatory variables could be of consequence.

In addition to these quantitative variables, circumstantial variables were tested in the model using dummy variables. A dummy variable for Indira Gandhi's assassination (INDIRAD) in office in 1984 was incorporated in the model, as her son Mr. Rajiv Gandhi[13] won the 1984 elections following her death in what was considered to be a huge wave of sympathy, with the INC alone winning 405 of the 515 Lok Sabha seats. Also, possibly the most unpopular decision in contemporary Indian politics, the declaration of a general emergency by Indira Gandhi in 1975 (EMGCY), has been incorporated in model using a dummy variable that assigns a value of 1 to the elections held immediately after the emergency, as this was sure to negatively impact the INC in the following elections.

To accommodate the rise of the middle class in India, a dummy variable (LIBERAL) was introduced that assigned a value of 1 to all elections held after the India liberalized its economy in 1991[14] and a value of 0 otherwise. Liberalization of the economy raised a plethora of new economic opportunities for a middle class to thrive, introducing India to the globalized economy. The economic opportunities and open access to the world encouraged the growth of a strong middle class, who quickly demanded a different array of policies and began to act as a group in their efforts to achieve their desired outcomes. As

they are an increasing percentage of the population, their presence must be accounted for in explaining the outcome of the general elections in India.

Initially two models were tested with all the variables to gauge the economic significance of each variable on the model. The first regression (see Table 1 in Appendix) took into account all variables and the assassination of both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. The second regression took into account all variables and only the death of Indira Gandhi (see Table 2 in Appendix). Since the regression gave us a much higher R2 (72.37 as compared 65.15) as well as a higher adjusted R2 (35.53 as compared to 18.67), we henceforth consider the second regression model a more accurate measurement. With the second regression model in mind, the variables regional trend factor (RTF), Indira Gandhi's death (INDIRAD), declaration of emergency by Indira Gandhi (EMGCY), and liberalization of the economy (LIBERAL) affect the dependent variable most significantly (i.e. they have larger coefficients). To determine the incorporation of one other variable we use the incremental F-statistic approach[15] to determine which variable to include. Literacy rate obtains the highest F statistic[16] in this case and is also the only variable with a t-statistic of an absolute value greater than 1[17]. Hence literacy rate (LITERACY) is incorporated in the model.

The model now accounts for regional trend factor (rtf), literacy rate, death of Indira Gandhi, general emergency declared in 1975, and economic liberalization of India.

$$Y= \beta_1 + \beta_2(\text{indirad}) + \beta_3(\text{emgcy}) + \beta_4(\text{rtf}) + \beta_5(\text{liberal}) + \beta_6(\text{literacy}) + u$$

While analyzing the raw data used to compute regional trend factor, it was noted that the majority of state legislatures went under presidential rule (central government rule) after the conclusion of the general elections in 1977. Most of the states witnessed three months of presidential rule followed by fresh elections. INC lost the control over the state legislatures in all the states that went into fresh elections following the three months of presidential rule, which itself followed the general elections after the declaration of a state of emergency. If the regional trend factor were to compensate for this, the value of the variable for 1977 elections would fall from 0.754613 to 0.201107 (i.e. from 409 seats to 109 seats)[18]. Furthermore, after Indira Gandhi's victory in 1980, the states that did hold elections simultaneously or immediately after the general elections witnessed a revival of the INC. When this too was adjusted for, we saw the regional trend factor for 1980 elections rise from 0.149446 to 0.5811808 (i.e. from 81 seats to 315 seats). The model thus includes adjusted values of the regional trend factor instead of RTF. The relationship between the adjusted RTF and the percentage of seats won by INC and allies is shown in Graph 6.

As compared to RTF (see graph 4), the adjusted RTF provides us with a better line of fit. The points are closer to the regression line, unlike the graph of the non-adjusted RTF. After contrasting the relationship of adjusted RTF and dependent variable with to that of the RTF and the dependent variable for the reasons discussed above, adjusted RTF seems like an appropriate variable to add to the model in place of RTF.

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13 The then head of the Indian National Congress.

14 Choudhury, Chandrahas. "20 Years Later, India's Transformation Is Incomplete: World View." Bloomberg. Bloomberg, 26 July 2011. Web. 04 Dec. 2012. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-26/20-years-later-india-s-transformation-is-incomplete-world-view.html>.

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15 F =

16 Fcpi = 0.5019; Fcpi*I = 0.9357; FHM = 0.0838; Ftime = 0.03631; Fliteracy = 2.373

17 t- statistic= -1.461498

18 See Table 4 in Appendix

Graph 6: Adjusted RTF and % of seats won by INC and allies

Thus, the model now reads:

$$Y = \beta_1 + \beta_2(\text{indirad}) + \beta_3(\text{emgcy}) + \beta_4(\text{adjusted\_rtf}) + \beta_5(\text{liberal}) + \beta_6(\text{literacy}) + u$$

However, in the case of this model, we encounter a problem of serious collinearity between the two independent variables, EMGCY and ADJUSTED_RTF. This is evident from the sudden drop in the value of the coefficient for EMGCY, from -21.68 to -0.158, as well as a sharp drop in the absolute value of its t-statistic, which falls from -1.45 to -0.008. This occurred because the adjusted regional trend factor modified the regional trend factor to show the effect of regional sentiments just after emergency ended. Thus, EMGCY should be discarded from the model, and is therefore not included in the final analysis.

Since our model has only four explanatory variables, the next significant economic variable is taken into consideration - consumer price index adjusted for the incumbent contender (i.e. CPI*I). Observing a significant increase in R2 (from 0.77 to 0.83) as well as in adjusted R2 (from 0.64 to 0.73), along with the absolute value of the t-statistic for the beta coefficient of CPI*I being greater than 1[19], we now include CPI*I into the model. Thus the final model reads:

$$Y = \beta_1 + \beta_2(\text{indirad}) + \beta_3(\text{cpi*i}) + \beta_4(\text{adjusted\_rtf}) + \beta_5(\text{liberal}) + \beta_6(\text{literacy}) + u[20]$$

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19 See Chapter 7 (Gujarati, 2003).
20 See Table 5 in Appendix for regression output.

The Data

Table 6: Independent Variables Tested for the model

Variable	CPI*I	INDIRAD	EMGCY	LIBERAL	LITERACY	RTF	HM
Mean	1.987	0.067	0.067	0.333	45.955	0.544	0.267
Median	3.210	0.000	0.000	0.000	47.100	0.584	0.000
Maximum	13.940	1.000	1.000	1.000	70.670	1.000	2.000
Minimum	-15.320	0.000	0.000	0.000	18.300	0.125	0.000
Std. Dev.	10.010	0.258	0.258	0.488	16.487	0.313	0.594
Skewness	-0.464	3.474	3.474	0.707	-0.115	0.043	2.039
Kurtosis	1.898	13.071	13.071	1.500	1.841	1.503	5.957
Jarque-Bera	1.298	93.575	93.575	2.656	0.873	1.406	
Probability	0.523	0.000	0.000	0.264	0.646	0.495	0.001
Sum	29.810	1.000	1.000	5.000	689.320	8.158	4.000
Sum Sq. Dev.	1402.921	0.933	0.933	3.333	3805.661	1.373	4.933
Observations	15	15	15	15	15	15	15

(All values in the table are rounded off to 3 decimal places)

CPI*I: Consumer Price Index corrected for incumbent contender
EMGCY: X=1 for elections immediately after the general emergency, 0 otherwise
INDIRAD: X=1 for elections immediately after the assassination of Indira Gandhi
LIBERAL: X=1 for any elections held post the liberalization of the economy in 1991, 0 for those held prior
LITERACY: Literacy rate in India
RTF: Computed regional trend factor
HM: Number of Hindu-Muslim Riots

The above table sets forth the basic statistics for the various independent variables considered for the model. Please note here that EMGCY, INDIRAD, and LIBERAL are dummy variables and their descriptive statistics as such are not of any consequence or importance.

Consumer Price Index Inflation

The data for the consumer price index (CPI) inflation is taken from the archives of the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (MOSPI), the Government of India. The CPI inflation rate is the annual inflation rate measured y-o-y in December every year. Given the general expectation of short term voter memory, a more appropriate indicator would be taking the average inflation rate for 6 months

prior to elections into consideration. However, since monthly data from 1947-1970 is not available via the Ministry's archives online, this was not possible.

Since India is an under-developed country where most of the working population is either in farming or manual labor for the major part of the time span covered by this study (1947-2009), one would expect the inflation rate to be of consequence to the voters as most of the population survives on minimum wages. Thus the governing partyment with a higher inflation rate year prior to the election would witness a disadvantage in the elections and vice versa. Since the inflation rate is being multiplied by 1 for INC incumbency and -1 for non-INC incumbency, the inflation rate must be negatively related to the percentage of seats gained by INC in the Lok Sabha.

Circumstantial Variables

The independent variables representing the unique and specific circumstances in Indian politics such as the assassination of Indira Gandhi, declaration of general emergency, and liberalization of the economy have been assigned distinct dummy variables. The values for these variables are derived via public knowledge of the occurrence of the events.

The a-priori expectation for the sign of the coefficient of the dummy variable for Indira Gandhi's assassination in office on the percentage of seats won by INC is positive. Despite her unpopular decisions, the killing of Indira Gandhi by her own bodyguards generated a huge sympathy wave for the INC and her son, successor and the new leader of INC, Rajiv Gandhi. Furthermore, fresh elections were held in the year of her assassination so the election results could not be affected by voter amnesia. Thus a positive co-efficient is expected.

The expected sign for coefficient for the dummy variable dealing with economic liberalization is positive. With the liberalization of the economy comes the emergence of the middle class given caused by the exposure to the outside world outside as well as the growth in opportunities in India itself. A middle class population is expected to be more secular and center-left leaning. Thus their presence should further aid INC given their center- left political orientation.

Literacy Rate

The literacy rate of India is based on a physical count and profiling of the population that takes place ion the 2nd year of every decade (i.e. 1951, 1961, 1971 and so on). The literacy rates of intermittent years are computed using regression techniques. The physical counting of the literacy rates as well as the computation of the expected literacy rate for the intermittent years is done by the Census Bureau of India, under the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India . For the purpose of this paper, this is the literacy data that has been used.

The rationale for expecting a positive sign for the coefficient for literacy is the same as the rationale given for the expectations for the liberalization of economy. Higher literacy rates generally correspond to a rise in education and the educated class. Education generally exhibits a center-left political pull over students.

Adjusted Regional Trend Factor

The previous section discusses extensively the anomalies found in the regional trend factor, and the modifications made to the data to account for the same. The raw data used in order to compute the regional trend factor includes the state wide distribution of seats in every Lok Sabha as well as the outcome of State Elections categorized by political affiliation. Both of these components were derived from the data sets published online by the Election Commission of India. Since the adjusted regional trend factor indicates regional trend in favor of INC and allies, the beta coefficient for this variable is expected to be positive.

Number of Hindu Muslim riots

The number of Hindu-Muslim riots is defined as any incidence of mass violence that was termed as a riot by the courts and the media. This statistic has been derived from common knowledge (and further confirmation of the same) of Indian Politics. In India the INC is termed as a secular party, to the extent that it has been 'accused' at times of giving more attention to minorities than required. On the other hand, the major centre-right political party, Bharitya Janta Party (BJP), on the other hand carries out its program of 'Hindutva,' which the masses interpret as its 'Hindu above all' policy. Despite the significance of Hindu-Muslim conflicts in defining the politics of India, we saw in our previous discussion that the contribution of this statistic to the overall model is to be a minimal one to the overall model. A possible reason for this could be the conservative manner of the court in terming an incidence as a riots given the question of desire to maintain stability in the country as well as its the concern for the safety of the Indian's citizens. The Bombay riots of 1992, caused after by the demolition of Babri Masjid, were termed as riots much long after the event, when the special committee analyzing the violent incidences termed it so. The conservative use of this definition of the courts could have resulted in drastically lowering the values taken by the independent variable, thus leading it to be insignificant in our model.

Regression Results

The final model estimates the equation:

$$Y= \beta_1 + \beta_2(\text{indirad}) + \beta_3(\text{cpi*i}) + \beta_4(\text{adjusted\_rtf}) + \beta_5(\text{liberal}) + \beta_6(\text{literacy}) + u$$

The estimators obtained for the same (using the OLS regression model) are[21]:

Estimation Equation:
=========================
Y = C(1) + C(2)*INDIRAD + C(3)*CPI*I + C(4)*ADJUSTED_RTF + C(5)*LIBERAL + C(6)*LITERACY

Substituted Coefficients:
=========================
Y=32.2733972321+33.1138828819*INDIRAD-0.634607925242*CPI*+ 56.4677109904*ADJUSTED_RTF + 6.57857343475*LIBERAL - 0.310847058145*LITERACY

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21 A snapshot of results presented using EViews 7.0

Detailed results of the regression are presented in Table 5, in the Appendix section.

As seen in table 7, the expected signs of coefficients for all the independent variables match with the obtained result except for the coefficient of the literacy rate.

Table 7: Expected and Observed Signs of the Coefficients

Variable	Expected sign	Observed sign
ꞌINDIRAD	positive	positive
CPI*I	negative	negative
ADJUSTED_RTF	positive	positive
LIBERAL	positive	positive
LITERACY	positive	negative

A possible reason for the literacy rate not having the a-priori expected sign for its beta coefficient could be a collinearity problem. Economic liberalization introduced India to increased economic opportunities, consequently leading to the rise of its middle class as India became completely exposed to the outer world. This could have given an impetus to education and literacy in India as education became the key to gaining a comfortable middle class lifestyle. Thus there is a possibility that LIBERAL and LITERACY independent variables have a strong correlation.

Table 8: Correlation Matrix for LIBERAL AND LITERACY

	LITERACY	LIBERAL
LITERACY	1	
LIBERAL	0.799046	1

The correlation matrix for LIBERAL AND LITERACY indicates a correlation coefficient of 0.799046 between the two variables which is considerably high. The evidence of their correlation can be found even in the regression output obtained as both the variables have insignificant t-statistics despite contributing to a high R^2 value[22].

The R^2 value of the final model is sufficiently high (at 0.81). Since we have only 15 observations included in the data set as the current Lok Sabha is the 15th Lok Sabha in the history of India, a low adjusted R^2 value was expected. This is because we included 5 explanatory variables for 15 observations. However the adjusted R^2 value is also fairly high (at 0.74), thus validating this model to a certain degree.

Having few observations creates other econometric problems as well, such as more variability and lesser degrees of freedom which contribute to lower t-statistic value for our coefficients and hence statistically insignificant results. INDIRAD and ADJUSTED_RTF are significant at a 5% significance level

22 See Chapter 7 (Gujarati, 2003)

with t-statistic probabilities being equal to 0.0266 and 0.0128 respectively. This observation, compounded by the significant beta coefficients of both these variables (33.11 and 56.47 respectively), suggests that sympathy vote and regionalism play a major role in shaping the outcome of the Indian general elections. Since the dependent variable is the percentage of contested Lok Sabha seats secured by INC and its allies, accounting for a positive 33% and 56% change in the number of seats secured at a 5% significance level makes INDIRAD and ADJUSTED_RTF crucial determinants of the outcome of the Lok Sabha elections.

With a p-value of 0.1096 for the t-statistic of the beta coefficient for CPI*I, CPI*I is almost significant at the 10% level. Possible access to monthly data for the 6 months prior to elections would help improve its significance and thus enhance the model further. Also unexpectedly, the beta coefficient of CPI*I is very small (at -0.63). Accounting for -0.63% of change in the dependent variable is not highly consequential.

High variability is also a problem associated with the presence of few observations. In such a case the test for hetero-skedasticity in the data is crucial. This is because we have estimated an OLS model and homo-skedasticity is an assumption for the model. Given the small number of observations we cannot carry out the White test for hetero-skedasticity, so we run the Glesjer test on the data to test for the presence of hetero-skedasticity. The results for this test are published as Table 9 in the Appendix. Coefficients for all independent variables except for LITERACY are insignificant at the 5% level in the Glejser regression. Given the correlation problem and the hetero-skedasticity problem associated with the literacy rate, it is best to find a substitution for literacy rate in this model. However, due to inconsistency in most data sets available from the Indian government, especially for data prior to 1970, the literacy rate is one of the best estimates for a leftward lean in the political outlook of Indian society as a whole. Furthermore, a rising middle class and a more educated society are important markers of transition of a country's demographics and thus must be captured in a model estimating the outcome of the elections in a developing and transitioning country such as India.

Assuming there are no drastic events such as a war or the assassination of a Prime Minister before the next elections, this model could be used to make a guess about the general elections to be held in 2014. However it is important to note here that this model is based on solely 15 observations and it will take time for the political trends in India to normalize and be mathematically modeled in order to generate accurate predictions for the outcome of elections in India. Rather than using this model solely for the purpose of predictions, one must use this model in order to gauge the importance and significance of various factors in determining the outcome of the Lok Sabha elections. Based on the results observed, we can say that regionalism and sympathy vote have a drastic and a statistically significant impact on Indian politics.

Summary and Conclusions

The OLS regression model established by this paper explains the percentage of seats won by the INC and its allies as a function of two dummy variables (assassination of Indira Gandhi and liberalization of the Indian economy) and three quantitative variables (consumer price index inflation adjusted for incumbent factor, adjusted regional trend factor, and literacy rate). The model incorporates circumstantial, economic, regional, and social developmental factors in an effort to explain the outcome

of the Indian elections. The assassination of Indira Gandhi and the adjusted regional trend factor are the most significant factors statistically as well as in terms of the magnitude of the beta coefficients estimated. This highlights the importance of the sympathy vote and regionalism in Indian politics.

In accordance with the empirical findings of Kondo (2003) which suggested the ineffectiveness of national socio-economic factors in explaining the outcome of the elections, we obtained statistically insignificant beta coefficients for both CPI*I and LITERACY. However the poor CPI*I coefficient can also be attributed to the unavailability of the monthly data from 1950 onwards. On the other hand, poor t-statistics for LITERACY are caused by the problem of the variables high correlation with LIBERAL as well as by the hetero-skedasticity present in the data as indicated by the results of the Glesjer test. However this problem is not a severe one and could possibly be fixed with more observations which would be possible as more elections take place.

This model has many shortcomings and there is also the possibility of a specification bias. However given that we have only 15 observations to work with, including more than five independent variables would diminish any credibility the model tries to achieve. If there are no major alterations in the political environment in India, then this model could be used by an individual to make a slightly educated guess about the general elections to be held in 2014.

Appendix

Table 1: Regression prior to incremental F statistic test with gandhid

Dependent Variable: Y				
Method: Least Squares				
Included observations: 15				
Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**t-Statistic**	**Prob.**
C	81.86678	44.70652	1.831205	0.1168
CPI	-0.623645	1.505494	-0.414246	0.6931
HM	-2.595861	11.91822	-0.217806	0.8348
LITERACY	-0.714900	0.819669	-0.872181	0.4166
GANDHID	17.67339	20.33329	0.869185	0.4182
EMGCY	-28.99314	25.06583	-1.156680	0.2914
RTF	9.645502	38.19125	0.252558	0.8090
TIME	0.685243	6.486737	0.105638	0.9193
LIBERAL	-0.196771	23.98444	-0.008204	0.9937
R-squared	0.651474	**Mean dependent var**		51.38068
Adjusted R-squared	0.186773	**S.D. dependent var**		20.51194
S.E. of regression	18.49748	**Akaike info criterion**		8.956855
Sum squared resid	2052.940	**Schwarz criterion**		9.381685

Table 2: Regression prior to incremental F statistic test with indira

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
Dependent Variable: Y				
Method: Least Squares				
Included observations: 15				
Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**t-Statistic**	**Prob.**
C	91.67824	40.41149	2.268618	0.0638
CPI	-0.637932	1.323497	-0.482005	0.6469
HM	-0.751666	10.09015	-0.074495	0.9430
LITERACY	-0.716937	0.662254	-1.082571	0.3206
INDIRAD	30.46316	19.18272	1.588052	0.1634
EMGCY	-26.41632	22.28732	-1.185262	0.2807
RTF	5.712566	33.64158	0.169807	0.8707
TIME	-0.871574	5.337090	-0.163305	0.8756
LIBERAL	-3.958727	17.95010	-0.220541	0.8328
R-squared	0.723717	**Mean dependent var**		51.38068
Adjusted R-squared	0.355339	**S.D. dependent var**		20.51194
S.E. of regression	16.46919	**Akaike info criterion**		8.724569
Sum squared resid	1627.405	**Schwarz criterion**		9.149399
Log likelihood	-56.43427	**Hannan-Quinn criter.**		8.720043
F-statistic	1.964607	**Durbin-Watson stat**		1.416060
Prob(F-statistic)	0.213094			

Table 3: Regression with the significant variables (i.e. high coefficients)

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
Dependent Variable: Y				
Method: Least Squares				
Included observations: 15				
Variable	**Coefficient**	**Std. Error**	**t-Statistic**	**Prob.**
C	42.65602	12.76865	3.340682	0.0075
INDIRAD	20.57358	15.35463	1.339894	0.2099
EMGCY	-26.01797	15.39828	-1.689667	0.1220
RTF	26.11780	17.06801	1.530220	0.1570
LIBERAL	-15.35146	11.10819	-1.381995	0.1971
R-squared	0.644298	**Mean dependent var**		51.38068
Adjusted R-squared	0.502017	**S.D. dependent var**		20.51194
S.E. of regression	14.47484	**Akaike info criterion**		8.443903
Sum squared resid	2095.211	**Schwarz criterion**		8.679920
Log likelihood	-58.32927	**Hannan-Quinn criter.**		8.441389
F-statistic	4.528354	**Durbin-Watson stat**		1.637113
Prob(F-statistic)	0.024038			

Table 4: Regional Trend Factor and Adjusted Regional Trend Factor

Lok Sabha #	Year of Election	# of seats assigned to states with INC or INC alliance government	Regional Trend Factor	Adjusted # of seats in states with INC or INC alliance government	Adjusted regional trend factor
1	1951	444	0.907975	444	0.9079755
2	1957	494	1	494	1
3	1962	471	0.953441	471	0.9534413
4	1967	443	0.851923	443	0.8519231
5	1971	366	0.706564	366	0.7065637
6	1977	409	0.754613	109	0.201107
7	1980	81	0.149446	315	0.5811808
8	1984	346	0.671845	346	0.6718447
9	1989	318	0.583486	318	0.5834862
10	1991	180	0.330275	180	0.3302752
11	1996	116	0.212844	116	0.212844
12	1998	68	0.124771	68	0.1247706
13	1999	101	0.185321	101	0.1853211
14	2004	191	0.35175	191	0.3517495
15	2009	203	0.373849	203	0.373849

Table 5: Final Regression Output

Dependent Variable: Y				
Method: Least Squares				
Included observations: 15				
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	32.27340	23.18920	1.391742	0.1974
INDIRAD	33.11388	12.51442	2.646059	0.0266
CPI*I	-0.634608	0.357507	-1.775094	0.1096
ADJUSTED_RTF	56.46771	18.23413	3.096814	0.0128
LIBERAL	6.578573	10.55297	0.623386	0.5485
LITERACY	-0.310847	0.385727	-0.805873	0.4411
R-squared	0.830574	Mean dependent var		51.38068
Adjusted R-squared	0.736449	S.D. dependent var		20.51194
S.E. of regression	10.53026	Akaike info criterion		7.835557
Sum squared resid	997.9765	Schwarz criterion		8.118777
Log likelihood	-52.76667	Hannan-Quinn criter.		7.832540
F-statistic	8.824133	Durbin-Watson stat		1.604224
Prob(F-statistic)	0.002807			

Table 9: Glejser Test for Hetero-Skedasticity in the Final Regression Output

Heteroskedasticity Test: Glejser			
F-statistic	1.641841	Prob. F(5,9)	0.2439
Obs*R-squared	7.155360	Prob. Chi-Square(5)	0.2093
Scaled explained SS	5.421821	Prob. Chi-Square(5)	0.3666
Test Equation:			
Dependent Variable: ARESID			
Method: Least Squares			
Date: 12/04/12 Time: 14:55			
Sample: 1 15			
Included observations: 15			
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-14.46935	11.36027	-1.273680	0.2347
INDIRAD	-13.30530	6.130746	-2.170258	0.0581
CPI*I	0.188432	0.175141	1.075889	0.3100
ADJUSTED_RTF	5.894769	8.932803	0.659901	0.5258
LIBERAL	-9.362060	5.169844	-1.810898	0.1036
LITERACY	0.455763	0.188966	2.411881	0.0391
R-squared	0.477024	Mean dependent var		5.999995
Adjusted R-squared	0.186482	S.D. dependent var		5.719499
S.E. of regression	5.158716	Akaike info criterion		6.408427
Sum squared resid	239.5112	Schwarz criterion		6.691647
Log likelihood	-42.06320	Hannan-Quinn criter.		6.405410
F-statistic	1.641841	Durbin-Watson stat		2.550977
Prob(F-statistic)	0.243929			

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The Effect of the European Union on Minority Nationalism: The Case of Catalonia

Mario Malavé

The rise of the European Union (EU) as a supranational power has had many important consequences for states that have joined the community. One of these consequences is that by concentrating so much power at the supranational level, many have started to wonder if the EU will one day signify the end of the nation-state. This very particular division of power among three distinct levels (Local Governments, Nation States, and the EU) has broken with the traditional model of bilateral relationships between local governments and the central state. The main concern of this article is to explore what consequences this phenomenon has had for cases of minority nationalism in Europe (i.e. Scottish, Flemish, Basque, etc) by focusing on the case of Catalonia, and whether the factors at play in the Catalan case are replicable throughout Europe. The ultimate question the article seeks to answer is whether the EU has a strengthening effect on cases of minority nationalism.

Introduction

On the second Tuesday of September 2012, 1.5 million Catalans took part in a massive demonstration in Barcelona demanding more than just powers for the Catalan region or protesting mistreatment from the central government. The slogan for the demonstration was clear and bold: "Catalonia: a new European state." With support for secession from Spain running at record highs of around 46% (Burgen 2012) the gathering certainly captured the world's attention. Yet the aspirations for independence were nothing new. An interesting detail of the event was the addition of the word 'European' to the secessionist motto. Those gathered in Barcelona were not asking to become an independent state or a sovereign Catalan state; they were clearly voicing their intentions to directly join a supranational "club" without having to access it through the Spanish state.

Cases of minority nationalism can be found all around the world, but there is something unique to those cases that occur within European Union (EU) member countries. Although experts still debate the extent, it is undeniable that the EU has gone a long way as a supranational concentration of power. Members give up their sovereign right to unilaterally decide many of their national policies, ranging from animal treatment to the national currencies.

Coupled with a significant trend of decentralization and devolution, Europe poses a distinctive case for the division of power along three levels: the EU, the nation-state, and the regional/local government. The Catalan case is one in which the regional power is trying to access supranational authority by elevating itself to the status of nation state, squeezing out the middle layer. Is this an expected behavior when a nation is faced with three distinct levels of power?

We know for certain that the EU has consolidated more and more power as the years have gone by, but from whom has it been taken? Has this action eroded the nation-state's power or has it suppressed regional governments? In many ways the "dual process of regionalization and European integration have arguably led to a 'symmetrical squeeze of the nation state'" (Roller 2004). The aim of this work is to explore how the addition of a third variable (the EU) has affected what has traditionally been a two variable game between states and regions by analyzing the political dynamics of Catalonia. Rather than an extensive review of Catalan politics, we wish to discern if the strength of the secessionist phenomenon in Catalonia has been influenced by the EU in ways that could potentially spread across Europe, since Catalonia is not the only case of minority nationalism in the continent.

Overview of Catalan Politics

After General Francisco Franco's death in 1975, Spain began a transition back to democracy. After the reinstatement of the monarchy and the coronation of King Juan Carlos I, Spain began drafting a new constitution.. One of the most unique traits of the 1978 Spanish Constitution is the inclusion of the "autonomous communities," an administrative division of the Spanish territory that seeks to protect and guarantee the existence of all the different regions and nationalities in the country. However, the constitution only outlines the right to autonomy possessed by these regions, and the details and laws that regulate the extent of their self-governance are included in individual "Statutes of Autonomy" that are drafted between the central government and each autonomous community. These accords will vary for every autonomous community, and accordingly "not all of Spain's autonomous communities have chosen, or been able to, assert their autonomy to the extents seen in the Basque country and Catalunya. This has led to Spain being labeled as a practitioner of differentiated or 'asymmetrical' federalism" (Bale, 2008). Asymmetrical granting of powers has given nationalities that have ethno-linguistic roots much more clout in negotiations, and consequentially a much higher degree of devolution. The degree of powers enjoyed by the Generalitat, the institutional system under which the self-government of Catalonia is organized, is only comparable to a few other Spanish regions, such as the Basque country and Navarra.

The Catalan government is comprised of three main bodies: the government, the state, and the parliament (executive and legislative powers). The only branch missing is the judicial power, which although existent, is not as relevant given that the Spanish state administers the national judicial system. Catalan courts only have autonomy over the 'civic law,' which is enacted by either the Statute of Autonomy or by their own parliament.

In this sense, Catalan politics are run parallel to national government, and the region has its own political party scene. This division of the political scene has given rise to a phenomenon known as the 'dual vote,' a concept that explains the wide variance of the Catalan vote depending on the election. This is not an uncommon feature for autonomist parties, since "the vast majority of autonomist parties, operating

at several territorial levels simultaneously is vital if they are to meet their primary goal, namely the re-distribution of political authority across different territorial levels within the state" (Elias & Tronconi, 2011). Autonomist parties are used to 'playing' politics in this dual playfield. For instance, the recurrent winner of the Catalan parliamentary elections has been the nationalist party Convergència i Unió (CiU), while the traditional winner in the Spanish parliamentary elections has been the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC).

As mentioned above, the legal instrument known as the Catalan Statute of Autonomy dictates the level of Catalonian self-governance. According to the Generalitat, the Statute "defines the rights and obligations of the citizens of Catalonia, the political institutions of the Catalan nationality, their competences and relations with the Spanish State and the financing of the Government of Catalonia." The first accord, the Statute of Sau, was agreed upon in 1979 and was the ruling document until 2006, when the agreement was reformed and replaced. In general terms, the statute grants Catalonia the right to self-govern in many policy areas, including the environment, education, health, transportation, commerce, and public safety.

The notable areas over which the Spanish state has kept control are taxation, foreign policy, national defense, social security, and macroeconomic policy. As it expanded, the Generalitat demanded more concessions in these centrally-controlled domains. In September 2012, after a series of lengthy meetings between Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy and Generalitat President Artur Mas in which they failed to agree upon granting Catalonia greater taxation authority, Mas announced that he would dissolve the Catalan parliament and call for early elections to be held on November 25th of the same year (Reuters, 2012).

The EU and its Regional Policy

The EU's regional policy accounts for the notion that "market mechanisms are insufficient to reduce economic and social disparities between richer and poorer regions, and may even exacerbate them" (Dinan 2010). Thus, the EU has created several funds to directly invest in less-developed regions and work towards ending territorial disparities among EU members. Catalonia, by far Spain's wealthiest region, accounts for about one-fifth of the national GDP and so does not receive Regional Development Funds. In fact, both Catalonia's GDP and population are larger than those of many members of the EU, a fact commonly cited by proponents of secession.

The current EU financial framework for 2007-2013 includes a €1.4 billion expenditure in Catalonia, distributed primarily through business development and urban development aid. While the amount is not tremendous, EU spending in Catalonia is nevertheless very important: EU investments are often negotiated directly between the EU and the Generalitat, and represent an expenditure that does not come directly from the central state, granting the region the opportunity to develop projects in association with the supranational body. Current developments in Catalonia include business support programs, water treatment plants, hospitals, research institutes, highway construction, and a new railway station.

Does the EU empower Catalan Nationalism?

With a basic understanding of the political structure of Catalonia and the role of the EU, we can now address our main question: what effect does the EU have on Catalan nationalism? Given its

complexity, the union impacts Catalonia in many different ways, but these interactions can be subdivided into three main fields: economic, ideological, and political.

EU Regional Investment in Catalonia 2007-2013

- Business Development — 53%
- Urban Development — 21%
- Energy and Transport — 17%
- Environment — 8%
- Technical Assistance — 1%

Economic

The popular notion holds that richer regions are less dependent on the benevolence of their central state, and have more clout and negotiating power to demand concessions from the national government. Thus, if the EU directly invests in Catalonia, is it not empowering the region's ability to ultimately gain more liberties?

The numbers above make it clear that while the economic interactions are significant (€1.4 billion over six years), they only represent about 0.65% of Catalonia's yearly GDP. Moreover, given that Catalonia is a relatively rich region, it is not a high priority region for the EU cohesion policy, and much more EU money is spent on southern regions of Spain in an effort to bring them up to par with wealthier provinces such as Catalonia. The EU does not invest significantly more in the area than in any other region. It is safe to reject the notion that by investing directly into Catalonia, the EU is strengthening the nationalist cause, because while the amount spent by the EU is not trivial, it is not enough to differentiate Catalonia from any other European region.

As explained above, regional spending is by no means the EU's primary contribution to Catalonia's minority nationalism. Laitin (2001) argues that Europe plays several different roles in the nationalist narrative of Catalonia. First, the pro-European stance of Catalans prevents accusations of provincialism and seclusion. Second, recognizing the EU as a legitimate authority other than the Spanish state fuels growth intentions of the Catalan government. Lastly, the conception of a continent not dominated by nation-states favors the Catalan political notion of stronger regions and weaker states.

Europe plays a central role in the formation of a Catalan identity that is detached from the Spanish identity. To use Benedict Anderson's (Anderson 2006) well-known 'imagined communities' framework, Europe serves as a replacement community of which Catalans can imagine themselves to be part. The continent has gone through 'Europeanization,' defined as the "development and sustaining of systematic European arrangements to manage cross-border connections, such that a European dimension becomes an embedded feature which frames policy and politics within European states" (Wallace 2000).

The creation of this 'European dimension' has allowed Europeans to identify at a level that transcends the national one. Interestingly enough, the European identity does not seem to pervade national identities, as nothing restricts individuals from identifying both as European and as their own nationality. Europe is a larger imagined community that does not conflict with the smaller national identity.

Political

While the economic and ideological impacts of the EU on Catalonia are significant, its greatest influence is in the realm of politics. The Catalan government lies within a multi-leveled system of governance, in which the Generalitat "is placed specifically within a double, pluri-national context, comprising the Spanish state and the EU" (Brugue, Goma, & Subirats, 2000). Thus, one of the most notable effects of the EU on the region is its legislation. The EU legislates across a wide spectrum of policy areas, but since Spain (and not Catalonia) retains membership in the EU, these negotiations exclude Catalonia. The "supranationalisation of policy-making has meant that sub-national legislative capacities have become more restricted, limited to implementing and applying EU legislation. In this respect, EU policy has had domestic consequences with subnational authorities limited in their ability to influence EU legislation" (Roller, 2004). In other words, the legislative role of the EU has resulted in the Generalitat's inability to influence many policy issues; it must comply with European policies despite its inability to participate in their formation.

The table below is extracted from Brugue et al (2000). It displays the leading policymaker according to policy area. The most striking feature of the table is the Strategic Regulation column, which shows that the EU is the ultimate watchdog for a high number of policy areas while the Generalitat is only allowed to regulate the use of Catalan. It is thus evident why CiU demands direct involvement in European Union policy making, and expresses its desire for Catalonia to be a member state by 2020 (Maiol 2012). Without membership in the EU, "Catalan self-government will not easily be able to continue growing without a strategic ability to participate directly and on an equal basis in the definition of pluri-national political projects" (Guibernau, 1996). So while the EU contributes to the development of Catalonia economically and ideologically, it also puts a limit to the extent of Catalan self-government. Without access to EU policy-making, Catalonia cannot attain greater control over the policies with which it must comply.

Multilevel Policy Making in Catalonia (Brugue, Goma, & Subirats, 2000)			
Policy Sector	Strategic Regulation	Formulation	Provision
	EU	State	State
Employment	EU	State	Generalitat
Environment	EU	Generalitat	Generalitat
Social Protection	EU	State	State
Immigration	EU	State	State/Generalitat
Housing	State	State/Generalitat	Generalitat
Education	State	Generalitat	Generalitat
Health	State	Generalitat	Generalitat
Language	Generalitat	Generalitat	Generalitat

Access to the EU has long been one of the primary objectives in the Catalan self-government agenda. While the EU's restrictions on sovereign power for European states limit the central state in Spain they do not necessarily advance the Catalan cause for secession; the EU has taken many policy areas "which previously had been of domestic concern" but which "have now been transferred to the supranational level, allowing the central government to claim that these now belong to its exclusively held foreign policy domain" (Roller, 2004), effectively excluding the Generalitat from the national policy formation process.

The preeminence of the EU in the Catalan political agenda is found in the current statute of autonomy, which has a complete chapter titled: "Relations of the Generalitat with the European Union." The accord states that the EU must consult and/or inform Catalonia of any EU affairs that affect it, and that Catalonia has the right to conduct bilateral negotiations on issues that affect it exclusively. Catalonia has the right to manage European funds when they concern its jurisdiction, establish offices abroad, send a delegation to the EU, and join international organizations that promote culture (i.e. UNESCO). The policies in the statute of autonomy seem lenient and generous, but to many Catalans they are merely façades that hide the true control of the Spanish state in dealing with the EU.

Despite Spain's power in managing EU affairs, the EU also has its own political agenda, deeply rooted in supranational integration. Accordingly, the EU prioritizes the increase of European identity as much as possible, which is one of the main reasons it has made such an effort to connect with regions of Europe directly. This direct regional intervention gives the union an opportunity to create relationships that potentially increase the citizens' affinity for the supranational institution. Because the institution funds a great deal of projects for the sole benefit of the citizens, fostering relationships with regions outside the jurisdiction of central states promotes awareness about the EU's work.

The EU has enjoyed significant success in pushing its integration agenda, but the power of the EU nevertheless stems from the nation-states of which it is comprised. The legitimacy of the organization relies upon the willingness of sovereign states to relinquish a portion of their sovereignty to benefit from the returns of extensive cooperation and coordination.

Because unanimity is not always attainable or required in an organization with 27 distinct members,, the EU must enact policies (such as written admonitions or economic sanctions) that often conflict with the individual interests of any given member. The EU is a de jure unaligned institution, able to act and legislate regardless of any one member's individual opinion. Because of the power-capping mechanism that allows states to withdraw from the body, however, the EU must constantly consider the risk of losing the participation of such members.

The organization learned this lesson in the so-called "Empty Chair" crisis, the "most serious constitutional conflict in the EU's history" (Dinan 2010). The crisis took place in 1965 when France, led by its notably intergovernmentalist president Gen. Charles De Gaulle, withdrew its representative from the organization to protest one of the commission's decisions. This historical episode serves to remind the EU's governing bodies of where the true power lies.

More recently, the continent's monetary crisis and the austerity measures demanded by the European Central Bank (ECB) in exchange for help have prompted more than one country to consider leaving the euro. The EU has learned to avoid highly sensitive political issues in its member states. No one could ever accuse the institution of being a supporter of the Catalonian national cause, as the EU has

been very careful to remain apolitical in the matter. After the massive pro-independence demonstrations held in Catalonia, the EU asserted that if Catalonia were to separate from Spain, such secession would not guarantee admission into the EU (Burgen, 2012). Furthermore, within the current framework, Spain would have to approve a potential entry for Catalonia into the organization, which makes an already remote accession to the EU more unlikely.

There is little doubt that the Catalan case is a headache for European officials, but paired with a 2014 independence referendum to be held in Scotland, it seems that the EU might soon have to take a definitive stance on cases of secession. An independent Catalonia would rank 7th in Europe in terms of GDP per capita and be a net contributor to the EU budget (EU Observer, 2012). Although highly indebted, the region would meet the economic and social standards of EU membership (Moffett 2012). Although Catalan leaders said they would consider independence outside of the EU (Benoit 2012), Europe still plays a very prominent role in the independence discourse. Catalans note that smaller, poorer, less developed nations retain full EU membership and contribute to the formation of continental policy. Access to the EU has become one of the driving forces for independence because it has reassured Catalans that once independent they will have a community to rely on.

Catalan Nationalism: an elite movement?

Thomas Miley, a professor at Cambridge University, pioneers one of the most recent theories about the Catalan national movement. Miley uses a series of polls to prove that the nationalist cause has very deep ethno-linguistic roots, despite historical theorizations that Catalonia was a case of 'civic nationalism.' The novel focus of Miley's research is the former group that leads the nationalist movement. Miley asserts that because elites identify themselves as 'Catalan' more often than the average citizen of Catalonia, relations with a supranational body have gained a central role in the independence political discourse.

It is unusual to observe that a central claim of a deeply ethno-linguistic nationalistic cause advocates strengthening relations with a bureaucratic supranational policy making body. In the most recent case of global secession, Kosovars did not rally because they were eager to join the United Nations. The EU has evolved to represent much more than just a bureaucratic policy making body.

We do not have enough data to make a definitive claim that the topic of EU relations has been a topic pushed into the political agenda by elites, but the suggestion alone raises important questions about the role of the EU in the nationalistic discourse.

Self-Identification Among Different Elite Groups in Catalonia						
	General Population	Local Politicians	Mayors	Teachers	Parliamentarians	High-level Functionaries
Spanish	13.6	1.5	6.4	6	0	0
More Spanish	5.9	0	7.9	3	0	0
As Spanish	31.8	39.7	24.8	28	32.1	7.8
More Catalan	27.5	27.5	36.3	25	30.4	29.9
Catalan	19.4	28.2	22.3	35.7	37.5	61
DK/DA	1.7	3.1	2	2.4	0	1.3
Total	99.9	100	99.7	100.1	100	100
N	(2778)	(131)	(216)	(168)	(56)	(77)

November 25th Elections: A halt in the secession agenda?

On November 25th 2012, parliamentary elections were held in Catalonia at the request of incumbent leader Artur Mas in an effort to gain a supra-majority in the parliament and execute his party's secessionist agenda. Though the elections resulted in a political failure for Mas, they painted an interesting picture for the independence movement. CiU lost a considerable portion of its seat, but retained its role as the largest party in Catalonia. At the same time, the leftist pro-independence Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) became the second largest party, replacing the long-standing incumbent socialist and anti-independence PSC. Despite Mas's loss and failure to implement his secessionist agenda, for the first time in history the top two parties in Catalunya are pro-independence. While it is still uncertain what coalition will be formed, it is even more uncertain what will happen to the secessionist agenda. The dichotomous reactions to the election became apparent in Mas's pledge to hold a referendum and the open celebrations of the anti-independence parties and the central states.

Conclusion

An understanding of Catalan politics, EU policies, and a review of the literature have all served to show the complexity of EU relations with Catalonia, and the different levels at which 'Europeanisation' has affected the political discourse in Catalan nationalism. While direct funding from the EU's regional policy has helped tighten the relationships between the EU and Catalonia, the financial effect has had little impact in terms of strengthening or weakening the nationalist cause. On the contrary, lack of involvement with the EU has led Catalan leaders to demand more. Access, engagement, and - most recently - potential membership in the EU have been salient components of the independence rhetoric. While the EU's legislation in extensive policy areas have taken policy competencies from the Generalitat and given further control to the central state, it has also given the Catalans political aspiration. Having greater control over affairs with the EU has become one of the primary political goals in Catalonia.

So far, there is no reason to believe the effect is not replicable among other cases of minority nationalism across Europe. One of the central topics in Scotland's referendum debate is precisely around potential admission to the EU, and since the organization promotes direct involvement and communication with regional governments across the continent, demanding greater EU involvement could become a common theme among cases of minority nationalism (Chorley, 2012). This willingness on the part of the EU to establish open dialogues and relations directly with regions might also mean that nations that intend to secede will not be isolated geopolitically, for they will have already developed dynamic relations with an organization of 27 sovereign members.

Miley's proposition that the Catalan movement is elitist and top-down raises the question that perhaps its leaders (rather than public opinion) are pushing EU issues to the top of the agenda. If this were the case, then the EU's economic and political advantages could serve as a political tool for the elites in cases of minority nationalism. The possibility that the effect of the EU in minority nationalisms might be stronger in cases of elite top-down movements poses an interesting research question. Unfortunately, the number of cases in Europe is not big enough to seek statistically significant results at a continental level, but looking at cases of top-down vs. bottom-up nationalist movements and comparing the prominence of greater EU involvement in the political discourse could be a first step in this direction.

The main lesson in this short evaluation of EU-Catalan relations is that the EU has a non-linear effect on Catalan nationalism. While the EU has boosted the Catalan claims to independence on some areas, it has also silently detracted power on other areas. The final balance seems to depend on what exactly is evaluated. In a seemingly contradictory fashion, the EU has managed to take policy competencies from Catalonia while placing EU membership as one of the region's main political aspirations.

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From Kosovo to Libya:
Theoretical Assessment of Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect

Yuki Yoshida

This paper discusses the ways in which two international relations theories (realism and liberalism) can explain a state's response to humanitarian crises. It explores whether responses to these crises changed before and after the responsibility to protect (R2P) policy was adopted at the World Summit in 2005. To see whether there have been any changes, the author purposefully selected two case studies: NATO intervention in Kosovo (1999) before R2P was adopted and another NATO intervention in Libya (2011) after R2P was adopted. The paper argues that the adoption of R2P was significant progress for the liberal school. Nevertheless, realism, which is defined as a state's desire to protect its national interests and survival in the anarchic international system, may better characterize and explain the NATO intervention in Libya.

Introduction

Although self-proclaimed "humanitarian interventions" were undertaken during the post-Cold War era, most of these interventions did not reflect purely humanitarian motives, but rather were greatly driven by states' national interests. Holzgrefe defines humanitarian intervention as:

> "…the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its citizens, without permission of the state within those territory force is applied.[1]"

One of the humanitarian interventions in the 1990s was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in Kosovo in 1999. NATO was criticized for its actions by certain developing states that claimed NATO intervened to pursue its own interests rather than humanitarian objectives.
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established by the Canadian government, proposed the notion of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to avoid interest-driven intervention and to promote only those interventions focused on civilian protection in humanitarian crises. R2P is

defined as the responsibility of states and the international community to protect civilians everywhere from human rights violations. After it was unanimously adopted at the 2005 World Summit, R2P was said to be at the heart of the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. Still, many developing states suspected that the NATO's involvement was a reflection of the national interests of Western states as in the case of Kosovo. By analyzing the NATO intervention in Kosovo as the "pre-R2P" case and the NATO intervention in Libya as the "post-R2P" case, this paper assesses whether state responses to humanitarian crises have changed since the adoption of R2P in 2005. This paper examines both realism and liberalism to explore which international relations theory better explains humanitarian intervention and R2P. The paper argues that while the adoption of R2P represents significant triumph for the liberal school, its effects on interventions have been limited. Although humanitarian responses do in some ways reflect the intention to protect human rights, the thrust of responses to humanitarian crises in the post-R2P period seems best explained by realism, which emphasizes prioritization of national interests.

Relevant Theories

Neoclassical realism

As Hans J. Morgenthau argues, an assumption of neoclassical realism is that all human beings inherently seek to increase their power.[2] Power-seeking impulses in human behavioral patterns often lead to situations in which states struggle for power over other states. Morgenthau claims that "politics is a struggle for power over men…the modes of acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action."[3] In international politics, states are always concerned about national interests such as security and wealth. To preserve their interests, intervention could be an option. He argues:

> "Intervene we must where our national interest requires it and where our power gives us a chance to succeed. The choice of these occasions will be determined… by a careful calculation of the interests involved and the power available.[4]"

Morgenthau defines success as "the degree to which one is able to maintain, to increase, or to demonstrate one's power over another."[5]

Neorealism

While neoclassical realism emphasizes human nature, neorealism focuses on the significance of an anarchic international system with no central governing authority. Kenneth Waltz, a leading neorealist scholar , argues that in a self-help international system, the state's foreign policy is determined based on its national interests.[6] States continuously make efforts to preserve their interests and ensure their survival; in the self-help system, "no one [else] can be relied on to do it for them."[7] Tucker argues that states' interests expand as they gain more power in international politics.[8] Similar to Morgenthau, Waltz argues that success means preservation and reinforcement of the state's power.[9] To summarize, classical neorealism focuses on power-seeking human nature, whereas neorealism focuses on an anarchic international system. Despite their different characterization self-motivated activities by state actors internationally, both strands of realist thought shed light on states' national interests and their desire to increase power.

Liberalism – basic ideas and assumptions

In contrast to the realist's focus on the state as a major actor, liberalism prioritizes the protection of human rights. Classical liberals argue that human beings possess "fundamental natural rights to liberty consisting in the right to do whatever they think fit to preserve themselves, provided they do not violate the equal liberty of others unless their own preservation is threatened."[10] People also have the right "to be treated and a duty to treat others as ethical subjects and not as objects or means only."[11]
Another core assumption of liberalism is that states can cooperate for a mutual gain.[12] While liberals acknowledge that each individual or state seeks personal gain, they believe that individuals share some interests, which can make both domestic and international cooperation possible.[13] To support this argument, liberals cite the emergence of such international organizations as the United Nations, as an example of the prevalence of interstate cooperation.[14]

Contemporary liberal internationalism

One strand of liberalism that discusses the validity of humanitarian intervention is contemporary liberal internationalism. Michael Walzer, a leading scholar in this field, argues that military intervention can be justified as a last resort and as a means to protect civilians from human rights violations, such as genocide and crimes against humanity.[15] However, such intervention should not be undertaken unilaterally, but rather multilaterally with the authorization of the UN Security Council. This reflects the liberal internationalist belief that multilateralism prevents great powers from placing national interests over humanitarian objectives in intervention.

NATO Intervention in Kosovo (1999)

The first case study to examine is the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. We must analyze what factors made the US and other NATO member states determined to intervene in the conflict in the Balkans.

Conflict Background

In 1989, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic asserted control over Kosovo and refused to recognize its autonomy, which was guaranteed under Yugoslavia's 1974 constitution.[16] In response to Milosevic's refusal, Kosovar Albanians established their own governing structure and conducted a series of non-violent protests against Milosevic and the Serb government to regain its autonomous status. After those efforts failed, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) conducted systematic attacks against Yugoslav police in 1997. The following year, Serbs sought retaliation by endorsing ethnic cleansing practices that were used against Kosovar Albanians. The UN Security Council failed to authorize the use of force to halt the ethnic cleansing because one of its permanent members, Russia, warned that it would veto any resolution authorizing the use of force.[17] Although the Security Council called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of Yugoslav forces in 1998 in Resolution 1199, ethnic cleansing practices did not cease. On January 29, 1999, NATO facilitated the negotiation between Serb and Kosovar Albanian leaders at Rambouillet where the two parties discussed the disarmament of the KLA, withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, and Kosovo's socio-political status. In spite of these efforts, the negotiations failed as Serbia refused to sign the agreement.[18] In order to bring an end to the ethnic cleansing against the Kosovar Albanians, NATO initiated an air campaign against Yugoslavia without Security Council authorization on March 24, 1999.[19]

Consequences of intervention

NATO's air campaign in Kosovo seemed to be successful in one sense because NATO did not lose aircrew members during the 78-day campaign.[20] NATO was also able to hit over 99 percent of its targets, which illustrates the precision of these air strikes. Even with the achievement of its strategic objectives NATO failed to achieve its purported humanitarian objectives on the ground. NATO's actions not only failed to halt the ethnic cleansing, but also pushed Milosevic to intensify the scale to which the horrendous practice was carried out.[21] The civilian casualty rate was rather large, as well: roughly 500 to 1,000 civilians were killed by NATO bombings.[22] NATO destroyed infrastructure essential to the provision and acquisition of socioeconomic resources in Serbia including bridges, factories, television stations, media facilities, power plant sites, and even some historic monuments., After the air campaign,the number of Kosovar Serb refugees only increased.[23] The NATO air campaign created an unintended humanitarian crisis in the Balkans. While the intervention in Kosovo might be viewed as a success from an operational point of view, it was not successful from a humanitarian point of view.

Reasons for NATO Intervention

Humanitarian concerns

Some NATO officials and member states did express humanitarian concerns regarding the civil war. Prior to the intervention, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana stated:

> "Our objective is to prevent more human suffering and more repression and violence against the civilian population in Kosovo…We must halt the violence and bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe now unfolding in Kosovo…We have a moral duty to do so.[24]"

At the Security Council meeting held soon after NATO initiated its air campaign, the U.S. delegate stated that the intervention was necessary "to respond to Belgrade's brutal persecution of Kosovar Albanians, violations of international law, excessive and indiscriminate use of force, refusal to negotiate to resolve the issue peacefully and recent military built-up in Kosovo."[25] The Canadian delegate expressed the context of the intervention as follows:

> "Humanitarian considerations underpin our action. We cannot simply stand by while innocents are murdered, and entire population is displaced, villages are burned and looted, and a population is denied its basic rights…[26]"

It seemed that the intervention was, to some extent, driven by the humanitarian concerns of NATO member states, which can be explained through the liberal lens.

National interests

Other national interests, however, seemed to be more at stake than humanitarian interests for some NATO member states. European states Belgium, Portugal, and Spain were concerned that the conflict in Kosovo could spread and produce refugee flow, which would undermine regional stability.[27] Europe's proximity to the conflict and feared that the conflict could spread into other areas in the region

motivated many European states to either intervene or support the intervention for the sake of their own security.

The U.S., which led the intervention, also had vital interests, though the conflict in Kosovo might not have undermined its own security quite as directly as it seemed to do in Europe. President Clinton stated that one of the purposes of the intervention was to ensure the credibility of NATO in Europe.[28] Because NATO has played a critical role in maintaining U.S. hegemony in Europe,[29] maintaining the efficacy of the organization as a crisis-response force was imperative for the U.S. to maintain its heightened influence and presence in the region.[30]

The existence of NATO in Europe, however, has been threatened by several European states. In the post-Cold War era, France and Germany claimed that Europe should stand independent from the U.S. military umbrella.[31] In 1991, both French and German leaders proposed the establishment of the Western European Union (WEU) "as an integral component of the European Security and Defense Identity." The WEU subsequently became the official military force of the European Union.[32] In 1995 the two states further announced the creation of the "Franco-German corps," which operates outside the EU framework, but encourages other European states to join.[33] Because the development of such independent European forces undermined legitimacy of NATO and threatened U.S. hegemony in Europe, the U.S. persuaded small European states to not join those forces. These efforts ultimately undermined European commitment to forming independent forces.[34] The U.S.'s active involvement in the intervention can also be viewed as an effort to regain its hegemonic figure in Europe. Thus, protection of national interests seemed to be a major factor that led the U.S. to intervene.

Moreover, by intervening in a conflict occurring in Eastern Europe, the U.S. was likely attempting to prevent Russia from becoming influential in the region. Since NATO's eastward expansion in Europe was proposed in 1994, NATO has increased its membership in the region, adding the countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to its coalition.[35] Gibbs argues that "expansion gave NATO a new function – preserving order in eastern Europe – which could serve as a partial replacement for the now obsolete objective of preventing Soviet invasion."[36] In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. still perceived Russia and communism as potential threats to the Western world. Waltz argues that the US can justify its actions abroad by exaggerating "the Russian or the communist threat and overreact[ing] to slight danger."[37] When the U.S. intervened in Kosovo, Russia did not pose any imminent threat to the region, indicating that U.S. sensitivity to Russian threat remained largely unchanged. In short, NATO's eastward expansion aimed to extend U.S. hegemony to Eastern Europe so that the U.S. could contain Russia. What Gibbs calls "double containment," or the containment of both U.S. allies in Europe and Russia, was the U.S.'s vital interest behind NATO intervention . In sum, although completely ignoring humanitarian interests of NATO might be wrong, realist rationale, which characterizes the security concerns of European states and the U.S.'s power-seeking nature, seems to have greater explanatory power for the intervention than does a liberal view.

Creation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
The establishment of the ICISS and R2P

In the 1990s, the UN Security Council failed to respond in a timely and decisive manner to several gross human rights violations including genocide in Rwanda (1994) and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

This was largely due to the principle of the non-interference of sovereignty.[38] Responding to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's call for reconciling the dilemma between sovereignty and human rights, the Canadian government took initiatives to establish the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001.[39] One of the most remarkable achievements of the ICISS was the creation of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P). According to the ICISS's report "Responsibility to Protect," R2P consists of three pillars: (1) states have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens from crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and war crimes; (2) the international community has the responsibility to assist states in fulfilling their responsibility to protect citizens; and (3) the international community has the responsibility to react to human rights violations if states are unable or unwilling to fulfill their responsibility through political or economic sanctions, and use of force as a last resort.[40]

Sovereignty as responsibility

R2P was established based on the interpretation of "sovereignty as responsibility." According to several UN officials who developed the idea in the 1990s, the idea of national sovereignty embraces a dual responsibility: an external obligation to respect sovereignty of other states and an internal one to respect and protect human rights of citizens within the state.[41] The ICISS report argues, "state sovereignty implies responsibility and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself."[42] With the redefined notion of sovereignty, a state would lose the right to sovereignty when it is unable or unwilling to protect citizens, and "the responsibility to protect them should be borne by the international community of states."[43] Thus, the ICISS challenged the traditional understanding of sovereignty by emphasizing the responsibility of a sovereign to manage its internal affairs as well as the consequences that follow when that responsibility is not met.

Change in terminology

In the report, the ICISS shifted language from "the right to intervene" to "the responsibility to protect." The shift of language suggests that intervention is defined in relation to its effect on the victims who suffer from violence rather than the intervening states' national interests.[44] Gareth Evans, a co-chair of the ICISS, states:

> "The whole point of embracing the new language of 'the responsibility to protect' is that it is capable of generating an effective, consensual response to extreme, conscious-shocking cases in a way that "right to intervene" language simply could not.[45]"

With the new terminology, the ICISS also aimed to generate the political will to intervene by appealing for states' moral duty to serve humanity, something that was generally missing in the 1990s.

Six criteria for military intervention

The report stipulates six criteria for military intervention. These are as follows: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects.[46] Military intervention must first be authorized by the right authority – the UN Security Council.[47] To make the Security Council a more competent body that can respond to humanitarian crises, the ICISS encourages the Council's

permanent members to refrain from exercising the veto when "quick and decisive action is needed to stop or avert a significant humanitarian crisis."[48] Just cause refers to the extent to which the crisis involves a large scale loss of life or large scale killing with genocidal intention or ethnic cleansing .[49] The intervention should be driven by the right intention – humanitarian interests as opposed to national interests.[50] Military intervention is only justified as a last resort after all preventive measures, such as political and economic sanctions, have been attempted and have failed, and a state continues to fail to protect its citizens.[51] The use of force should be proportional, meaning that it should be "the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question."[52] Military intervention is only regarded as a success if it achieves the humanitarian objectives that motivated the action in the first place. The ICISS clarified in detail when and how states can intervene militarily in international conflicts.

R2P-related discussions in the UN

R2P, although originally established outside the UN framework, soon became the UN agenda. In 2004, R2P was discussed in the context of UN reform.[53] The report by the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes declared that R2P was an emerging international norm:

"We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.[54]"

In 2005, R2P was unanimously adopted by the heads of state at the World Summit.[55] Global leaders agreed that states have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. If states fail to fulfill their promise, the responsibility to protect falls to the international community, which will meet this need through various means, including the use of force. The specific provisions for R2P were stipulated in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document:

"138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means…The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance

with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.[56]"

In 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1647 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, reaffirming the provision of R2P adopted at the World Summit.[57] Furthermore, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has actively promoted R2P by publishing several reports including "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" (2009), "Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect" (2010), and "The Role of Regional and Sub-regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" (2011). R2P remains one of the most important and discussed agendas at the UN.

Theoretical assessment of R2P

It is clear that the foundation of R2P is the liberal view of the world. As liberals would argue, human rights protection is at the core of R2P. R2P calls for international cooperation to protect citizens if states fail to fulfill their responsibility., and its appeal to the use of force as a last resort to halt human rights violations resonates with the argument of contemporary liberal internationalism. At face value, R2P establishes a an approach to intervention that is comprised of core liberal assumptions and beliefs.

Realists, however, would argue that the implementation of R2P would still be determined based on the national interests of great powers. The third pillar of R2P stipulates that if states fail to protect citizens from human rights violations, the international community will fulfill that responsibility. Realists would question which actors would be included in the term "international community" in this context. As the ICISS clarified in its report, only the UN Security Council can authorize military intervention. More specifically, the five permanent member states will determine whether the "international community" will intervene, and this decision will largely depend on the national interests of these five states. Moses argues that "there can be no guarantee of good behavior by great powers, precisely because there are no higher powers that can hold them to account."[58] Moses further claims that "it is the powerful who decide when interventions should take place and what form they should take."[59] Moral sensibilities are less important than national interests for such intervening states. Realists would conclude that states' responses to humanitarian crises would not change even after the adoption of R2P, which calls for the international community's moral duty to save civilians in mass atrocities.

NATO Intervention in Libya (2011)

The second case study presented is the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. The case study explores some of the interests of intervening states. The case study examines whether or not there have been any changes since the intervention in Kosovo.

Background of the civil war

The uprising for political reforms in Libya against the Muammar el-Qadhafi regime occurred in the context of the "Arab Spring," in which states in North Africa and the Middle East claimed democratization of their states. In mid-February 2011, Qadhafi's forces in Benghazi and other eastern

cities killed several protesters.[60] During the clashes between the Libyan authority and the opposition group, Qadhafi's armed forces were deployed to contain those protesters. While the Qadhafi regime still maintained its authority in Tripoli, the capital city, the opposition headquartered in Benghazi occupied eastern Libya. Qadhafi denounced the protesters as "cockroaches" and stated that he would "cleanse Libya, house by house."[61] On February 26, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, establishing an arms embargo and imposing sanctions on Qadhafi and his family.[62] In March, the UN dispatched officials to Libya to persuade Libyan government officials to end the violence. Moreover, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon personally spoke with Qadhafi on the phone to acquire his compliance with the resolution.[63] However, those diplomatic efforts turned out to be failures. Consequently, on March 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, authorizing "all necessary measures…to protect civilians." The next day, NATO air forces initiated bombing on Libya.[64]

Consequences of the intervention

NATO claimed that the intervention saved Libyan civilians from Qadhafi's aggression.[65] NATO also successfully contributed to the overthrowing of the Qadhafi regime, though this was not the explicit purpose of the intervention.[66] The majority of the bombing targets were also military-related facilities that were not likely to directly threaten the Libyan people.[67] Nevertheless, NATO again failed to improve the humanitarian situation; Libya remains highly unstable today. Occasional clashes between militia groups also contribute to Libya's instability. The Interim National Transitional Council (INTC), established by the Libyan opposition group and supported by NATO, has been unable to function as the county's central governing authority.[68] The opposition-sponsored militia "have unlawfully detained thousands of regime supporters, executed others, driven communities from their homes, and [has] engaged in widespread torture."[69] Furthermore, according to the International Crisis Group, roughly 12,500 Libyans remained armed, and small arms proliferate throughout the country.[70] Considering Libya's chaotic situation, it is questionable whether the NATO intervention can be viewed as a "humanitarian" intervention.

Why did NATO Intervene in Libya?

Humanitarian concerns

NATO member states expressed humanitarian concerns about the imminent threat in Libya. U.S. President Obama stated, "We cannot stand idly when a tyrant tells his people there will be no mercy."*71* French President Sarkozy also claimed that "in Libya, the civilian population, which is demanding nothing more than the right to choose their own destiny, is in mortal danger…it is our duty to respond to their anguished appeal."[72] The UN Security Council concluded that attacks of pro-Qadhafi forces on militia and civilians alike "may amount to crimes against humanity."[73] Qadhafi's explicit aggression against protesters whom some international actors felt morally obligated to save appears to have sanctioned the NATO intervention.

National interests

NATO intervening states had concrete national interests to preserve in Libya. The restoration of access to Libya's oil reserve was vital for European states; Libya has exported roughly 85 percent of its oil resources to Italy, France, and the UK.[74] Libyan oil accounted for more than 28 percent of Italian

oil imports, 17 percent of French oil imports, and 8 percent of UK's oil imports. During the civil war, oil production dropped significantly, meeting less than 20 percent of Libya's domestic needs.[75] This decline likely caused great damage to the economies of those oil-importing European states. Ending the civil war to restore Libya's oil production was the primary purpose of their intervention. Those European states consequently played leading roles in the intervention by providing air forces, training Libyan rebels, and providing them with their weapons.[76]

Western states also feared that Libya could return to a terrorist-sponsored state if Qadhafi won the civil war.[77] Since Qadhafi established terrorist training camps in Libya in the early 1970s, the Libyan government provided a large amount of weapons, money, and safe heaven to various terrorist groups.[78] The U.S. then added Libya to the list of states sponsoring terrorism and implemented trade restrictions against Libya.[79] In 1999, Qadhafi started cutting his ties with terrorist groups, and his efforts eventually prompted the U.S. to remove Libya from the aforementioned list in 2006. It can be assumed that Qadhafi did not sponsor any terrorist groups at the time of the civil war. Yet, Western states were afraid that Qadhafi would eventually resort back to sponsoring terrorism, which was also perceived as a regional threat in Europe because of Libya's proximity to the continent.

There was also a fear that Libya's might possess and use chemical weapons against Western states. In the mid-1970s, Qadhafi pursued nuclear weapons. Libya's use of chemical weapons against Chad was also severely criticized in the late 1980s.[80] In 2003, the Libyan government announced that it would abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.[81] Libya still failed to give up their chemical weapons completely. Because Qadhafi was not generally considered a rational government actor, the mere threat that Libya might possess chemical weapons under his government was alarming to Western states.

The cumulative effect of these threatened economic and security interests of NATO member states were greater driving forces behind the intervention than any particular humanitarian concern. Similar to the case of Kosovo, realist arguments seems to better explain the motivations behind the international intervention in Libya.

R2P: What has Changed?

Several differences distinguish the case of Kosovo from that of Libya. NATO intervention in Kosovo was illegal under international law because NATO did not receive any authorization from Security Council prior to intervening. The intervention in Libya was legal in this same context because the Security Council, in Resolution 1973, "provided the coalition with the legitimate authority to intervene."[82] This change is worth noting because it suggests that NATO recognized the Security Council as the legitimate authority whose approval is required for military intervention, an approach stipulated in ICISS's report.

Another significant difference to note is the time frame applied to the approval of intervention. While it took almost a decade for the international community to mobilize the coalition in Kosovo's case, it took only a month for the Security Council to authorize the use of force in the Libyan conflict.[83] This perhaps suggests that the international community has become more responsive to humanitarian crises and appreciates its moral duty to protect civilians everywhere. In this sense, R2P has had some impact on states' behavior in the face of ghastly atrocities and human rights abuses.

R2P: What has Remained the Same?

The impact of R2P has proven to be very limited; the two case studies presented share many similar features and consequences. The pursuit of national interests serves as greater motivational factor than humanitarian concerns. NATO intervened in Kosovo because European states wanted to protect their own security interests, whereas the U.S. sought to maintain its hegemony in Europe. Likewise, NATO intervened in Libya because it was afraid that Qadhafi might once again sponsor terrorists and employ chemical weapons against Western states. To remove such threats, regime change then became the main objective of its intervention.[84] This argument is well-supported by the fact that NATO left Libya "soon after the killing of Qaddafi despite the continuation of sporadic violence in some parts of the country."[85] This was a clear abuse of the R2P mandate because the Security Council authorized the use of force to protect civilians, but not to change existing regime and to support the rebels.[86] This blatant abuse of the mandate implies that realism best characterizes the thought process and motivations of Western or International intervention regardless of adoption of R2P.

Both interventions were also not fully supported by the international community. This was obvious in Kosovo's case because Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council, warned that it would veto any resolution authorizing the use of force. Many developing states also criticized the great powers' justification of the intervention.[87] In the case of Libya, the Security Council's authorization of the use of force does not mean that the intervention was fully supported by much of the international community. In fact, Brazil, China, Germany, India, and Russia abstained from voting by expressing their opposition to the use of force. Brazil stated, "We are not convinced that the use of force…will lead to the realization of our common objectives – the immediate end to violence and the protection of civilians."[88] China agreed, stating "China is always against the use of force in international relations…China has serious difficulty with parts of the resolution."[89] Germany also claimed that is had " very carefully considered the option of using military force – its implications as well as its limitations. We see great risks. The likelihood of large-scale loss of life should not be underestimated."[90] The reason why those states, especially Russia and China, abstained rather than vetoing the resolution entirely was because, as Russia stated, these states did not want to necessarily prevent the adoption of the resolution. Although this might be viewed as an influence of R2P, which appeals to states' moral obligation to defend human rights, a large-scale and fundamental opposition of use of force against sovereign states remains present worldwide.

As previously examined in both case studies, the two NATO interventions clearly failed to alleviate the terrible atrocities that characterized the humanitarian condition of Kosovo and Libya during the crisis periods. The interventions instead prompted unintended and new humanitarian crises that incurred greater suffering. Although the first pillar of R2P calls for states' responsibility to protect, and it was mentioned in Resolution 1973, neither the NATO member states nor the Security Council invoked the third pillar of R2P, which calls for the international community's responsibility to protect.[91] R2P was not fully employed to mobilize the international coalition to protect civilians. In this sense R2P has yet developed enough as a doctrine to influence states' decision-making.

Conclusion

Examination of the features of the NATO interventions in Kosovo and Libya shows that states' responses to humanitarian crises have not dramatically changed before and after the adoption of R2P.

Although the adoption of R2P itself represents a significant progress of the liberal school, the realist critique of R2P should be seriously considered to avoid promoting an intervention that is intrinsically based on the national interests of great powers. Considering the fact that the intervention in Libya was undertaken to preserve the economic and security interests of some of NATO member states, interventions are likely to occur selectively in the future, i.e. states would not intervene in humanitarian crises if their national interests are not at stake. Realism continues to enjoy greater explanatory power for humanitarian intervention than does liberalism. Also, the intervention in Libya made it difficult for the Security Council to authorize future intervention because the mandate stipulated in Resolution 1973 was stretched to serve one interest of the Western states, which was regime change. The abuse of the R2P mandate made developing states suspicious about the motivations of intervening states. This will inevitably prevent R2P from developing into a more solid and influential international approach to intervention, and states' reference to R2P when defending intervention in future humanitarian crises will be contested.

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The Ideology of the Boko Haram: Understanding the Problem and the Enemy with a View to Effectively Containing the Threat

Elizabeth T Hassan

In an age of increased terrorist activities and deep anxiety over national security, the sometimes not-so-subtle friction between fundamental rights and national security is brought to the fore and the question that still plag0ues the mind is 'what course ought-t0a government0follow in order to effectively address or eliminate terrorist threats/acts without compromising the best values of the society?0'0Solving this problem0is not so easy when0the law itself, albeit indirectly, is0instrumental to the creation of the problem. Such is the dilemma faced by the Nigerian government in relation to Boko Haram today.

This paper explores the socio-political environment from which Boko Haram emerged and how it has influenced government responses so far. From an essentially domestic but somewhat comparative perspective, it presents an exposition on the legal instruments that form the basis o0f the movement. Several questions are asked. W0hat is the position of the law concerning Boko Haram and its activities? What are the legal classifications of these kinds of movements and what is the yardstick for ascertaining these? What fundamental rights are at the core of these movements and how should they be interpreted in light of the divergent interests in the society? Where do you draw the line and how do you reconcile these interests? And, ultimately, within which legal framework or paradigm should the Nigerian government approach the problem0?0This0paper proposes a different approach in States' counter-terrorism strategies and supports the development of effective counter-narratives that can neutralize extremist ideologies and create a rejectionist outlook on society.[1]

1 New York University School of Law, LLM in International Legal Studies, 2012; BL Nigerian Law School, Lagos, 2010; LL.B University of Jos, Nigeria, 2009. Special thanks to Professor Tom Gerety (my Professor and supervisor) for his guidance, insightful observations and endless reserve of patience; Colleagues from the War, Crime and Terror Seminar for their thought-provoking perspectives; my editor, Ali Assareh for his helpful comments and critiques, and Mita Mulia and Cansu Kahya for their helpful observations and support.

Introduction

      The emergence of the Boko Haram in Nigeria has placed the country in a very precarious position. In the face of recurring bomb blasts in different cities and the inability of the government to effectively address the situation, there have been several calls for President Goodluck Jonathan to resign from office.[1] There are also several indications that the Boko Haram has infiltrated segments of the security and government machinery.[2] Given its diversity[3] and long history of ethno-religious violence, nothing short of a careful and calculated counterterrorist engagement will successfully contain the threat and restore normalcy.

      For instance, in the last decade, the country experienced several riots and killings. In May 1999, violence erupted in Kaduna State over the succession of an Emir. Historically, Emirs served as both traditional and religious leaders to the Hausas in the north, but now in a more traditional capacity. They wield considerable power and influence in northern Nigeria.The violence resulted in more than 100 deaths. In Kaduna in February-May of 2000, over 1,000 people died in rioting over the introduction of criminal Sharia law in the state. Hundreds of ethnic Hausa were killed in reprisal attacks in southeastern Nigeria. In September 2001, over 2,000 people were killed in inter-religious rioting in Jos. In October 2001, hundreds were killed and thousands displaced in communal violence that spread across the Middle-Belt states of Benue, Taraba, and Nasarawa.[4] A great deal of the effort invested into counterterrorism today is aimed at eliminating or disabling terrorists.

      This paper argues that states, especially underdeveloped and developing countries like Nigeria where terrorism emerges out of a complex mix of religious, political, social and economic factors, stand a better chance of eliminating or neutralizing the threat through psychological engagement. This requires a deeper appreciation and understanding of the factors that either caused or facilitated terrorism. Although conventional strategies like coercion and negotiation may be necessary or relevant at times, it argues and concludes that the most effective means to permanent neutralization is dismantling or undermining the ideology.

      Part I presents the historical antecedents of northern Nigeria and explores the socio-economic and political environment from which the Boko Haram emerged. It examines the nature and character of the group from inception, and how it evolved from a radical rejectionist group into a terrorist organization. The aim is to provide a context that will facilitate greater understanding of the problem and the group, its motivations, and ideology.

      Part II examines the applicable laws that regulate or provide the justification for such movements. It analyses the President's emergency powers and legal options available to the government. It also considers how the government has responded to the threat or applied the necessary instruments in addressing the Boko Haram threat.

      Part III analyzes the major counterterrorism tools states employ and the efficacy of each method or strategy. Essentially, this part argues that the conventional tools of counterterrorist engagement – negotiation and coercion – have proven incapable of addressing the problem of terrorism. It draws on academic literature and comparative studies of efforts in other countries to support this claim. But additionally, this part emphasizes that for Nigeria, these tools are unreliable given the complexity of the polity.

      Thus, the paper concludes by recommending an alternative means: "psychological warfare," which is aimed at disabling the enemy from the source of its strength – its ideology and the moral support it enjoys from citizens.

Part I

Nigeria: Historical Antecedence[5]

      Nigeria is Africa's most populous country, with a population of over 150 million people. The country is divided into 36 states and a federal capital territory. The major religions are Christianity and Islam.[6] Although many believe that there are approximately equal percentages of Christians and Muslims, statistics estimate the Muslim population at 50%, Christians at 40%, and traditional believers at 10%.[7] The Boko Haram is found in northern Nigeria, which is predominantly Muslim and covers about 19 states, representing the largest demographic bloc in the country--larger than the south and east put together. [8] Nigeria's oil reserve is situated in the relatively smaller south and is the country's major natural resource. However, despite being recently ranked the world's second biggest oil exporter by volume and seventh in terms of oil reserve,[9] the GNI per capita of the country is $1,180 and 64% of the population lives below the international poverty line of $1.25 per day as of 2010.[10]

      Historically, Nigeria consisted of independent self-governing regions. The Muslim Hausas and Fulanis inhabited the north[11] while the then-traditional and later largely Christian Yorubas and Igbos inhabited the south. The Emirs ruled the north and served in dual capacity as both religious and secular leaders. However, the region was administered under Sharia Islamic Law by the Sultan of the Sokoto Caliphate.[12]

      The British amalgamated the northern and southern protectorates in 1914 for ease of administration. The north retained Islamic Law, but limited its application to civil cases. Christian

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1 Jide Ajani. "Nigeria: A Country Charred by Insurgency – The Patience and Good Luck President Jonathan Needs", Vanguard, Aug 19, 2012.

2 Maxwell Oditta, "Boko Haram: Many Battles for Mr. President," The Moment, Aug 19, 2012.

3 Nigeria has more than 250 ethnic groups. See "Facts and Focus", NigeriaWorld.

4 US Department of State, "Background Note: Nigeria."

5 Refer to Appendix I for relevant maps.

6 "Facts and Focus", NIGERIAWORLD.

7 UNITED NATIONS, "Civil and Political Rights, Including Religious Intolerance – Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Asma Jahangir: Mission to Nigeria," Economic and Social Council, Oct 7, 2005.

8 Although since the establishment of the Middle Belt region in the 4th Republic, this number is often restricted to the 12 core northern states, namely: Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara. See "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict," International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 168, Dec 20, 2010.

9 George Franklin, 'OPEC Ranks Nigeria Second Biggest Oil Exporter', Sweet Crude Reports – A Review of the Nigerian Energy Industry.

10 The World Bank, 'Data, Nigeria.'

11 International Crisis Working Group, Id. 1-4

12 Toyin Falola and Matthew Heaton, "A History of Nigeria", (Cambridge 2008), Chapters 1 and 2. The traditional northern empires comprised of the Hausa Bakwai (legitimate Hausa states): Biram, Kano, Daura, Katsina, Gobir, Rano and Zazzau; and the Banza Bakwai (illegitimate Hausa states): Zamfara, Kebbi, Yauri, Kwararafa, Nupe, and Illorin.

missionaries introduced Western education across all of Nigeria. The south responded to Christianity and Western education while the north resisted. As a result, more southerners became educated and secured better jobs than their contemporaries in the north. The amalgamation led to the influx of Christian missionaries in the north who built schools and established European style-education system alongside the Islamic system. Thus, the British modernized the north, but many northern Nigerians remained largely suspicious of western education. The Muslims, who considered the changes an incursion and a way of imposing or elevating the Christian religion, received these developments with ambivalence at best and animosity at worst. This created a great deal of tension in the north with instances of violence such as the Hausa-Igbo clash of 1953.[13]

The animosity was further heightened by the discovery of marketable oil reserves in the south in 1954. Thereafter, more attention was paid to the south in terms of socio-economic development as well as education. In 1959, just before giving Nigeria its independence, the British expunged the Sharia content of Islamic Law on the grounds that some of its provisions were incompatible with rights of all citizens in what had fast become a religiously pluralistic society. The northern region's government was forced to accept a compromise code, the Penal Code, which established the Sharia Court with jurisdiction for only Muslim personal law.[14]

Politically, the north was always able to exercise strong influence after independence in 1960. Although wealth was in the south, the north's demographic strength ensured that it retained the necessary leverage to influence politics in the country and exercise some measure of control over the country's resources. In fact, since independence, the north has produced the majority of Nigeria's Presidents and Heads of State. Not surprisingly, this did not sit well with the south.

This state of affairs formed the foundation of a long history of hostility and intense rivalry that was mostly masked by communal tolerance but which sometimes culminated in ethno-religious violence.

The Emergence of the Boko Haram in Nigeria

It is uncertain exactly when the Boko Haram was founded. However, most researchers place its inception in the mid-1990s.[15] According to the Nigerian Director of Defense Information, the group emerged as a radical rejectionist sect in 1995 under the name Ahlulsunna Wal'jama'ah Hijra, led by Abubakah Lawan.[16] Lawan later left for studies in Saudi Arabia and was succeeded by Mohammad Yusuf. Nothing tangible has emerged on Lawan's activities in Saudi Arabia but the sect he founded gradually transformed into a problematic radical rejectionist group. Rejectionists are persons or groups who reject a country's policies, right to exist, or plainly refuse to compromise in a dispute.[17] "Rejectionist" originally referred to an Arab who refuses to accept a negotiated peace with Israel, but now more generally refers to

a broader range of people. Northern Nigeria has a long history of rejectionist insurgencies but, in the last decade, Nigeria experienced a resurgence of more radical rejectionist sects seeking political and religious reforms with occasional outbreaks of violence. Some of the prominent ones include Islamic Movement of Nigeria led by Sheik El-Zakzakky, the Kala-Kato led by Mallam Badamasi, the Darika Shi'a Salafiya (Izala) led by late Sheik Abubakar Gumi, the Ahmadiyya Movement led by Al Gulan, the Khadiriyyha led by Nasir Kabara, and the Tijjaniya led by Isiaku Rabiu.[18] Like most extremist groups in history, these sects emerged with the ultimate aim of establishing Nigeria as an Islamic state,[19] and the Boko Haram is not different in this regard. What makes the Boko Haram peculiar in the Nigerian context is the fact that unlike other movements which have never gotten so far, it emerged as what the government thought was a "low-risk" threat and evolved into a full blown terrorist organization with regional and international links, and the capacity to carry out the most audacious attacks Nigeria has ever experienced from any religious extremist group.[20]

But how did this happen? What factors caused or facilitated the emergence of the Boko Haram? The answer is not far removed from generally known causes. Before proceeding, it is worth pointing out that the Boko Haram is undoubtedly an extremist Islamic terrorist group, primarily due to its activities and ideology. This is evident in some of the statements and press releases made by its leaders. For instance, during an interrogation after his capture, Yusuf, then-leader of the Boko Haram, said, "Allah said in the Qur'an that people should seek knowledge, but not knowledge that contravenes the teachings of Islam. All knowledge that contradicts Islam is prohibited by the Almighty."[21] In a video released by the Boko Haram, the present leader, Shekau said, "Oh you people, oh you people. I want you all to listen to me carefully; listen to this servant of God who has no other duty to pursue on earth except the propagation and the fighting on the cause of Allah. We have given the assurance and have committed faith in God that nothing can be done to subdue us. With all glory to God, our divine desire is that all of us should be killed as martyrs on the path of God, so as to enable us be blessed with the rewards of Allah as promised in His holy book, Al Qur'an. We will not bother ourselves engaging in too many talks, neither are we going to worry about the talks of the people, except on issue that will be of benefit to the people. We pray Allah to continue to support us on this mission and make us to continue in this mission with no purpose other than His worship. We have prayed that God should give us the privilege of being amongst those killed in the path of the struggle for the establishment of His dominion."[22] On August 9, 2009, about a week after Yusuf's death, a temporary leader of Boko Haram, Sani Umar, issued an ideological statement:

"For the first time since the killing of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf, our leader, we hereby make the following statements.

1) First of all that Boko Haram does not in any way mean "Western Education is a sin," as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram actually means "Western Civilization" is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal

13 International Crisis Working Group, Id., 6
14 Id., 5
15 Lisa Waldek and Shankara Jayasekara, "Boko Haram: The Evolution of Islamic Extremism in Nigeria," Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counterterrorism, Vol. 6, No. 2, Oct 2011, 168-178 at 168; Freedom Onuoha, "The Audacity f the Boko Haram: Background, Analysis and Emerging Trend," Security Journal, June 2011, 1-18 at 1; "Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland," U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security – Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Nov 30, 2011.
16 Onuoha, Id. 2; U.S. Homeland Security, Id. 6
17 See – Oxford English Dictionary, Collins Dictionary, and Nice Definition e.t.c.

18 Onuoha, Supra 1
19 Suleiman T., "The Plot to Islamise Nigeria", Tell, Nov 30, 2009 at 20
20 See UN Headquaters and Police Headquaters bombings in Abuja in 2011.
21 Nasiru Abubakar, "The Last Interview of our Supreme Leader Ustaz Mohamed Yusuf During Interrogation by Infidel Security Operatives of the Nigerian State," June 20, 2011.
22 Aaron Y Zelin, "New Video Message from Boko Haram's Amir Imam Abu Bakr Shekau, 'We are Coming to get you Jonathan.'" Jihadology, Apr 12, 2012.

education coming from the West, that is Europe, which is not true, the second affirms our believe in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not Education), for culture is broader, it includes education but [is] not determined by Western Education.

In this case we are talking of Western Ways of life which include: constitutional provision as it relates to, for instance, the rights and privileges of Women, the idea of homosexualism [sic], lesbianism, sanctions in cases of terrible crimes like drug trafficking, rape of infants, multi-party democracy in an overwhelmingly Islamic country like Nigeria, blue films, prostitution, drinking beer and alcohol and many others that are opposed to Islamic civilization.

2) That Boko Haram is an Islamic Revolution whose impact is not limited to Northern Nigeria, in fact, we are spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria, and Boko Haram is just a version of the Al Qaeda which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamized which is according to the wish of Allah.

3) That Mallam Yusuf has not died in vain and he is a martyr. His ideas will live forever.

4) That Boko Haram lost over 1000 of our Martyr members killed by the wicked Nigerian army and police mostly of Southern Nigeria extraction. That the Southern states, especially the infidel Yoruba, Igbo and Ijaw infidels will be our immediate target.

5) That the killing of our leaders in a callous, wicked and malicious manner will not in any way deter us. They have lost their lives in the struggle for Allah.
Having made the following statement we hereby reinstate our demands:

1) That we have started a Jihad in Nigeria which no force on earth can stop. The aim is to Islamize Nigeria and [to] ensure the rule of the majority Muslims in the country. We will teach Nigeria a lesson, a very bitter one.

2) That from the Month of August, we shall carry out series of bombing in Southern and Northern Nigerian cities, beginning with Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu and Port Harcourt. The bombing will not stop until Shari`a and Western Civilization is wiped off [sic] from Nigeria. We will not stop until these evil cities are turned into ashes.

3) That we shall make the country ungovernable, kill and eliminate irresponsible political leaders of all leanings, hunt and gun down those who oppose the rule of Shari`a in Nigeria and ensure that the infidel does not go unpunished.

4) We promise the West and Southern Nigeria, a horrible pastime. We shall focus on these areas which are the devil empire and has been the one encouraging and sponsoring Western Civilization into the shores of Nigeria.

5) We call on all Northerners in the Islamic States to quit the follower ship [fellowship?] of the wicked political parties leading the country, the corrupt, irresponsible, criminal, murderous political leadership, and join the struggle for Islamic Society that will be corruption free, Sodom free, where security will be guaranteed and there will be peace under Islam.

6) That very soon, we shall stir Lagos, the evil city and Nigeria's South West and South East, in a way no one has ever done before. Al Hakubarah [Allahu Akbar].

IT'S EITHER YOU ARE FOR US OR AGAINST US.[23]"

What this section concentrates on are the factors that fostered or facilitated its emergence and evolution into a full-blown terrorist organization. Terrorists essentially see themselves as "freedom fighters" or "defenders of a cause" and emerge in response to what they consider deeply seethed injustice, oppression, or moral depravity that they feel needs to be addressed.[24] For instance, Osama Bin Laden told the American people, "We fight because we are free men who don't sleep under oppression. We want to restore freedom to our nation."[25]

Recent trends in counterterrorism, especially post 9/11, erroneously project terrorism as essentially a function of Islamic extremism. While that may be true in certain contexts, history shows terrorism extends beyond the confines of religious beliefs and is a function of political, economic, social and ideological factors. Louise Richardson disagreed with this submission. She argued that "the causes of terrorism are not to be found in objective conditions of poverty or privation or in a ruthless quest for domination but in subjective perceptions, in a lethal cocktail containing a disaffected individual, an enabling community and a legitimizing ideology."[26] Although her submission is not wrong, it is too narrow and does not completely capture the entire context within which terrorism thrives. Her argument fails to fully appreciate the fact that, perhaps in varying degrees (e.g. more in under-developed than developed countries), extremism develops within and is sustained by a combination of these political, religious, social, and economic factors. The case of the Boko Haram illustrates this point. The background section shows the preexisting grievances some northern Muslims and clerics had, caused as much by what they considered a 'contamination' of Islam by Westernization, as by a loss of political power to the new secular leadership. Over time, this animosity was fed by socio-economic factors. The International Crisis Working Group reported that "persistently high levels of poverty in the country had become a northern phenomenon; of the ten states with the highest incidence of poverty, eight were in the far northern zone… a recent study found as many as 76 per cent of northerners are 'earning a daily income of less than the equivalent of one American dollar.' With virtually no modern industries, there is a high dependence on the government… the region's economy is particularly affected by lack of skilled manpower."[27] According to Professor Sadiq Abubakar of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, "unemployment is very high and jobs are not forthcoming even for graduates; at the same time, wealth is concentrated in a few privileged hands."[28] Jean Herskovits of the State University of New York pointed out that "in the face of such poverty and deprivation, standard of living declines, frustration grows and people are easily persuaded to take up arms against the government."[29] Over the past ten years, things have become worse in Nigeria and class difference is glaring. The impoverished struggle to make a living while being confronted daily with the affluence of government officials and a privileged few. World Bank statistics show that 64% of the population live below

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23 See David Cook, "Boko Haram: A Prognosis," James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, December 16, 2011. See also Mallam Sanni Umaru, "Boko Haram Ressurects, Declares Total Jihad," Vanguard, August 14, 2009, accessed October 31, 2011.

24 Louise Richardson, "What Terrorists Want: Understanding Terrorist Threat," John Murray 2006, at 26.

25 Osama Bin Laden, "Message to America", Oct 10, 2004.

26 Richardson, Supra at 14.

27 International Crisis Working Group, Supra at 10.

28 David Goggins, "Who Are The Boko Haram?"The Researcher, Vol. 4, Issue 3, Oct 2009 at 24.

29 Id.

the international poverty line of $1.25 per day as at 2010,[30] with a higher percentage in the north than the south. There has also been a persistent disparity in income distribution since the first republic.[31] These differences have sometimes led to protests. For instance, In July 2002, a group of peasant women occupied ChevronTexaco's operations in Nigeria for 10 days and withdrew only after company officials agreed to provide jobs for their sons and set up credit plans for the women in the village to start businesses.[32] It is not surprising, therefore, that the membership of the Boko Haram consists largely of Almajiris (beggars), petty traders, unemployed youths, and jobless graduates.[33] The leadership of the group is itself not affluent or privileged, unlike in other contexts. Shekau was born in a farming village in Yobe state. He is not; however, illiterate since he studied theology and Islamic studies before joining the Boko Haram.[34] Yusuf seemed to fall under the middle class, a borderline between the haves and have-nots. This is evident from his ability to afford a car and cell phone and live more comfortably than his followers.[35] Perhaps, this places him in a strategic position to relate to and influence the underprivileged membership.

The Boko Haram emerged as an insurrection group on a vendetta against the government and in search of alternatives to the government's underperformance. Islam represented such an alternative. Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer submitted that with governments as oppressive and ineffective as they are corrupt, there is the tendency for many Muslims to seek salvation in their religion.[36]

1.3 The Ideology of the Boko Haram

Boko Haram means, "Western Education is a Sin" or "Western Education is Forbidden" or "Western Education is a Sacrilege." The group adopted this name to express its absolute rejection of Westernization. Muslim fundamentalists generally believe that the problems Muslims face are due to the pervasiveness of foreign ideologies, which have displaced the much nobler philosophy and cultural values of Islam. The group openly rejects secularism, which it considers incompatible with the tenets of Islam. Yusuf believed that Western education is the source of Nigeria's problems and since the mission is to rid the north of its problems, he proposed that things would only improve if secularism were replaced with Sharia law. This is the basic ideology of the group, which is encapsulated by its official name, Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal Jihad, meaning, "People committed to the propagation of the Prophets teachings and jihad."[37]

When Yusuf began his campaign, it was very easy to win support and recruit followers through religion. This is a strategy terrorists often employ. Richardson pointed out that "Religion is never the sole cause of terrorism; religion serves to incite, to mobilize, and to legitimize terrorist actions."[38]

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30 The World Bank, 'Data, Nigeria', available at http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria; UNICEF, 'At a Glance: Nigeria – Statistics', available at http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nigeria_statistics.html
31 Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Nigeria: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991.
32 See "Citizen, Society and State in Nigeria," available at http://phs.prs.k12.nj.us/ewood/nigeriacitiznes.html
33 Onuoha, Supra at 4, 8.
34 "Abubakar Mohammad Shekau: Shadowy Leader of Nigeria's Boko Haram," Al Arabiya News, Jan 28, 2012.
35 Islamic, "Last Interview of Our Supreme Leader…" Id.
36 Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer, " Islamic Extremism: Causes, Diversity and Challenges," (Rowman and Littlefield: 2008) 18
37 Toni Johnson, "Boko Haram," Council on Foreign Relations, Nov 7, 2011.
38 Richardson, Supra at 92.

Boko Haram's ideology was heavily criticized when the group became famous. In the first place, it seemed absurd that anyone would believe that education is a sin. Secondly, although the group openly renounced Western education, it was using Western technology like the Internet to propagate its ideology. In response to this, then-acting leader of the group, Mallam Sanni Umaru, released a statement in 2009 making a distinction between the alleged definition of "Boko Haram" and their own definition of it.

To the largely illiterate and erratic members, though, these distinctions did not matter. Boko Haram is advocating the Islamization of Nigeria, but apart from its campaign against Western education, the group has no clearly identifiable or articulated set of demands, nor methodology on how it expects this to be done, nor the exact future it envisions. Is it advocating a constitutional change and instatement of the Sharia Code as the supreme law of the land? Is it advancing a regime change that will replace the current leadership with its favored clerics? And what about the 'infidel' population? Is it proposing a forceful conversion of all non-Muslims to Islam or a total wipeout of the rest of the population as a way of cleansing the land it claims to be contaminated by unholy Western influence? The difficulties in answering these questions reveal the futility of such causes--or, at the very least, the ideology behind them.

1.4 The Evolution of the Boko Haram from a Radical Rejectionist Group to a Terrorist Organization

A careful study of the timeline[39] of the Boko Haram's activities reveals a gradual progression from a disenfranchised and alienated rejectionist group to an extremist insurgent group to a terrorist organization with regional and international links. This evolution happened over a period of nine years.

The Boko Haram first took up arms against the government on December 24, 2003, when it attacked police stations and public buildings in the towns of Geiam and Kanamma in Yobe State, the home state of the leader, Yusuf Mohammed.[40] It established a base in the latter city called "Afghanistan" and became popularly known as "Nigerian Taliban," a nickname it got as a result of its anti-western position, willingness to resort to violence, and alleged affiliations to the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al Shabaab.[41, 42] A few days later, security forces raided them; the group disbanded and resettled in Maiduguri, Borno State. In Maiduguri, it continued its aggression against the state, periodically targeting Christian or Muslim faithfuls who oppose them.

In September 2004, it attacked Bama and Gworza police stations, killing 24 officers and stealing arms and ammunitions. Between 2003 and 2009, the Boko haram continued a steady low-level offensive against the government. On July 26, 2009, the group launched an attack against a police station in Bauchi State killing two police officers and one soldier. Thereafter, it clashed with security forces between July 26 and July 30 in five states; Bauchi, Kano, Borno, Yobe and Katsina. On July 30, 2009, security forces shelled the Boko Haram headquarters in Maiduguri and engaged the group in a shoot-out that killed over 700 persons including 28 policemen.[43] Many members were arrested and detained in Bauchi. Yusuf was captured and killed in what appeared to have been an extrajudicial killing. Amnesty International reported that Yusuf was killed after a clash between government security forces and the Boko Haram. The

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39 Appendix II.
40 Onuoha, Id. at 5; U.S. Homeland Security, Supra at 6.
41 Anti-Defamation League, "Boko Haram: The Emerging Jihadist Threat in West Africa, " ADL, Jan 24, 2012.
42 Awofadeji S., "150 Killed in Bauchi Religious Crisis," Thisday, July 27, 2009.
43 "More Than 700 Killed in Nigeria Clashes", Reuters Alertnet, Aug 2, 2009.

government refused to publicize the findings of a report on the clash.[44] The attorney general's office filed criminal charges against five police officers, including three assistant commissioners of police, suspected for the extrajudicial killing. They were detained but never prosecuted.[45]

The group was badly injured by this incident and went underground.[46] Meanwhile, Yusuf's extrajudicial killing received a lot of publicity nationally and internationally. Human Rights organizations like Amnesty International,[47] Human Rights Watch,[48] Refugee Documentation Centre Ireland, and Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) criticized the Nigerian government for violating its international obligations. Domestically, Yusuf's death was regarded as martyrdom and the Boko Haram used it to gain popularity and recruit more members.

In 2010, the Boko Haram re-emerged more violently and determined to exact vengeance for the execution of its leader.[49] It re-emerged under the leadership of Imam Abubakar Shekau, who was more extremist than Yusuf. The group raided Bauchi prison and released over 700 prisoners including 100 sect members. It also killed seven guards and bystanders.[50]

In 2011, it evolved into a terrorist organization and started attacking government institutions, churches, and public places containing civilians in a series of random bomb blasts. Its first suicide bomb attack was on the Nigerian Police Headquarters in Abuja on June 16, 2011.[51] The group released a statement claiming responsibility for the bombing. On August 26, it became more audacious and bombed the UN Headquarters Building in Abuja.[52] This began a series of bomb attacks, mostly suicide bombing.

How did this happen? What led to the birth of a terrorist ring out of an ordinary rejectionist movement? Vidino et al, along with several other experts, believe that there is no single factor that leads an individual or even a group to become radicalized--rather, it is the complex overlap of concurring and mutually reinforcing factors.[53] They posit four theories of the radicalization process: grievance, ideology, mobilization, and tipping points.[54] Richardson's 3 Rs (Revenge, Renown and Reaction) explain some of

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[44] Amnesty Report 2012: Nigeria," Amnesty International, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/nigeria/report-2012#section-15-5

[45] Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2012: Nigeria," available at http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-nigeria

[46] "National Conflict Assessment," USAID, Aug 2011, p. 39

[47] In December 2009, Amnesty International published "Killing at Will: Extrjudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in Nigeria. " See U.S. Department of State, 2010 Human Rights Report: Nigeria, April 8, 2011.

[48] "Violence Between Security Forces and Islamist Group in Nigeria", Human Rights Watch; see also The Researcher, Supra at 26.

[49] U.S. Homeland Security at 7.

[50] U.S. 2010 Counterterrorism Report, at 22.

[51] "Breaking News: Suicide Bombers Attack Police Headquarters in Abuja'" Sahara Reporters, June 16, 2011.

[52] Senan Murray and Adam Nossiter, "Suicide Bomber Attacks UN Building in Nigeria," New York Times, Aug 26, 2011.

[53] Vidino, L., Pantucci, R., Kohlmann, E., "Bringing Global Jihad t the Horn of Africa: Al Shabaab, Western Fighters, and the Sacralization of the Somali Conflict," African Security 3 (2009:4), 216-238. See also Roy, O., "EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?" The National Interest, Apr 1, 2003; Saggar, S., "The One Per Cent World: Managing the Myth of Muslim Religious Extremism," The Political Quarterly 77 (2006:3), 314-327; Saucier, G., Akers, I.G., Shen-Miller, S., Knezevic, G., and Stankov, L., "Patterns of Thinking In Militant Extremism," Perspectives on Psychological Science 4 (2009:3), 256-271.

[54] Vidino et al, Id.

the reasons.[55] According to her, one of the primary motivations of terrorists is the desire to seek revenge for a wrong done to them or the audience they are seeking to protect. Closely related to that is the desire for recognition as a relevant group. Terrorists attempt to seek the attention of a particular audience that either ignores them or before whom they feel irrelevant. Terrorist attacks draw publicity and feed a group's desire for attention, thus encouraging it to perpetuate its ideology. Lastly, some of their actions are either reactions to what they perceive as injustices in the society or acts aimed at eliciting reactions from their target.

Critically analyzing the emergence of the Boko Haram and its activities from inception to present, these elements and factors ring true. As a group comprised of mostly poor, disenfranchised, and neglected individuals, the desire for revenge, renown, and reaction stands as a compelling explanation for the development of the group as a terrorist organization.

Several other factors facilitated this evolution. First, the "martyrdom" of Yusuf can be considered a tipping point for the group, which led to the emergence of Abubakar Shekau as leader. Part of the ideological belief of religious fundamentalists is the existence of the afterlife and the rewards that come with martyrdom. They are willing to murder because they believe they are fighting for God. They have no sympathy for their victims, and are themselves ready to die to secure rewards of the afterlife.

According to Jibrin Ibrahim, politics and religion have always been inextricably linked in the north.[56] Some experts argue that religion is mostly a cover for deeper antagonism caused by political rivalry; political developments between 2010 and 2011 support this. President Goodluck Jonathan won the elections amidst bitterness by northerners who believed it was their turn to rule. Conspiracy theorists argue that northern politicians are deliberately cultivating the Boko Haram extremism in order to to pressure the incumbent and forestall any thoughts he may have of extending his tenure.[57] Some people believe that northern politicians are one funding the organization and quite possibly the reason it has been difficult to successfully prosecute its members.

Finally, external links Boko Haram had with regional and international terrorist organizations further strengthened the group in terms of funding, training and logistics. At first, the existence of any tangible links to Al Qaeda or the Al Shabaab were disputed and not seriously considered. In 2009 an analyst concluded that "there is no evidence of any links between Boko Haram and international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda."[58] However, after the jailbreak in 2010, a pattern started forming in the tactics of the Boko Haram similar to those used by renowned organizations like Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). The proximity of Borno state to the Sahel, where these regional organizations were operating, made the possibility of a linkage even more plausible. In 2011, the Boko Haram and AQIM openly declared their intention to coordinate and synchronize efforts.[59]

Subsequent suicide attacks confirm that this linkage exists. Although the Boko Haram is yet to

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[55] Richardson, Supra at 95-131.

[56] "The Politics of Religion in Nigeria: The Parameters of the 1987 Crisis in Kaduna State," Review of African Political Economy (1989), 81.

[57] "What Will Follow the Boko Haram?" IRIN, nOV 24, 2011, available at http://www.unhrc.org./refworld/docid/4ed388292.html

[58] Shulze, S., "Nigeria: The Boko Haram Battle," available at www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/current-affairs/security-watch/detail/?lng=en&id=105612

[59] U.S. Homeland Security at 16

be formally designated a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), there is no doubt that the group has evolved into a terrorist organization.

Part II

2.1 Contextualizing the Boko Haram within Nigeria's Legal Framework

Nigeria has three officially recognized religions; Islam, Christianity, and Traditional belief. Unlike Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, the Vatican, and other countries where the ratio of Muslims to Christians is radically different, Nigeria has a 50% to 40% ratio of Muslims to Christians, which makes it impractical to adopt one religion over the other. Thus, the Nigerian Constitution protects religious freedom of citizens, and this is generally respected by the State. Section 38 of the 1999 Constitution provides:

(1) Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including to change his belief and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.[60]

(2) No person attending any place of education shall be required to receive religious instruction or to take part in or attend any religious ceremony or observance if such instruction ceremony or observance relates to a religion other than his own, or religion not approved by his parent or guardian.

(3) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any place of education maintained wholly by that community or denomination.

On its face, this section heavily protects the freedom of citizens to observe their religion. It precludes any form of government interference with this right and seems to suggest that citizens are free to practice and observe their religion in a manner they consider suitable. However, the section further stipulates:

(4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person to form, take part in the activity or be a member of a secret society.

Section 318 then defines a secret society as:

any society, association, group or body of persons (whether registered or not)

(a) that uses secret signs, oaths, rites or symbols and which is formed to promote a cause, the purpose or part of the purpose of which is to foster the interest of its members and to aid one another under any circumstances without due regard to merit, fair play or justice to the detriment of the legitimate interest of those who are not members;

(b) the membership of which is incompatible with the function or dignity of any public office under this Constitution and whose members are sworn to observe oaths of secrecy; or

(c) the activities of which are not known to the public at large, the names of whose members are kept secret and whose meetings and other activities are held in secret.

These restrictions on the exercise of the freedom of religion provide the context within which to analyze

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60 Section 38 (1) of The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria found under Chapter IV – Fundamental Human Rights

the Boko Haram. Although the Boko Haram is publicly known and its actions are of a public nature, it still falls under the definition of a secret society because the nature and character of the group is largely unknown. This follows the order of most secret groups where their existence is known but their strategies or modus operandi are concealed to effectuate attacks and avoid law enforcement operatives. Boko Haram's affairs are conducted secretly within the group and only come to public knowledge via attacks. Moreover, their members are sworn to secrecy and undertake to remain loyal to the cause. But more importantly, the cause and the activities are incompatible with general notions of governance and peace. Given this, the position of the law is clear; insofar as all citizens have the right to freely practice their religion, they must practice it within the confines of limits imposed by the Constitution.

Furthermore, Section 10 (which is the default limitation on the right to freedom of religion) provides:

The Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion."[61]

Section 10 is an absolute ban that places a positive duty on the government to ensure that no religion is either adopted or given higher priority in the country. Nigeria, for the most part, has observed this constitutional provision. However, a great deal of controversy arose in 1999 when 12 northern states adopted Sharia Law.[62] Sharia Law is recognized by the Constitution, which also established Sharia Courts for the administration of the law.[63] However, as modified during the colonial administration, only the civil aspect of Sharia Law was applied. The court's jurisdiction was limited to Muslims, and only those who accepted subjection to its jurisdiction. However, the 1999 adoption of Sharia Law, which was championed by Zamfara State, involuntarily introduced the criminal aspect that contained provisions like flogging, death by stoning and amputation, which are contrary to fundamental rights of citizens enshrined in Chapter IV if the Constitution as well as several international conventions to which Nigeria is a signatory.[64] The states established enforcement bodies, prominently the Hisbah, to oversee the implementation of the law and ensure compliance. This introduction of Sharia Law was strongly opposed by the Christian population and the international community.

Opponents argued that Sharia was unconstitutional and that it signified a move towards restricting the freedom of religion or institutionalizing Islam.[65] Proponents countered that Muslim law has always been applied in Nigeria, albeit not in entirety. They argued that the Constitution conferred power on states to enact criminal laws and that, moreover; the laws were applicable only to Muslims.[66] To them, a true Muslim follows the laws of the Prophet, and Sharia is a manifestation of the law of the Prophet. However, in application, some of these laws, like the restriction on owning businesses that sell alcohol and the general religious observances during Ramadan, affect non-Muslims.

Internal controversy, coupled with international pressure, forced states to refrain from enforcing

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61 Section 10, Id., under Chapter II – Directive Principles of State Policy
62 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF Annual Report 2012, "Countries of Particular Concern: Nigeria," Mar 20, 2012, p. 5.
63 See Sections 260 and 275 of the Constitution.
64 Such as International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women etc.
65 United Nations Economic and Social Council, "Civil and Political Rights Including Religious Intolerance – Report of Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Rligion or Belief, Asma Jahangir: Mission to Nigeria", Oct 7, 2005.
66 Id.

the graver penalties, like amputation. The federal government never took any active steps to reverse or overrule the law itself. This encouraged the emergence of extremist groups like the Boko Haram, which demanded the Islamization of Nigeria.

2.2 Initial Response to the Boko Haram Threat

The Nigerian government underestimated the potential of the Boko Haram to become a dangerous security risk capable of rising to the level of terrorism. But indicators were there all along. First, the enabling environment had been built by events that transpired during the colonial era coupled with the depravity and hopelessness that is prevalent in the country, particularly in the north.

Osama Bin Laden designated Nigeria as one of the countries to be Islamized.[67] The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) had also earlier expressed concern about reports of foreign funding for extremist groups in Nigeria and had urged the government to place high priority on preventing the possibility of such alignment.[68] Similarly, the Boko Haram itself made several public declarations of partnership with foreign terrorist organizations.[69]

However, these warning signs were discountenanced and deemphasized. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo reportedly said that the best way to respond to Sharia is to ignore it. According to him, to confront it is to keep it alive.[70] Several other experts discredited the existence of outside links.[71] By the time Nigeria fully appreciated the degree of threat that Boko Haram posed, the organization had become formidable. In response, the Nigerian state rushed into emergency mode to counter the security risks using insufficient methods.

2.3 Emergency Powers of the President and the Nigerian Government's Counterterrorism Efforts

The Nigerian Constitution confers enormous emergency powers on the President who acts in a dual capacity as President as well as the Commander-in-Chief. Section 305 of the Constitution reads:

(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by instrument published in the Official-Gazette} of the Government of the Federation issue a Proclamation of a state of emergency in the Federation or any part thereof.

(2) The President shall immediately after the publication, transmit copies of the Official -Gazette of the Government of the Federation containing the proclamation including the details of the emergency to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, each of whom shall forthwith convene or arrange for a meeting of the House of which he is President or Speaker, as the case may be, to consider the situation and decide whether or not to pass a resolution approving the Proclamation.

(3) The President shall have power to issue a Proclamation of a state of emergency only when -

(a) the Federation is at war;

(b) the Federation is in imminent danger of invasion or involvement in a state of war;

(c) there is actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the Federation or any part thereof to such extent as to require extraordinary measures to restore peace and security;

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67 Sahara Reporters, "Next Phase of Boko Haram", Feb 7, 2012.
68 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF Annual Report 2012, "Countries of Particular Concern: Nigeria," Mar 20, 2012.
69 Waldek and Jayasekara, supra; Onuoha, supra.
70 Lauren Ploch, "CRS Report for Congress – Nigeria: Current Issues," CRS Code RL33964.
71 Infra.

(d) there is a clear and present danger of an actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the Federation or any part thereof requiring extraordinary measures to avert such danger...[72]

Under a state of emergency, the President has power to take all the necessary measures to avert crisis or restore peace. When Boko Haram's attacks became more frequent and aggressive, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in relation to the situation. Following this, the government initiated several military and non-military measures designed to disband and incapacitate the group. The President moved to strengthen the counterterrorism legislation that had been stalled since 2008 and established regional and international partnerships to combat terrorism. Most of the measures employed, however, were high-handed. Military troops were deployed to affected states particularly Borno, Yobe and Bauchi. Security forces raided suspected Boko Haram settlements and hideouts. It was during one such raid that Yusuf was arrested and later extra-judicially killed, along with 700 other members.[73] The group temporarily disbanded—or rather, went underground. When it resurfaced more aggressively in 2010, the government attempted negotiations. This attempt was disapproved by the Senate and rejected by Boko Haram's new leader, Abubakar Shekau, who introduced suicide bombing and emphasized jihad. On April 18, 2012, the Senate passed a resolution that urged the executive to "recognize that these terrorists have declared war on Nigeria which is to our sovereignty, existence, and economic well being and respond with all instruments of national powers at its disposal."[74] Neither the Constitution nor the Senate resolution provided any clearly defined domestic parameters for what the President can order under the emergency powers. The government's full-blown aggression against the Boko Haram violated several international conventions, including those on extrajudicial killing and due process. Members of the group were killed, detained without trial, or tried without their full constitutional guarantees. This attracted serious criticism from the international community.

Primarily, the Nigerian government used coercion and negotiation to approach the Boko Haram problem but none of these measures seem to have been successful. Rather, they reinforced the organization. But why were these methods unsuccessful and what other prospects lay for Nigeria in engaging the Boko Haram? More importantly, how can it approach the problem such that the Boko Haram threat will be effectively contained and normalcy restored to the country?

PART III

3.1 Dealing With the Boko Haram Emergency: Options and Strategies

Law has always been considered a tool for accommodating various sets of interests and striking a balance among these conflicting interests. But the counterterrorism efforts of states have put this notion to test. In between acting and reacting to terrorist threats and attacks, states have had to reconcile the rule of law and individual rights on one hand and national security considerations on the other. For a long time, the debate revolved around what paradigm of law states ought to adopt in addressing terrorist concerns, peace or

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72 A copy of the Constitution may be found at http://www.nigeria-law.org/ ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm
73 U.S. Department of State, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2010," Aug 2011, available at www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170254.htm
74 Lawal Bako, "Boko Haram: Politics of Negotiation," Blueprint Newspaper, May 7, 2012.

war? After the 9/11 attacks on the United States, a new variable was introduced. The Bush Administration contested that the law did not anticipate the kind of threat posed by terrorism and opted to address the emergency using what Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann called the 'No Law Zone.'[75] The rationale argued that adherence to the rule of law and individual rights necessarily comes at the expense of security needs, which states are unwilling to jeopardize during periods of national emergency. The question of what model to employ is still fiercely debated and it is little comfort that none of the paradigms presented have been able to completely present a solution to the problem.

For Nigeria, it is much less comfort that the Boko Haram threat emerged in the whirlwind of such uncertain times. How can Nigeria contain or neutralize the Boko Haram threat? What paradigm would be most effective? It is easy to argue for either paradigm, but given the complexity of the Nigerian political and religious milieu, perhaps the answer lays not so much in legal constructs but more on the tools Nigeria employs in combatting or containing the Boko Haram. There are essentially two prominent approaches states have used over time: negotiation and coercion. These tools, which have been used by Nigeria, will be examined in comparison to their use in other countries. The discussion will focus on their efficacy in terrorism and possible explanations for their various failings. Subsequently, the paper will argue in support of an alternative method, the psychological tool. The Boko Haram threat, and indeed all terrorist threats or acts, cannot be successfully or effectively addressed using only negotiation and coercion alone. Since terrorists are driven by religious, ideological, political, social and economic factors, engaging them necessarily involves approaching the threat through unconventional and nondescript channels.

3.1.1 Negotiating the Threat Away

Robert Mnookin defined negotiation as "a joint decision-making process involving interactive communication in which parties that lack identical interests attempt to reach agreement."[76] In the context of terrorism, the idea of brokering peace or eliminating threat through negotiation seems absurd. This perhaps, explains why many states have a policy of "no-negotiation" with terrorists.

Blum and Heymann presented some basic arguments in support of no-negotiation policies. [77]The first argument is that negotiating with terrorists sets a bad precedent and encourages future attacks. A second argument is that negotiating with terrorists inadvertently serves to legitimize and afford recognition to terrorist organizations. According to Harmonie Toros,[78] since the idea is to isolate them by delegitimizing them, it would be self-defeating for a state to agree to negotiation, because by doing so, it is implicitly granting legitimacy to terrorists. A third argument is that terrorists, by their very nature, are not trustworthy and therefore make bad negotiating partners. Because trust is a necessary ingredient in negotiations, an inherent risk associated with negotiating with terrorists is the absence of a guarantee that they will honor any agreement reached. Blum and Heymann illustrated this using the United States' failed attempt to secure the release of hostages from Hezbollah through an arms deal with Iran in

1985.[79] The difficulty in negotiating with terrorists is often complicated by the rather decentralized or fractionalized structure of terrorist cells, where there is no guarantee that an agreement brokered with certain representatives would be accepted by all other members or factions.

The fourth argument is that there is always the danger that negotiations could weaken or diminish the ability of states to employ coercion or obtain domestic or international support when necessary. It could make a state infamous among its people or allies and antagonize rather than inspire support. A final consideration is predicated on the idea that states base a great deal of their decisions on morals and values of their societies, so even if their decisions are strategically driven, the justifications are often value-based. Between states and terrorists, there is a "lack of common values or moral perceptions or tradable advantages that must form the basis on which to begin negotiations."[80]

The Nigerian government has generally been open to negotiating with opposing or dissenting groups. For example, the Nigerian government has successfully negotiated with the Nigerian Labor Congress and other professional associations to avert or recall strike actions in the past, and negotiated an amnesty with the Niger Delta militia during the last administration, Nevertheless, many of Blum and Heymann's justifications are legitimate when applied to the Nigerian case. First, by its very nature, the Boko Haram is very volatile and consists of individuals whose ideologies are grounded in the belief that they are fighting a just and religious war and who see their task as an ultimate calling to cleanse an unclean society. In an exclusive interview with the Guardian in January, a Boko Hara spokesman, Abu Qaqa said, "poor people are tired of the injustice, people are crying for saviors and they know the messiahs are Boko Haram."[81] Responding to the President Jonathan's invitation to negotiate, Abu Qaqa said, "we will consider negotiation only when we have brought the government to their knees," and "once we see that things are being done according to the dictates if Allah, and our members are released from prison, we will only put aside our arms – but we will not lay them down. You don't put down your arms in Islam, you only put them aside."[82] The chances of objectively reasoning with such resistant minds successfully are slim. But even where the government decides to pursue this course of action vigorously, there is the overwhelming danger of setting bad precedent. In the Nigerian case, negotiating with the Boko Haram will set a bad precedent on two counts. First, negotiations require compromises. Government compromises could very well mark the beginning of an endless line of concessions. Some in the government, or even the public, may view this as a sign of weakness on the government's part. Second, it could also serve to incentivize other groups to similar illegal action. This risk is great because it places the government in a vulnerable situation that could encourage future attacks not only by terrorist organizations but also any other disenfranchised or embittered groups. Incidents in countries like France, Brazil and Colombia, all

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75 Gabriella Blum, Philip B. Heymann, "Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists: Lessons from the War on Terrorism", The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, (2010) p. xiii.
76 Robert Mnookin, "When Not to Negotiate: A Negotiation Imperialists Reflects on Appropriate Limits", University of Colorado Law Review 74 (2003), 1077, 1080.
77 Blum and Heymann, Supra, 139-147.
78 Harmonie Toros, "'We Don't' Negotiate With Terrorist!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terror Conflicts," Security Dialogue 39 (2008), 407-11.

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79 Blum and Heyman, id., p. 141.
80 Supra, p. 143.
81 Monica Mark, "Boko haram vows to Fight Until Nigeria Establishes Sharia Law", GUARDIAN, Friday Jan 27, 2012.
82 Id.

of which have made concessions to terrorist organizations at some point, support this claim.[83] In Nigeria, the Niger Delta Amnesty Accord made with the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is instructive. The decision by the Yar' Adua Administration to negotiate and grant amnesty to the militants was criticized by some commentators who believed that it would open the door to more attacks. MEND started on a small scale, much like Boko Haram. The group gradually intensified its attacks until national security was so severely jeopardized that the government decided to call for peace. Although the two groups are distinct in the cause they stand for and MEND never degenerated into a terrorist ring, the same modus operandi is at play – a series of aggravated attacks until the government compromises. One cannot help but ask if the compromise the Yar'adua regime made with MEND served to incentivize Boko Haram to intensify its attacks. The stakes are often high and the pay-outs uncertain, especially when the adverse party is a terrorist organization.

3.1.2 Use of State Coercive Powers

An alternative strategy states employ in addressing security threats is coercion. This is a more controversial approach because it necessarily involves the exercise of the president's emergency powers and entails the outright use of force against the enemy. Coercion is more commonly used within the context of the war paradigm. The basic idea behind use of force by states is that certain threats, actual, prospective or imminent, can only be avoided or eliminated by using coercive techniques, which could range from torture and other forms of hybrid interrogation to targeted killings and invasions or occupations. Beyond the constitutional and international law concerns that arise, scholars have heavily questioned the efficacy of coercion in relation to counterterrorism.[84]

The post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan by the United States demonstrated the somewhat lackluster effect of coercion. In an effort to promptly and completely decapitate Al Qaeda, the United States threw itself into a prolonged war that led to more loss of innocent lives and made the U.S. infamous among its allies and the international community. Contrary to the initial expectation, the invasion did not lead to the capture of Osama bin Laden (at least not until ten years later); neither did it end the terrorist ring. [85]Instead, it led to the spread of Al Qaeda cells to other countries and its evolution into a somewhat global terrorist network. It also informed subsequent attacks by other organizations.[86] As Blum and Heymann reflected, "It no longer seems that our danger is concentrated in a single, however loosely, organized group with whom we are in a struggle. Most experts now believe that in addition to the hierarchical, relatively small, and still very dangerous organization of Al Qaeda, there are bands of followers outside the formal structure of Al Qaeda that are motivated by the feelings and beliefs widely

shared among millions…."[87]

Nigeria's attempt to subdue Boko Haram by using force was a costly mistake, not so much because military coercion is often ineffective, but because it is an inferior strategy to combat an enemy that has little or no appreciation for the value of human life. The 2009 crackdown and extrajudicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf proved counterproductive; in fact, it reinforced the resilience of the group. Emmanuel Ojo points out that Yusuf's killing was possibly a tipping point in the radicalization of Boko Haram.[88] The timeline below describes an increasingly aggressive trend in radicalization after Yusuf's assassination. [89]Members of the group interpreted Mohammad Yusuf's death as 'martyrdom.'[90] They went underground and regrouped, gathered support from partners in the Sahel and a year later launched a deadly campaign against not only the Nigerian state, but also the Christian population and Muslims who opposed them.

3.2 Towards Effectively Containing Terrorism and Disabling Terrorists: A Case for 'Switching Gears'

In his article, "The Audacity of the Boko Haram," Freedom Onuoha warned that "if the Boko Haram challenge is entirely ignored or badly managed by the Nigerian government, there is a possibility of further radicalization of the group, which may prove entirely difficult for the Nigerian government to easily suppress in the future."[91] Today, Onuoha's warning seems like a prophecy come true. The Nigerian government has inadvertently facilitated the creation of a dangerous terrorist organization through mismanagement of the threat and use of high-handed and inconsistent measures.

To its credit, the government has employed the usual counterterrorism mechanisms: negotiation, coercion, new legislations, partnerships with counterterrorism networks and organizations, and criminal prosecutions, but these measures are costly. Instances of negotiation by France and Nigeria demonstrate the inadequacy of relying primarily on negotiation; the U.S. experience with coercive mechanisms also demonstrates the cost of departing from domestic and international laws. So, although these mechanisms may be instrumental in containing threats, they are often unreliable in neutralizing or eliminating terrorist threats or securing peace in the long run. What Nigeria has failed to do is learn from the mistakes of other countries that have experienced similar emergencies. Instead, it is relying on the same conventional methods. But perhaps employing unconventional methods is the best chance the government has to effectively address the Boko Haram situation. Writers like Louise Richardson, Gabriella Blum, Philip Heymann, and Lawrence Wright have emphasized this option.

It is pertinent to point out that there is no one clear and defined mechanism for engaging in the 'war' on terror and, despite their inadequacies, the different strategies discussed above are relevant one way or another. However, as reported by the National Counterintelligence Strategy of the U.S., the struggle against jihadist terror will necessarily be a long one, and one that cannot be won by military

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83 In "Negotiating with Terrorists", Richard Hayes cited a study conducted by Defense Systems Inc. which showed that the number of terrorists incidents in France rose significantly after 1973, when the French made substantial concessions to resolve the crisis at the Saudi Embassy in Paris remained on the rise until the government took a firm stance. Richard Hayes, "Negotiating With Terrorists", International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002), 424-425; See also, Blum and Heyman, supra, 139-140.
84 Blum and Heymann, Supra.
85 Examples of Al Qaeda cells that emerged are: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
86 Ref- Madrid 2004, London 2005, Mumbai 2008, and the failed Christmas Day bombing of the Northwest airliner en route to Detroit are examples.

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87 Supra, 162.
88 Emmanuel Ojo, "Boko Haram: Nigeria's Extra-judicial State," Journal of Sustainable Development In Africa 12 (2010:2), 45-62.
89 Appendix II.
90 Freedom C. Onuoha, "The Audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, Analysis and Emerging Trend", Security Journal (2011) 1-18 at 9; See also Amos Jimos, "Nigeria: Boko Haram on a Revenge Mission," Vanguard, April 2; Morgan Lorraine Roach, "Boko Haram," The Heritage Foundation, Mar 12, 2012.
91 Onuoha, Supra, p. 16.

operations alone.[92] This underscores the importance of using the least damaging but more efficacious measure advanced by Richardson and others. In similar light, this paper makes a case for switching gears from the conventional methods usually applied, to psychological warfare that is calculated towards neutralizing radical extremism from the source – the ideology.

3.3 A Psychological Warfare of Hearts and Minds

Richardson argues for the use of psychological warfare as a means of countering terrorism. According to her, terrorists are invariably weaker than their opponents, so they try to compensate for this weakness by achieving dramatic effects.[93] In the same vein, Onuoha argued that a "crucial feature of terrorism is that the premeditated use of violence is designed to have a psychological impact that far outweighs the actual physical damage caused by any attack."[94] It is important to fully appreciate the context within which a threat emerges--that is, whether the threat is from the inside (as in the Nigerian case) or the outside (as in the case of Al Qaeda's attack on U.S. soil). The context should inform whatever tools or strategies are employed. In Nigeria, the pre-existing socio-economic problems, as well as historic religious intolerance, are local factors that cannot be ignored. Being an inside threat (albeit with demonstrated external links), the case for engaging in psychological warfare instead of coercion is even more compelling because in the latter, there is the risk of applying techniques that will either hurt more innocent people, aggravate religious tensions, or further alienate people. Nigeria's primary interest lies not only in quelling the present threat and attacks, but also in securing lasting peace with and among its people. This goal is by no means an easy feat,[95] but it still represents the wiser course of action.

There are two ways Nigeria can engage in this type of warfare. The first is by reducing moral support for the Boko Haram, and the second is by attacking the ideology of the Boko Haram itself. Terrorist organizations thrive on the loyalty and support they enjoy from the portion of the population that subscribes to their ideologies or agrees with the cause they champion. This assertion is demonstrated by Qaqa's comment during the interview with the Guardian. He said, "people are singing songs in Kano and Kaduna saying: 'We want Boko Haram.' If the masses don't like us, they would have exposed us by now." [96]Blum and Heymann emphasized the "need for an effective campaign for hearts and minds, one that seeks to reduce the moral support for terrorism among large populations."[97] They argued that a campaign to reduce moral support for terrorism would make it difficult for terrorist groups to recruit, gain financing, and carry out operations.[98] In order to achieve this, Nigeria needs to separate the terrorists from their communities and engage others in countering the threat.[99] One of the dangers of contemporary counterterrorism efforts is the fact that it is carried out as a war against Islam and Muslims.

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92 Director of National Intelligence (DNI), "National Counterintelligence Strategy of the United States of America, 2007," p. 9.
93 Richardson at p. 183.
94 Onuoha at p. 15.
95 Writing in relation to the Middle East counterterrorism efforts of the US, Palmer and Palmer said "the task of containing religious extremism pales in comparison to the challenge of building a new Middle East of peace, prosperity and democracy allied with the United States and supportive of Israel." p. 264.
96 The Guardian, supra.
97 Blum and Heymann, Supra, 134.
98 Id., 164.
99 Richardson, 260-277.

This is arguably due to the fact that Muslim extremists have carried out the major terrorist acts in recent years. But in the process, states have inadvertently alienated the very communities that could help in the fight against terrorism. Richardson counselled that working with Muslim communities would help in intelligence-gathering and countering the extremist ideologies propagated by terrorists. It will also limit the ability of the cells to recruit new members. This option is not airtight and has to be carried out with extreme vigilance because of the risk that loyalists to the organization might compromise such efforts.

The time is right for Nigeria to make a strong move against the Boko Haram. When the Boko Haram began its attacks in 2003, most of its targets were government institutions and officials. However, the violent and inhuman attacks that it has carried out since its proliferation in 2009 under the leadership of Shekau have made the group infamous. Within the Muslim community, the assassinations of some religious leaders and the constant targeting of the Christian population have angered many Muslims. In an interview, the Chief Imam of Edo State, Mallam Abdul-Fatai Enabulele, said, "the Boko Haram sect negates all that Islam stands for."[100] Even within the group, Shekau's violence has not been well-received. Some members of the group who are more supportive of Yusuf's anti-government methods broke away to form the Yusufiyya Islamic Movement (YIM).[101] The YIM has not renounced violence altogether, but disagrees with the much more radical and violent direction Shekau has steered the group since Yusuf's death. In particular, it was Shekau's emphasis on jihad that led to the split of the Boko Haram. This loss of internal cohesion could be leveraged to lead to the group's collapse or at least facilitate an infiltration that will lead to the incapacitation of the group. As rightly observed by Blum and Heymann, there is much evidence that terrorist movements have end and terrorist groups dissolve when they lose the backing of a sizeable sympathetic population.[102]

The second strategy involves attacking terrorist ideologies. The first part of this paper highlighted the fact that the major driver of terrorism is 'ideology'. Ideology, when strategically aligned to or interpreted in the light of imperfect practical situations, creates a combustible flame that turns an erstwhile-dissatisfied individual into a willing suicide bomber.

The ability of terrorist leaders to interpret religious dogma in self-serving ways, coupled with the reality of a government's apparent weaknesses, builds revulsion in the minds of individuals that make them susceptible to terrorist manipulations. It becomes easier for them to trod the path of 'justice' as defined by a terrorist rather than that of a state that has failed them. Under this model, states can engage in a war of ideas and in effect try to inoculate the broader community against the appeal of extremism. [103]It may be true, as submitted by Cronin, that terrorism is "intended to be a matter of perception and is thus seen differently by different observers," more like the old-time, "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Thus, there would always be people who support terrorist activities or who believe in the cause pursued by terrorists. However, it is also true that these ideologies can be countered. The fact that there are Muslims who oppose terrorist activities invariably means that the ideologies that drive terrorism are subjective, capable of different interpretations, thus capable of being discredited, more so using

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100 James Azania, "Boko Haram Not Defending Islam," The Punch, Aug 14, 2012.
101 Jamestown Foundation, "Can Nigeria Exploit the Split in the Boko Haram Movement?" Terrorism Monitor Vol 9, Issue 6, Sep 22, 2011.
102 Blum and Heymann, at p. 165.
103 Richardson, 262.

moderate Muslims as recommended by the United States' 2009 Country Report on Terrorism. According the Report, "Muslims have more credibility in addressing issues in their own communities. They are the ones best placed to convey effective counter-narratives capable of discrediting violent extremism in a way that makes sense to their local community, and only they have the credibility to counter the religious claims made by violent extremists."[104]

In the case of the Boko Haram, the Nigerian state has an additional counter-narrative. Because the factors that facilitated the rise of the Boko Haram are not strictly religious but are also rooted in deep socio-economic problems, Nigeria could use this same narrative to deflate support for the group. Boko Haram gained support largely by emphasizing the country's socio-economic problems and the government's ineptitude at meeting the basic needs of the people. Its target members consisted of socially alienated or economically challenged individuals who had lost all hope in the government. Jean Herskovits summarized the situation succinctly: "ten years of supposed democracy have yielded mounting poverty and deprivation of every kind in Nigeria. Young people, under-educated by a collapsed educational system, may 'graduate', but only into joblessness. Lives decline, frustration grows and angry young men are too easily persuaded to pick up readily accessible guns in protest when something sparks their rage."[105] Disapproval of the government has been shown to foster terrorist overtures. In their article "Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection," Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malecckova described how a 20-per cent increase in the disapproval rate of leaders of nine western countries was correlated with an 80 per cent increase in the number of terrorist attacks experienced by those countries.[106] Given such state of affairs, it was easy to lure prospective terrorists with grand promises of the afterlife and/or a regime change that will be more responsive to their needs.

It is unrealistic to expect that Nigeria would experience a socio-economic revival that would appease the dissatisfied faction of the society and make them less susceptible to terrorist advances, at least not with the urgency that quelling the Boko Haram threat demands; but the group has failed to present the people with any tangible evidence that it can meet their needs either. The economics argument made by Lawrence Iannaccone is illustrative here.[107] Essentially, both parties are 'selling' products to the people and the product that looks more attractive is the product the people will go for. Although the government is not exactly popular among the people, depicting the emptiness of Boko Haram's product can tilt back the balance in its favor. For instance, looking at the structure of the organization and its membership, it is clearly not a body that can take on leadership responsibilities of a country, even if the country were to be Islamized. It lacks the necessary skills and competence. And so the counter-narrative is that its supporters or sympathizers still have no guarantee of a better life.

Another way of effectively neutralizing the ideology of the Boko Haram is by emphasizing the contradictions or inconsistencies between its teachings and practices. The basic ideology of the group is that western education and culture are unclean and contrary to the dictates of Allah. The International

Crisis Group pointed out that Yusuf constantly railed against what he saw as the corrupting influences of "Godless" system of education introduced during colonial rule. However, this apparent rejection of western education and associated technology sits uneasily with the organization's ready use of the internet to disseminate its ideas." When challenged about this contradiction, Yusuf was unable to provide a clear or convincing answer.[108] Similarly, in an interview conducted during his detention, Yusuf was queried by one of the police officers why he was dressed in western pants and wearing western timepiece when he claims it is ungodly. The only answer he could give was "it is different."[109]

Conclusion

History has repeatedly revealed that it is fatal to underestimate a terrorist threat or the ability of terrorist organizations to expand and infiltrate even the least suspecting communities.

It is naïve to think that terrorism can be totally eliminated but what states can hope for is that their counterterrorism efforts can effectively contain the threat or neutralize it to the bare minimum. Several writers have advanced different means of achieving this objective. Some support the use of coercion, including outright occupations or targeted killings of high profile leaders of terrorist organizations. Others have expressed preference for negotiation or other non-forceful measures, like a stricter financial regulatory regime to monitor transfer of funds and frustrate terrorist funding, and training for security and intelligence units. In addition, some states have created international security and intelligence partnerships to monitor and coordinate counterterrorism efforts. All of these strategies are relevant, albeit in varying degrees, in the fight against terrorism. Nigeria must utilize such methods in order to regain the stability of the country and contain the Boko Haram threat. It also goes without saying that the country must improve upon its delivery of public goods in order to regain the loyalty of the people. But to secure long-term peace and stability, Nigeria must effectively cripple the ideology of the Boko Haram as well as its demagogues.

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104 United States Department of State Publication, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. August 2010, at 229.
105 See David Goggins, "Who are the Boko Haram,", The Researcher, vol. 4, Issue 3, Oct 2009.
106 Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malecckova, "Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection," Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2004:4), 119-144
107 Lawrence R. Iannaccone, "Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad and the Deadly."

108 Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict," International Crisis Working Group, Africa Report 168, Dec 20, 2010, p. 37.
109 "Boko Haram Leader Mohammed Yusuf Interrogation before his Execution by Nigerian Security", available on YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePpUvfTXY7w

Appendix I: MAPS

A. Map of Nigeria Showing the 36 States and bordering countries

B. Map of Nigeria highlighting the 12 Northern States under Sharia Law

C. Map of the Sokoto Caliphate where the Islam and Sharia Law were first introduced under Usman Dan Fodio

D. Map of the Northern Nigeria in the 18th Century showing the Hausa States

APPENDIX II

TIMELINE OF BOKO HARAM ATTACKS RELATED VIOLENCE

2002 – January 2012

June 10, 2012: Bombing of a church in Jos during service. About 7 killed and 50 wounded.

June 3, 2012: 15 churchgoers were killed and several injured in a church bombing in Bauchi state. Boku Haram claimed responsibility through spokesperson Abu Qaqa

March 8, 2012: During a British hostage rescue attempt to free Italian engineer Franco Lamolinara and Briton Christopher McManus, abducted in 2011 by a splinter group Boko Haram, both hostages were killed.

February 16, 2012: Another prison break staged in central Nigeria; 119 prisoners are released, one warder killed

February 8, 2012: Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at the army headquarters in Kaduna

January 20, 2012: Bombings of five government buildings in Kano State that killed 185 people, 150 of whom were civilians and at least 32 police officers, including 3 members of the secret police.

18 Jan 2012: A key suspect in the 2011 Christmas Day bombing in Abuja, which killed more than 40 people, escapes police custody.

17 Jan 2012: Two soldiers and four BH gunmen are killed in an attack on a military checkpoint in Maiduguri, Borno State. Soldiers arrest six high-profile BH members in a raid on a sect hideout in the city.

13 Jan 2012: BH kills four and injures two others, including a policeman, in two separate attacks on pubs in Yola (Adawama State) and Gombe city in neighbouring Gombe State.

11 Jan 2012: Four Christians killed by BH gunmen in Potiskum, Yobe State, when gunmen open fire on their car as they stop for fuel. The victims had been fleeing Maiduguri to their home town in eastern Nigeria.

10 Jan 2012: A BH attack on a beer garden kills eight, including five policemen and a teenage girl, in Damaturu, capital of Yobe State.

9 Jan 2012: BH gunmen shoot dead a secret police operative along with his civilian friend as they leave a mosque in Biu, Borno State, 200km south of the state capital, Maiduguri. The president says BH has infiltrated the executive, parliamentary and judicial wings of government.

7 Jan 2012: Three Christian poker players are killed and seven others wounded by BH gunmen in the town of Biu.

6 Jan 2012: Eight worshippers are killed in a shooting attack on a church in Yola. BH gunmen shoot dead 17 Christian mourners in the town of Mubi in the northeastern state of Adamawa. The victims are friends and relations of one of five people killed in a BH attack on a hotel the previous day.

5 Jan 2012: Six worshippers are killed and 10 others wounded when BH gunmen attack a church in Gombe city.

3 Jan 2012: BH gunmen attack a police station in the town of Birniwa in Jigawa State killing a teenage girl and wounding a police officer.

1 Jan 2012: President Goodluck Jonathan imposes a state of emergency on 15 local government areas hardest-hit by BH attacks, in Borno, Yobe and Plateau states. He orders the closure of Nigerian borders in the north.

30 Dec 2011: Four Muslim worshippers are killed in a BH bomb and shooting attack targeting a military checkpoint in Maiduguri as worshippers leave a mosque after attending Friday prayers.

28 Dec 2011: A bombing and shooting attack by BH on a beer parlour in the town of Mubi, Adamawa State, wounds 15.

25 Dec 2011: A Christmas Day BH bomb attack on Saint Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla town near Abuja kills 42 worshippers. Three secret police (SSS) operatives and a BH bomber are killed in a suicide attack when the bomber rams his bomb-laden car into a military convoy at the gates of SSS headquarters in Damaturu. A policeman is killed in a botched BH bomb attack on a church in the Ray Field area of Jos, capital of Plateau State.

22 Dec 2011: BH bombs in parts of Maiduguri kill 20. Four policemen and a civilian are killed in gun and bomb attacks on a police building in Potiskum, Yobe State. Around 100 are killed following multiple bomb and shooting attacks by BH gunmen and ensuing gun battles with troops in the Pompomari outskirts of Damaturu.

19 Dec 2011: One suspected BH member dies and two others wounded in an accidental explosion while assembling a home-made bomb in a hideout in Damaturu.

17 Dec 2011: A shootout between sect members and policemen following a raid on the hideout of a BH sect leader in the Darmanawa area of Kano State kills seven, including three police officers. Police arrest 14 BH suspects and seize large amount of arms and bombs. Three BH members die in an accidental explosion while assembling home-made bombs in a hideout on the outskirts of Maiduguri.

13 Dec 2011: A bomb attack on a military checkpoint by BH and resulting shooting by soldiers in Maiduguri leaves 10 dead and 30 injured.

7 Dec 2011: An explosion linked to BH kills eight in the Oriyapata district of Kaduna city.

4 Dec 2011: A soldier, a policeman and a civilian are killed in bomb and gun attacks on police buildings and two banks in Azare, Bauchi State. BH open fire at a wedding in Maiduguri, killing the groom and a guest.

27 Nov 2011: A Borno State protocol officer in the office of the governor is shot dead by motorcycle-riding sect members while driving home.

26 Nov 2011: Three policemen and a civilian are wounded in BH bomb and shooting attacks in Geidam, Yobe State. Six churches, a police station, a beer parlour, a shopping complex, a high court, a local council building and 11 cars are burnt in the attacks.

9 Nov 2011: BH members bomb a police station and the office of Nigeria's road safety agency in Maina village, Borno State. No one is hurt.

4 Nov 2011: The motorcade of Borno State governor Kashim Shettima comes under BH bomb attack in Maiduguri on its way from the airport to the governor's residence as he returns from a trip to Abuja. Around 150 are killed in coordinated BH bombing and shooting attacks on police facilities in Damaturu and Potiskum in Yobe State. Two BH suicide-bombers blow themselves up outside the military Joint Task Force headquarters in Maiduguri in a botched suicide attack.

2 Nov 2011: A soldier on duty is shot dead by sect members outside Maiduguri's main market.

November 2011: BH says it will not dialogue with the government until all of its members who have been arrested are released.

29 Oct 2011: BH gunmen shoot dead Muslim cleric Sheikh Ali Jana'a outside his home in the Bulabulin Ngarnam neighbourhood of Maiduguri. Jana'a is known to have provided information to security forces regarding the sect.

25 Oct 2011: A policeman is shot dead in his house in a targeted attack by BH gunmen in Damaturu.

23 Oct 2011: Sect members open fire on a market in the town of Katari in Kaduna State, killing two.

23 Oct 2011: BH members kill a policeman and a bank security guard in bombing and shooting attacks on a police station and two banks in Saminaka, Kaduna State.

3 October 2011: Three killed in BH attacks on Baga market in Maiduguri, Borno State. The victims included a tea-seller, a drug store owner and a passer-by.

1 October 2011: A butcher and his assistant are killed by BH gunmen at Baga market in Maiduguri in a targeted killing. In a separate incident, three people are killed in a shoot-out following BH bomb and shooting attacks on a military patrol vehicle delivering food to soldiers at a checkpoint in Maiduguri. All three victims are civilians.

17 September 2011: Babakura Fugu, brother-in-law to slain BH leader Mohammed Yusuf, is shot dead outside his house in Maiduguri two days after attending a peace meeting with Nigeria's ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo in the city. BH denies any involvement in the incident.

13 September 2011: Four soldiers shot and wounded in an ambush by BH members in Maiduguri shortly after the arrest of 15 sect members in military raids on BH hideouts in the city.

12 September 2011: Seven men, including four policemen, are killed by BH gunmen in bomb and shooting attacks on a police station and a bank in Misau, Bauchi State. The attackers rob the bank.

4 September 2011: Muslim cleric Malam Dala shot dead by two BH members outside his home in the Zinnari area of Maiduguri.

1 September 2011: A shootout between BH gunmen and soldiers in Song, Adamawa State, kills one sect members while another is injured and captured.

26 August 2011: BH claims responsibility for a suicide bomb blast on the UN compound in Abuja, killing 23 people.

25 August 2011: Gun and bomb attacks by BH on two police stations and two banks in Gombi, Adamawa State, kill at least 16 people, including seven policemen.

3 August 2011: The government rejects negotiations with BH.

July 2011: Government says it will open a negotiation panel to initiate negotiations with BH.

27 June 2011: BH's gun and bomb attack on a beer garden in Maiduguri leaves at least 25 dead and dozens injured.

20 June 2011: Seven people including five policemen killed in gun and bomb attacks on a police station and a bank in Kankara, Katsina State.

16 June 2011: BH targets national police headquarters in Abuja, killing two.

7 June 2011: Attacks on a church and two police posts in Maiduguri, blamed on the sect, leave at least 14 dead.

6 June 2011: Muslim cleric Ibrahim Birkuti, critical of BH, shot dead by two motorcycle-riding BH gunmen outside his house in Biu, 200km from Maiduguri.

29 May 2011: Three bombs rip through a beer garden in a military barracks in the northern city of Bauchi, killing 13 and wounding 33. BH claims responsibility.

27 May 2011: A group of around 70 suspected BH gunmen kill eight people including four policemen in

simultaneous gun and bomb attacks on a police station, a police barracks and a bank in Damboa, Borno State, near the border with Chad.

29 December 2010: Suspected BH gunmen shoot dead eight people in Maiduguri, including the governorship candidate of the ruling All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) in Borno State.

24 and 27 December 2010: A series of attacks claimed by BH in the central city of Jos and Maiduguri kill at least 86.

7 September 2010: A group of BH gunmen free over 700 inmates including around 100 sect members from a prison in Bauchi. Four people including a soldier, one policeman and two residents were killed in the raid.

26 July 2009: BH launches a short-lived uprising in parts of the north, which is quelled by a military crackdown that leaves more than 800 dead - mostly sect members, including BH leader Mohammed Yusuf. A mosque in the capital of Borno State (Maiduguri) that served as a sect headquarters is burnt down.

11-12 June 2009: BH leader Mohammed Yusuf threatens reprisals in a video recording to the president following the killing of 17 BH members in a joint military and police operation in Borno State. This was after a disagreement over BH members' alleged refusal to use crash helmets while in a funeral procession to bury members who had died in a car accident.

2005-2008: BH concentrated on recruiting new members and shoring up its resources. As evidence of their growing popularity, Borno State governor Ali Modu Sheriff appoints an influential BH member, Buju Foi, as his commissioner of religious affairs in 2007.

10 October 2004: Gunmen from a BH splinter group attack a convoy of 60 policemen in an ambush near the town of Kala-Balge on the border with Chad. The militants took 12 policemen hostage and police authorities presumed they were killed by the gunmen because all attempts to trace them failed.

23 September 2004: A BH splinter group launches a militia attack on police stations in the towns of Gwoza and Bama in Borno State, killing four policemen and two civilians. They took to the Mandara mountains along the Nigeria-Cameroon border. Soldiers and two gunships were deployed in the mountains and after two days of battle 27 sect members were killed while the rest slipped away. Five BH members who crossed into Cameroon were arrested by Cameroonian gendarmes who had been alerted by Nigerian authorities. The five were deported and handed over to Nigerian authorities.

7 January 2004: Seven members of BH killed and three others arrested by a team of local vigilantes outside the town of Damboa, Borno State, near border with Chad. Bags containing AK-47 rifles were recovered from sect members.

June 2004: Four members of BH were killed by prison guards in a foiled jail break in Yobe State capital Damaturu.

23-31 December 2003: A group of about 200 members of a BH splinter group launched attacks on police stations in the towns of Kanamma and Geidam in Yobe State from their enclave outside Kanamma on the Nigerian border with Niger. The militants killed several policemen and requisitioned police weapons and vehicles. Following the deployment of military troops to contain the insurrection, 18 militants were killed, and a number arrested.

2002: Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Haram in 2002, establishing a mosque called Markaz as the headquarters of his movement, following his expulsion from two mosques in Maiduguri by Muslim clerics for propagating his radical views.

Source: IRIN, DAKAR, 20 January 2012; Media Reports

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