

# JOURNAL OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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
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# THE JOURNAL OF & INTERNATIONAL POLITICS & AFFAIRS

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# WORLD BANK LENDING AND ITS EFFECT ON DEVELOPMENT: IS THERE A DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT REGIONALLY?

BRIANA FINKELSTEIN

*Since the Soviet Union fell in 1991, the individual countries that had been within the USSR have needed to create their own economic and political policymaking institutions that may have affected their development. Does World Bank lending have different impacts in this region as compared to other regions? I examine this question using a fixed effects analysis and health, education, and economic indicators. Through a cross-country panel analysis, I find evidence that, indeed World Bank loans had different effects on development over this period. Overall, it included relatively higher effects in income but worsened human development outcomes in health and education. Through the examination of corruption as a possible mechanism, it cannot be proven that corruption has or does not have a direct impact on development in this instance, as there is not enough power to examine this mechanism. Furthermore, I conclude that the relatively higher effect in income and worsening human development outcomes can be attributed to the institutional legacy, re-allocation of resources and funds, and a greater focus on infrastructure and private industry rather than social sector spending.*

## **Introduction**

This thesis examines the effect of World Bank lending on developmental outcomes. More specifically, it examines whether World Bank lending exerts a different effect on developmental outcomes in former Soviet Union countries, as compared to non-Soviet Union countries. In order to adequately assess development within a country, the paper looks at outcomes related to health, education, and income per capita through a fixed effect cross-country panel analysis.

I will also examine the role that corruption and political instability have in relation to development and lending. The effectiveness of World Bank lending has been a controversial issue for many years, as seen through previous literature on this topic. However, this paper hopes to examine specific developmental outcomes in former Soviet Union countries in comparison to the rest of the world and determine if the lending has a unique effect in these fifteen countries. Moreover, it is important to consider these countries as they are all relatively young in their policymaking ability.

The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: In the next section, I provide a literature review. After the review I describe the background information and theoretical mechanisms for the analysis. I follow up by explaining the data used in the analysis, followed by the empirical strategy. I



then describe the main findings and ultimately, the final section concludes the entirety of the thesis. The appendix provides additional charts and graphs to help understand the data more thoroughly.

### **Literature Review**

In order to adequately understand the relationship between lending and development within countries from the former Soviet Union, the literature regarding the Soviet Union's political atmosphere is crucial as well as the literature regarding aid/lending and development. Both of these types of literature help to explain the causal pathways as well as the importance of studying this proposed relationship. Moreover, the literature regarding post-communist countries explains the unique political atmosphere, thus illustrating why a different effect might be present as well as why it is important to study this relationship within these countries.

#### *Communist Legacies and Political Framework (Post-Communist Politics)*

The paper "Communist Legacies and Political Values and Behavior: A Theoretical Framework with an Application to Political Party Trust" by Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker provides insight into communism's effects. This paper proposes a theoretical framework by which to examine what differentiates political values and behavior in ex-communist countries from other countries. They distinguish between the effects of communist legacies at the individual and institutional level. Pop-Eleches and Tucker provide a theoretical framework comprised of distinctions between political attitudes political behavior. For the purpose of this thesis, the most relevant portion of their research is examination at the institutional level, as this lends itself to propose why lending would affect former communist countries differently than others. The specification between distinctly linked institutions to communism, including communist political parties and economic policies, such as diverse supply chains, illustrates that the political environment present in post-communism countries differs. It emphasizes that the distinct institutions, which were rooted in communism, shape the states' behavior.

This paper proposes six causal pathways by which the "past" in post-communist countries could influence political values and behavior. For the purpose of this thesis, the most important causal pathways are: 1) the existence of informal communist institutions that continue to exist in the post-communist era and exert an influence on political values or behavior, 2) the existence of formal institutions, and 3) a changed socio-demographic landscape from years of communist rule. Pop-Eleches and Tucker utilize an inter-regional comparison to measure distinct post-communist characteristics and explain the distinction with the legacy pathways. Their main independent variable is an interactive variable, examining living in a post-communist country and the variable in question. Their proposed research design examines trust in political parties within post-communist countries using the previously mentioned causal pathways and statistical analysis. One important theoretical mechanism that can be applied to this thesis is the use of "the tolerance deficit." It argues that ethnic conflict in this region, though "some conflict was arguable the inevitable fallout of the dissolution of the region's multi-ethnic states", had a possibility that part of the conflict could be a product of a "peculiarly communist legacy of intolerance".

In addition to the inter-regional comparison and use of an interactive variable as the main independent variable, Pop-Eleches and Tucker utilize a difference-in-difference approach. They hypothesize that the longer a person lived under communist rule, the more they should be affected by

this legacy and thus the greater their distrust of political parties. They aim to distinguish whether post-communist political parties differ systematically from their counterparts in non-communist countries by controlling for governing system type and electoral rules. They also gage post-communist legacies on institutional performance through the observable outcomes of economic performance. They account for the fact that the transition countries “almost all experienced a combination of deep recessions, high inflation, and rising unemployment during the 1990s, related to the distorted economies inherited from communism.”

Moreover, their evidence provides legacy analyses that suggest distinctive differences in post-communist countries and the effect of these institutions on the political environment. Model 7 of their analysis suggests “the post-communist trust deficit is driven in part by the gap between democratic freedoms and institutional performance among the region’s democratic front-runners”. Their article ultimately “identified a set of mechanisms through which the communist past can shape political attitudes and actions of citizens of the former Soviet bloc” through examining the link between communist legacies and the trust deficit of post-communist citizens in political parties. This thesis, examining World Bank lending and developmental outcomes in former Soviet Union countries, hopes to apply Pop-Eleches and Tucker’s broad theoretical framework to examine the interaction between lending and development.

#### Effects of Aid and Lending on Development

While there is not that much literature on the historical precedence regarding the political environment in post-communist countries, it helps explain the causal pathways proposed in this paper. There is, however, a substantial amount of literature regarding the effects of aid and lending on countries. The paper “Counting Chickens when they hatch: timing and the effects of aid on growth” by Michael A. Clemens, Steven Radelet, Rikhil R. Bhavnani and Samuel Bazzi examines the cross-country relationship of aid on economic growth. They alter the research designs of the three most influential papers in the aid and growth literature to reexamine the topic in a new way. They add a time lag in order to assess the previous studies’ observations and notice markedly different results. Moreover, they deal with the specifications regarding the effect of aid on growth as the results from previous studies suggest certain requirements for aid to have an affect. Namely, aid only affects growth in countries that have: 1) low inflation, 2) do not run large budget deficits, and 3) are open to trade. This paper uses short-period panel data, which allows country fixed effects to be differenced away thus allowing for the time lag. Moreover, the paper does not include the aid whose growth effect will arrive much farther into the future, or ultimately never.

This thesis uses a similar research design as it examines short-period panel data, allowing for country-fixed effects to be differenced away. It differs in that it looks at lending at both lending and aid, while lending often times has contingencies attached to it, such as repayment of debt. Additionally, it will be looking for specific relationships and differences between former Soviet Union countries and other countries. This thesis does not use an instrumental variable, as also stated in Clements et al, since instrumental variables pose problems due to possible causal links.

Another instrumental paper when considering the relationship between lending and development in former Soviet Union countries is “Public Goods or Political Pandering: Evidence from IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe” by Grigore Pop-Eleches. This paper discusses to what extent the lending practices of international organizations (IOs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) deviate from the principle of technocratic impartiality. The key independent variables of Pop-Eleches’s

paper capture indicators of economic and/or political factors that might affect preferential treatment by the IMF. Moreover, he studies the use of aid in order to determine how preferential treatment occurs.

In order to examine this, the paper evaluates four relevant IMF program dimensions as outcome variables: 1) program initiation, 2) loan size, 3) program waivers, and 4) program compliance evaluation. His main focus is on the two aspects of lending that is much more up to the discretion of the IMF: the amount of funding and the incidence of program vouchers. These two aspects offered a more direct approach for evaluating preferential treatment. The main explanatory variables are economic and political importance, combined with crisis intensity. The focal point of the paper was on three distinct regions in order to evaluate across regions rather than only across countries. Ultimately, the results confirmed that IMF lending during the Latin American debt crisis and communist transition were affected by systematically driven deviations from technocratic impartiality. Moreover, this analysis is important in understanding that unique situations can affect lending.

The final important paper examined is “The Political Economy of Lending in Africa” by Randall W. Stone. The paper does a cross-sectional analysis of 53 African countries on a monthly basis from 1990 to 2000 to determine why IMF lending has achieved poor results in Africa. It questions whether the main issue is wrong conditionality attached to the loans or a failure of enforcing the conditions attached to the loans. The results indicate that loans-for-reform lack credibility as there is less rigorous enforcement due to the involvement of international bodies. Additionally, in order for the IMF to perform properly with enforcement, the IMF needs to become more independent. Furthermore, the paper establishes that countries with close ties to the US or France have their programs interrupted more frequently and thus since they are undeterred by short punishments they are free to flaunt the IMF’s conditions. Since African countries generally rate so poorly on the scale of international influence, if IMF lending is politicized in Africa, the exceptional cases on other countries are not as striking as previously thought. Moreover, the paper discusses the relevance of politicization of lending and how international influence can affect it.

The aforementioned papers discuss relevant theories and research designs that have been very influential and beneficial when considering this thesis regarding World Bank lending and development in former Soviet Union countries. This thesis examines lending and development through the channels proposed in these past literature, examining corruption and political stability in order to assess whether lending and developmental outcomes are unique in former Soviet Union countries, or simply in corrupt countries. Moreover in order to account for the possible effects in former Soviet Union countries relative to African countries with poor institutional environments, the thesis will examine the regions individually to see if there is a different effect. Moreover, lending and development have been examined through different lenses; however, not strictly in the context that this thesis plans to tackle it.

## **Background**

World Bank lending comprises different types of loans. These loans can be classified into several categories. A complete list and categorization of these lending groups by country can be found in Table 1 in the Appendix. The data available for world loans is available for 209 economies from the year 1970 onwards. The lending rates differ depending on risk of the country being able to repay their debt. For instance, a country that possesses a riskier environment and a lower likelihood of being able to repay their debt will have a higher interest rate. This indicates that a country with a higher interest rate will end up

paying more back as time progresses.

The main purpose of the Bank's operations is to lend to developing member countries for productive projects in sectors such as agriculture, energy, industry, and transportation and to help improve basic services considered essential for development. Moreover, each loan allocated by the World Bank goes towards a specific project. The IDA snapshot every year provides information on loans regarding: type, status, interest rate, currency information,<sup>1</sup> disbursement amounts, repaid amounts and the project name of the specified loan.

When examining the IDA snapshot, it provides information on the allocation of the specific loans from the World Bank. Based on information provided by the World Bank, the projects that the former Soviet countries are undertaking and borrowing for tend to be for infrastructure and to increase the private industry. For instance, for Kazakhstan, of the 38 projects the IDA lists that loans are being allocated towards, only two of these projects are in the health sector, while at least eight of the projects are in infrastructure, and a few are in privatization and specific industries like agriculture.

When examining Armenia there are similar results to the allocation of loans as such in Kazakhstan.<sup>2</sup> Hence, there is a greater focus on infrastructure, state building and private industries at present times. When considering other non-former Soviet countries, for example Bolivia, which is also considered a lower middle-income country like Armenia, Bolivia possesses a project specifically geared towards education and other projects towards social development. Even when considering Lithuania, which is considered a high-income former Soviet country, there still tends to be a focus on infrastructure and energy improvements, with only one loan being allocated towards Education as opposed to Australia, which has a number of loans being geared towards "General Development."

Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, none of the countries, except for Russia, possessed an independent policymaking institution. This has ultimately created the domestic situation where each former Soviet Union country can be considered new democracies or new states in that their individual policymaking institutions are new. In 1991, these countries gained their independence and have since been formulating their own economic policies regarding development and growth. Moreover, the drastic shifts from almost no interaction with non-former Soviet Union nations to an opening up of trade and markets also could have contributed to the shifts from communism to free market systems, therefore potentially impacting the relationship between former Soviet Union countries and other international organizations. The political climate during the Cold War also potentially has created tensions between former Soviet Union countries and other nations.

### **Theoretical Mechanism**

This thesis posits that World Bank lending will have a less positive effect on development in former Soviet Union countries. I posit this effect based on several theories and the idea that institutional legacies differentiate the former Soviet Union countries from other nations.

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<sup>1</sup>Such as currency of commitment and exchange adjustment

<sup>2</sup>The project names are as follows: Institution Building, AM, Access to Finance for SME, Lifeline Roads Improvement Project, Irrigation Rehabilitation Emergency, SIF 3, SOC PROT ADMIN, PSMP II, Lifeline Roads Improvement Project (another loan towards the same project), E-society & Innovation DPO 2, HLTH SYS MOD (APL2), Electricity Supply Reliability, Irrigation Rehabilitation, and Emergency

Specifically with regard to the unique attributes that cause less development in former Soviet Union countries, the institutional legacies may create a political atmosphere, through corruption and lack of experience, that prevent the same amount of growth as non-former Soviet Union countries. In addition, these countries have less experience because during Soviet times other countries besides Russia were unable to set their own economic strategies and policies. These countries therefore are considered new democracies and the potential for less development from lending can occur due to less experience. Since former communist countries had argued that a totally government-controlled and planned economy would enjoy more rapid economic growth than a capitalist economy. Their case was primarily based on the idea that a planned economy would maintain a steadier and higher rate of investment, free of the periodic slowdowns of investment caused by sporadic financial crises in the capitalist business cycle. As such they tended to focus their development and resources on building up infrastructure and physical capital. Yet, economists favor a free market system where the total amount of investment is in both non-human and human capital, since they are both important in rapid economic growth. This could have created the informal institution of focusing resources and funds towards infrastructural development rather than human capital.

Moreover, in the case of former communist countries the immediate shifting of economic, political, and social policies caused an upheaval within the citizens' lives. This formal and informal institutional change ultimately changed the status quo conditions that had previously sustained their institutions. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky's paper "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda" proposes a theory regarding development and informal institution states. It states, "development in the external environment may change the distribution of power and resources within a community, weakening those actors who benefit from a particular informal institution and strengthening those who seek to change it" (Helmke and Levitsky, 2003). Hence, such a large development and shift for these former Soviet Union countries creates the political environment where development may take longer. Moreover, the corruption of countries also affects the level of spending and allocation of funds towards development. Public spending is less efficient in countries with high levels of corruption: corrupt public agents tend to favor investment project, which generate highest bribes and not necessarily the most efficient outcomes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Hence, corruption can severely limit social outcomes and the expenditure as a share of GDP. It can have a negative impact on the part of human capital investment (Ehrlich and Lui, 1999) and on education (Mauro, 1997). Hence, the relationship between expenditure spending as an outcome and loans can be expected to be negative in regards to human capital and education in more corrupt countries. Specifically in regards to former Soviet countries, this effect would be greater due to the countries' post-communist institutions and distinct economic institutions directly linked to economic practices under communism (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2011).

Furthermore, this paper's specific hypotheses in regards to the relationship between lending and development are as follows.

**H1:** As World Bank lending increases, I expect developmental outcomes, such as GDP per capita and a consumption proxy, to increase less positively than in non-former Soviet Union countries due to the unique political, economic, and informal institutions present in former Soviet Union countries from their historical legacy. The distribution of resources may be skewed so even though social sectors are worsening,

overall there are more positive effects on growth.

**H2:** As World Bank lending increases, I expect Education and Health spending to decrease more negatively in former Soviet Union countries due to the effects of corruption on public spending.

**H3:** As World Bank lending increases, I expect services in the social sectors, such as number of hospital beds and secondary school to decrease less positively in former Soviet Union countries than other countries due to the misallocation of resources and funds.

### Data

This thesis uses data regarding World Bank loans from the World Bank. It looks at Net Flows of Loans, which includes disbursements and repayments for 209 economies from 1970 onwards. The data statistics on education, health, and economic development have been acquired via the World Bank databank, which aggregates data from relevant countries, and specific sections of the World Bank. For instance, for the education statistics the education expenditures come from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics.

The Governance Indicators are based on 32 individual data sources produced by survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations and private sector firms. These indicators have been compiled by: Daniel Kaufmann, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) and Brookings Institution, Aart Kraay, World Bank Development Research Group and Massimo Mastruzzi. The polity indicators come from the “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013” by Monty G. Marshall. The dataset also possesses the replication data set from the paper “Counting Chickens When They Hatch: Timing and the Effects of Aid on Growth” by Michael A. Clemens, Steven Radelet, Rikhil R. Bhavnani, and Samuel Bazzi.

The data can be broken up into three categories: dependent, independent, and control variables. These different variable descriptions can be found below with information regarding their data sources and summary statistics. The summary statistics will be used for the data interpretation in the Results Section (Section 7) of this paper.

The proposed regression equations are as follows where  $Y_{it}$  represents a different developmental outcome for the topics of health, education, and economic indicators:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta t + \gamma(\text{World Bank Lending}_{it} \times \text{formerUSSR}_i) + \delta \text{World Bank Lending}_{it} + \lambda \text{Non-WB Loans}_{it} + \kappa(\text{Non-WB Loans}_{it} \times \text{formerUSSR}_i) + \mu \text{controls} + \epsilon_{it}$$

Within the regression equation,  $\alpha_i$  is defined as country fixed effects and  $\beta t$  is defined as the year fixed effects.  $\text{USSR}_i$  is an indication, through a dummy variable, of if a country is a former Soviet Union country or not. The controls also include regional interactions for other regions, such as East Asia Pacific, North Africa and Middle East, etc., which indicates, through dummy variables, what countries are in specific regions.

*Dependent Variables*

The dependent variables are broken up into two groupings: 1) spending or rather more immediate outcomes and 2) service delivery outcomes, as in lengthier more tangible outcomes that may take longer to occur. These variables occur for 209 economies and are from 1960s-present. These indicators are split into 3 separate categories of development indicators: health, education, and economic.

**Health Indicators:**

Health Expenditure as a percentage of GDP consists of recurrent and capital spending from government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance fund and comes from the World Health Organization National Health Account database. The regressions when utilizing this indicator possess a one-year time lag since the data from a given year covers the fiscal year of the previous year. For instance, 2008 data will cover the fiscal year 2007-08.

The number of hospital beds (per 1000 people) includes inpatient beds available in public, private, general, and specialized hospitals and rehabilitation centers. In most cases beds for both acute and chronic care are included. Data is from the World Health Organization, supplemented by country data. These regressions possess a 3-year time lag on the World Bank loans.

**Education Indicators:**

Education Expenditure as a percentage of GDP measures public expenditure, which consists of current and capital government spending on educational institutions (both public and private), education administration as well as subsidies for private entities (students/households and other private entities). The data comes from United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. These regressions possess a one-year time lag on World Bank lending.

Transition of students to secondary school (%) refers to the number of new entrants to the first grade of secondary school in a given year as a percentage of the number of students enrolled in the final grade of primary school in the previous year. The data comes from United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. These regressions possess a three-year time lag on World Bank lending.

**Economic Indicators:**

GDP per capita measures the Income per capita within a nation in current USD. These regressions possess a one-year time lag on World Bank loans.

Motor Vehicles (per 1000 people) include cars, buses, and freight vehicles but do not include two-wheelers. Population refers to midyear population in the year for which data are available. The data comes from the International Road Federation, World Road Statistics and data files. These regressions possess a three-year time lag on World Bank loans.

**Table 1: Dependent Variables Summary Statistics**

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviations	MIN	MAX
Health Expenditure (% of GDP)	1689	3.713556	2.371226	0.1130201	21.569
Education Expenditure (% of GDP)	977	13.86655	5.075382	2.13243	44.8018
GDP per capita	1796	12105.69	18595.1	102.662	138536.8
Number of Hospital Beds (per 1000)	1172	4.315692	3.113548	0.1	19.9
Progression to Secondary School (%)	985	79.68385	22.31634	10.30775	99.98988
Motor Vehicles (per 1000)	665	278.4126	248.5349	0.3084591	830.8448

*Independent Variables*

World Bank loans are considered the aggregates of net flows of loans to each country in USD. For the purpose of this paper it has been rescaled to be in ten millions of dollars.

Non-World Bank loans are considered the aggregates of net flows of non-World Bank loans to each country. Furthermore, it describes bilateral, multilateral loans, and other private creditors.

I have also indicated below the summary statistics for World Bank Loans and Non-World Bank Loans to former USSR countries, specifically when the dummy variable of USSR indicates a 1. This is different to the variable  $WBloansit \times USSR_i$  as it has the additional specification of looking at when the USSR term is 1 only, meaning only when the country is a former Soviet country.



**Table 2: Independent Variables Summary Statistics**

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviations	MIN	MAX
World Bank Loans to USSR Expenditure (% of GDP)	156	4.920557	25.16954	-67.654	265.8267
Non-WB Loans to USSR Expenditure (% of GDP)	106	165.4835	515.8379	-834.4075	2195.313
WB Loans	4849	4.839827	25.8378	-467.1142	421.3285
Non-WB Loans	4337	430.4556	2019.449	-12140.59	39665.09

*Control Variables – Governance Indicators*

All the governance indicators range from -2.5 to 2.5 with a lower value indicating a worse construction of each indicator. The specific descriptions of each indicator can be found below. The number of observations are much less for the control variables as these specifications are available for 209 economies but only from 1996 onwards.

- Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.
- Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically- motivated violence, including terrorism.
- Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
- Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
- Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by

To adequately assess successful development, specific development indicators relevant to each sector will be used as the outcomes of the analysis. The development indicators have been split into sections: health, education, and economic development. Within these indicators the paper will examine different time-variant indicators. Moreover, it will distinguish between immediate effects versus longer-term effects, items that need more years to develop. Firstly, health expenditure and number of hospital beds will be examine health development. Education expenditure (% of GDP) and transition of students to secondary school (%) in each country will assess the success of educational development. Lastly, GDP per capita and motor vehicles per 1,000 (as a consumption proxy) will assess economic development.

Moreover, lending within each individual country has been aggregated to look at Net Flows of loans and the data contains 27 loans in total. The main independent variables are the loans originating from World Bank, which have been aggregated into a single variable. The other types of loans have been aggregated into another variable and will be used as control variables in order to ensure that they are not impacting the relationship between lending and development.

For the purpose of this paper, corruption and political instability are considered to be a part of the causal mechanism of the hypothesis; these too will be used as controls after the initial regression, meaning that the regressions will be run without controlling for these political indicators and then run a second time including them as controls in order to assess if the political climate makes an effect on development.

One concern in this analysis is the possibility of reverse causality as well as potential omitted variables in the analysis due to the nature of development. Previous papers have used instrumental variables in an effort to disentangle correlation from causation between lending and development. Rather than utilize an instrumental variable, this thesis uses control variables and a time lag in lending to see the effects of lending on aid. In order to try and prevent this from occurring a number of control variables have been accounted for in the analysis, such as size of population, GDP per capita (when not looking at economic outcomes), and political stability controls.

There is the question of income as a contributing factor that could affect the relationships between the effects of lending on development and in order to account for this possibility I have controlled for GDP per capita when it is not an outcome variable. Moreover, lending is lagged since when lending occurs the effect may not be immediate and there needs to be a period where the development can occur. Lagging also helps address reverse causation where the development impacts the amount of lending and hence a cyclical effect of each affecting the other.

## **Results**

In order to test the hypotheses proposed in my thesis, I ran a series of fixed effect regressions. As can be seen in the following tables, for each set of development indicators five regressions were run, each with different specifications. Column One indicates the first initial fixed effect regression, with no controls or regional specifications other than the former Soviet Union. Column Two adds the regional specifications including the former Soviet Union and thus the term “World Bank loans” ultimately indicates the North America region. The third column adds the specification of dropping all values prior to 1996 in order to compare this column with the next two columns where the control variables are added. This was done in order to evaluate the same years since the controls for corruption and state status were only available from

elites and private interests.

**Table 3: Control Variable Summary Statistics**

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviations	MIN	MAX
Government Effectiveness	400	-0.4464323	0.5886607	-1.77376	1.24741
Political Stability & Absence of Violence/ Terrorism	400	-0.3903266	0.7750457	-2.70445	1.30769
Regulatory Quality	400	-0.3532918	0.6512621	-2.230094	1.310162
Rule of Law	400	-0.4924618	0.5911741	-2.022398	1.007987
Voice & Accountability	400	-0.3935283	0.6955099	-2.224493	1.246137
Control of Corruption	400	-0.4875595	0.5344221	-1.815871	1.249671

**Empirical Approach**

This thesis utilizes a fixed effect regression research design through cross-country panel data. It examines 209 economies from 1970-present in order to assess the impact of World Bank lending on developmental outcomes in former Soviet Union countries. These countries are broken up into regions based on the World Bank classifications of the regions. In order to do a comprehensive comparison, the former USSR countries will be compared to all other countries and different regions through regional interaction terms (dummy variables interacted with regional specifications) and examining the growth of each individual country through fixed effects.

1996 onwards. In the first table all the variables are shown in order to understand the complete picture of the regressions being run and henceforth only the most important variables of interest are illustrated

**Table 4: Impacts on Income Per Capita and Consumption**

Variables	(1) GDP Per Capita	(2) GDP Per Capita	(3) GDP Per Capita	(4) GDP Per Capita	(5) GDP Per Capita
WB Loans x Former USSR (1 Year Lag)	63.033** (24.253)	78.597*** (29.538)	49.744** (23.765)	63.824** (28.446)	66.806** (28.120)
Non WB Loans x Former USSR (1 Year Lag)	0.536 (1.083)	-0.277 (1.293)	0.532 (1.078)	-0.780 (0.553)	-0.830 (0.524)
WB Loans (1 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	4.787 (6.692)	7.450 (10.340)	15.452** (6.499)	28.244*** (9.969)	26.369*** (9.648)
Non WB Loans (1 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	0.260 (0.208)	-0.326*** (0.111)	-0.195* (0.100)	-0.182 (0.126)	-0.173 (0.128)
Control of Corruption					1,464.743 (3,531.127)
Observations	3,487	3,487	1,690	932	932
R-squared	0.310	0.330	0.323	0.357	0.359
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Regions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample After 1996 Only	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Number of Countries	107	107	105	76	76
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Robust standard errors are clustered in parentheses.

When considering the effect of World Bank (WB) loans on GDP per capita within former Soviet Union countries, it can be seen that the effect is much greater in former Soviet Union countries. Furthermore, the effect of every increase away from the mean is  $[(4.920557 \times 66.806) / 12105.69]$ , a .0271544 increase when considering all the controls (in column 5). This means that income per capita increases relatively more in former Soviet countries than in other regions. The coefficient on the World Bank Loans (one year lag) shows (in column 1) that the effect in other regions is positive and insignificant. This indicates the relatively more positive effect in the former Soviet countries. The results from column 3 to 5, once the governance indicator controls are introduced, indicate a significant result for WB loans in other regions. However, since the number of observations drops dramatically from column two to three and even more from three to four this could be a spurious relationship and there is not enough power to make assumptions or conclusions.

**Table 5**

Variables	(1) Motor Vehicles Per 1000 People	(2) Motor Vehicles Per 1000 People	(3) Motor Vehicles Per 1000 People	(4) Motor Vehicles Per 1000 People	(5) Motor Vehicles Per 1000 People
WB Loans x Former USSR (3 Year Lag)	0.606*** (0.218)	0.628*** (0.223)	0.628*** (0.223)	0.331 (0.210)	0.368* (0.206)
Non WB Loans x Former USSR (3 Year Lag)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.004)
WB Loans (3 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	0.013 (0.029)	0.089 (0.057)	0.089 (0.057)	0.085* (0.047)	0.098* (0.052)
Non WB Loans (3 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001* (0.001)
Rule of Law				-33.944** (15.102)	-31.386** (15.250)

Control of Corruption					-10.603 (9.807)
Observations	665	665	665	452	452
R-squared	0.362	0.435	0.435	0.515	0.517
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Regions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample After 1996 Only	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	94	94	94	68	68

Robust standard errors clustered in parentheses.

As stated in Section 5, for the purposes of this paper Motor Vehicles (per 1000 people) is used as a proxy for consumption. When considering the effect of World Bank loans on consumption, it can be seen in Table 5 that the effect is much greater in former Soviet Union countries. Furthermore, the effect of every increase away from the mean is  $[(4.920557*0.386)/278.4126]$ , a .00682201 increase. Moreover, when considering column one instead of column five, which possesses significance at the one percent level the results are  $[(4.920557*0.606)/278.4126]$ , a .0107102 increase. This means that for every standard deviation from the mean there is a .0107102 increase in Motor Vehicles (per 1000). The consumption proxy of Motor Vehicles further affirms the results of a relative increase in income per capita in former Soviet countries than in other regions since in column one the coefficient on the World Bank Loans for a three-year lag is insignificant. The three-year lag exists based on the assumption that it takes a few years for the results of the loans to have an effect on consumption.

*Short Term Development Indicators*

**Table 6: Impacts on Social Sector**

Variables	(1) Education Spending (% of GDP)	(2) Education Spending (% of GDP)	(3) Education Spending (% of GDP)	(4) Education Spending (% of GDP)	(5) Education Spending (% of GDP)
WB Loans x Former USSR (1 Year Lag)	-0.107*** (0.022)	-0.108*** (0.022)	-0.107*** (0.025)	-0.118*** (0.016)	-0.127*** (0.018)
Non WB Loans x Former USSR (1 Year Lag)	0.004** (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003* (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
WB Loans (1 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.031*** (0.011)	-0.027** (0.012)
Non WB Loans (1 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Control of Corruption					-2.405*** (0.841)
Observations	977	977	570	463	460
R-squared	0.192	0.214	0.116	0.176	0.209
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Regions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample After 1996 Only	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes

Number of Countries	86	86	77	61	60
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Robust standard errors are clustered in parentheses.

This regression indicates the effect of lending on education spending within nations. Moreover, the overall effect is negative and statistically significant. When there is one unit increase away from the mean of spending there is a .045 decrease in education spending  $[(4.920557*-.127)/ 13.86655]$ . Furthermore, column five looks at the addition of the corruption variable and possesses a large reduction in observations. When considering column one (that does not possess controls for corruption), the results indicate a .037969 decrease in education spending  $[(4.920557*-.107)/ 13.86655]$  at a 1% significant level. This coupled with the lack of significance on the non-former Soviet countries indicates a relative worsening of education expenditure for former Soviet countries.

Considering column five's reduction in sample size, since the effect holds without the corruption control in the sub-sample of countries for which corruption data is available,<sup>3</sup> this means that corruption is not the channel for the relative reduction of education spending in former Soviet countries. Rather, the large reduction in observations by adding the control might be affecting the results.

**Table 7**

Variables	(1) Health Spending (% Of GDP)	(2) Health Spending (% Of GDP)	(3) Health Spending (% Of GDP)	(4) Health Spending (% Of GDP)	(5) Health Spending (% Of GDP)
WB Loans x Former USSR (1 Year Lag)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Non WB Loans x Former USSR (1 Year Lag)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
WB Loans (1 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	-0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Non WB Loans (1 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)

3 The results from the regression based on the subsample from Table 6 and column 5 with the same specifications as Table 6 and column 1 indicate a -.050 decrease for WBLoansxUSSR at the 1% significant level and a 0.001 increase with no significance for WBLoans for all other countries.



Control of Corruption					0.055 (0.332)
Observations	1,689	1,689	1,500	880	867
R-squared	0.165	0.173	0.165	0.229	0.235
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Regions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample After 1996 Only	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	97	97	97	70	69

Robust standard errors are clustered in parentheses.

For health spending, the sudden drop in statistical significance when controlling for corruption and other political regulatory statuses means the relationship is different after 1996 and there is not enough power to identify this effect. When considering column one for health spending the results indicate that health spending decreases relatively more in the former Soviet countries than other regions, and this effect is relative to the negative insignificant effect in other regions. However, when comparing the effects found in column one with column three, which illustrates the dropping of all values prior to 1996 (column three), the WB Loans in the former Soviet countries becomes positive and not significant. This suggests that there is a different relationship after 1996.

*Long Term Development Indicators (Service Delivery Outcomes)***Table 8**

Variables	(1) Progression To Secondary School (%)	(2) Progression To Secondary School (%)	(3) Progression To Secondary School (%)	(4) Progression To Secondary School (%)	(5) Progression To Secondary School (%)
WB Loans x Former USSR (3 Year Lag)	-0.212*** (0.052)	-0.221*** (0.054)	-0.134*** (0.040)	-0.085** (0.036)	-0.085** (0.036)
Non WB Loans x Former USSR (3 Year Lag)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
WB Loans (3 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	0.004 (0.010)	0.007 (0.015)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.022** (0.009)
Non WB Loans (3 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
Regulatory Quality				-4.641** (1.853)	-4.625** (1.828)
Rule of Law				6.610*** (2.026)	6.657*** (2.094)
GDP per Capita				-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Control of Corruption					-0.183 (1.846)
Observations	985	985	523	446	446
R-squared	0.410	0.418	0.269	0.357	0.357
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Regions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample After 1996 Only	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	66	66	61	58	58

Robust standard errors are clustered in parentheses.

**Table 9**

Variables	(1) Hospital Beds per 1000 people	(2) Hospital Beds per 1000 people	(3) Hospital Beds per 1000 people	(4) Hospital Beds per 1000 people	(5) Hospital Beds per 1000 people
WB Loans x Former USSR (3 Year Lag)	-0.042*** (0.007)	-0.052*** (0.007)	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.031*** (0.006)	-0.031*** (0.006)
Non WB Loans x Former USSR (3 Year Lag)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
WB Loans (3 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.007)	0.002 (0.035)	-0.077 (0.099)	-0.075 (0.098)
Non WB Loans (3 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Control of Corruption					-0.099 (0.314)

Observations	1,172	1,172	580	397	397
R-squared	0.308	0.334	0.129	0.183	0.184
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Regions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample After 1996 Only	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	103	103	98	69	69

Robust standard errors are clustered in parentheses

When considering the above service delivery outcomes (Table 8 and Table 9) the relative effects are as follows for column 1:

For Progression to secondary school, there is a  $[(4.920557* -0.212)/ 79.68385]$  .00056403 decrease. This means that for every standard deviation away from the mean there is a .0005% decrease in progression to secondary schooling.

For Hospital beds (per 1000 people), there is a  $[(4.920557* -0.042)/ 4.315692]$  0.04788650209 decrease. This means that for every standard deviation away from the mean there is a .0478 decrease in Hospital beds (per 1000 people).<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, when examining the long-term development outcomes it can be seen that there is a strong connection between the short-term indicators and the long-term indicators. For instance, as seen previously when there are decreases in healthcare and education spending, there is also a decrease in the developmental outcomes. Yet, considering the overall positive impacts due to the relative positive increases in income per capita and consumption, this indicates a re-allocation of resources from the social sector to the private sector.

<sup>4</sup> The regression already takes into account for population controls.

**Conclusion**

The thesis presents data that indicates that World Bank lending affects a country's development in the former Soviet Union relatively more positively for income per capita and relatively worsen in human development than other countries. It is also important to examine the absolute effect of the results in the former Soviet countries. For instance, does aid have a positive effect on GDP per capita and negative effect on the health and education spending in these places? The answer based on the results of this paper is yes. I found that income per capita increases relatively more in former Soviet countries than in other regions since the coefficient on World Bank loans (with a one year lag) shows that the effect in other regions is positive and insignificant. Similarly, I found that education spending decreases relatively more in the former Soviet countries than other regions, and this effect is relative to a negative insignificant effect in the other regions. This indicates that the effects of the historical legacies within the former Soviet Union as presented by previous papers on the topic, can have an effect on the way that development occurs. Once lending occurs, there is a relatively positive effect on income per capita but this is accompanied by a re-allocation of resources away from social sectors and a relative worsening of human development outcomes.

These effects can also be explained by the projects where the loans are designated to go towards. Through an examination of the IDA snapshot, as discussed in the background section (Section 3 of this paper), which indicates the project name of each specific loan (including the amount repaid and disbursed), most of the loans present in former Soviet countries are allocated towards infrastructure and privatization.

I treated corruption as a control to examine if it was a part of the causal mechanism. Yet, the results indicate that there is not much evidence to suggest such since controlling for corruption and other governance indicators do not make much of a difference in the results. Additionally, since there are much less observations for corruption and governance indicators than the other variables in the analyses there is not enough power to indicate whether or not they actually have an effect. There is still much research that needs to be done on this topic, as there is more data that needs to be gathered, specifically in regards to governance indicators and other potential outcomes. Since the Soviet Union fell relatively recently more years of data as well as of other indicators that might not be present or reported would help in assessing the situation more thoroughly.

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## Appendix

**Table 1: World Bank Lending Table**

Economy	Code	Income group	Lending category
1 Afghanistan	AFG	Low income	IDA
2 Albania	ALB	Upper middle income	IBRD
3 Algeria	DZA	Upper middle income	IBRD
4 American Samoa	ASM	Upper middle income	..
5 Andorra	ADO	High income: nonOECD	..
6 Angola	AGO	Upper middle income	IBRD
7 Antigua and Barbuda	ATG	High income: nonOECD	IBRD
8 Argentina	ARG	Upper middle income	IBRD
9 Armenia	ARM	Lower middle income	IBRD
10 Aruba	ABW	High income: nonOECD	..
11 Australia	AUS	High income: OECD	..
12 Austria	AUT	High income: OECD	..
13 Azerbaijan	AZE	Upper middle income	IBRD
14 Bahamas, The	BHS	High income: nonOECD	..
15 Bahrain	BHR	High income: nonOECD	..
16 Bangladesh	BGD	Low income	IDA
17 Barbados	BRB	High income: nonOECD	..
18 Belarus	BLR	Upper middle income	IBRD
19 Belgium	BEL	High income: OECD	..
20 Belize	BLZ	Upper middle income	IBRD
21 Benin	BEN	Low income	IDA
22 Bermuda	BMU	High income: nonOECD	..
23 Bhutan	BTN	Lower middle income	IDA
24 Bolivia	BOL	Lower middle income	Blend
25 Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	Upper middle income	IBRD
26 Botswana	BWA	Upper middle income	IBRD
27 Brazil	BRA	Upper middle income	IBRD
28 Brunei Darussalam	BRN	High income: nonOECD	..
29 Bulgaria	BGR	Upper middle income	IBRD
30 Burkina Faso	BFA	Low income	IDA
31 Burundi	BDI	Low income	IDA
32 Cabo Verde	CPV	Lower middle income	Blend
33 Cambodia	KHM	Low income	IDA
34 Cameroon	CMR	Lower middle income	Blend
35 Canada	CAN	High income: OECD	..



36 Cayman Islands	CYM	High income: nonOECD	..
37 Central African Republic	CAF	Low income	IDA
38 Chad	TCD	Low income	IDA
39 Channel Islands	CHI	High income: nonOECD	..
40 Chile	CHL	High income: OECD	IBRD
41 China	CHN	Upper middle income	IBRD
42 Colombia	COL	Upper middle income	IBRD
43 Comoros	COM	Low income	IDA
44 Congo, Dem. Rep.	ZAR	Low income	IDA
45 Congo, Rep.	COG	Lower middle income	Blend
46 Costa Rica	CRI	Upper middle income	IBRD
47 Côte d'Ivoire	CIV	Lower middle income	IDA
48 Croatia	HRV	High income: nonOECD	IBRD
49 Cuba	CUB	Upper middle income	..
50 Curaçao	CUW	High income: nonOECD	..
51 Cyprus	CYP	High income: nonOECD	..
52 Czech Republic	CZE	High income: OECD	..
53 Denmark	DNK	High income: OECD	..
54 Djibouti	DJI	Lower middle income	IDA
55 Dominica	DMA	Upper middle income	Blend
56 Dominican Republic	DOM	Upper middle income	IBRD
57 Ecuador	ECU	Upper middle income	IBRD
58 Egypt, Arab Rep.	EGY	Lower middle income	IBRD
59 El Salvador	SLV	Lower middle income	IBRD
60 Equatorial Guinea	GNQ	High income: nonOECD	IBRD
61 Eritrea	ERI	Low income	IDA
62 Estonia	EST	High income: OECD	..
63 Ethiopia	ETH	Low income	IDA
64 Faeroe Islands	FRO	High income: nonOECD	..
65 Fiji	FJI	Upper middle income	IBRD
66 Finland	FIN	High income: OECD	..
67 France	FRA	High income: OECD	..
68 French Polynesia	PYF	High income: nonOECD	..
69 Gabon	GAB	Upper middle income	IBRD
70 Gambia, The	GMB	Low income	IDA
71 Georgia	GEO	Lower middle income	IBRD
72 Germany	DEU	High income: OECD	..
73 Ghana	GHA	Lower middle income	IDA
74 Greece	GRC	High income: OECD	..
75 Greenland	GRL	High income: nonOECD	..
76 Grenada	GRD	Upper middle income	Blend

77 Guam	GUM	High income: nonOECD	..
78 Guatemala	GTM	Lower middle income	IBRD
79 Guinea	GIN	Low income	IDA
80 Guinea-Bissau	GNB	Low income	IDA
81 Guyana	GUY	Lower middle income	IDA
82 Haiti	HTI	Low income	IDA
83 Honduras	HND	Lower middle income	IDA
84 Hong Kong SAR, China	HKG	High income: nonOECD	..
85 Hungary	HUN	Upper middle income	..
86 Iceland	ISL	High income: OECD	..
87 India	IND	Lower middle income	IBRD
88 Indonesia	IDN	Lower middle income	IBRD
89 Iran, Islamic Rep.	IRN	Upper middle income	IBRD
90 Iraq	IRQ	Upper middle income	IBRD
91 Ireland	IRL	High income: OECD	..
92 Isle of Man	IMY	High income: nonOECD	..
93 Israel	ISR	High income: OECD	..
94 Italy	ITA	High income: OECD	..
95 Jamaica	JAM	Upper middle income	IBRD
96 Japan	JPN	High income: OECD	..
97 Jordan	JOR	Upper middle income	IBRD
98 Kazakhstan	KAZ	Upper middle income	IBRD
99 Kenya	KEN	Low income	IDA
100 Kiribati	KIR	Lower middle income	IDA
101 Korea, Dem. Rep.	PRK	Low income	..
102 Korea, Rep.	KOR	High income: OECD	IBRD
103 Kosovo	KSV	Lower middle income	IDA
104 Kuwait	KWT	High income: nonOECD	..
105 Kyrgyz Republic	KGZ	Lower middle income	IDA
106 Lao PDR	LAO	Lower middle income	IDA
107 Latvia	LVA	High income: nonOECD	..
108 Lebanon	LBN	Upper middle income	IBRD
109 Lesotho	LSO	Lower middle income	IDA
110 Liberia	LBR	Low income	IDA
111 Libya	LYB	Upper middle income	IBRD
112 Liechtenstein	LIE	High income: nonOECD	..
113 Lithuania	LTU	High income: nonOECD	..
114 Luxembourg	LUX	High income: OECD	..
115 Macao SAR, China	MAC	High income: nonOECD	..
116 Macedonia, FYR	MKD	Upper middle income	IBRD
117 Madagascar	MDG	Low income	IDA

118 Malawi	MWI	Low income	IDA
119 Malaysia	MYS	Upper middle income	IBRD
120 Maldives	MDV	Upper middle income	IDA
121 Mali	MLI	Low income	IDA
122 Malta	MLT	High income: nonOECD	..
123 Marshall Islands	MHL	Upper middle income	IDA
124 Mauritania	MRT	Lower middle income	IDA
125 Mauritius	MUS	Upper middle income	IBRD
126 Mexico	MEX	Upper middle income	IBRD
127 Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	FSM	Lower middle income	IDA
128 Moldova	MDA	Lower middle income	Blend
129 Monaco	MCO	High income: nonOECD	..
130 Mongolia	MNG	Lower middle income	Blend
131 Montenegro	MNE	Upper middle income	IBRD
132 Morocco	MAR	Lower middle income	IBRD
133 Mozambique	MOZ	Low income	IDA
134 Myanmar	MMR	Low income	IDA
135 Namibia	NAM	Upper middle income	IBRD
136 Nepal	NPL	Low income	IDA
137 Netherlands	NLD	High income: OECD	..
138 New Caledonia	NCL	High income: nonOECD	..
139 New Zealand	NZL	High income: OECD	..
140 Nicaragua	NIC	Lower middle income	IDA
141 Niger	NER	Low income	IDA
142 Nigeria	NGA	Lower middle income	Blend
143 Northern Mariana Islands	MNP	High income: nonOECD	..
144 Norway	NOR	High income: OECD	..
145 Oman	OMN	High income: nonOECD	..
146 Pakistan	PAK	Lower middle income	Blend
147 Palau	PLW	Upper middle income	IBRD
148 Panama	PAN	Upper middle income	IBRD
149 Papua New Guinea	PNG	Lower middle income	Blend
150 Paraguay	PRY	Lower middle income	IBRD
151 Peru	PER	Upper middle income	IBRD
152 Philippines	PHL	Lower middle income	IBRD
153 Poland	POL	High income: OECD	IBRD
154 Portugal	PRT	High income: OECD	..
155 Puerto Rico	PRI	High income: nonOECD	..
156 Qatar	QAT	High income: nonOECD	..
157 Romania	ROM	Upper middle income	IBRD
158 Russian Federation	RUS	High income: nonOECD	IBRD

159 Rwanda	RWA	Low income	IDA
160 Samoa	WSM	Lower middle income	IDA
161 San Marino	SMR	High income: nonOECD	..
162 São Tomé and Príncipe	STP	Lower middle income	IDA
163 Saudi Arabia	SAU	High income: nonOECD	..
164 Senegal	SEN	Lower middle income	IDA
165 Serbia	SRB	Upper middle income	IBRD
166 Seychelles	SYC	Upper middle income	IBRD
167 Sierra Leone	SLE	Low income	IDA
168 Singapore	SGP	High income: nonOECD	..
169 Sint Maarten (Dutch part)	SXM	High income: nonOECD	..
170 Slovak Republic	SVK	High income: OECD	..
171 Slovenia	SVN	High income: OECD	..
172 Solomon Islands	SLB	Lower middle income	IDA
173 Somalia	SOM	Low income	IDA
174 South Africa	ZAF	Upper middle income	IBRD
175 South Sudan	SSD	Lower middle income	IDA
176 Spain	ESP	High income: OECD	..
177 Sri Lanka	LKA	Lower middle income	Blend
178 St. Kitts and Nevis	KNA	High income: nonOECD	IBRD
179 St. Lucia	LCA	Upper middle income	Blend
180 St. Martin (French part)	MAF	High income: nonOECD	..
181 St. Vincent and the Grenadines	VCT	Upper middle income	Blend
182 Sudan	SDN	Lower middle income	IDA
183 Suriname	SUR	Upper middle income	IBRD
184 Swaziland	SWZ	Lower middle income	IBRD
185 Sweden	SWE	High income: OECD	..
186 Switzerland	CHE	High income: OECD	..
187 Syrian Arab Republic	SYR	Lower middle income	IBRD
188 Tajikistan	TJK	Low income	IDA
189 Tanzania	TZA	Low income	IDA
190 Thailand	THA	Upper middle income	IBRD
191 Timor-Leste	TMP	Lower middle income	Blend
192 Togo	TGO	Low income	IDA
193 Tonga	TON	Upper middle income	IDA
194 Trinidad and Tobago	TTO	High income: nonOECD	IBRD
195 Tunisia	TUN	Upper middle income	IBRD
196 Turkey	TUR	Upper middle income	IBRD
197 Turkmenistan	TKM	Upper middle income	IBRD
198 Turks and Caicos Islands	TCA	High income: nonOECD	..
199 Tuvalu	TUV	Upper middle income	IDA

200 Uganda	UGA	Low income	IDA
201 Ukraine	UKR	Lower middle income	IBRD
202 United Arab Emirates	ARE	High income: nonOECD	..
203 United Kingdom	GBR	High income: OECD	..
204 United States	USA	High income: OECD	..
205 Uruguay	URY	High income: nonOECD	IBRD
206 Uzbekistan	UZB	Lower middle income	Blend
207 Vanuatu	VUT	Lower middle income	IDA
208 Venezuela, RB	VEN	Upper middle income	IBRD
209 Vietnam	VNM	Lower middle income	Blend
210 Virgin Islands (U.S.)	VIR	High income: nonOECD	..
211 West Bank and Gaza	WBG	Lower middle income	..
212 Yemen, Rep.	YEM	Lower middle income	

**Table 2: Effects with Regional Interactions**

Variables	(1) Education Spending (% of GDP)	(2) Education Spending (% of GDP)	(3) Education Spending (% of GDP)	(4) Education Spending (% of GDP)	(5) Education Spending (% of GDP)
WB Loans To Former USSR (1 Year Lag)	-0.107*** (0.022)	-0.108*** (0.022)	-0.107*** (0.025)	-0.118*** (0.016)	-0.127*** (0.018)
Non WB Loans To Former USSR (1 Year Lag)	0.004** (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003* (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
WB Loans (1 Year Lag) (10 millions)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.022*** (0.005)	-0.013*** (0.005)	-0.031*** (0.011)	-0.027** (0.012)
Non WB Loans (1 Year Lag) (10 Millions)	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)

Non WB Loans to Latin America & Caribbean (1 Year Lag)		0.000*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
WB Loans to South Asia (1 Year Lag)		0.250 (0.202)	0.028 (0.279)	0.135 (0.154)	0.144 (0.155)
Non WB Loans to South Asia (1 Year Lag)		-0.001 (0.002)	-0.006* (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Government Effectiveness				-0.035 (1.194)	0.521 (1.176)
Political Stability & Absence of Violence/ Terrorism				1.160** (0.568)	1.075** (0.533)
Regulatory Quality				-0.179 (1.225)	-0.107 (1.146)
Rule of Law				1.022 (0.998)	1.987** (0.949)
Voice & Accountability				-1.378* (0.758)	-1.234* (0.667)
Log of Population				-1.626 (2.308)	-1.180 (2.233)
GDP Per Capita					-0.000 (0.000)
Control of Corruption					-2.405*** (0.841)
Observations	977	977	570	463	460
R-squared	0.192	0.214	0.116	0.176	0.209

Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Regions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Number of Countries	86	86	77	61	60

# THE ROLE OF R2P IN PEACEKEEPING

## MATTHEW GRAHAM

Since the turn of the 21st century, the Security Council of the United Nations (UN) has increasingly assigned Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandates, so that UN missions prioritize human rights equally between politics and security. At the heart of the growing frequency of PoC mandates is the notion that focusing on the traditional themes of peacekeeping operations, politics and security has been insufficient in fostering sustainable peace, particularly in nations experiencing endemic conflict. Presumably, missions in these nations fail because of absence of social justice in the peace process, which leaves societies unhelpful and, therefore, unwilling to participate in constructing post-conflict societies. Instilling confidence in local stakeholders to take ownership over any plan of action is difficult when in actuality the safety of civilians and the path towards peace remain unresolved issues. If protecting human rights is the genuine desire of the United Nations, the organization must orient PoC missions to establish stability so that institutions designed to uphold dignity can develop roots in civil society upon which they can build over time.

The UN's eagerness to prioritize human rights is fueled by justice. Atrocities as Rwanda and Srebrenica and the violence in several African nations, including Sudan, resulted in UN officials and member states experiencing severe criticism. Many human rights groups considered these acts as indifference to civilian tragedies and, in some instances, genocide. These events signaled an utter failure to act as it was believed that the barbarous crimes committed during these conflicts could have been prevented, specifically if UN officials put forth a more impassioned effort to garner the support of member states, particularly Western nations.

This criticism has profoundly influenced the manner in which the UN and member states view intervention. Since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was ratified in 1949, a principle objective of the UN has been nudging national governments to adopt the view that upholding the dignity of citizens is their inherent duty.<sup>1</sup> However, diffusing this concept of justice has been constrained by the perception that self-determination made implementing human rights norms, within sovereign states, the responsibility of national governments. Therefore, foreign officials persuading nations to adopt human rights norms through cooperative measures, such as conditioning bilateral trade agreements on the prohibition of child labor, was a legitimate practice. On the other hand, intervening militarily to develop or restore justice abroad, except to prevent war or maintain peace between countries, was construed as violating the sovereign authority of states to govern their people.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the soundness of such political theory, the genuine horror of the atrocities experienced in the 1990s was stirring. As modern news reporting streamed images, witness accounts and casualty figures

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1 "The Universal Declaration of Human Right," United Nations, accessed May 4, 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>.

2 "Charter of the United Nations, ch. 1, art. 2," United Nations, accessed May 4, 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>.



into homes, on a daily basis, it transformed human rights into a personal issue. As the information on these events mounted, so did the scrutiny regarding the inaction of the UN. In response, the notion began to develop among UN officials that sovereignty was collective in scope, and over time, the responsibility to protect (R2P) emerged.<sup>3</sup>

R2P builds on the spirit of the nation-state system. To advocates, particularly supporters from the human rights field, the commitment of UN member states to the system obligates them to not only uphold international norms inside their borders, but also enforce the principles to which nations pledged their allegiance. The UN is a fellowship in which member states are expected to hold each other accountable for their commitment to a common understanding of justice. Without accountability, the nation-state system loses its meaning and, in turn, integrity. R2P advocates believe that sovereignty is earned by the merit of governments orienting policies to benefit citizens and maintain their safety.<sup>4</sup>

Of course, determining whether national policies effectively promote social justice is subjective, despite the United Nations providing a metric, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For example, banning slavery or servitude takes on a different meaning, depending on the people or society implementing the prohibition. Slavery could apply merely to physical labor in one country. At the same time, another nation could extend the definition to include wage inequality, as the practice can subjugate women into servile roles. The parameters for advocating social justice remain, inexorably, in the eye of the beholder. Nevertheless, adherents of R2P have managed to promulgate their version of justice by relying on precedent to validate the authority of the UN to take collective action against officials, leaders or nations accused of violating, presumably, universal human rights precepts.

Since establishing a legal basis for R2P in 2005, advocates have sought to broaden the scope of its implementation by trying to incorporate social justice reforms into a normative framework for peacekeeping operations.<sup>5</sup> Essentially, the agenda has been to alter the approach of PoC mandates, so that peacekeeping and peacebuilding are placed on equal footing, at every stage and level of operations.<sup>6</sup> This is not to say that taking R2P into account when constructing mandates is altogether harmful to the protection of civilians, or that the two concepts do not share historical and thematic links. R2P and PoC are both rooted in humanitarian, human rights and refugee law as well as the respect for the norms established in all three arenas. Moreover, R2P has provided PoC missions with the leverage needed to coerce host nations to cooperate in opening humanitarian corridors and avoiding civilian casualties during armed

3 "To protect sovereignty, or to protect lives?" *The Economist*, May 15, 2008, <http://www.economist.com/node/11376531>.

4 General Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005), para. 138-139, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf>.

5 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict: Encouraging developments, S/2007/643 (28 October 2007), p. 4, <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7DCivilians%20S2007643.pdf>.

6 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN peacekeeping Operations: Dilemmas, Emerging Practices and Lessons, p. 4, (New York: United Nations, 2009), <http://www.ccopab.eb.mil.br/biblioteca/documentos/100129%20%20DPKO-DFS%20POC%20Lessons%20Learned%20Note.pdf>.

conflicts. Furthermore, the R2P movement has validated PoC mandates by forcing the international community to recognize that every civilian has a right to life and dignity. Nevertheless, the two concepts are different and diverge in key areas.

Unlike PoC, R2P was crafted to specifically prevent “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”<sup>7</sup> While the evolution of PoC may have been influenced by the genocides in Srebrenica and Rwanda, R2P, arguably, was born directly out of the failure of the international community to prevent these atrocities.<sup>8</sup> Learning from the conditions that allowed the events in Srebrenica and Rwanda to unfold, R2P takes aim at governments and their historic responsibility to ensure the safety of civilians within their borders. Its primary objective is to halt genocide or other forms of mass killing by enticing governments to deescalate conflicts at the ground level, before actors resort to violence. To ensure accountability, the international community effectively elevates the rights of civilians above the sovereignty of nations—or in other words, the “rights” of nations—during instances when civilian atrocities seem eminent. Hence, R2P requires governments to protect their own people from mass atrocities and genocide, while also obligating the collective responsibility to intervene and prohibit such acts, when fellow nations are incapable of or unwilling to stop them.<sup>9</sup>

PoC, on the other hand, applies to international human rights law in a far broader context. PoC is not a norm, and the international community does not hold or endorse a unified understanding of the concept. It is merely a loaded term that distinguishes several measures used to enhance the robustness of peacekeeping missions and improve their performance in maintaining the “safety, dignity, and integrity” of civilians during armed conflict.<sup>10</sup> Although these measures can be characterized as human rights-based initiatives, the function and framework of PoC is general, which is why social justice was traditionally absent from the core focus of UN missions executing PoC mandates. As the capacity to protect civilians varies by host nation, this flexibility allows PoC missions to target priorities and identify key benchmarks, so that a sustainable path towards stability, peace, and reconciliation can be charted. Ultimately, the responsibility of defining and promoting justice is left in the hands of the respective civil society, while UN personnel nurture a political and security environment capable of facilitating the growth of institutions that can develop human rights from the bottom up.

Missions are prohibited from extending their authority to intervene in the civic and/or political affairs of nations, beyond the paradigm of armed conflict. Essentially, the goal of PoC mandates is to create space for negotiation and agreement between local power brokers. Lasting peace, in turn, is fostered among civil society. Once hostilities begin to subside, a staged drawdown in mission operations traditionally

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7 2005 World Summit Outcome.

8 United Nations, Department of Public Information, Kofi Annan Emphasizes Commitment to Enabling UN Never Again to Fail in Protecting Civilian Population from Genocide or Mass Slaughter, SG/SM/7263, 16 December 1999, <http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19991216.sgsm7263.doc.html>.

9 Luke Glanville, “The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders,” *The Human Rights Law Review* 12 (2012): 3-5. Accessed May 1, 2014. doi: 10.1093/hrlr/ngr047.

10 “The Relationship between the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, January 2009, <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/GCR2P%20Policy%20Brief-%20The%20relationship%20between%20R2P%20and%20the%20Protection%20of%20Civilians%20in%20Armed%20Conflict.pdf>.

follows.

Independently, R2P and PoC have clear boundaries. Although R2P can invoke collective intervention in any instance, mobilizing an international response is limited to preventing an unfolding genocide, and taking action is conditioned on the capacity and disposition of the nation in question to handle the situation on its own. Regarding PoC mandates, missions are permitted to take action to stop a wide range of human rights and humanitarian violations, so long as some degree of violence is unfolding in the host nation they are mandated to support. Despite this distinction, various infractions of human rights or humanitarian law can be construed as precursors to genocide, in the fog of war. Upon uniting the two concepts, R2P could easily justify extending the traditional role of PoC missions beyond providing good offices and general physical protection during armed conflict. If bolstering the rights of civilians “protects” them from potential genocide in the future, then the United Nations has the legitimate authority to restructure national institutions from the top down. Effectively, sovereignty would be removed as an obstacle to promulgating human rights. While such an outlook would prevent habitual human rights abusers from hiding behind sovereignty to escape accountability and/or prosecution, executing PoC mandates within the conceptual framework of R2P is a practical leap, when it comes to peacekeeping operations. The ethics of molding the outcome of peace processes is undeniably controversial.

Although the United Nations has not officially endorsed such a scenario, melding R2P and PoC presents a precarious situation in which a nation’s inviolable right to self-determination is no longer guaranteed. Hypothetically, the political implications would be numerous, and the way that host nations and regional partners—with respect to peacekeeping—interact with the United Nations would change considerably. Engaging in speculation is not meant to indict the Security Council or UN officials. After all, the guidelines and parameters of R2P and PoC were fleshed out in completely separate vetting processes. The argument that both R2P and PoC developed along relatively similar timelines is specious, and it does not prove officials purposefully conflated the two concepts at any point. The line between R2P and PoC is very thin and the failure of the UN to clearly articulate what constitutes PoC has only added to the confusion.<sup>11</sup>

The lack of clarity has left the door open for an alternative narrative to emerge characterizing R2P and PoC as natural complements that were always intended to function together. Attempting to form a synergy between the two concepts is not a new development. As early as 2000, the Security Council discussed establishing “preventative missions,” while in the same breath proposing to classify violations of humanitarian and human rights norms as a “threat to international peace and security.”<sup>12</sup> Incorporating R2P into the design of PoC mandates has not gained traction until the last few years, but since then, the agenda has advanced rapidly due in large part to the support of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.

Strikingly, the Secretary General seems to share the view that this joint narrative is indeed true. He has taken steps to institute a normative framework that would redefine the boundaries of R2P and

<sup>11</sup> United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (New York: United Nations, 2013), p. 3-4, <http://www.peacekeeping.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/100129-DPKO-DFS-POC-Operational-Concept.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> Security Council Resolution 1296, S/RES/1296 (19 April 2000), para. 4-5, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/399/03/PDF/N0039903.pdf?OpenElement>.

expand the objectives of PoC mandates. For example, in his 2007 report to the Security Council on PoC, the Secretary General refers to paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document on R2P as a “cardinal achievement” that must be followed up with “earlier and more decisive action to prevent or mitigate the suffering of civilians in conflict areas.” In the succeeding paragraph, he goes on to outline a normative and operational framework for PoC that reflects this call for action.<sup>13</sup> Over the years, his support for evolving PoC mandates to include elements of R2P has strengthened. In turn, his pronouncements on the subject have become bolder. Take for instance his 2013 report to the Security Council on R2P. In the report, the Secretary General reasoned that reforming the societies of host nations, in fact, was an aspect of the international community’s collective responsibility to deter genocide.<sup>14</sup> This language marks a vast departure from the tactical prose of the World Summit Outcome Document, in which officials were careful not to couch R2P in any light other than a response to genocide or another form of mass killing.<sup>15</sup>

The Secretary General’s endorsement of a joint R2P-PoC framework of intervention has not been reserved for rhetoric alone. The Secretary General has initiated measures within UN channels to formalize the notion that R2P not only requires the international community to respond to targeted killing, but also it behooves nations to implement preventative measures that eliminate the potential precursors to genocide. The Secretary General’s decision to create the Joint Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) in 2009 and add “prevention” to his Five-Year Action Agenda in 2012, brought the UN closer to normalizing an R2P-PoC framework of intervention.<sup>16</sup>

These initiatives could be dismissed as symbolic efforts to show that the United Nations is serious about combatting mass atrocities. Although the suggestions expressed in the Five-Year Action Agenda represent UN-wide directives to advance a preventative approach for human rights, actions taken to support such reforms are not apparent throughout the organization.<sup>17</sup> The structural changes to OSAPG, however, have cultivated measurable progress in establishing a systematic approach to combating the precursors of genocide, while also identifying the indicators that would provoke a collective response from the international community. This achievement is embodied in the Analysis Framework that was produced by OSAPG to determine the likelihood of genocide.<sup>18</sup> The Framework gives an actionable metric upon which the international community can draw to anticipate genocide. The content of the Framework confirms that PoC is indeed the mechanism that the R2P movement intends to use to advance its social justice agenda. When the Framework and its factors are placed into context, these seemingly specious claims are shown to be valid.

Nevertheless, these developments could be UN officials working to enhance the efficiency of the

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13 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

14 United Nations, General Assembly, Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention, A/67/929 (9 July 2013), para. 4-7, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/67/929](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/67/929).  
15 2005 World Summit Outcome.

16 “Joint Office of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect,” International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, accessed May 3, 2014, <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/3618>.

17 “Secretary-General’s Five-Year Action Agenda: prevention,” United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, January 25, 2012, <http://www.un.org/sg/priorities/prevention.shtml>.

18 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes (New York: United Nations, 2014), [http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/framework%20of%20analysis%20for%20atrocity%20crimes\\_en.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/framework%20of%20analysis%20for%20atrocity%20crimes_en.pdf)

organization's structure, so that the advocacy of human rights agencies, functioning within the traditional administrative and political boundaries of the United Nations, is more effective. Undeniably, the United Nations already has a broad spectrum of tools, methods and initiatives available to support the preventative regime of R2P. There are plenty of projects related to R2P, such as capacity-building measures of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, which are managed by other UN agencies and do not involve the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in any aspect of their administration or coordination.<sup>19</sup> However, these projects fall short of the Framework's core purpose. The Framework is designed to forecast impending atrocities in preparation for collective intervention—barring the nation in question has the capacity and intention to defend its citizens from harm. Logically, the regions of the world that appear on OASPG's radar are most likely engaged in an active conflict. Therefore, it would be unlikely that a R2P project functioning outside of a peacekeeping command would fall within the purview of OASPG or match the scale of preventative action envisioned by the Secretary General and other R2P advocates.

Furthermore, the similarities between the risk factors posited in the Framework and the characteristics of the environments in which current PoC missions operate are unmistakable. For example, the presence of armed groups, ethnic tension, impunity and targeting of vulnerable groups are issues mentioned in the Framework that are also prevalent in host nations in which PoC missions most often operate, such as South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic.<sup>20</sup> The fact that most of these themes coincide seem to reveal an attempt to set a standard for genocide prevention in which situations of armed conflict represent an initial stage that would justifiably trigger collective intervention.

It is important to take into account that these are only a few of the measures implemented to harmonize R2P and PoC into a single framework. For years, the Secretary General, as well as other advocates who favor normalizing an R2P-PoC framework of intervention, has worked to reshape the strategy, operations, and tactics of PoC mandates. The changes are deep rooted and hard to distinguish. While the intention is clear, the specific effects remain uncertain. In the initial stages of its development, opponents of R2P fought to restrain the concept out of fear that the collective responsibility clause would be manipulated by powerful states to interfere in the affairs of weaker ones.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, advocates were forced to take indirect steps to lay the groundwork for an R2P-PoC framework, so that potential political and legal controversy could be avoided. Consequently, identifying which shifts in the development of PoC are attributed to policymakers, eager to advance their R2P agenda, is a challenge because the structure and objectives for an R2P-PoC framework were never outlined in an explicit blueprint.

By comparing the body of work that comprises their respective frameworks, the applications of R2P and PoC are shown to be different. Therefore, detecting the influence of R2P comes from analyzing the evolution of PoC missions. In particular, R2P-related themes have caused PoC missions to shift their practices beyond the prism of armed conflict and altered their tactics from an operational focus, based in fostering peace from the bottom up, to a multidimensional approach that incorporates top down reforms

19 "What we do," Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, accessed May 4, 2014, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ABOUTUS/Pages/WhatWeDo.aspx>.

20 Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes.

21 Luke Glanville.

intended to strengthen social justice. As a corollary, adapting the approach of missions has magnified the footprint of the United Nations in host nations. Setting aside the legal and ethical debates, the bottom line remains whether or not these changes have had a positive impact on the effectiveness of PoC missions and improved their likelihood of success. The data seems to suggest that they do not.

Redefining “imminent threat” is the effect of R2P that has had the greatest impact on the way PoC missions approach peacekeeping. Since the protection of civilians first entered the spotlight in 1999, integrating preventative measures that deter humanitarian and human rights abuses has been an operational concern for PoC. These concerns, in fact, were mentioned specifically in the mandate authorizing the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)—the first PoC mission.<sup>22</sup> However, UNAMSIL—like the other PoC missions from that era, such as the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNTAET)—conducted operations in the field with the view that politics and security were the thematic priorities.<sup>23</sup> These missions were navigating in dangerous security environments in which the confluence of social or ethnic resentment and political turmoil had caused both the government and civil society to break down. Hence, the plan of action emphasized stabilizing the country, and the priorities were set at creating a secure environment for civilians—which included upholding the law and providing basic social services—while also nurturing a political process that would provide the foundation to strengthen social justice institutions in the near future.<sup>24</sup>

However, establishing parity between social justice reforms and measures aimed at stabilizing host nations was a controversial issue even at that time, as officials—namely Secretary General Kofi Annan—perceived peacebuilding and peacekeeping as “mutually enforcing.”<sup>25</sup> Certainly, neglecting to lay the groundwork for peacebuilding initiatives, such as developing the justice system and law enforcement sector, could undermine the exit strategy of the mission and defeat the purpose of restoring peace in the first place. For example, the absence of rule of law in a host nation could confuse UN personnel, when they come across instances in which civilians face the “imminent threat of physical violence” because of underdeveloped civil law. Local customs may permit the victim of a robbery to chop off the thief’s hand, for instance, but the practice is inhumane. Such circumstances represent gray areas regarding the definition of imminent threat. UN troops of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) have encountered such problems in the past. The primary issue was not necessarily that institutionalized inequality precluded troops from containing violence. The problem that UNMIL personnel experienced was procedural, as

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22 Security Council Resolution 1270, S/RES/1270 (22 October 1999), [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1270\(1999\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1270(1999)).

23 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone (New York: United Nations, 2003), p. 10-12, <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/SL-LL%20Report.pdf>.

24 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, UN peacekeeping operations in post-conflict Timor-Leste: Accomplishments and lessons learned (New York: United Nations, 2005), p. 5-7, <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbps/Library/untaet%2099-00.pdf>.

25 United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, S/1999/957 (8 September 1999), para. 33, <http://www.poa-iss.org/CASAUplod/ELibrary/S-1999-957EN.pdf>.

their confusion stemmed from the fact that they did not have clear guidance to direct their actions.<sup>26</sup> The experience of UNMIL troops exemplifies the general misperception of post-conflict scenarios that has led UN policymakers to overstate the urgency of including social justice initiatives in the short-term planning of peacekeeping operations.

Combining security and social justice into a single, nonspecific approach has been the preferred method of the Security Council, since the World Summit Outcome Document was released in 2005. Fueling the decision is their understanding of imminent threat of physical violence. Recall that to R2P advocates, “the root causes of genocide revolve around inequalities between identity groups.”<sup>27</sup> Preventative action is a responsibility of the international community that cannot be pushed to the background.<sup>28</sup> Inequality is an imminent threat. The very definition of imminent threat has been molded to reflect this notion. Unfortunately, expanding the meaning of this concept has obscured the operational guidance for PoC missions even further.<sup>29</sup>

It is hard to deny that there are operational conflicts associated with comprehensive planning, such as ambiguous objectives and unclear timelines.<sup>30</sup> The Security Council has tried to make structural changes to PoC missions, such as adopting staged transitions, to reconcile separate personnel units carrying out tasks that are tangential, but not necessarily mutually reinforcing. In the staged approach, the UN works closely with regional and multilateral organizations to coordinate an initial stage in which security is the primary responsibility of its partners. While partners fight to diminish violence, a UN political or observer mission helps to facilitate a political agreement and develop the social justice institutions of the host nation. Once the host nation meets certain conditions, the Security Council authorizes a full mission that transitions complete authority to the United Nations.

Although it does provide for better preparation and unites security and social justice under a single command, the staged strategy still fails to correct for the confusion on the ground caused by undefined priorities. In UNTAET, the presence of myriad partners exacerbated the challenge of tracking the progress made within the government and civil society toward achieving a sustainable peace. Hence, timelines for reaching political benchmarks were not met, and the delayed handover of authority to the Timorese created a “culture of dependency” instead of fostering a sense of empowerment.<sup>31</sup> Ownership is a guiding principle of peacekeeping operations, and facilitating multiple tasks, at the same time, forces the UN’s footprint to grow.<sup>32</sup> UNTAET demonstrated that the comprehensive approach hampers missions in meeting this standard of host nation participation.

Despite the indications that comprehensive PoC mandates may actually hinder the development

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26 Justin MacDermott and Mans Hanssen, “Protection of Civilians: Delivering on the Mandate through Civil-Military Coordination,” Swedish Defense Research Agency, September 2010, p 49, <http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/PBPS/Library/FOI%20PoC.pdf>.

27 United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, Booklet (New York: United Nations: 2010), p. 4, [http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg\\_booklet\\_eng.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_booklet_eng.pdf).

28 Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, p 8-9.

29 . Ibid.

30 Justin MacDermott and Mans Hanssen.

31 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (New York: United Nations, 2008), p. 38-39, [http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone\\_doctrine\\_eng.pdf](http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf)

32 UN peacekeeping operations in post-conflict Timor-Leste: Accomplishments and lessons Learned, p. 9.

of social justice, the Security Council has not relented in its support of the approach. Instead, the council has deepened its commitment to this vision for peacekeeping. Recent mandates have become even more diluted, as peacebuilding measures, such as human rights capacity-building, appear regularly as pillars of PoC mandates.<sup>33</sup> As a result, PoC missions have morphed into monumental undertakings that utilize more human and financial resources than any other missions in the history of peacekeeping.<sup>34</sup>

Nevertheless, unlike their cohorts, most PoC missions have faced a perpetual struggle to bring the security situation of the host nation under their complete control. For instance, the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has been conducting operations for several years, but current reports show that insecurity has actually grown worse in recent months.<sup>35</sup> In 2012, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) failed to stop the rebel group M23 from capturing Goma and other areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).<sup>36</sup> Over the course of several months, M23 displaced hundreds of thousands of people and committed myriad atrocities, including numerous acts of sexual violence, without any resistance. Ironically, years later, many members of M23 were soldiers who mutinied after receiving their posts through the reintegration process organized by MONUSCO.<sup>37</sup>

In the case of MONUSCO, the argument could be made that the decision of these soldiers to mutiny, in fact, proves that greater emphasis should be placed on social justice when designing PoC mandates, as M23 claimed to rebel over the government neglecting to pay their wages.<sup>38</sup> The soldiers may not have mutinied, if steps were taken to improve the efficiency of institutions and uphold fairness. Both assumptions are valid. However, outside of the threat of force, members of militias have no incentive to respect human rights, institutions or the rule of law.

This event reveals that prioritizing security is indelible to PoC missions. Compelling violent actors to comply with international norms and keeping the peace process on track are practical and foundational components of peacekeeping that fall outside the realm of social justice reform. It is hard to deny that prioritizing security would have allowed MONUSCO to prevent the subsequent attacks against civilians and encourage soldiers to seek retribution through the appropriate bureaucratic channels. Channeling the vast majority of resources to security measures would have given MONUSCO a preponderance of military power and forced rebels to choose between complying with the reintegration process or death in battle, over time. While the reality of this strategy is harsh, the truth of their fate would have inspired rebels to take ownership over the reintegration program, because frankly, participating in and sustaining the process would represent their only chance for survival in post-conflict DRC. In this manner, institutions

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33 Security Council Resolution 2149, S/RES/2149 (10 April 2014), [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2149\(2014\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2149(2014)).

34 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Fact Sheet (New York: United Nations, 2013), <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/bnote0613.pdf>

35 Security Council Resolution 2148, S/RES/2148 (3 April 2014), [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2148\(2014\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2148(2014)).

36 Azad Essa, "DR Congo rebels hand back control of Goma," *Al Jazeera*, December 2, 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/12/201212184043522311.html>.

37 "DRC: Understanding armed group M23," IRIN, June 22, 2012, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/95715/drc-understanding-armed-group-m23>.

38 *Ibid.*



would still have been strengthened, except the results would have been achieved organically.

To be fair, the international community has not provisioned PoC missions with the resources they need to succeed, regardless of the mandates put forth by the Security Council. For example in 2014, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) struggled for months to get a handle on extreme violence sparked by the rivalry between President Salva Kiir and the former vice president, Riek Machar. The voracity of the violence, in fact, forced UNMISS to scale back its activities and focus on stabilizing conditions on the ground, alone.<sup>39</sup> Despite its obvious debility, UNMISS has still not reached the augmented troop and police levels authorized by the Security Council and promised by member states.<sup>40</sup> Also, many other PoC missions have never received critical assets to contain violence, such as helicopters.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, it would be disingenuous to overlook the fact that these missions cannot eradicate insecurity even with the appropriate equipment, because the scope of their mandates is overwhelming. Furthermore, blaming the international community would ignore the reality of international politics. Frankly, it is understandable that nations desire some indication that the mission will succeed before investing large amounts of resources. Nations are responsible for their own populations, too. Thus, they want to be certain that their patronage will come to an end, at some point. Demonstrating that the conditions exist for society and stability to grow would be the strongest indication. A good first step would be ending hostilities. However, host nations cannot diminish violence and create the space for a peace process unless missions target security and political objectives as priorities.

There is agreement, UN-wide, that prevention is essential to PoC and should be an integral part of peacekeeping operations. However, the message is clear that priorities must be set and mandates refined to achieve stability, first, so that the personnel in PoC missions are certain how and when to act.<sup>42</sup> PoC mandates are most often approved for missions entering conflict scenarios in which violence is endemic and security, politics and human rights are all relevant issues. Therefore, clarity is imperative for peacekeeping officials on the ground, who on a daily basis must make split-second decisions regarding the allocation of resources, such as choosing to commit UN troops to secure a humanitarian aid corridor under attack or instead divert security personnel to protect a convoy of judicial experts teaching post-conflict law to native judges. Due to budgetary constraints, these choices can determine the success of missions, as the resources expended to complete one objective ostensibly detract from the operational capabilities available to complete another objective.

Furthermore, setting clear priorities for stabilization allows missions to design and reach benchmarks. With benchmarks, missions have a metric upon which adjustments can be made to ensure relative timelines are met and the transition of authority to the host nation remains on schedule. Ultimately, balancing objectives between prevention and stabilization overburdens the resources of PoC missions.

39 "UN/South Sudan," UNIFEED, accessed May 4, 2014, <http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/2014/03/un-south-sudan-13/>.

40 UNMISS Facts and Figures," UN Peacekeeping, accessed May 5, 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/facts.shtml>.

41 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN peacekeeping Operations: Dilemmas, Emerging Practices and Lessons (New York: United Nations, 2009).

42 *Ibid.*

While sustainable peace may be the common purpose that unites prevention and stabilization in the long-term, they represent different stages of conflict resolution for which distinct and divergent steps must be accomplished, in the short-term, to produce this shared outcome in the future. Following the trend of R2P and adding human rights to the traditional priorities of peacekeeping spreads the budgets and personnel of UN missions too thin, and in turn, undermines their ability to prevent large-scale injustice or stabilize the current political and security environment. The result is mission creep in which civilians are safe somewhat and institutions wield marginal authority to hold human rights violators accountable, but sustaining these conditions is tentative without the presence of the United Nations. This scenario effectively characterizes all active PoC missions, such as MONUSCO and UNAMID. Hence, while reforming aspects of the traditional approach to UN peacekeeping, such as the implementation process, may be advisable, politics and security remain the most rational and effective means of resolving conflict and cultivating a definitive roadmap for sustainable peace.

In the end, R2P advocates must think logically and decide whether upholding their principles outweighs reaching their goals. Abandoning the campaign to create parity between prevention and stabilization in PoC mandates may represent a loss in promoting respect for human rights and humanitarian norms, but the defeat would be symbolic. Although championing the rights of civilians in the immediate stages of PoC operations seems like a faster route to eradicating inequality, pervasive insecurity prohibits nascent institutions, which promote human dignity, from flourishing in the long-term. If R2P advocates truly care about preventing genocide and restoring the dignity of civilians in war-torn nations, they will encourage efforts to prioritize PoC mandates with clear benchmarks for politics and security, so that UN personnel can effectively place host nations on a path to sustainable peace. As a caveat, the international community must be ready and willing to act in support of peacekeeping operations, when conflicts arise. Missions can build solid foundations for institutions, so they are capable of building social justice during the transition stages of UN operations and functioning independently, eventually. In this manner, civil society can be empowered on its own accord, and justice will not only take root in institutions, but more permanently in the hearts and minds of people.

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# CONFLICT BETWEEN CONSTITUENCY AND REGULATORY INTEREST: FINAL RULE'S ALIGNMENT OF QRM AND QM DEFINITIONS

YU QI HAN

*After the Financial Crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act—commonly known as the Dodd-Frank Act—was signed into federal law by President Obama to bring significant changes to financial regulation. Since the initial proposal, major changes regarding the definition of Qualified Residential Mortgage occurred due to a conflict between constituency and regulatory interest. In broadening the definition of QRM, the weakened risk retention rule seems to contradict the original intention of the Dodd-Frank Act, which is to keep the sponsors' "skin in the game" by aligning investor and securitizer interest. This paper examines that conflict between constituency and regulatory interest, which led to the adoption of the final rule on credit risk retention in October 2014.*

On October 21st, 2014, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development together adopted the Final Rule, implementing the credit risk retention requirements of section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act for assetbacked securities. The Final Rule, Section 15G of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, along with section 941(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, prescribe regulations that first require a securitizer to retain no less than 5 percent of the credit risk of any asset that the securitizer transfers to a third party through the issuance, transfer, or sells of asset backed securities, and second, prohibits a securitizer from directly or indirectly hedging or otherwise transferring the credit risk that the securitizer is required to retain under the section 15G and the agencies' implementing rules (Securities and Exchange Act 15G. (C) 1A). The rules provide an incentive for securitizers to monitor and ensure the quality of the assets, and thus align the interest of the securitizers with that of the investors. The risk retention rules were initially proposed by the Joint Regulators in March 2011 and repropose in August 2013. Under the original proposal, a sponsor could satisfy risk retention obligations by retaining a first-loss "eligible horizontal residual interest" equal to at least 5 percent of the total par value of the asset-backed securities (ABS). The original proposal

also allowed a sponsor to fund a horizontal cash reserve account, equal to at least five percent of the par value of all the ABS interests. Perhaps the most controversial risk retention requirement in the original proposal was the Premium Capture Cash Reserve Account (PCCRA). This mechanism is designed by the regulators to prevent the sponsor from minimizing its retained economic exposure to the securitized assets by monetizing the excess spread or selling premium of interest only tranches of the mortgage-backed securities (MBS). However, many commenters, particularly JPMorgan Chase, asserted after the passing of the original proposal that the restrictive nature of the premium capture cash reserve account would severely restrict the increase of private capital in the residential real estate markets and curtail the issuance of non-agency residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) as well as commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). While the purpose of the PCCRA was to align the interests of the sponsor with those of the investors, the confining nature of the credit risk retention obligation on securitizers and loan originators in the private sector created a conflicting interest between regulators and the private sector, where eager lobbyists strive to elicit the manifestation of the regulation.

Being responsive to the interests of their financial constituencies, politicians responded accordingly. Coalition Letters on behalf of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the U.S. Department of Treasury, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) asserted collective opposition to the premium capture cash reserve mechanism. In a cost-benefit analysis, the effect of the premium capture rule includes a mortgage rate increase “of 1 to 4 percent points depending on the parameters of the mortgages being originated and the discount rate applied” (Bernanke, Maryo, Martin et. al). Alongside the Coalition Letter, former chairman of the House Financial Services Committee Rep. Spencer Bachus (R-AL) believed that the Dodd-Frank Act lacked statutory authority to create the PCCRA. There were also many similar statutory concerns expressed by House and Senate policymakers. It is not surprising how fast the policy makers responded to the interests of the financial sector constituency to relax the credit risk retention requirements in the reproposal given the record high lobbying expenditure of the National Association of Realtors, which accounts for one-third of all lobbying expenses in the sector. In particular, the National Association of Realtors’ contribution to former Chairman Bachus ranked second among the list of top contributors in 2010.<sup>1</sup> In fact, the National Association of Realtors spent more than \$22 million in 2011, making it the largest real estate lobbying organization in the year of the reproposal.

Heeding to the political interests of constituencies from the commercial and real estate sector, the agencies finally eliminated the cash reserve account mechanism in the repropose credit risk retention rules, which geared toward more flexibility in meeting the risk retention obligations. According to the original proposal, a sponsor either choose the retention of five percent vertical interest in each class of ABS interests, or a five percent horizontal first-loss interest in the securitization based on par value of the securities. In the repropose rule, a sponsor is given the option to “satisfy its obligation by retaining any combination of an ‘eligible vertical interest’ with a pro rata interest in all ABS interests issued and a first-loss ‘eligible horizontal residual interest’ to meet the five percent minimum requirement” (Credit Risk Retention Proposed Rule). In addition, the combined vertical and horizontal interests for which the sum of the percentage held as a vertical strip and the percentage of the market value of the eligible horizontal residual interest compared to all the issued ABS securities must be at least five percent. More

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<sup>1</sup> The data is obtained from Opensecrets.org. <http://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/contrib.php?type=C&cid=N00008091&newMem=N&cycle=2010>

importantly, the regulator's concerted effort to protect and enhance participation by the private sector extended to repropose a broadened scope of exemption from the risk retention requirements for ABS.

In the reproposal, the agencies simplified the breadth of the definition of QRM in the original proposal by aligning the definition of QRM with the definition of QM, under section 129C of the Truth in Lending Act 1987 (TILA). Under the original proposal, QRMs are prohibited from having product features including negative amortization, interest-only payments, or significant interest rate increases. The definition of QRM also entails a "down payment requirement of 20 percent in the case of a purchase transaction, maximum loan-to-value ratio of 75 percent on rate and term refinance loans and 70 percent for cashout refinance loans, as well as credit history criteria (or requirements)" (Credit Risk Retention Proposed Rule). The definition of QRM in the original proposal pinpoints high quality underwriting standards through maximum front-end and backend debt-to-income ratios. Commonly known as the mortgage-to-income ratio, the front-end debt ratio is computed by dividing the borrower's projected monthly mortgage payment by the monthly gross income. The backend ratio is known as the debt-to-income ratio. This ratio takes into account the borrower's current debt position to ensure his ability to take on home loan debt. In this case, car loans, personal loans and credit card debt payments are all taken into account to project the borrower's ability to afford new debt.

Thus, the agencies intended for the QRM definition to reflect very high underwriting standards, so that sponsors of securitized commercial and real estate loans that meet the standards would be exempted from the credit risk retention obligation due to historically low default rates of loans with high underwriting standards. Nonetheless, an overwhelming majority of commenters criticized the agencies' definition of QRM because of its twenty percent down payment requirement. After the release of the initial proposal, many commenters from the private sector asserted that the narrowly proposed QRM rule would prevent the private sector from becoming the primary source of credit for borrowers and make it more difficult to reduce the participation of the enterprises in the mortgage market.

Contrary to this argument is the further perverse effect of reduction in credit availability that makes it more difficult for low and moderate-income borrowers or first-time homebuyers to obtain a mortgage. As a tradeoff for higher underwriting standards to protect investors, the twenty percent down payment requirement can "stifle the ability and incentives for the private sector to extend funds to borrowers in the housing market" due to the comparative advantage of Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) (Chao 16). Under the original proposal as well as under the reproposal, as long as the enterprises<sup>2</sup> operate under conservatorship or receivership of Federal Housing Finance Agency, they will be provided a full guarantee for timely repayment of principal and interest with capital support from the United States government, in addition to their exemption from hedging and finance provisions. Since the agencies believed that this would satisfy the risk retention requirements of section 15G of the Exchange Act, GSEs are not obligated to satisfy the risk retention requirements and can thus avail credit risk retention options. Alternatively, commenters urged the agencies to align the QRM definition with the definition of QM, as implemented by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).

The agencies then aligned the definition of QRM with QM, qualified mortgage. On major piece of evidence that supports the alignment is the historically low default rate: "Loans that meet the QM criteria have a lower probability of default than mortgages that do not. This is especially true for loans originated close to the peak of the housing bubble: From 2005 to 2008, 23 percent of those that met the QM criteria experienced 90 days or more delinquency or a foreclosure by the end of 2012, compared with 44 percent of loans that did not meet the QM criteria" (Credit Risk Retention Proposed

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2 Federal National Mortgage Association, Fannie Mae, and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Freddie Mac.



Rule VI, B).

In addition to the low default rate, the QM rules provide lenders with a presumption of compliance with the ability to repay requirement under Section 129 (C)(a) of the Truth in Lending Act. This presumption zooms in on the traditional aspect of the mortgage market, and requires that “no creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable good faith determination based on verified and documented information that, at the time of the loan is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, insurance, and assessments.” Besides the protection of underwriting standards in the traditional ability to repay requirement under QM, the definition of QM also encourages the agencies to align the definitions of QRM with QM. Under the final rule, the definition of QM entails the following seven criterion that ensure borrowers’ ability to repay the loans:

- (i) regular periodic payments that are substantially equal; (ii) no negative amortization, interest only or balloon features; (iii) a maximum loan term of 30 years; (iv) total points and fees that do not exceed 3 percent of the total loan amount, or the applicable amounts specified for small loans up to \$100,000; (v) payments underwritten using the maximum interest rate that may apply during the first five years after the date on which the first regular period payment is due; (vi) consideration and verification of the consumer’s income and assets, including employment status if relied upon, and current debt obligations, mortgage related obligations, alimony and child support; (vii) total debt to income (DTI) ratio that does not exceed 43 percent (Credit Risk Retention Proposed Rule VI, C).

One fundamental difference between the original proposal which provided a complete exemption from risk retention requirements for ABS that are collateralized entirely by QRMs, and the reproposal, is that the initial proposal required the definition of a QRM be no broader than the definition of a QM. Compared to the seven criterion above, the QRMs have high quality underwriting standards, through both maximizing front-end and backend debt-income ratios and the 20 percent down payment requirement. In other words, the major reason to align the definition is to replace the down payment requirement with the more relaxed version of an ability-to-repay requirement. Despite the initial effort of regulators to ensure high underwriting standards, as shown in the strict exemption criterion under the definition of QRM, regulators succumbed to overwhelming lobbying by the alliance of bankers, lenders, and consumer advocate groups who furiously opposed the 20 percent down payment requirement.

It is not surprising that the final rule incorporated the alignment of the definitions, given the support of this alignment by many leading officials in the securitization markets. One of the officials who voiced his support on the alignment of the definition is David H. Stevens, the president of Mortgage Bankers Association, who asserted after the release of the final rule that “this is absolutely the most conservative framework ever in the history of this country, what has happened in the last weeks shouldn’t be reflected as going easy on the mortgage industry” (Eavis). However, his support of the elimination of the down payment requirement is not exceptional. Standing with Stevens was the Center for Responsible Lending, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Urban League, and four other consumer groups that said minimum down payment was unnecessary under the QM rule due to its prohibitive criterion on abusive and deceptive practices. While Stevens voiced his opinion on

the final adoption of the definition alignment, the consumer groups extended his opinion to the effects of the alignment on low and moderate-income borrowers:

Once the proposed product restrictions of QM are in place, a 10 percent down payment requirement would have only a marginal impact on default rates about one percentage point while locking 30 percent of borrowers out of the mainstream market... the impact would be felt most strongly by black and Latino borrowers... If regulators required borrowers to put down a 10 percent down payment, it would take black families 31 years to save for a home and Latino families 26 years... Currently, 60 percent of black homeowners and half of Latino homeowners put down less than a 10 percent down payment... As a result, not only would a regulatory down payment requirement exacerbate the already enormous wealth gap between white and nonwhite families, but it could create a new 'dual market,' where minority and moderate-income borrowers are relegated to fringe mortgage products served outside the financial mainstream (Eavis).

Regulators, heeding warnings from consumer advocates, thus voted to require only that a bank document a borrower's ability to repay a loan and ensure their debt is below a certain threshold, as now required by the ability-to-repay requirement in the adopted final rules of credit risk retention. It is not surprising how regulators reacted to the advocates due to the political difficulties: "A broad array of politically powerful interests have lobbied heavily against risk retention, congress created regulatory agencies as independent entities for times such as these, when protection of the broad public interest requires that regulators stand up to the selfinterest of powerful and well financed constituencies" (Eavis).

Accordingly, in compliance with the consumer advocate's interest, the government recently announced plans to use the enterprises to expand credit, rather than reducing their outside role in the housing market. Melvin L. Watt, the director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and former Democratic congressman told the Senate Banking Committee that "Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae (the Government Sponsored Enterprises) will guarantee some loans with down payments of as little as 3 percent in order to lower the barriers and restrictions on borrowers with weak credits" (Swanson). His effort to expand credit rather than reducing the role of GSEs is not surprising given that his DW NOMINATE score is 0.544, indicating that ideology is a powerful predictor of legislative actions.

Similar to Stevens, Watt also took into account the concerns of private sector participants and reviewed the forthcoming revisions to GSE lending standards accordingly. Among the evidence presented to regulators in order to eliminate the down payment requirement was a mutual concern among many bankers that shed light on the credit flow in the housing market, which has remained tight for borrowers with low credit scores or little funds to make down payments. Bankers have found that:

Mortgage applications in the first six months of 2014, as measured by the Mortgage Bankers Association application indexes, were at the lowest levels since the 1990s. Existing home sales rose only 3.5 percent in the first six months of 2014 and are still roughly 25 percent below their 2004 level. In addition, the private label RMBS market remains extremely small and limited to mortgages of very high credit quality. In the second quarter of 2014, less than 1 percent of mortgage originations were funded through privatelabel RMBS (QRM Final Rule Released, 358).

Given the alleged decrease of mortgage applications in the privatelabel RMBS market, bankers fervently lobbied Congress for their own profits. To be specific, “Between 400 and 500 members of Congress got involved in arguing against any requirement that would require significant down payments for loans to be classified in the QRM group” (Norris). Ironically, their argument to bring back the privatelabel residential mortgage-backed securities is mostly invalid, since RMBS’s role in the mortgage industry is historically unimportant. Indeed, it does not make sense for government agencies to implement rules with the goal of increasing the role of privatelabel RMBS. Only recently have private-label mortgage-backed securities grown to influence the market. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, privatelabel RMBS—or nonagency securities—funding peaked at about 21 percent before the subprime collapse:

By 2005 and 2006, Wall Street was securitizing one-third more loans than Fannie and Freddie. In just two years, private label mortgage-backed securities had grown more than 30 percent; reaching \$1.15 trillion in 2006... the biggest gains over this period were in the ‘sand states’: places like the Los Angeles suburbs (“The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report”).

Just like the financial sector, the power of the real estate sector does not arise from the raw numbers of voters it commands. Instead, employment in the real estate sector is smaller and less concentrated than in the financial sector. Nevertheless, they are “overrepresented in places like Florida, California, and Nevada, where housing bubble was the greatest” (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal, 76). It is thus not at all surprising that the bankers want to bring the private RMBS back to the market, because despite the small portion of the labor force in real estate and the financial sector in each congressional district, members of Congress are very responsive to their views.

Influenced by bankers who want to increase the role of private RMBS, the Enterprises aimed to expand credit availability, rather than reducing their outside role in the housing market. Recognizing an array of concerns by private participants in the mortgage industry, director Watt<sup>3</sup> highlighted the upcoming revisions to the GSE lending standards in his speech at the Mortgage Bankers Association’s Annual Convention. Despite the importance of strict underwriting standards in developing a stable market, as documented in the 2014 Strategic Plan for the Conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:

some originators and mortgage insurers have placed additional conditions such as higher minimum credit score requirements on top of the acceptable credit standards of each Enterprise. These credit overlays result in the rejection of many loans that would otherwise meet Enterprise credit standards. In this current market context, FHFA is required to meet its statutory obligation of enabling “liquid, efficient, competitive, and resilient national housing finance markets” while ensuring the Enterprises meet their fundamental safety and soundness obligation (Federal Affair Finance Agency).

While Watt aims to lower the barriers and restrictions on borrowers with weak credit, many other leading officials disagree with the GSE approach to expanding its role in order to increase private capital presence in the market.

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<sup>3</sup> President Obama also nominated Watt as the head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversight the Federal Housing Administration, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The U.S. Senate confirmed Watt on December 10, 2013.

Many officials believe that the alignment of the QM and QRM of final rule on credit risk retention will work against the initial purpose of coordinating investor interest with that of the securitizers. In particular, SEC Commissioner Gallagher said in a dissenting statement at the open meeting regarding the final rule on credit risk retention that “by applying the government’s QRM label—with its unambiguous declaration that a loan is ‘qualified’—to virtually any residential mortgage, we render the new standard meaningless at best, deleterious at worst:

It was securitizations of what we called subprime RMBS carrying triple A ratings from credit rating agencies implicitly endorsed by the government as “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations” that played a major role in the last crisis. For the next, there won’t even be the “subprime” moniker to dissuade investors from purchasing securitizations of lowquality loans. Instead, residential mortgages with zero percent down and weak loan-to-value ratios that in the past would have been called subprime will now carry the same “quality” endorsement from the government as solid mortgages with significant down payments and strong LTV ratios. When every mortgage is labeled as “qualified,” investors should assume none really will be (Gallagher).

In line with Gallagher’s opinion, former chairwoman of the FDIC Sheila Bair pointed out, “since securitizers won’t be required to retain risk for privatelabel securities, investors will continue to be reluctant to buy their securities. So the government backed ones [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] will remain pretty much the only game in town” (Norris). It is only a matter of time until the agencies change the approach on credit risk retention, given the conflicting interest between the coalition of mortgage lenders, home builders, lowincome mortgage advocates, consumer groups and the regulators who proposed the initial 20 percent down payment requirement.

Lobbying by both the real estate sector and the financial sector, in a span of three years since the initial proposal, defeated the idea behind the initial proposal, which aimed to create a twotier mortgage market: the first tier including the mortgages deemed to be QRM, characterized by substantial down payments that ensure minimum default risk, and the second tier including the riskier mortgages that can only be securitized with the obligation of PCCRA and the five-percent rule. After heavy lobbying by mortgage lenders, home builders, and lowincome mortgage advocates who were concerned that the risk retention rule would reduce the availability of loans, the final rule eventually gave in to the lobbyists and provided the market with a weakened version of the initial proposal.

The final proposal contradicts the initial purpose of regulatory measures and encourages the securitizer to employ originate-to-distribute methods which allow them to obtain profit while exposing the entire securities market to heightened default risk, in the absence of PCCRA. Combined with the effect of the elimination of down payments, the quality of a “qualified” residential mortgage decreases enormously. The ability to repay requirement watered down the exemption rule by bringing back the traditional notion of a borrowerlender relationship, that is, a “good” faith measurement of the ability to repay, instead of a strict and more predictable exemption such as originally proposed by the QRM definition. Even though the QM rule excludes notorious mortgages such as nodocument loans, negative amortization loans, interestonly loans, and balloon payment loans, the mortgage industry is eased to the extent that the previous financial crisis might happen again, due to the deteriorated underwriting standards included in the final rule.

To understand the extent to which bad underwriting standards can result in another financial crisis, it is important to look at what happened to GSEs in the past. One major cause of the previous financial crisis was deteriorated underwriting standards, in which there were an increase in the loan origination to low documentation and low down payment borrowers. Before the financial crisis, the privatelabel issuers could not compete effectively with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for conforming mortgages. Instead, privatelabel issuers competed through subprime mortgages and loans, which were not eligible for guarantee by GSEs. After the underwriting guidelines shifted away from the rulesbased underwriting system, GSEs incorporated riskbased pricing of subprime finance by privatelabel underwriters. Indeed, there was a gradual yet significant decrease in the underwriting standards, which then led to the financial crisis. More specifically, the decline of underwriting standards started five years before the financial crisis. Between 2003 and 2007, while median FICO scores for Freddie Mac were constant, underwriting standards had deteriorated because there was more origination to low documentation borrowers and borrowers with low down payments or higher loantovalue ratios. The relaxation of underwriting standards in the adopted final rule that zooms in on the traditional, abilityto repay requirement is similar to the path undertaken by GSEs in the past. While the final rule intends to revive the housing market, the housing market is harmed rather than aided by the expansion of creditavailability, as many bankers and consumer advocates asserted.

Due to the strong and conflicting interests centered on the adoption of the QM rule and whether the goal of increasing credit availability should overweigh the initial goal of aligning investor interest with that of the securitizers, the agencies believe that it would be beneficial to periodically review the QRM definition after the adoption of the final rule. The agencies are committed to review the QRM definition at regular intervals to consider changes that may include:

The structures of securitization, the relationship between, and roles undertaken by, the various transaction parties, implications for investor protection and financial stability arising from relationship between Enterprise markets and private label markets, and trends in mortgage products in various markets and structures (QRM Final Rule Released 361).

In proposing to align the QRM definition with QM, the agencies reviewed the advantages and disadvantages of this decision as the market evolves, in order to ensure that the risk retention rule best meets the statutory objective of the section 15G of the Exchange Act. This approach is further explained by the chair of US Securities and Exchange Commission Mary Jo White, who stated at the Open Meeting in October 2014:

While this approach is appropriate today, it is important that we closely monitor the implementation of this exemption to assess its impact. Mortgage and securitization market conditions change and underwriting practices and product offerings evolve... It is therefore essential, in my view, that the rules we are considering today now include a commitment by the agencies to review the QRM definition at regular intervals, or at the request of any agency. This requirement will provide the agencies the opportunity to consider changed circumstances, including any changes to the structure and framework of the GSEs and these markets and whether additional regulatory changes affecting securitization should be made ("SEC Supports Final Risk Retention Rule").

In this way, the agencies hoped to continue to reasonably balance the goals of helping to ensure high quality underwriting and appropriate risk management with the public interest in continuing access to credit for creditworthy borrowers. The agencies should commence a review of the definition of QRM not later than four years after the effective date of the Final Rule, and no later than five years after the completion of the initial review, and every five years thereafter. The agencies intended to complete each review no later than 6 months after initial notice of review, and following the review, and will jointly publish a notice that includes their conclusions from the reviews and, as part of such reviews, take actions required by applicable law. This allows the agencies to “take into account developments in the residential mortgage market as well as the results of the CFPB’s five-year review of the ability-to-repay rules and the QM definitions, which is required under section 1022(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act” (QRM Final Rule Released).

Whether or not the CFPB will have the ability to take on the burden of reviewing the QM definition in five years is still debatable under current circumstances. The CFPB regulates the offerings and provisions of consumer financial products and services under the federal consumer financial laws, and ensures that the federal consumer financial laws are enforced. The Bureau has the authority to administer, enforce, and otherwise implement federal consumer financial laws, which includes power to make rules, issue orders, and issue guidance. Unfortunately, CFPB’s growth has been accompanied by its internal control weaknesses since its establishment in 2011. For the past three years, CFPB “continued to grow and developed from 58 employees at the beginning of fiscal year 2011 to 1443 employees at the end of fiscal year 2014.” According to the financial audit of CFPB’s 2013 and 2014’s financial statements by the Government Accountability Office (GAO):

CFPB’s internal control over financial reporting was not effective as of September 30, 2014, because of a material weakness in internal control over the reporting of account payable...CFPB did not have effective procedures in place to determine and record an appropriate amount for goods and services received but not yet paid for as of September 30, 2014, [and furthermore] CFPB did not have effective review procedures to timely detect and correct inaccuracies in the accrual amounts...the material weakness may adversely affect any decisions by CFPB’s management that are based, in whole or in part, on information that is inaccurate because of this weakness (Johnson, Crapo, Hensarling et al.).

In addition to material weaknesses, in a House Financial Service Committee hearing on January 28th, 2014, Chairman Jeb Hensarling delivered his opening statement regarding CFPB:

He believes that the Bureau is fundamentally unaccountable to the president since the director can only be removed for cause. Fundamentally unaccountable to Congress because the bureau’s funding is not subject to appropriations. Fundamentally unaccountable to the courts because Dodd-Frank requires courts to grant the CFPB deference regarding its interpretation of Federal consumer financial law. Thus, the Bureau regrettably remains unaccountable to the American people (Johnson, Crapo, Hensarling et al.).

Since the creation of the CFPB by Elizabeth Warren (DMA), both Republicans and Democrats have concerns that a single politically appointed director will be unstable in terms of policy changes. However, since the Republicans have taken over the Senate, there will likely be three changes to the

Bureau before the five year review of QRM definition happens under the requirement of the Dodd-Frank Act: firstly, Congress likely has the right to review its budget, secondly, it is likely that CFPB will be changed from a single director driven agency to bipartisan commission, and thirdly, there will be a method for ensuring that the Bureau's actions do not produce bank failure. If a Republican does not win the presidency in 2016, there will likely be gridlock.

Even though the agencies strive to closely monitor the implication of exemption, given the broad array of politically powerful interests that have lobbied heavily against risk retention, the regulatory agencies have succumbed and will possibly give in to the broad public interests. The self-interest of powerful constituencies, such as the alliance of bankers in the financial sector and the concentrated capability of the real estate sector will likely force the regulators to modify the final rule according to the interests of its well financed constituencies. While Watt understood the importance of prudent standards for stable markets, he nevertheless opposes higher minimum credit score requirements on top of the credit standards of each Enterprise. As former chairman of the House Financial Service Committee Barney Frank points out, “the loophole has eaten the rule, and there is no residential mortgage risk retention” (Norris). Furthermore, it is vital for the agencies to review the QRM alignment with the QM definition at regular intervals, because it is very important to change the definition according to changed circumstances, including the structure and framework of the GSEs.

In examining the final rule's adoption of the QRM definition in alignment with the QM definition, it is apparent that the broadening definition of QRM, as a result of lobbying from conflicting interest groups, has controversial effects. The final rule's elimination of the down payment requirement especially reflects the strength of the alliance formed by bankers, consumer advocates, and mortgage lenders. On the positive side, the ability-to-pay requirement and the elimination of down payment represents the regulators' effort to repair the housing market and extend credit to creditworthy borrowers. However, past evidence from the history of GSEs and the warning from Ms. Bair and Gallagher suggests that the watered down risk retention rule will worsen the “loophole,” in which sponsors avoid keeping their “skin in the game” by forming alliance with other interest groups to increase their profit at the cost of the investors (Gallagher). In the absence of the PCCRA, the final credit risk retention rule would allow sponsors to monetize the excess spread before the performance of the securitized assets could be observed or unexpected losses realized. In this way, sponsors could originate to distribute, which would increase the exposure of the entire securities market to heightened default risk via misalignment of investor securitizer interests.

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
# THE EFFECT OF EDUCATION ON IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN THE U.S. CONGRESS: AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ANALYSIS

JACLYN KASLOVSKY

*This paper attempts to answer the following question: have increasing levels of education contributed to increasing levels of political polarization in Congress? While many studies have sought to explain increasing congressional polarization, the phenomenon remains largely unexplained. Some evidence suggests that increased education leads to more extreme ideological preferences, and we know that the increasing education levels of members of Congress have greatly outpaced increases in the general population. Yet to date, no study has sought to explain increases in congressional polarization as a function of increases in congressional educational levels. My study addresses this gap in the literature by using an instrumental variable design with eligibility for the 1944 G.I. Bill as an exogenous instrument, and the number of post-secondary degrees held by a member of the 89th Congress as the endogenous independent variable. The dependent variable is a measure of ideological extremism derived from roll call votes, known as a DW-NOMINATE score. The results indicate that Democratic Senators in the 89th Congress were in fact polarized by education, while their Republican peers were not.*

## **Statement of Research Question**


The 112th Congress, in session from January 5th, 2011 to January 2nd, 2013, was the most polarized Congress in modern history (Barber and McCarty 2013). Using Howard Rosenthal and Keith Poole's DW-NOMINATE scores, which plot legislators on the ideological spectrum based on their roll call votes, polarization can be measured by taking the difference between the mean scores of the two parties. Figure 1 reports this measure of polarization from 1879 to 2013 (Rosenthal, Poole, and Hare 2013).



Polarization in Congress has greatly outpaced polarization in the electorate. In “Political Polarization of the Mass Public,” Fiorina and Abrams (2008) argue that “the most direct evidence — citizens’ positions on public policy issues — shows little or no indication of increased mass polarization over the past two or three decades” (563).

While many studies have sought to explain increasing congressional polarization, the phenomenon remains largely unexplained (Hirano et al 2010, Baldassarri and Gelman 2008, McCarty et al 2006). Yet few studies have considered rising educational levels as a cause of rising congressional polarization. Some evidence suggests that increased education is associated with more extreme ideological preferences (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). And we know that the education levels of members of Congress have been steadily increasing (Peterson 2012). In addition to being the most polarized Congress in modern history, the 112th was also one of the best most educated. In the 89th Congress (1965-67), for example, 58.2 percent of Representatives and 66.0 percent of Senators held graduate degrees. This is in contrast to the 112th Congress, during which 72.6 percent of Representatives and 76.0 percent of Senators held graduate degrees (Peterson 2012: 15). Figure 2 reports a sample of educational levels from the 79th to the 112th Congresses.

**Figure 9. Four or More Years of College Completed by Representatives, Senators, and U.S. Population, Selected Congresses Since 1945**



**Source:** CQ Press Electronic Library, CQ Congress Collection; CQ Roll Call, *Guide to the New Congress, 112th Congress*; U.S. Census Bureau; and CRS calculations. U.S. data are based on Americans aged 25 years or older.

Over this same time period, polarization in both chambers increased markedly. The difference between the mean DW-NOMINATE scores for the Democrats and Republicans in the 89th House of Representatives was only 0.47. This figure is low when compared to the 112th House, which had an ideological difference between the parties of 1.06. Likewise, the 89th Senate had a polarization score of only 0.57, whereas the 112th Senate had a polarization score of 0.80.

Moreover, like the phenomenon of ideological polarization, the education of members of Congress has been consistently higher than the general population (Peterson 2012). For example, in 1970, the national average for completing four or more years of college was 10.7 percent (Census.gov). This figure had risen to 27.9 percent by 2009 (Peterson 2012). This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 2.

Yet to date no study has sought to explain increases in congressional polarization as a function of increases in congressional educational levels. My study will address this gap in the literature by analyzing the connection between education and ideological extremism in the 112th and 89th Congresses. I will also attempt to address the endogeneity of educational levels by implementing an instrumental variable design using G.I. Bill eligibility as an instrument for the educational levels of members of the 89th Congress. My research will attempt to answer the following question: Have increasing levels of education contributed to increasing polarization in Congress?

### Literature Review

Using estimates of congressional preferences derived from roll call votes, scholars of Congress have found that Representatives and Senators from the two political parties have moved increasingly farther apart from each other since the 1970s (McCarty et al 2006). Several explanations have been proposed for congressional polarization, including redistricting, Southern realignment, and primary elections (McCarty et al 2009, Heberlig et al 2006). Yet the evidence for these explanations remains weak (Hirano et al 2010).

One possible explanation that has yet to be pursued is that congressional polarization has been at least in part a function of the increasing educational levels of members of Congress. Numerous studies have found that education leads individuals to become more ideologically consistent (Bishop 1976, Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). The likely causal mechanism is that education works to reaffirm pre-existing ideologies.

In his 1976 empirical study "The Effect of Education on Ideological Consistency," George Bishop argues that "rising levels of education should be substituted for political salience as an explanation for rising ideological consistency" (Bishop 1976:338). Using survey data from 1964, 1968, and 1972, Bishop used feeling thermometer questions to "construct an overall index of ideological consistency based directly on liberal-conservative content" (341). Individuals' ratings of conservatives were subtracted from their ratings of liberals, leaving Bishop with a range of scores from +97 to -97. The correlation between these scores and attitudes on sociopolitical issues was then used as an indicator of ideological consistency. With level of education as the independent variable and the ideological consistency index as the dependent variable, Bishop found that "better educated groups respond in a more consistently ideological fashion" (344). Furthermore, the results revealed "the greatest difference across educational groups occurred on the issue of government power, an issue which has traditionally divided Democrats from Republicans as well as liberals from conservatives... Thus one important effect of education may be to reinforce existing ideological cleavage or consensus" (342). This finding indicates that there is a negative relationship between level of education and moderation.

Bishop suggests the causal story that attending college exposes individuals to more information. It is possible that this exposure makes college educated individuals more familiar with political issues, allowing them to form opinions on a wider variety of topics (344). Additionally, it is also possible that students use this information to bolster their pre-existing beliefs, leading college educated individuals to hold more consistent opinions. Essentially, instead of moderating existing opinions, access to more information could lead individuals to simply extend their ideologies across the issue spectrum.

However, Bishop's study does not support an inference of causality. It is possible that more ideologically consistent individuals choose to complete more years of education, and not the other way around. This might be the case due to the nature of highly ideological individuals. For example, if someone feels strongly about their beliefs, they may seek more information in order to strengthen their arguments. Increases in education are occurring at the same time as Republicans shifting further to the ideological right. While this trend goes against the commonly held idea that more education leads to more liberal opinions, empirical evidence exists showing that education can also lead individuals to become more conservative (Weakliem 2002). In his paper "The Effects of Education on Political Opinions: An International Study" (2002), David Weakliem explores the "core values thesis," which suggests that education increases commitment to the values of a society, allowing for shifts to either the right or left depending on the issue. Using data from the 1989-93 World Values Survey (WVS), Weakliem tested for the effect of additional years of education on opinions that fall within four categories: political issues, judgments of morality, confidence in institutions, and more general issues. The survey measures for the dependent variables were then standardized for the sake of comparison. He uses a "mixed model," adding nation-specific random variables to the constants of a basic regression. The results reveal that "education shifts opinions to the left on most questions, but to the right on a significant minority...it has conservative effects on the central economic questions that have traditionally divided the left and right" (2002:148). For example,

the coefficient for the variable indicating preference for whether the individual vs. state should hold more responsibility was  $-0.571$ , meaning education makes individuals more conservative on this issue and is significant at the 0.1 percent level. This finding shows that it is possible for more education to increase conservatism on certain issues, possibly explaining the shift of Republicans to the ideological right.

This may be the case due to the fact that higher education exposes individuals to more information. It is possible that students are learning about economics for the first time in college, leading them to shift to the right upon learning about this set of issues. It is also possible that certain colleges present economic material in a conservative light. Additionally, it may be the case that individuals process information in ways that bolster their pre-existing beliefs, leading education to increase conservatism in students that already hold conservative values.

However, this study presents the problem of endogeneity. It is possible that more economically conservative individuals simply prefer more education, and that this is the effect being demonstrated in Weikleim's study. Economic conservatives may prefer more education due to the ideology's emphasis on business and Wall Street. It is possible that economic conservatives feel compelled to complete more degrees, such as an M.B.A or M.A., in order to be competitive in fields that are associated with economics and finance.

In the study "The Automacity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis," Milton Lodge and Charles Taber (2005) test the hot cognition hypothesis, which states that when individuals think about a political issue, person, or symbol, these ideas become positively or negatively charged. This happens because these emotional charges make ideas easier to recall from one's long-term memory. As a result, emotional charges become embedded in our minds, making it difficult for individuals to break free of pre-existing sentiments.

To test this hypothesis, students at Stony Brook University were shown a priming word on a screen. Priming words act like a cue, implicitly stimulating certain thoughts or feelings in the test subject. For this study, the primes were chosen from a sample of political objects, including various persons, groups and issues. The test subjects were then shown a second "target" word with "widely accepted evaluative implications" (2005: 467), and were told to indicate as quickly as possible whether the target word was "positive/good" or "negative/bad." Reaction time to rate the target word is the dependent variable, and knowledge of/attitude towards the prime word are the independent variables. The authors hypothesize that reaction time to rate the target word will be faster for politically knowledgeable individuals, since they are more likely to have pre-existing political opinions, and that response times will be faster when the prime word is congruent with the subject's own beliefs. For example, a prime word used in the experiment was "Gun Control," and a possible target word could have been "Death." The authors expect the reaction time to rate "Death" as negative to be faster for individuals who are against gun control. In this study, political knowledge is measured as the correct number of responses on a political knowledge test, with results "subjected to a median split, with 0 coded for unsophisticates, 1 for sophisticates" (2005: 466).

The results show that politically knowledgeable individuals have faster response times than individuals below the median, and answer more slowly when they feel negatively about the political object in question. This shows that it is more difficult for politically knowledgeable individuals to process information that goes against their own ideologies. It is important to note that people with high levels of political knowledge are likely to have high levels of education.

However, Lodge and Taber cannot claim a causal relationship between political knowledge and hot cognition, since it is possible that more biased individuals choose to acquaint themselves with more political information that back up their opinions. This may be the case since holding a heavily biased (or very consistent) world-view requires connecting information that ties together the issues. Such information provides the necessary support for opinions, debates, and policy making. More biased or ideologically consistent individuals may then seek out more political knowledge and education in order to bolster their prior biases.

Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) test the hypothesis that more highly educated individuals are more ideologically consistent by looking for varying levels of partisanship between subgroups of educational levels. Using NES Survey data from 1972-2004, the authors measured correlations between individuals' self-reported partisanship and their issue positions, between self-reported ideology and issue positions, and between pairs of issue positions. These correlations were used as the dependent variables, and level of education was used as the independent variable. The data revealed that individuals with more education have consistently higher correlations across the issues of the economy, morality, civil rights, and foreign policy than those with less education (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008:436). This seems to indicate that more education leads to more structured and consistent ideological opinions. The proposed causal mechanism is that higher education endows students with enhanced analysis skills. These skills enable educated individuals to match their issue preferences with an ideology that best suits their beliefs. As a result, such individuals often end up sorting themselves along party lines.

However, Baldassarri and Gelman cannot claim a causal relationship between education and ideological consistency. It is possible that more ideologically consistent individuals choose to complete more years of education. Such individuals may seek to bolster their ideas by acquiring information that legitimizes their existing beliefs and reaffirms their outlook on life.

### **Causal Model**

The causal model for this paper is based on the work by Lodge and Taber (2005), which explains that political sophisticates are more likely to experience the effects of hot cognition. In "Automated Analysis," they explain that individuals who are well informed are likely to have pre-existing opinions on a wider variety of issues. Such pre-existing opinions lead individuals to have a difficult time processing information that is incongruent with their own ideas. We also know that higher levels of education lead to higher levels of information (McMahon 2009: 260). Attaining higher levels of political knowledge may lead students to become "biased information processors," meaning that the information they actually retain is more likely to be congruent with their pre-existing beliefs (Lodge and Taber 2005: 455). This may lead students to reject views that would otherwise pull them towards the center of the ideological spectrum.

It is important to note that while members of Congress have traditionally held undergraduate degrees, the number of graduate degrees held by members of Congress is increasing (Peterson 2012). It is possible that this hot cognition effect is magnified in graduate school, during which students are presented with higher levels of information. This information could lead members of Congress to form even more consistent ideologies, pulling them away from the ideological center (Bishop 1976, Baldassarri and Gelman 2008).

However, political polarization cannot be attributed equally to the two parties (McCarty 2013). The rising level of polarization in American politics is mostly due to a shift of the Republican Party to the right. Republicans have become much more conservative since the mid-1970's, with mean House Republican DW-NOMINATE scores increasing from 0.22 in 1975 to 0.67 in 2012 (Rosenthal, McCarty et al 2013). Although Democrats have also shifted to the left, most of the shift can be attributed to the replacement of Southern Democrats with Republicans. After this is taken into account, the Northern "...Democrats of the 1970s are ideologically indistinguishable from their present-day counterparts, with average scores around -0.4" (Rosenthal, McCarty et al 2013).

It is possible that education might polarize Republicans more than Democrats. A possible causal mechanism is that education increases ideological consistency more in conservative individuals, relative to more liberal individuals. In the study "Cognitive Style and Political Ideology" (1983), Philip E. Tetlock tests the idea that political ideology is connected to the way one learns or thinks. To do so, he analyzes the relationship between ideological extremism and integrative complexity, or the ability to overcome black-white thinking and form connections between different viewpoints. He proposes two possible hypotheses. The first is that conservative senators "rely more on simple (good vs. bad) evaluative rules in interpreting policy issues than liberal or moderate senators" (Tetlock 1983: 118). The possible causal mechanism is that more conservative individuals "adopt rigid, dichotomous and value-laden interpretations of events," which lead conservatives to embrace more simplified ideological beliefs than liberals (Tetlock 1983: 118). This could be the case, Tetlock posits, because individuals with conservative attitudes tend to prefer order and be intolerant of uncertainty (Tetlock 1983: 119).

The second hypothesis is that senators who vote in ideologically consistent patterns are more likely to rely on simple evaluative rules. If this is the case, the possible causal mechanism is that ideological extremists, whether on the right or left of the ideological spectrum, are more ideologically consistent. Tetlock uses political classification (including liberal, moderate, and conservative) as an independent variable to predict the level of integrative complexity used in policy statements from 1975 and 1976. Political classification was measured using Americans for Democratic Action's ratings of voting records. Integrative complexity is measured using a coding system based off of a seven-point scale. The results show that conservative senators make less complex policy statements than liberals and moderates. However, Tetlock found no difference in integrative complexity between liberals and moderates. These findings indicate that conservative senators process information in less integratively complex ways. It is possible that as education increases among the political elite, conservative Representatives process the information presented to them in ways that eliminate inconsistent ideas that would normally pull them towards the ideological center. As a result, increasing education could lead Republicans to shift towards the right, removing the ability for compromise in Congress.

### **The 112th Congress**

As a first cut attempt at analyzing the relationship between levels of education and polarization among members of Congress, I collected data on the 112th Congress (2011-2013). Biographical information on members of the 112th Congress was collected from the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, a database updated by the Senate Historical Office and the Office of History and Preservation of the House of Representatives. A data set was created for the House and Senate,



including year of birth, number of post-secondary degrees attained, and the DW-NOMINATE score for each member. DW-NOMINATE scores, which were downloaded from [voteview.com](http://voteview.com), plot legislators on the ideological spectrum based on roll call votes on a scale from -1 to 1. All of the regressions reported in this paper use the absolute value of the member's DW-NOMINATE scores.

Additionally, the data set contains numerous control variables, including political party and whether the member is from a southern state or not. States counted in this dataset as southern include Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. This is the official list of southern states as defined by the U.S. federal government (Encyclopedia Britannica). Controls for the percent foreign born, percent unemployed, and percent African American in a congressional district or state were also included. This data was collected from the United States Census American Community Survey for the 112th Congress. These control variables were included in order to represent other potential influences on ideological extremism among representatives. Southern realignment, increases in immigrant population, income inequality, and majority minority districts have all been pointed to as potential culprits behind political polarization (McCarty et al 2006).

There are 442 members of the House of Representatives included in the dataset, although only 438 have DW-NOMINATE scores. There are more than 435 Representatives are included, due to accounting for members resigning or dying and needing to be replaced. For instance, there are 101 senators included due to Senator Brian Schatz filling the vacancy left by Senator Daniel Inouye. Senator Schatz is the only senator missing a DW-NOMINATE score.

As reported in Table 1, the average Representative and Senator in the 112th Congress held 1.78 and 1.84 postsecondary degrees, respectively. In the House, approximately 1 percent of the representatives held 0 postsecondary degrees, 33 percent held 1 postsecondary degree, 55 percent held 2 postsecondary degrees, 10 percent held 3 postsecondary degrees, and 1 percent held 4 postsecondary degrees. In the Senate, approximately 1 percent of senators held 0 postsecondary degrees, 23 percent held 1 postsecondary degree, 69 percent held 2 postsecondary degrees, and 8 percent held 3 postsecondary degrees.

T-tests were performed comparing the differences in the mean absolute value of DW-NOMINATE scores between the groups of members of the 112th Congress who were above and below each chamber's mean educational level. The results can be seen in Tables 2 and 3. The p-value for the House is 0.30, meaning that the difference in means is not significant. The p-value for the Senate is 0.35, also indicating that the difference in means is not significant. These results suggest that there is not a significant difference between the absolute values of the mean DW-NOMINATE scores between the groups above and below each chamber's mean education level in the 112th Congress.

I then ran a series of OLS regressions to further test whether holding more postsecondary degrees leads members of the 112th Congress to become more ideologically extreme, i.e. to have DW-NOMINATE scores farther away from zero. To do so, I set the absolute value of the member's DW-NOMINATE score as the dependent variable and the number of postsecondary degrees held as the independent variable. As shown in Table 4, the variable for number of postsecondary degrees is not statistically significant in the regressions, either with or without controls, for either chamber. These results indicate that holding an additional postsecondary degree does not have a significant effect on the absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score.

Next, I ran the regressions again with the addition of an interaction between number of postsecondary degrees and political party. This interaction term tests whether education polarizes Republicans more than Democrats. The coefficient on the interaction variable indicates the additional effect of one more postsecondary degree on the absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score when the member is a Republican. Once again, the coefficient on number of postsecondary degrees for both houses of Congress is not statistically significant in the regressions either with or without controls. The coefficient for the interaction term also fails to be significant. These results imply that education does not have a greater polarizing effect on Republicans than on Democrats in the 112th Congress.

The control variable for political party is significant in both houses for all of the regressions. The variable is coded as one if the member is a Republican. This variable is positive and significant at the 10 percent level, indicating that Republicans have higher absolute value DW-NOMINATE scores, and are therefore more ideologically extreme, than Democrats. Additionally, the variable for Southern state is significant and negative in the 112th House. This suggests that, controlling for political party, Southern members are less extreme, relative to Northern members.

While these results do not suggest a relationship between level of education and political polarization, the results are suspect due to issues with causal inference. The basic OLS regression model does not account for the issue of nonrandom self-selection, or the possibility that ideologically extreme individuals choose to complete more years of education. The inability of this model to uncover a causal relationship requires that a new design be created that can more effectively address the causal relationship between the education of political elites and congressional polarization.

### **Problems With Casual Inference**

Existing research cannot identify a causal relationship between education and ideological preferences because this research does not account for the issue of non-random self-selection. While studies claim that more education leads to more ideological consistency (Bishop 1976, Baldassarri and Gelman 2008), it is possible that more ideologically consistent individuals choose to complete more years of education. It may be the case that ideologically consistent individuals choose to complete more years of education in order to find information that confirms their belief systems. It is also possible that these individuals' underlying beliefs encourage participation in job markets that require one or multiple postsecondary degrees. For example, it is possible that a conservative who supports a strong business sector would want to work on Wall Street. However, to do so usually requires at least a bachelor's degree.

As demonstrated by the 112th Congress, some of the most conservative representatives are very highly educated. However, from the OLS regressions we are unable to tell whether political elites simply choose to complete more education because of their strong ideological beliefs. In order to make a claim of causality, it is necessary to utilize a design that can address this issue of nonrandom self-selection.

### **Research Design**

As previously stated, it is possible that more ideologically consistent or extreme individuals choose to complete more years of education. In order to address this problem of identification, I will use an instrumental variable design for the 89th Congress. My design uses eligibility for the 1944 G.I. Bill as an exogenous instrument to predict levels of education of members of the 89th Congress. Because

eligibility for the G.I. bill was plausibly exogenous to members' educational choices, and likely had no direct relationship with their ideological preferences, this design should allow me to estimate the causal effect of members' educational levels on their ideological preferences.

More commonly known as the G.I. Bill, the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944 was passed in order to help re-assimilate World War II veterans into civilian life. Many of those veterans had been drafted as a result of The Selective Service Act of 1940, which was the first peacetime draft in the history of the United States. Initially, men between the ages of 21 and 36 were to submit themselves for registration with local draft boards. As the need for more manpower grew, the draft was extended in 1942 to include men between the ages of 18 and 45. The main reasons for deferment in World War II "were physical or mental disability (Class IV), employment in war production or agriculture (Class II), or the presence of dependents," with probability of being drafted largely based upon date of birth (Bound and Turner 2002:788).

As a result of the G.I. Bill, upon their return veterans were given the chance to "study anywhere in the United States at any approved school," with the government footing the bill (GI Bill of Rights). In order to receive G.I. bill benefits, the veteran had to have served for at least 90 days between September 16,th 1940 and 1945 and had their education impeded by the war. The latter was automatically assumed if the veteran was 25 or younger at the time of service,; otherwise it had to proven that their civilian education was interrupted. The G.I. Bill was still applicable if the veteran was discharged for causes other than dishonorable. Additionally, the 90 days were not required if the veteran was discharged for a service-related injury.

Existing work indicates that the G.I. Bill had a large effect on the educational levels of veterans. In the paper "Going to War and Going to College: Did World War II and the G.I. Bill Increase Educational Attainment for Returning Veterans?"; John Bound and Sara Turner use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of G.I. Bill eligibility on educational levels (Bound and Turner 2002). Bound and Turner divide the data between birth cohorts, using "the between-cohort variation in veteran status to measure the effect of military service and GI benefits on collegiate attainment" (2002: 786). They found that "the net effect of military service and G.I. benefits was substantial gains in the collegiate attainment of World War II veterans" (2002: 785) with "about 0.15 years of collegiate attainment and a 4-percentage point increase in college completion" (2002: 806). These findings indicate that the G. I. Bill was "a policy instrument with dramatic effect on the level of educational attainment of returning veterans, as well as the overall landscape of higher education" (Bound and Turner 2002:784). In fact, by the end of World War II, veterans made up about 70 percent of male collegiate enrollment (Bound and Turner 2002:784). As a result, GI Bill eligibility should serve as a good indicator of educational attainment for members of the 89th Congress, which is filled with World War II veterans.

The methodological approach employed in this paper is an instrumental variable design that takes advantage of these provisions of the G.I. Bill. This design entails using an exogenous independent variable to predict an endogenous independent variable, and then using those predicted values in a regression with a dependent variable. The endogenous independent variable is the number of postsecondary degrees held by a member of Congress, and the dependent variable is a measure of his ideology derived from his roll call votes, known as a DW-NOMINATE score. The exogenous instrument is eligibility for the 1944 G.I. Bill.

Using G.I. Bill eligibility status as a predictor of education levels does not perfectly solve the issue of causal inference. For example, in order to be eligible for the G.I. Bill, it is necessary that the individual be a veteran. Analyzing veterans alone eliminates a class of individuals who do not meet the military's standards of mental or physical fitness, similarly eliminating some individuals from this study who may choose not to attend institutions of higher education.

Despite this issue, an instrumental variable design greatly enhances our ability to claim a causal relationship. The G.I. Bill is plausibly exogenous to an individual's educational decisions and ideological preferences, allowing estimation of the causal effects of education on ideological preferences while controlling for other factors such as party membership.

Additionally, G.I. Bill eligibility plausibly satisfies the exclusion restriction, which states that the instrument must be uncorrelated with the dependent variable, other than through its relationship with the endogenous independent variable. Ideological extremism was unlikely to be affected by G.I. Bill eligibility, since eligibility status was determined in an as-if random fashion by the draft. While eligible veterans likely shared certain formative experiences at the same point in their lives, such as serving in World War II, the draft recruited veterans from all points on the ideological spectrum. Given the heterogeneity in ideological preferences prior to service, it is unlikely, albeit (although possible,) that the shared experiences of wartime service had a uniform effect on those preferences. .

### **Testable Hypotheses**

Hypothesis A: G.I. Bill eligibility leads to the completion of more postsecondary degrees.

Hypothesis B: Holding more postsecondary degrees leads members of Congress to be more ideologically extreme, i.e. to have a DW-NOMINATE score farther away from zero.

Hypothesis C: Holding more postsecondary degrees will have a larger effect on the DW-NOMINATE scores of Republicans than on the DW-NOMINATE scores of Democrats.

### **Description of Data**

Biographical information on members of the 89th Congress (1965-1967) was collected from the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. Data collected from this directory includes year of birth, number of post-secondary degrees attained, and whether a member served in World War II. DW-NOMINATE scores for each member were retrieved from [www.voteview.com](http://www.voteview.com). The dataset also includes various control variables, including political party and whether the member is from a southern state or not (as defined earlier). Additional control variables were collected from the United States Census website and from Scott Adler's Congressional District Data File for the 89th Congress. These include the percent foreign born, percent unemployed, and percent African American in the congressional district or state.

For G.I. Bill eligibility, I created a dichotomous variable for eligibility, coded 1 if the veteran served in World War II for at least ninety days between September 16,th 1940 and 1945, and 0 otherwise. This variable indicates that the veteran would have been eligible to apply for the educational benefits provided by the G.I. Bill. Additionally, I created a dummy variable recording whether the veteran served for at least ninety days and was 25 or younger at the time of service, since this would indicate that the

veteran was automatically eligible for G.I. Bill benefits. These variables were used as exogenous instruments to predict the endogenous independent variable, number of postsecondary degrees.

As shown in Table 5, almost half of the 89th Congress was eligible for G.I. Bill benefits, based on having served at least 90 days in World War II. However, the variable for at least 90 days of service and 25 years of age or younger is more restrictive, and the percentage of eligible Representatives decreases to about 31 percent. In the Senate, fewer individuals served in World War II, with only 14 Senators eligible for benefits using the stricter measure.

The endogenous independent variable is a count of the number of postsecondary degrees held by each member of Congress. Summary statistics are reported in Table 6. The average Representative and Senator in the 89th Congress held 1.53 and 1.57 postsecondary degrees, respectively. In the House, approximately 8 percent held 0 postsecondary degrees, 34 percent held 1 postsecondary degree, 53 percent held 2 postsecondary degrees, and 4 percent held 3 postsecondary degrees. In the 89th Senate, approximately 11 percent held 0 postsecondary degrees, 25 percent held one post secondary degree, 59 percent held two postsecondary degrees, 5 percent held three postsecondary degrees, and 1 percent held 4.

T-tests were performed comparing the difference in mean number of postsecondary degrees between the group of members of Congress who were eligible for G.I. Bill benefits—(based on the completion of 90 days of service—) and the group of members who were not eligible. The results for these tests can be seen in Tables 7 and 8. The results show that the mean number of postsecondary degrees among representatives who were not eligible for G.I. Bill benefits is 1.40 and the mean for those who were eligible is 1.65. The difference is even larger in the Senate, with the results showing that the mean number of postsecondary degrees among senators who were not eligible for G.I. Bill benefits is 1.40 and the mean for those who were eligible is 1.95. The p-value for both the House and the Senate is 0.00. This indicates that the differences of means in number of postsecondary degrees between those eligible and not eligible—(based on 90 days of service—) are significantly different from zero. The same t-tests were performed using the stricter instrument, which is based on the representative having served at least 90 days in the war and being 25 years of age or younger at the time of being drafted. The results were similar to that of the first instrument, with eligible representatives and senators holding 1.69 and 1.93 degrees on average, respectively. The results can be seen in Tables 9 and 10. The p-values were once again significant for both the House and Senate, with the House having a p-value of 0.00 and the Senate a value of 0.10. This indicates that the differences of means in number of postsecondary degrees between those eligible and not eligible based on the stricter instrument are significantly different from zero. These t-tests suggest that eligibility for the G.I. Bill may be a good instrument for educational levels in the 89th th Congress.

Next, t-tests were run comparing the difference in the mean absolute value of DW--NOMINATE scores between members of congress who were eligible and those who were not eligible for G.I. Bill benefits. The differences in means were not significant at the 10 percent level for either measure of eligibility. Results are reported in Tables 11 – 14. These results suggest that there may be no relationship between number of degrees as predicted by G.I. Bill eligibility and ideological extremism.

Finally, t-tests were performed comparing the differences in the mean absolute value of DW--NOMINATE scores between the groups of members who are above the mean educational levels and the groups of members who are below the mean educational levels for each chamber. The results can be seen in Tables 15 and 16. The p-value for the House is 0.42, meaning that the difference in means is not

significant. However, the p-value for the Senate is 0.16, which means that we are much closer to being able to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the means. The mean score is 0.29 for those below the mean education level and is 0.34 for those above. However, the difference in the means is -0.06, which is in the opposite of the predicted direction. These findings suggest that there may be significant differences in ideological extremism as a function of educational levels in the 89th Senate, and that more education might actually make senators more liberal.

### Regression Analyses

First I ran a traditional OLS regression identical to the regressions run for the 112th Congress. The absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score is set as the dependent variable and the number of postsecondary degrees as the independent variable. Political party, whether the member is from a southern state or not, percent unemployed, percent foreign born, and percent African American are included as controls. The equation is:

$$\text{DW score} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Number of Postsecondary Degrees} + \beta_2 \text{ Republican} + \beta_3 \text{ Southern State} + \beta_4 \text{ Percent Unemployed} + \beta_5 \text{ Percent Foreign Born} + \beta_6 \text{ Percent African American} + \epsilon$$

In this equation,  $\beta_1$  represents the effect of one additional postsecondary degree on the absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score, and  $\beta_2$  represents the effect of being a Republican on the absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score.  $\beta_3$  represents the effect of being from a southern state on a member's DW-NOMINATE score, and  $\beta_4$ - $\beta_6$  represent the effect of one more percentage point of each constituency type in a member's district or state on the absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score. I expect the coefficient on predicted number of postsecondary degrees to be significant and positive, since my hypothesis is that more education leads to more consistent political opinions. I expect the coefficient on Republican to be significant and positive, based on the estimates for the 112th Congress. I expect coefficients  $\beta_3$ - $\beta_6$  to be significant and positive, since it is possible that all of these controls contribute to ideological extremism. The same expectations for the control variables hold throughout all of the following equations.

I then ran the regression with the addition of an interaction between number of postsecondary degrees and political party. As previously explained, this interaction tests whether education polarizes Republicans more than Democrats, with the coefficient on the interaction variable representing the additional effect of one more postsecondary degree on the absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score when the member is a Republican. The equation is:

$$\text{DW score} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Number of Postsecondary Degrees} + \beta_2 \text{ Republican} + \beta_3 \text{ Number of Postsecondary Degrees} \times \text{Republican} + \beta_4 \text{ Southern State} + \beta_5 \text{ Percent Unemployed} + \beta_6 \text{ Percent Foreign Born} + \beta_7 \text{ Percent African American} + \epsilon$$

I expect the coefficient on number of postsecondary degrees to be significant and positive, since it is possible that more education leads to more consistent ideological opinions. I expect  $\beta_2$  to be significant and positive, since it may be the case that Republicans started to become increasingly

ideologically extreme at this time. Finally, I expect the value of  $\beta_3$  to be significant and positive, since in accordance with Hypothesis C it is possible that Republicans are more polarized by education.

To test hypotheses A and B, I will use several sets of 2SLS equations. For the first set, I will be using G.I. Bill eligibility to predict the number of postsecondary degrees for members of each chamber of the 89th Congress with and without the inclusion of control variables. My first stage equation for the first set of 2SLS equations is:

$$\text{Number of postsecondary degrees} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Eligibility} + \beta_2 \text{ Republican} + \beta_3 \text{ Southern State} + \beta_4 \text{ Percent Unemployed} + \beta_5 \text{ Percent Foreign Born} + \beta_6 \text{ Percent African American} + \epsilon$$

In this equation,  $\beta_1$  represents the effect of G.I. Bill eligibility on the number of postsecondary degrees. I will estimate this first stage equation separately for each measure of eligibility. I expect that  $\beta_1$  will be significant and positive, since the G.I. Bill greatly expanded access to higher education by providing generous benefits to returning veterans. I expect the coefficient for the control variable for Republican Party to be significant and negative, due to the fact that higher levels of education (additional degrees) are associated with more liberal Representatives through the mid 1970's (Tetlock 1983).

The second stage equation will then use predicted numbers of postsecondary degrees in order to predict members' absolute values of DW-NOMINATE scores. The second stage regression will be:

$$\text{DW score} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Predicted Number of Postsecondary Degrees} + \beta_2 \text{ Republican} + \beta_3 \text{ Southern State} + \beta_4 \text{ Percent Unemployed} + \beta_5 \text{ Percent Foreign Born} + \beta_6 \text{ Percent African American} + \epsilon$$

in which  $\beta_1$  represents the effect of one additional predicted postsecondary degree on the absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score, and  $\beta_2$  represents the effect of being a Republican on the absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score. I expect the coefficient on predicted number of postsecondary degrees to be significant and positive, since my hypothesis is that more education leads to more consistent political opinions. I also expect the coefficient on the Republican Party to be significant and positive, since I expect that, controlling for education, Republicans may be beginning their shift to the right at this time.

For the second set of 2SLS equations, I will be including an interaction term in order to determine if the effect of education varies with political party. This equation will test hypothesis C. The first stage regression will be

$$\text{Number of postsecondary degrees} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Eligibility} + \beta_2 \text{ Republican} + \beta_3 \text{ Eligibility} \times \text{Republican} + \beta_4 \text{ Southern State} + \beta_5 \text{ Percent Unemployed} + \beta_6 \text{ Percent Foreign Born} + \beta_7 \text{ Percent African American} + \epsilon$$

in which  $\beta_1$  represents the effect of G.I. Bill eligibility on educational attainment when the member is a Democrat, and  $\beta_2$  is the effect of being a Republican on educational attainment when the member is not eligible for G.I. Bill benefits.  $\beta_3$  measures the additional effect of G.I. Bill eligibility on educational attainment when the member is a Republican. I once again expect  $\beta_1$  to be significant and positive and

$\beta_2$  to be significant and negative. I have no expectation for  $\beta_3$ .

The second stage regression equation is the following:

$$\text{DW score} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{ Predicted Education} + \beta_2 \text{ Republican} + \beta_3 \text{ Predicted Education} \times \text{Republican} + \beta_4 \text{ Southern State} + \beta_5 \text{ Percent Unemployed} + \beta_6 \text{ Percent Foreign Born} + \beta_7 \text{ Percent African American} + \epsilon$$

in which  $\beta_1$  is the effect of one more predicted postsecondary degree on a member's DW-NOMINATE score, given that the person is a Democrat.  $\beta_2$  is the effect of being a Republican on the member's DW-NOMINATE score, given that the member has no postsecondary degrees.  $\beta_3$  is the coefficient for the interaction term, representing the marginal effect of attaining one more predicted postsecondary degree when the member is a Republican. I expect the coefficient on predicted education to be significant and positive, since if hypothesis B is correct, more education leads to more consistent and ideological opinions. I expect  $\beta_2$  to be significant and positive, since it is possible that Republicans have become increasingly ideologically extreme. Finally, if hypothesis C is correct, the value of  $\beta_3$  will be significant and positive since Republicans will be more polarized by the completion of more postsecondary degrees.

## Results

Table 17 reports the OLS estimates for the 89th Congress, with number of postsecondary degrees as the dependent variable and absolute value of DW-NOMINATE score as the independent variable. In the House, the variable for number of postsecondary degrees is not significant in any of the regressions. However, the OLS regressions for the 89th Senate do yield significant results. In the regression without controls, the coefficient for number of postsecondary degrees is 0.07 and is significant at the 5 percent level. This indicates that the completion of one more postsecondary degree increases the absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score by 0.07. The addition of controls leads the coefficient on number of postsecondary degrees to decrease to 0.06, although it retains its significance at the 10 percent level.

A regression including an interaction between number of postsecondary degrees and political party was then run in order to test if the effect of education varies with party. The coefficient on number of postsecondary degrees is 0.11 and is significant at the 1 percent level without controls, and is 0.09 and significant at the 1 percent level with controls. Additionally, the coefficient on the interaction term is -0.12 in both equations, and is significant at the 5 percent level in the equation without controls and significant at the 10 percent level in the equation with controls. These results indicate that the completion of one more postsecondary degree leads a Democratic Senator's DW-NOMINATE score to be 0.09 – 0.11 more extreme. However, the addition of the interaction coefficient to the coefficient for number of postsecondary degrees eliminates this effect for Republican senators. This indicates that more higher education has a polarizing effect on Democrats in the 89th Senate, while there is no effect on Republicans.

The marginal effect of additional postsecondary degrees for Republicans can be seen in Figure 3. This figure confirms that there is no effect of additional postsecondary degrees on ideological extremism for Republican senators, at any level of education. Additionally, the divergent effect between the parties is further demonstrated in Figure 4, which was constructed by overlaying linear fit prediction lines on top of



scatter plots of Senators in the 89th Congress, by political party. Number of postsecondary degrees is on the x-axis and absolute value of a senator's DW-NOMINATE score is on the y-axis. The prediction lines do not include controls.

Figure 3: 89th Senate





Figure 3 demonstrates the marginal effect of one more postsecondary degree on the absolute value of a Republican senator's DW-NOMINATE score, including controls.

Figure 4: 89th Senate



Higher education has a polarizing effect on Democrats in the 89th Senate, while there is no effect on Republicans. The prediction lines do not include controls.

While these results are suggestive, OLS regressions cannot account for issues of endogeneity. Regression coefficients may be biased due to nonrandom self-selection. For example, the OLS regressions indicate that there is no effect of education on Republicans, which is the opposite of what was hypothesized. It is possible that highly ideological Republicans chose not to complete additional postsecondary degrees. This could be the case due to the ideology's focus on small businesses and entrepreneurship, which are career fields that often do not require the completion of a postsecondary degree. Similarly, it is possible that more liberal individuals simply chose to complete more years of education. It is possible that the ideology's emphasis on education leads more liberal individuals to put more importance on acquiring more degrees. Additionally, it could be the case that liberals tend to live in parts of the country that place a greater emphasis on education. In order to account for the possible endogeneity of educational choices to ideological preferences, a series of IV regressions were run using G.I. Bill eligibility as an instrument for educational levels.

The results of the 2SLS regressions using the first instrument, which requires that the member served at least 90 days in World War II, can be seen in Tables 18-21. Three regressions were run: one without controls, one with controls, and one including an interaction term between predicted number of postsecondary degrees and political party. The results of the 2SLS regressions using the second instrument, which requires at least 90 days of service and that the member be 25 years of age or younger at the time of service, can be seen in Tables 22 - 25. Once again, a regression was run without controls, with controls, and with the inclusion of an interaction term between political party and predicted number of postsecondary degrees.

In order to test the strength of eligibility as an instrument, F-tests were performed in the first stage regressions. The F statistic tests the extent to which the instrument is correlated with the endogenous independent variable. It is necessary that there be a high level of correlation for the 2SLS design to be dependable. An F statistic greater than ten indicates that an instrument is very strong (Staiger 1997). The F statistics reporting on the relationship between eligibility and number of postsecondary degrees are all above ten for the first instrument. However, the F statistic often hovers around or falls below ten for the second instrument. It is possible that the second instrument, which requires that the member have served at least 90 days and have been 25 years of age or younger at the time of service, may be too strict. Because so few members met this criterion for G.I. eligibility, this instrument may fail to pick up a connection between eligibility and number of postsecondary degrees.

For regressions including the interaction term between political party and number of postsecondary degrees, Shea's Adjusted Partial R-squared is reported in place of an F-test. This is a better predictor of correlation, as Shea's Partial Adjusted R-squared makes an adjustment for degrees of freedom as more instruments are added to the model. Across the first stage regressions, this statistic takes on the values of 0.01 to 0.04.

The second stage results can be seen in Tables 19, 21, 23, and 25. The variable for number of postsecondary degrees consistently fails to be statistically significant, across models with and without interaction terms. These findings indicate that, after addressing the possible endogeneity of educational levels to ideological extremism, the predicted number of postsecondary degrees does not have a significant effect on the absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score.

Additionally, Tables 26 and 27 report reduced form results showing that eligibility is not

directly associated with ideological extremism. These tables report estimates from OLS regressions with the eligibility instruments as the independent variables and the absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score as the dependent variables. These regressions were run for each chamber in the 89th Congress. None of the coefficients on eligibility were significant.

The 2SLS results seem to indicate that there is no relationship between number of postsecondary degrees and ideological extremism. While eligibility based on 90 days of service proved to be a strong instrument, the coefficients on number of postsecondary degrees are not significant in any of the second stage regressions.

However, it is not clear that the 2SLS results are in fact preferable to the OLS results reported in Table 17. In order to determine if an IV regression is preferable to a traditional OLS design, it is necessary to perform tests of endogeneity. Endogeneity tests indicate whether the presumably endogenous variable is in fact endogenous by testing whether there is a significant difference in the coefficients for the presumably endogenous independent variable between OLS and 2SLS specifications. To reject the null hypothesis that the supposedly endogenous variable is exogenous, it is necessary that for the endogeneity test to have a p-value below 0.10. All of the endogeneity tests for the 2SLS regressions reported in Tables 18 - 25 have p-values considerably above 0.10. These tests suggest that the null hypothesis that education is exogenous to ideology cannot be rejected. These results further suggest that the OLS model is preferable to the 2SLS model, given the greater efficiency of OLS.

According to the OLS regressions, when Democratic Senators in the 89th Congress complete one more postsecondary degree, their DW-NOMINATE score becomes somewhere between 0.09 – 0.11 more extreme, conditional on whether covariates are included. However, Republican Senators do not experience this polarizing effect of education. These OLS inferences suggest that Hypothesis B, which states that the absolute value of a member's DW-NOMINATE score will be further away from zero with the completion of additional postsecondary degrees, is only true when the senator is a Democrat. These inferences also suggest that Hypothesis C, which states that education will have a more polarizing effect on Republicans, is false.

In order to illustrate the magnitude of the polarizing effect of education on Senate Democrats in the 89th Congress, it is useful to consider a relatively moderate Democratic senator with no postsecondary degrees, and a polarized Democratic senator with many postsecondary degrees. An example of a more moderate Democratic senator with no postsecondary degrees is Senator Patrick V. McNamara. A senator from Michigan, Patrick McNamara attended public high school before transferring to the Fore River Apprentice School in Quincy, Massachusetts to study pipefitting. With zero postsecondary degrees and a DW-NOMINATE score of -0.58, Senator McNamara pursued a combination of bipartisan issues, such as nursing home reform, as well as more traditionally Democratic goals such as Medicare (Kiger).

In contrast, a possible example of the polarizing effect of higher education is Senator Paul H. Douglas (D-IL). According to the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Senator Douglas graduated from Bowdoin College and Columbia University. In addition to his undergraduate degree, he also completed an M.A. and a Ph.D. Before entering Congress, Douglas became a college professor of economics and international relations.

In the 89th Congress, Senator Douglas had a DW-NOMINATE score of -0.90, one of the most liberal scores in that Senate. He was a staunch supporter of civil rights legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Douglas reportedly “made it a major mission of his life as a senator, to get civil rights legislation through a Senate which, for seventy years before he came, buried anything to do with civil rights” (Keohane 2003). Additionally, Douglas was an “an ardent conservationist,” leading “the fight in Congress to save the Indiana Dunes from the marauding bulldozers of steel companies” (Keohane 2003). As these policy positions and his high DW-NOMINATE score indicate, Senator Douglas held a very consistent and ideological worldview. It is likely that his many years of schooling exposed him to large amounts of information. It is possible that his opinions became more ideologically consistent with the completion of additional degrees due to the elimination of inconsistent information that would otherwise have pulled him towards the ideological center.

The OLS model with the interaction term explains nearly all of the difference between the scores of Senator McNamara and Senator Douglas. The predicted effect of an additional three postsecondary degrees in the model with controls is an additional .27 points in liberalism for Democratic senators. The difference between the scores of Senator McNamara and Senator Douglas is .32.

### Robustness

In small n datasets it is possible that a few high leverage points are disproportionately affecting the regression coefficients. An observation is said to have high leverage when it has an extreme value on the independent variable. The inclusion of such an observation could change the fit of the regression line, leading to incorrectly estimated coefficients. Figure 5 displays the leverage of observations in the 89th Senate.

Figure 5: 89th State




Figure 5 displays the leverage of observations in the 89th Senate. The point with the highest leverage in the top right corner of the graph is Senator Wayne Lyman Morse.



The point with the highest leverage in the top right corner of the graph is Senator Wayne Lyman Morse. According to the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Senator Morse (D-OR) “graduated from the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1923, and received a graduate degree from that institution in 1924; graduated from the law department of the University of Minnesota at Minneapolis in 1928, and from the law school at Columbia University, N.Y. in 1932.” Morse would go on to teach at the universities of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Oregon. He is the only Senator in the 89th Congress with 4 postsecondary degrees. Senator Morse was as polarized as he was educated; his DW-NOMINATE score of -0.974 made him the most extreme Democrat in the 89th Senate. As a result, Morse’s inclusion in the regressions may bias the data.

In order to test the robustness of my results, regressions were run excluding Senator Morse. The results can be seen in Tables 28 - 32. In the OLS regression without controls, the effect of number of postsecondary degrees on the absolute value of a member’s DW-NOMINATE is 0.05, and the coefficient is significant at the 10 percent level. This is a 0.02 decrease from the regression including Senator Morse. The addition of control variables into the regression leads the coefficient on number of degrees to lose its significance. But in the OLS regression including an interaction between political party and number of postsecondary degrees, the coefficient on number of degrees is significant at the 5 percent level with a value of 0.08. This is a 0.01 decrease from the OLS regression that included Senator Morse. Additionally, the exclusion of Senator Morse leads the interaction term to become insignificant. This result indicates that there is no longer a significant difference in the effect by party. Finally, in the regression including the interaction term and controls, the coefficient on number of postsecondary degrees is 0.07. This is a 0.02 decrease from the regression including Senator Morse. The interaction term is also insignificant in this model.

The marginal effect of one more postsecondary degree for Republican senators when Senator Morse is excluded can be seen in Figure 6. This figure confirms that there continues to be no effect of additional postsecondary degrees on ideological extremism for Republican senators, at any level of education. The divergent effect between the parties is represented in Figure 7, which was constructed by overlaying linear fit prediction lines on top of scatter plots of senators in the 89th Congress, by political party, excluding Senator Morse. Number of postsecondary degrees is on the x-axis and absolute value of a senator’s DW-NOMINATE score is on the y-axis. The prediction lines do not include controls.

Figure 6. A Replication of Figure 3, Excluding Senator Morse





Figure 6 demonstrates the marginal effect of one more postsecondary degree on the absolute value of a Republican senator's DW-NOMINATE score, including controls and excluding Senator Morse.

Figure 7: A Replication of Figure 2, Excluding Senator Morse



These results suggest that the OLS results for Democratic Senators from Table 17 were not being unduly influenced by the presence of Senator Morse. Even after excluding him from the regressions, holding more postsecondary degrees is still associated with higher levels of ideological extremism among Democratic senators, and with no effect for Republican senators.

The 2SLS regressions excluding Senator Morse are reported in Tables 29 - 32. Table 30, which shows the second stage result for the 89th th Senate using the first instrument, reveals that the coefficient for number of postsecondary degrees is significant at the 10 percent level in the regression including the interaction term. The coefficient indicates that the completion of one more postsecondary degree leads a Democratic senator to be 0.13 more ideologically extreme in comparison to a Republican senator. This finding further suggests that education may have had a polarizing effect on Democratic senators in the 89th Congress. However, the exogeneity of education to ideological extremism cannot be rejected in the models excluding Senator Morse, again suggesting that the OLS estimates are preferable.

### **Conclusion**

These results have important implications for understanding the relationship between education, ideological extremism and political polarization. While the F statistics show eligibility to be a very strong instrument for educational levels of members of the 89th Congress, tests of endogeneity fail to reject the hypothesis that education is exogenous to ideological extremism in this Congress. As a result, a traditional OLS regression is probably a better model for understanding the relationship between number of postsecondary degrees and the absolute value of DW-NOMINATE scores in the 89th Congress.

The OLS results in Table 17 reveal that when a Democratic Senator in the 89th Congress completes one more postsecondary degree, his DW-NOMINATE score is between 0.09 – 0.11 more extreme, conditional on whether covariates are included. There is no effect of education on ideological extremism for Republican Senators, or for members of the House of Representatives in the 89th Congress.

Table 4 shows that the effect of education on ideological extremism among Democratic senators is no longer present by the 112th Congress. Although it is possible that the polarizing effect of education could have dissipated by 2011, it could also be the case that there is simply too little variation in education in the 112th Congress to pick up an effect. In the 112th Congress 88 percent of Representatives and 92 percent of Senators held either one or two postsecondary degrees. In order to test for the effect of additional postsecondary degrees, it is necessary that there be sufficient variation in the number of postsecondary degrees. This is not the case in the 112th Congress, and as a result the relationship between education and modern political polarization may be very difficult to determine.

Overall, these results are suggestive of a relationship between higher education and ideological extremism, but more data is needed. Future research on this question should focus on identifying additional exogenous predictors of educational levels, and adding additional Congresses to the analysis.

## Tables

Table 1. Summary Statistics for the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress

Variables	Observations	112th House			
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Number of Degrees	442	1.78	0.68	0	4
DW-NOMINATE Score	438	0.19	0.56	-0.78	1.29
Absolute Value of DW-NOMINATE Score	438	0.55	0.21	0.05	1.29
Republican	442	0.55	0.50	0	1
Percent Unemployed	437	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.14
Percent African American	437	0.14	0.15	0.01	0.71
Percent Foreign Born	433	0.13	0.11	0.01	0.65
Southern State	442	0.35	0.48	0	1
112th Senate					
Number of Degrees	101	1.84	0.56	0	3
DW-NOMINATE Score	101	0.42	0.46	-0.64	1
Absolute Value of DW-NOMINATE Score	101	0.42	0.18	0.01	1
Republican	102	0.47	0.50	0	1
Percent Unemployed	102	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.08
Percent African American	102	0.11	0.10	0.01	0.38
Percent Foreign Born	102	0.09	0.06	0.01	0.28
Southern State	102	0.31	0.47	0	1

Table 2. T-test of Absolute Value of DW-NOMINATE score for Representatives above and below the mean education level in the 112<sup>th</sup> House

112 <sup>th</sup> House	N	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Below Mean	148	0.56	0.02	0.53	0.60
Above Mean	290	0.54	0.01	0.52	0.57
Difference		0.02	0.01	0.53	0.57
P-value		0.30			



Table 3. T-test of Absolute Value of DW-NOMINATE score for Senators above and below the mean education level in the 112<sup>th</sup> Senate

112 <sup>th</sup> Senate	N	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Int]	
Below Mean	23	0.39	0.04	0.31	0.47
Above Mean	78	0.43	0.02	0.39	0.47
Difference		-0.04	0.04	-0.12	0.04
P-value		0.35			

Table 4. OLS Regression: The Effect of Number of Postsecondary Degrees on the Absolute Value of the DW-NOMINATE Score of Representatives in the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress

	112 <sup>th</sup> House				112 <sup>th</sup> Senate			
Number of Degrees	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Republican		0.30*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.04)	0.27*** (0.04)		0.12*** (0.04)	0.01 (0.14)	0.02 (0.14)
Degree/Republican Interaction			0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)			0.06 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)
Southern State		-0.02 (0.02)		-0.02 (0.02)		0.06 (0.06)		0.06 (0.07)
Percent Unemployed		-0.29 (0.53)		-0.28 (0.53)		0.69 (1.43)		0.69 (1.44)
Percent African American		0.02 (0.06)		0.02 (0.06)		-0.23 (0.29)		-0.22 (0.30)
Percent Foreign Born		0.13 (0.08)		0.13 (0.08)		0.35 (0.27)		0.33 (0.26)
Constant	0.59*** (0.03)	0.37*** (0.04)	0.39*** (0.03)	0.39*** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.10)	0.36*** (0.07)	0.28*** (0.09)
Observations	438	430	438	430	101	101	101	101
R-squared	0.01	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.01	0.13	0.11	0.14

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05,

\* p<0.1

Table 5. G.I. Bill Eligibility in the 89<sup>th</sup> Congress

89 <sup>th</sup> Congress	House	Senate
Completed At Least 90 Days of Service	231	39
Completed At Least 90 Days of Service and 25 Years of Age or Younger	137	14

Table 6. Summary Statistics for the 89<sup>th</sup> Congress

Variables	Observations	89 <sup>th</sup> House			
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Number of Degrees	441	1.53	0.71	0	3
DW-NOMINATE Score	441	-0.1	0.3	-0.72	1.2
Absolute Value of DW-NOMINATE Score	441	0.27	0.16	0	1.2
Republican	436	0.32	0.47	0	1
Percent Unemployed	434	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.06
Percent African American	434	0.11	0.14	0.00	0.87
Percent Foreign Born	434	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.29
Southern State	441	0.31	0.46	0	1
		89 <sup>th</sup> Senate			
Number of Degrees	102	1.57	0.74	0	4
DW-NOMINATE Score	102	-0.1	0.36	-0.97	0.72
Absolute Value of DW-NOMINATE Score	102	0.32	0.19	0	0.97
Republican	102	0.32	0.47	0	1
Percent Unemployed	100	0.06	0.14	0.00	0.90
Percent African American	100	0.30	0.56	0.00	3.17
Percent Foreign Born	100	0.20	0.60	0.00	3.62
Southern State	102	0.32	0.47	0	1

Table 7. T-test of Number of Degrees by Eligibility (At Least 90 Days of Service) in the 89<sup>th</sup> House

89 <sup>th</sup> House	N	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Int]	
Not Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	209	1.40	0.05	1.30	1.50
Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	231	1.65	0.05	1.57	1.74
Difference		-0.27	0.07	-0.39	-0.13
P-value		0.00			

Table 8. T-test of Number of Degrees by Eligibility (At Least 90 Days of Service) in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

89 <sup>th</sup> Senate	N	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Int]	
Not Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	63	1.40	0.11	1.18	1.62
Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	39	1.95	0.07	1.80	2.10
Difference		-0.55	0.15	-0.85	-0.25
P-value		0.00			

Table 9. T-test of Number of Degrees by Eligibility (At Least 90 Days of Service and 25 or Younger) in the 89<sup>th</sup> House

89 <sup>th</sup> House	N	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Int]	
Not Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	304	1.46	0.04	1.38	1.54
Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	137	1.69	0.05	1.59	1.80
Difference		-0.23	0.07	-0.38	-0.09
P-value		0.00			

Table 10. T-test of Number of Degrees by Eligibility (At Least 90 Days of Service and 25 or Younger) in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

89 <sup>th</sup> Senate	N	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Not Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	88	1.56	0.09	1.38	1.73
Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	14	1.93	0.07	1.77	2.08
Difference		-0.37	0.22	-0.82	0.07
P-value		0.10			

Table 11. T-test of Absolute value of DW-NOMINATE Scores by Eligibility (At Least 90 Days of Service) in the 89<sup>th</sup> House

89 <sup>th</sup> House	N	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Not Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	209	0.28	0.01	0.26	0.31
Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	231	0.26	0.01	0.24	0.28
Difference		0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.05
P-value		0.15			

Table 12. T-test of Absolute value of DW-NOMINATE Scores by Eligibility (At Least 90 Days of Service) in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

89 <sup>th</sup> Senate	N	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Not Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	63	0.31	0.03	0.26	0.36
Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	39	0.34	0.03	0.28	0.40
Difference		-0.02	0.04	-0.10	0.06
P-value		0.57			

Table 13. T-test of Absolute value of DW-NOMINATE Scores by Eligibility (At Least 90 Days of Service and 25 or Younger) in the 89<sup>th</sup> House

89 <sup>th</sup> House	N	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Not Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	304	0.27	0.01	0.25	0.30
Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	137	0.27	0.01	0.25	0.30
Difference		- 0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.03
P-value		0.85			

Table 14. T-test of Absolute value of DW-NOMINATE Scores by Eligibility (At Least 90 Days of Service and 25 or Younger) in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

89 <sup>th</sup> Senate	N	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Not Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	88	0.32	0.02	0.28	0.36
Eligible for G.I. Bill Benefits	14	0.35	0.03	0.29	0.42
Difference		-0.03	0.06	-0.14	0.08
P-value		0.54			

Table 15. T-test of Absolute Value of DW-NOMINATE score by being above and below the mean education level in the 89<sup>th</sup> House

89 <sup>th</sup> House	N	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Below Mean	188	0.27	0.01	0.25	0.28
Above Mean	253	0.28	0.01	0.26	0.30
Difference		-0.01	0.02	-0.04	0.02
P-value		0.42			

Table 16. T-test of Absolute Value of DW-NOMINATE score by being above and below the mean education level in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

89 <sup>th</sup> House	N	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Int]	
Below Mean	36	0.29	0.03	0.23	0.35
Above Mean	66	0.34	0.02	0.30	0.40
Difference		-0.06	0.04	-0.14	0.02
P-value		0.16			

Table 17. OLS Regression: The Effect of Number of Postsecondary Degrees on the Absolute Value of the DW-NOMINATE Score of Representatives in the 89<sup>th</sup> Congress

	89th House				89th Senate			
Number of Degrees	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.07** (0.03)	0.06* (0.03)	0.11*** (0.04)	0.09*** (0.04)
Republican		-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)		-0.02 (0.04)	0.18* (0.10)	0.16 (0.12)
Degree/Republican Interaction			0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)			-0.12** (0.06)	-0.12* (0.07)
Southern State		-0.11*** (0.02)		-0.11*** (0.02)		-0.14*** (0.05)		-0.13*** (0.05)
Percent Unemployed		4.56*** (1.00)		4.56*** (1.01)		0.45 (0.32)		0.36 (0.34)
Percent African American		0.10* (0.06)		0.10* (0.06)		-0.02 (0.09)		-0.00 (0.09)
Percent Foreign Born		0.41** (0.17)		0.41** (0.17)		-0.07 (0.05)		-0.08 (0.05)
Constant	0.27*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.03)	0.21*** (0.05)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.14** (0.07)	0.21*** (0.06)
Observations	441	429	436	429	102	100	102	100
R-squared	0.00	0.26	0.02	0.26	0.08	0.19	0.13	0.24

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 18. First Stage Regression for IV:  
 Instrument: G.I. Bill Eligibility (90 days of Service)  
 Dependent Variable: Number of Postsecondary Degrees and Number of Degrees/Republican Interaction in the 89<sup>th</sup> House

VARIABLES	89th House			
	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees/Republican Interaction
Eligibility	0.26*** (0.07)	0.25*** (0.07)	0.22*** (0.08)	-0.00 (0.01)
Eligibility/Republican Interaction			0.09 (0.15)	0.31*** (0.11)
Republican		0.02 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.12)	1.32*** (0.09)
Southern State		-0.03 (0.10)	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.05)
Percent Unemployed		3.33 (5.39)	3.28 (5.39)	1.60 (2.93)
Percent African American		0.36 (0.30)	0.35 (0.31)	-0.06 (0.11)
Percent Foreign Born		0.15 (0.70)	0.14 (0.71)	-0.47 (0.35)
Constant	1.40*** (0.05)	1.29*** (0.13)	1.31*** (0.14)	0.03 (0.07)
Observations	440	428	428	428
R-squared	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.79
F statistic/ Shea's Adjusted Partial R-squared	14.67***	14.10***	0.01	0.03
Endogeneity P-value	0.14	0.39	0.43	0.43

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 19. Second Stage Regression for IV:  
 Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of the DW-NOMINATE Score of Representatives in the 89<sup>th</sup> House

	89 <sup>th</sup> House		
Number of Degrees	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)
Republican		-0.05*** (0.02)	-0.13 (0.12)
Degree/Republican Interaction			0.15 (0.18)
Southern State		-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.02)
Percent Unemployed		4.74*** (1.05)	4.79*** (1.09)
Percent African American		0.11* (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)
Percent Foreign Born		0.41** (0.17)	0.35* (0.18)
Constant	0.40*** (0.1)	0.27*** (0.08)	0.20** (0.09)
Observations	440	428	428
R-squared		0.22	0.16

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



Table 20. First Stage Regression for IV:

Instrument: G.I. Bill Eligibility (90 days of Service)

Dependent Variable: Number of Postsecondary Degrees and Number of Postsecondary Degrees/Republican Interaction in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

VARIABLES	89th Senate			
	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees/Republican Interaction
Eligibility	0.55*** (0.13)	0.58*** (0.13)	0.50*** (0.16)	0.02 (0.03)
Republican		-0.44*** (0.15)	-0.55** (0.23)	1.09*** (0.19)
Eligibility/Republican Interaction			0.27 (0.30)	0.60*** (0.23)
Southern State		-0.27 (0.18)	-0.31 (0.23)	-0.16 (0.12)
Percent Unemployed		-1.25 (1.70)	-1.26 (1.70)	-1.14 (1.21)
Percent African American		-0.03 (0.33)	0.01 (0.33)	0.22 (0.28)
Percent Foreign Born		0.11 (0.20)	0.09 (0.22)	-0.05 (0.15)
Constant	1.40*** (0.11)	1.69*** (0.13)	1.73*** (0.15)	0.06* (0.04)
Observations	102	100	100	100
R-squared	0.12	0.21	0.22	0.75
F Statistic/ Shea's Adjusted Partial R-squared	17.51***	19.14***	0.04	0.05
Endogeneity	0.68	0.75	0.75	0.75

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 21. Second Stage Regression for IV:  
 Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of the DW-NOMINATE Score of Representatives in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

	89 <sup>th</sup> Senate		
Number of Degrees	0.04 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	0.11 (0.09)
Degree/Republican Interaction			-0.21 (0.16)
Republican		-0.03 (0.05)	0.29 (0.26)
Southern State		-0.14*** (0.05)	-0.13*** (0.05)
Percent Unemployed		0.43 (0.30)	0.29 (0.36)
Percent African American		-0.02 (0.08)	0.01 (0.09)
Percent Foreign Born		-0.07 (0.05)	-0.08 (0.05)
Constant	0.26** (0.11)	0.32*** (0.12)	0.18 (0.17)
Observations	102	100	100
R-squared	0.06	0.19	0.21

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 22. First Stage Regression for IV:

Instrument: G.I. Bill Eligibility (90 days of Service and 25 Years of Age or Younger)

Dependent Variable: Number of Postsecondary Degrees and Number of Postsecondary Degrees/Republican Interaction in the 89<sup>th</sup> House

VARIABLES	89th House			
	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees/Republican Interaction
Eligibility2	0.23*** (0.07)	0.23*** (0.07)	0.20*** (0.09)	-0.01 (0.01)
Eligibility2 Republican Interaction			-0.17 (0.15)	0.14 (0.11)
Republican		0.01 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.10)	1.43*** (0.08)
Southern State		0.00 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.05)
Percent Unemployed		4.21 (5.38)	4.50 (5.35)	1.82 (2.97)
Percent African American		0.30 (0.30)	0.32 (0.31)	-0.06 (0.11)
Percent Foreign Born		0.08 (0.72)	0.10 (0.73)	-0.47 (0.35)
Constant	1.46*** (0.04)	1.34*** (0.13)	1.31*** (0.13)	0.02 (0.07)
Observations	441	420	420	429
R-squared	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.78
F Statistic/ Shea's Adjusted Partial R-squared	11.74***	10.82***	0.02	-0.00
Endogeneity	0.89	1.00	0.25	0.25

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 23. Second Stage Regression for IV:  
 Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of the DW-NOMINATE Score of Representatives in the 89<sup>th</sup> House

	89th House		
Number of Degrees	0.01 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.06)	0.05 (0.05)
Degree/Republican Interaction			-0.27 (0.25)
Republican		-0.05*** (0.02)	0.36 (0.39)
Southern State		-0.11*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.03)
Percent Unemployed		4.56*** (1.03)	4.89*** (1.19)
Percent African American		0.10* (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)
Percent Foreign Born		0.41** (0.17)	0.28 (0.21)
Constant	0.25** (0.10)	0.20** (0.09)	0.13 (0.08)
Observations	441	429	429
R-squared		0.26	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 24. First Stage Regression for IV:

Instrument: G.I. Bill Eligibility (90 days of Service and 25 Years of Age or Younger)

Dependent Variable: Number of Postsecondary Degrees and Number of Postsecondary Degrees/Republican Interaction in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

89 <sup>th</sup> Senate				
VARIABLES	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees/Republican Interaction
Eligibility2	0.37*** (0.11)	0.33** (0.13)	0.31** (0.13)	0.01 (0.04)
Eligibility2 Republican Interaction			0.07 (0.39)	0.37 (0.34)
Republican		-0.42** (0.17)	-0.42** (0.19)	1.30*** (0.15)
Southern State		-0.20 (0.20)	-0.20 (0.21)	-0.05 (0.14)
Percent Unemployed		-0.61 (2.03)	-0.63 (2.05)	-0.97 (1.38)
Percent African American		-0.13 (0.39)	-0.12 (0.40)	0.13 (0.32)
Percent Foreign Born		0.12 (0.20)	0.12 (0.20)	0.02 (0.12)
Constant	1.56*** (0.09)	1.82*** (0.13)	1.82*** (0.13)	0.03 (0.04)
Observations	102	160	160	160
R-squared	0.03	0.11	0.11	0.70
F Statistic/Shea's Adjusted Partial R- squared	10.88***	6.52***	-0.04	-0.04
Endogeneity	0.81	0.97	0.92	0.92

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Table 25. Second Stage Regression for IV:  
 Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of the DW-NOMINATE Score of Representatives in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

	89th Senate		
Number of Degrees	0.09 (0.09)	0.06 (0.12)	0.06 (0.13)
Degree/Republican Interaction			0.02 (0.33)
Republican		-0.02 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.48)
Southern State		-0.14** (0.06)	-0.14** (0.06)
Percent Unemployed		0.45 (0.34)	0.46 (0.40)
Percent African American		-0.02 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.09)
Percent Foreign Born		-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
Constant	0.18 (0.16)	0.27 (0.23)	0.28 (0.25)
Observations	102	100	100
R-squared	0.07	0.19	0.18

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 26. Effect of G.I. Bill Eligibility (90 days of Service) on Absolute Value of DW-NOMINATE score in the 89<sup>th</sup> Congress

	89 <sup>th</sup> House		89 <sup>th</sup> Senate	
Eligibility	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Republican		-0.05***		-0.04
		(0.02)		(0.04)
Southern State		-0.11***		-0.15***
		(0.02)		(0.05)
Percent Unemployed		4.58***		0.39
		(1.11)		(0.46)
Percent African American		0.09		-0.02
		(0.06)		(0.10)
Percent Foreign Born		0.40***		-0.07
		(0.15)		(0.07)
Constant	0.28***	0.21***	0.32***	0.38***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	440	428	102	100
R-squared	0.01	0.26	0.00	0.15

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 27. Effect of G.I. Bill Eligibility (90 days of Service and 25 Years or Younger) on Absolute Value of DW-NOMINATE score

	89 <sup>th</sup> House		89 <sup>th</sup> Senate	
Eligibility2	0.00	-0.00	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Republican		-0.05***		-0.04
		(0.02)		(0.04)
Southern State		-0.11***		-0.15***
		(0.02)		(0.05)
Percent Unemployed		4.55***		0.41
		(1.11)		(0.46)
Percent African American		0.10		-0.03
		(0.06)		(0.10)
Percent Foreign Born		0.41***		-0.07
		(0.15)		(0.07)
Constant	0.27***	0.20***	0.31***	0.38***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Observations	441	429	102	100
R-squared	0.00	0.26	0.00	0.15

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1



Table 28. OLS Regression: The Effect of Number of Postsecondary Degrees on the Absolute Value of the DW-NOMINATE Score of Representatives in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate without Senator Wayne Lyman Morse

	89th Senate			
Number of Degrees	0.05*	0.04	0.08**	0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Republican		-0.02	0.14	0.12
		(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Degree/Republican Interaction			-0.09	-0.10
			(0.06)	(0.07)
Southern State		-0.13***		-0.13***
		(0.05)		(0.05)
Percent Unemployed		0.43		0.37
		(0.31)		(0.32)
Percent African American		-0.02		-0.00
		(0.09)		(0.09)
Percent Foreign Born		-0.07		-0.08
		(0.05)		(0.05)
Constant	0.24***	0.31***	0.18***	0.25***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Observations	101	99	101	99
R-squared	0.04	0.16	0.07	0.19

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 29. First Stage Regression for IV without Senator Wayne Lyman Morse:

Instrument: G.I. Bill Eligibility (90 days of Service)

Dependent Variable: Number of Postsecondary Degrees and Number of Postsecondary Degrees/Republican Interaction in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

VARIABLES	89th Senate			
	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees/Republican Interaction
Eligibility	0.59*** (0.13)	0.62*** (0.13)	0.56*** (0.14)	0.01 (0.03)
Eligibility Republican Interaction			0.19 (0.29)	0.60*** (0.23)
Republican		-0.40*** (0.15)	-0.47** (0.22)	1.09*** (0.19)
Southern State		-0.23 (0.18)	-0.26 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.12)
Percent Unemployed		-1.27 (1.68)	-1.28 (1.69)	-1.14 (1.21)
Percent African American		-0.00 (0.33)	0.17 (0.33)	0.22 (0.28)
Percent Foreign Born		0.10 (0.20)	0.09 (0.21)	-0.05 (0.15)
Constant	1.36*** (0.10)	1.62*** (0.12)	1.65*** (0.13)	0.06* (0.04)
Observations	101	99	99	99
R-squared	0.15	0.23	0.24	0.75
F Statistic/ Shea's Adjusted Partial R-squared	22.09***	23.07***	0.08	0.07
Endogeneity	0.88	0.78	0.54	0.54

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 30. Second Stage Regression for IV without Senator Wayne Lyman Morse  
 Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of the DW-NOMINATE Score of Representatives in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

	89 <sup>th</sup> Senate		
Number of Degrees	0.06	0.05	0.13*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Degree/Republican Interaction			-0.24
			(0.15)
Republican		-0.01	0.34
		(0.05)	(0.24)
Southern State		-0.13***	-0.13***
		(0.05)	(0.05)
Percent Unemployed		0.44	0.28
		(0.31)	(0.38)
Percent African American		-0.02	0.02
		(0.08)	(0.09)
Percent Foreign Born		-0.07	-0.08
		(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	0.23**	0.28***	0.14
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.14)
Observations	101	99	99
R-squared	0.04	0.16	0.12

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 31. First Stage Regression for IV without Senator Wayne Lyman Morse:  
 Instrument: G.I. Bill Eligibility (90 days of Service and 25 Years of Age or Younger)  
 Dependent Variable: Number of Postsecondary Degrees/Republican Interaction in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

89th Senate				
VARIABLES	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees	Number of Postsecondary Degrees/Republican Interaction
Eligibility2	0.40*** (0.11)	0.36*** (0.12)	0.35*** (0.12)	0.01 (0.04)
Eligibility2 Republican Interaction			-0.37** (0.19)	1.29*** (0.15)
Republican		-0.37** (0.17)	0.02 (0.38)	0.37 (0.34)
Southern State		-0.16 (0.20)	-0.16 (0.20)	-0.05 (0.14)
Percent Unemployed		-0.59 (2.03)	-0.59 (2.04)	-0.97 (1.38)
Percent African American		-0.11 (0.39)	-0.11 (0.40)	0.13 (0.32)
Percent Foreign Born		0.11 (0.20)	0.11 (0.20)	0.02 (0.12)
Constant	1.53*** (0.09)	1.76*** (0.12)	1.77*** (0.12)	0.03 (0.04)
Observations	101	99	99	99
R-squared	0.03	0.10	0.10	0.70
F statistic/ Shea's Adjusted Partial R- squared	13.25	8.50	-0.03	-0.04
Endogeneity	0.53	0.70	0.95	0.95

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 32. Second Stage Regression for IV without Senator Wayne Lyman Morse  
 Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of the DW-NOMINATE Score of Representatives in the 89<sup>th</sup> Senate

	89th Senate		
Number of Degrees	0.10	0.08	0.08
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Degree/Republican Interaction			-0.01
			(0.31)
Republican		0.00	0.02
		(0.06)	(0.45)
Southern State		-0.12**	-0.12**
		(0.06)	(0.06)
Percent Unemployed		0.47	0.46
		(0.36)	(0.41)
Percent African American		-0.02	-0.02
		(0.09)	(0.09)
Percent Foreign Born		-0.08	-0.08*
		(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	0.15	0.23	0.22
	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.21)
Observations	101	99	99
R-squared		0.13	0.14

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

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# GENDERED VIOLENCE, INEQUALITY AND SILENCE: WOMEN IN QUETZALTENANGO, GUATEMALA

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*The thirty-year civil war and subsequent violence in Guatemala persists today and affects many individuals, specifically women affected by domestic violence and the elderly population of urban Xela, Guatemala and rural surrounding areas. These factors can be supported and analyzed through qualitative analysis of interviews and participant observation. The lasting effect of violence upon the population of Guatemala is important to evaluate in understanding the gender roles that exist in present-day Guatemala. Feminist theory interprets the situational and interpersonal violence that occurs. Literary research, semi- and un-structured interviews, and participant observation also confirm this phenomenon. Research demonstrates that women in Guatemala are largely silent and complacent about violence and gender inequality. This work seeks to question why that is the case and to increase awareness for these problems. This topic was chosen based on my experiences and time in Guatemala conducting interviews, performing participant observation, and discussing these topics.*

## Introduction

Guatemala's Civil War from the 1960s to the 1990s continues to affect the daily life of citizens in many ways. This backdrop provides an explanation for a violent culture and mindset that is present today in Guatemala. Is this violence still perpetuated from the Civil War? Does it date further back, perhaps even to the Conquest?

Much of this violence is gendered in nature, specifically targeted towards women. If this targeted violence is due to aftermath of the Guatemalan Civil War, why does it persist in this nature? Were these gender constructs and attitudes about gender present before the War, and solidified and promoted even further throughout the War? Why are women increasingly pressured to remain silent about their situations? What is causing women to refrain from speaking out in this society?

The War and subsequent sustained violence in Guatemala persists today, and is evident in the lack of social cohesion and the regularity of social violence. Economic struggle is also a relevant issue here, as it is exacerbated by these persisting factors, and vice versa. These factors in turn affect the general gender roles of the Guatemalan population, as specifically seen in women affected by domestic violence and the elderly population of urban Xela, Guatemala and rural surrounding areas today. The existing gender roles and societal constructs and their effects upon women are critical: women's voices are unheard and systematically repressed. Solid statistics supporting trends in domestic and social violence are readily unavailable or incomplete for a number of reasons, but this is not credited to a lack of occurrence; rather, abounding literature and sources otherwise attest to the existence and persistence of social and domestic violence in this area.



These different factors and effects of violence upon gender roles, and specifically women, can be supported and analyzed through qualitative analysis of different interviews and participant observation. Once we understand why these gender roles exist, we can assess what actions are necessary to alleviate the problems these gender roles create -- especially for women in Guatemalan society.

I chose this topic because I spent two months in Guatemala conducting interviews, performing participant observation, and discussing these topics. After the extensive experience I had interacting with women affected by such factors, I felt a personal obligation to understand the significance of these societal and gendered constructs for Guatemalans. The current repression of voice and women's rights in Guatemala represents a blatant disregard for human rights.

The goal of this research is to understand, at least partially, how factors in Guatemala construct gender roles. This will be analyzed via stories and speech samples collected in order to analyze how the population defines its own gender roles and how gender is a component of social violence. Intergenerational comparisons will play a large part in providing evidence for shifts and changes in gender roles and shed light on the Civil War's effect upon gender roles and violence.

In order to investigate these topics, it is important to identify certain key terms that are involved in this discussion. Feminist theory contains claims about "how women ought (or ought not) to be viewed and treated and draw on a background conception of justice or broad moral position" (Haslanger 1). It also involves diagnostic claims about how women actually are "viewed and treated, alleging that they are not being treated in accordance with the standards of justice or morality invoked" (Haslanger 1).

Violence theory and violentology will also be essential in understanding the current gendered violence in Guatemala. There are many different theories on violence and construction interpretations based on different situations, so the Encyclopedia of Interpersonal Violence will aid in this understanding. The basic concept of gender roles, norms, and inequality are also essential. The distinction between sex and gender, as well as the disparity in how different societies construct norms for different genders, are essential. Stanford's Encyclopedia of Philosophy and various entries regarding feminist perspectives on sex and gender will be crucial to understanding these issues.

This issue deserves attention because it deals with basic human rights, women's rights, and gender inequalities. It is important to address this in order to alleviate, or perhaps rearrange, situations for Guatemalan women. Change begins with awareness, and awareness comes with understanding of a problem. If we understand the context of the problem, we might be able to pinpoint possible ways to change this culture of thought -- which could aid Guatemalan women in pursuing higher standards of living and human rights overall.

## Literature Review

### 1. Guatemala: A History of Violence

I will begin by constructing a historical setting for the problems and issues at hand utilizing secondary sources that explain the economic, political, and social contexts of the thirty-year Civil War and genocide against the indigenous populations of Guatemala.

#### 1.1 *A Pre-Colombian Civilization*

From the archive of knowledge about the pre-Colombian Maya civilization, we can assess that it was a very functional society. The Mayans made significant progress in mathematical and scientific in-

novations as well as efficient farming systems; they were “the first to grow corn” (Ivanoff 6). A tribute system, similar to the European feudal system, was in place and farmers used “slash-and-burn” tactics that are sometimes still used today (Orellana 68-69). A complex hierarchy existed long before recorded contact with the Europeans (Orellana 77). The pre-Colombian Quichés also had intricate military methods with complex fortifications, and they were able to successfully prepare for war and implement maneuvers secretly. The Mayan civilization was a cultured one as well; “the rulers ... retained a knowledge of their forefathers through the sacred books they kept” (Carmack 43). We also have evidence of their complex culture in the *Popol Vuh*, the Sacred Book of the ancient Quiché Maya. This book contains “cosmogony, mythology, traditions, and history of this native American people, who were the most powerful nation of the Guatemala highlands in pre-Conquest times,” providing overwhelming confirmation of strength and efficiency (Recinos IX). Many of the cultural practices persist even today, more than five hundred years after the European invasion.

And yet, despite all of these advancements, the Spanish were able to overthrow this complex society. The Spanish conquest, however, was facilitated by the fact that “the hostile feelings among the three [Maya] groups [the Cackchiquels, Tzutujils, and Quichés] were too strong to allow for military collaboration against the Spaniards” (Orellana 112). Orellana further informs us that Pedro de Alvarado, in 1524:

...entered Guatemala and proceeded to the lowland piedmont area. He conquered the Quiché stronghold...When the Quichés learned of the entrance of the Spaniards into Guatemala, they sent messengers to the Cackchiquels and the Tzutujils asking them to attend a conference to decide on a proper course of action. The Cackchiquels refused to come and the Tzutujils replied that they could defend themselves without any help (Orellana 112).

After using the schism between the three groups to his advantage to overcome the Mayans, Alvarado immediately began repressing the indigenous population by demanding excessive and impossible amounts of tribute and forcing the Indians to work in mines (Orellana 114-15). The story is similar to the well-known story of Cortez’s conquest of Mexico; the Indians were enslaved, forced to convert to Catholicism, and suffered greatly from the influx of European diseases. Their culture was rejected by the Spaniards, and they were forced to abandon centuries-old practices.

The subjugation of the native population initiated by the European arrival has continued in varying forms even until present-day; “modern Guatemala is a society which came into being as a result of the Conquest not only in the economic sense but in social terms as well” (Fried 4). The government and military have been controlled and operated by the minority Ladinos (another word for Mestizo, which is a Spanish term that was used in the Spanish Empire to refer to people of mixed European and Amerindian ancestry in Latin America), and they “consume most of the country’s resources to support their fortified luxury” (Davidson 54). The Indian population has been used as slave labor (during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries), a prototype of serfs who were forced to pay tribute (in the eighteenth century), and a huge labor force unable to hold their own land (following the independence from Spain in 1821) (Fried 19-27). The natives have had their lands confiscated, especially immediately after the Conquest and after Independence from Spain was achieved:

...new laws were passed aimed at expropriating Indian lands; in 1884 alone, over one hundred thousand acres of Indian land passed into private hands... [and those in

power] ‘ruthlessly drove them from their holdings, thus making them more dependent on such employment as planters and others might offer’ (Fried 25-26).

Along with having their land expropriated, the Indians “are repressed by the state whenever they attempt to exercise their economic, political, and cultural rights” (Davidson 54). This theme of indigenous repression, exploitation, and foreign penetration of indigenous culture began with the Conquest and continues to persist in present day Guatemala. All of this, as Art Davidson identifies it, is “the Conquest in its modern-day guise—repressive regimes and the long reach of multinational corporations” (Davidson 54).

### 1.2 *A Thirty-Year Civil War*

Land distribution seems to have been the principle underlying cause for the problems that Guatemala has faced in recent decades, especially in the recent past. After the Spanish Conquest, the Indians<sup>1</sup> were continually stripped of their lands, and then forced to work on that same land as slaves or for deplorable wages (Fried 19-27). Research has been conducted on this situation in Guatemala, and a study by the Agency for International Development conducted in 1982

stated that Guatemala had the worst figures in all Latin America. Using the Gini index which measures land distribution on a scale of zero to one hundred—zero being perfectly equal distribution and the one hundred the worst—the AID study concluded that Guatemala’s Gini index was higher than figures for pre-reform Nicaragua or El Salvador (Simon 20).

However, under the leadership of President Juan José Arévalo (1945-51) and President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (1951-54), there were significant attempts to reduce the unequal land distribution and bring real reform to Guatemala. Both presidents were democratically elected (Simon 20). President Arévalo nullified the Vagrancy Law of his predecessor, President Jorge Ubico, (Simon 21) that stated that “peasants possessing less than ten acres of land were required to perform one hundred days of unpaid labor per year; to be officially registered in passbooks signed by the landowners” (Simon 21). Arévalo also assisted in passing the Work Code, a prototype of social security, and allowed the legal formation of unions (Simon 21). He also emphasized the importance of education and formed some schools in the rural areas (Simon 21). Arévalo is “still remembered as one of Guatemala’s most enlightened presidents” (Buckman 183). President Jacobo Arbenz (1944-1951) also made significant reforms to abolish “rural feudalism” and assist the peasant cause; Decree 900 “called for expropriation of all idle lands exceeding two hundred twenty three acres in size. Cultivated land was not touched, and expropriated land was reimbursed for its value with government bonds” (Simon 21). Arbenz’s goals, in his words, were,

...first, to convert [Guatemala] from a dependent nation with a semi-feudal economy to an economically independent country; second, to transform [Guatemala] from a backward nation...to a modern capitalist country; and third, to accomplish this transformation in a manner that brings the greatest possible elevation of the living standard of the great masses of people (Fried

<sup>1</sup> The ethnic makeup of Guatemala is as follows (obtained from CIA World Factbook): Mestizo (mixed Amerindian-Spanish; Ladino) & European: 59.4%; Quiché: 9.1%; Kaqchikel: 8.4%; Mam: 7.9%; Q’eqchi: 6.3%; Other Mayan: 8.6%; Indigenous non-Mayan: 0.2%; Other: 0.1% (2001 census)

43).

His reforms were certainly leaning in the direction of social progress. One-tenth of the population, half a million people, “benefited from redistribution” and “sixty percent of the economically active population, some 300,000 to 400,000 workers, were unionized as well, the highest number in Guatemala’s history” (Simon 21).

Immediately, these reforms were tagged as communist, but “as essayist Cardoza y Aragón observed, the period was revolutionary only in contrast with the past” (Fried 43). The most intense resistance towards Arbenz’s reforms came from the United States, primarily the United Fruit Company, which:

...was particularly upset about Arbenz’s plan to build a new highway and railroad to the Atlantic coast, breaking the company monopoly on Guatemala’s export trade...[and] even more alarmed [with Arbenz’s] modest agrarian-reform program that would give small holdings to a hundred thousand landless families. Part of the land was to come from company property that was standing idle (Black 97).

The United Fruit Company had benefited from “tax-exempt export privileges on its banana monopoly since 1901” (Simon 21). They also “controlled one-tenth of the Guatemalan economy through exclusive rights on the Guatemalan railroad and telegraph systems, and a monopoly of its ports” (Simon 21). The United Fruit Company was the largest landowner in Guatemala, as it possessed over 555,000 acres (Simon 21). The UFCO refused Arbenz’s tax compensation and instead demanded more money (U.S. \$16 million) while simultaneously campaigning, working with John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State, and Allen Dulles (his brother), CIA director, to destabilize the Arbenz administration (Simon 21). In a CIA-backed coup, Arbenz was overthrown in 1954 and replaced by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, hand-picked by the U.S. government (Buckman 183). Again, we see this pattern of foreign penetration into indigenous culture as the U.S. denied indigenous rights and continued to extract resources with little regard for the rights of the people -- another form of the modern-day conquest.

With help from CIA operatives, the new government began creating a black list of over seventy thousand people, beginning with Arbenz supporters (Simon 23). Thousands of Guatemalans, anticipating the coming violence, fled to surrounding countries including Mexico, Belize, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the U.S., and Canada, while many others were assassinated (Simon 23). After just a short while, as more and more union and peasant leaders were being murdered, participation in unions dropped steeply, and they were eventually dissolved by Castillo Armas and his army (Fried 61).

Just three years after the CIA coup, Colonel Castillo Armas was assassinated in 1957 and replaced by Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes in 1958 (Buckman 183). Fuentes was in turn overthrown in yet another military coup in a 1963 and succeeded by Colonel Enrique Peralta Azúrdia who, having adjourned the Constitution and Congress, ruled by decree until 1966, when Julio César Méndez Montenegro was elected democratically (Buckman 183). It was during the 1960s that the counterinsurgency campaign began as well. Born out of an officers’ rebellion in 1960, the guerrilla movement had begun; the officers

were furious that Fuentes had not informed them that training for the U.S. Bay of Pigs invasion was taking place in Guatemalan territory (Simon 23). Two of those officers, Luis Turcios Lima and Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, left the Guatemalan military and became prominent guerrilla leaders, mostly in charge of “weekend” guerrillas, university students who would train during the weekends and study during the weeks (Simon 23). According to Simon, “Guatemalan guerrillas never numbered more than five hundred in the 1960s, [yet] they provided the rationale for killing thousands of unarmed civilians” (Simon 23). However, as oppression and political violence grew, spurred by racism and fears of changes in the ruling class, the guerrilla movement grew as well (Simon 28-29). The guerrilla movement became more prominent in the 1970s; four principal guerrilla organizations emerged, namely the Guatemalan’s Workers Party (PGT) in Guatemala City and the Southern Coast, the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) in the Petén, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) in the northwest Quiché areas, and the Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA) in San Marcos, Sololá, and Quetzaltenango (Simon 28-29). The participation was mainly Mayan (around ninety percent were Indians), but Ladino leadership was quite common (Simon 29; Kobrak 1). The military responded with even more terror and disappearances, mainly directed at the indigenous population. Prophette et al. explain as follows:

In the rural areas, the growth of the insurrection led the army to believe that the indigenous people were the guerrilla’s social base, which converted the control of their communities into a priority concern for the army. A historic lack of understanding and mistrust, combined with extreme racism towards the indigenous people, facilitated the belief among the state and powerful sectors of the society that the indigenous population should be identified with the enemy (Prophette 2-3).

Francisco Bianchi, Ríos Montt’s secretary openly stated what Prophette et al., concluded above; in 1982 he openly affirmed:

The guerrillas won over many Indian collaborators, therefore the Indians were subversive, right? And how do you fight subversion? Clearly you had to kill Indians because they were collaborating with subversion (Oettler 13).

The indigenous population was caught in the middle of all of this. They were assumed to be leftists and the base of the guerrilla movement, even though this was not always the case. David Stoll discusses how Indians were often caught between insurrection and the different military governments in his book *Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala*. According to Stoll, Mayans were certainly part of the guerrilla movement during the Civil War. However, Stoll states that “most of the people of Ixil country were rebels against their will, and they were coerced by the guerrillas as well as the army” (xi). The indigenous population was used as a tool for an insurrectionist movement and essentially given no options regarding involvement. Once again, we see patterns of exploitation and foreign penetration here. Many indigenous families had the option of neutrality yanked from their hands; safety was often used as a threat to ensure participation: “‘If we obey,’ one patroller said in 1985, ‘they don’t kill us anymore’” (Stoll xiv). Stoll argues largely that

Ixil support for the guerrillas was mainly a reaction to government repression, not the result of a peasantry pregnant with revolutionary impulses, or seeking to restore a lost moral community, or calculating how to assert its land claims. If so, then the familiar narrative of popular frustration giving rise to a revolutionary movement, to be followed by repression and continuing resistance,

imposes an agenda most Ixils do not share (xiv).

If this is the explanation for indigenous involvement in the guerrilla movement – and not a desire to assert land and other rights – then why were the indigenous populations so complacent and silent regarding the rights violations they suffered continually? What forms did their resistance take? Was their silence a form of resistance? This theme is evident in other aspects of Guatemalan society and culture and will be discussed in further detail.

Meanwhile, the repression and violence, directed against both leftists and Indians (considered by some to be one and the same), began to increase; there was an unbelievably high number of ‘disappearances,’ and death squads gained prominence as well (Simon 24). A notorious political leader, Mario Sandoval Alarcón, publicly announced that the death squad formed by his political party in 1966, *Mano Blanca*, would “eradicate national renegades and traitors to the fatherland” (Simon 24). These disappearances and death squads began under Montenegro, and it was under him that “massive repression in Guatemala” began (Simon 24). Under the pretext of “eliminating communism,” Montenegro ordered death squads to execute hundreds of people, specifically leftists, and commanded the massacre of innumerable villages that were usually not even remotely connected to the guerrilla movement, again specifically targeting the indigenous population that was mistrusted and often falsely viewed as leftist (Simon 25; Kobrak 2). His presidency was also responsible for countless disappearances as guerrillas were sought out (Simon 25; Kobrak 2). General Carlos Arana Osorio’s administration, Montenegro’s successor in 1970, had similar characteristics. In the 1970s, during his reign, the “number of ‘disappearances’ in Guatemala was greatest” according to Amnesty International, even though the guerrilla movement had not yet reached full swing (Simon 25).

In the 1974 elections, General Kjell Eugenio Laugerud García won the presidency in a blatantly fraudulent election against General Efraín Ríos Montt (Buckman 183). President García advocated “mild reforms to ease the plight of the impoverished highland Indians...[and] the formation of rural peasant cooperatives to increase production from inefficient, small plots,” but he was quickly labeled a communist (Buckman 183). In the 1978 elections, President Fernando Romeo Lucas García won in yet another fraudulent election; he had in fact received less than seven percent of the population’s vote (Simon 71). Under his rule, 1979 and 1980 “marked the beginning of massive, selective repression—not a contradiction in terms but the definition of government license to carry out urban ‘disappearances’ and killings by the hundreds, then by the thousands” (Simon 72). Any political opponents, both moderates and leftists, were essentially eliminated—“systematically wiped out [in the] thousands” (Buckman 183). Political opponents were not the only targets; “Amnesty International estimated that between March and September 1980, one hundred twenty seven teachers, lawyers, and students were murdered by government forces” as well as unionists (Simon 72-73). The indigenous peasants were also massacred in huge numbers in an effort to wipe out the guerrilla movement, which grew in number from 1,500 in 1980 to 4,000 in 1982 (Buckman 183). García’s regime was considered “the most repressive and corrupt in Latin America. London-based Amnesty International even accused the regime of operation ‘murder and torture’ chambers in an annex of the Presidential Palace” (Buckman 183) The numbers show that García was responsible for at least eleven thousand political murders in 1981 alone, while over two hundred thousand Guatemalan peasants fled to neighboring countries (Buckman 183).

The elections of 1982 were expected to once again be wrought with fraud, and those expectations were met: the existing Congress essentially hand-picked General Angel Aníbal Guevara, who received only sixteen percent of the popular vote, and the three opposing candidates were arrested when complaining about fraud (Buckman 184). But General Guevara never took office due to

a bloodless military coup three weeks after the election that forced Lucas García to resign and placed General José Efraín Ríos Montt as leader (Buckman 184). Many Guatemalans were tentatively hopeful as Montt promised “no more assassinations—if someone violates the law, they will be tried, and if convicted of a capital crime, shot. Only the Army will carry guns” (Simon 109). This, however, was an empty promise: “rural repression soared immediately after the coup, reaching unprecedented levels” (Simon 110). In an attempt to wipe out the guerrilla effort permanently, Montt approved the annihilation of over four hundred Indian villages as well as the rape and torture of their citizens (Buckman 184). Under Montt’s regime, the numbers of fleeing Guatemalans grew even more, as well as the number of the ‘disappeared.’ Simon tells us that “less than two months after the coup, the Bishops’ office said that some 200,000 Guatemalans had fled to other countries” (Simon 114). During this time, “the state also deployed a policy of *tierras arrasadas*, or scorched earth<sup>2</sup>, which primarily affected the rural population, the majority of which is Maya,” causing even more indigenous displacement to Mexico, Honduras, Belize, Canada, U.S., and some to large cities within Guatemala such as Guatemala City (Loucky 56).

The Montt regime came to an end in 1983 when General Oscar Humbert Mejía Victores overthrew him and declared himself president (Buckman 184). Under Mejía Victores, the rural slaughtering might have decreased, but “selective ‘disappearances’ and killings soared” (Simon 154). Thousands were abducted, tortured, and killed (Simon 154). Mejía Victores also expanded the civil patrol system (implemented under the Montt regime), where “the army forced villagers to form ‘civil patrols’ and made them responsible” for protecting their communities from and exterminating guerrillas (Kobrak 2). All men roughly between ages fourteen and seventy were included, but they were not provided with adequate weapons for defense (Montejo 12). Mejía Victores also constructed “model villages” where refugees came and began construction work under the army’s supervision (Simon 155). These model villages were created to replace some of the demolished villages, and were “direct containment of the population” so that the “army [could consolidate] its future power in rural areas” (Simon 155). Mejía, however, did promise “a return to democracy;” a new constitution was ratified in 1985, and preparations began for the upcoming presidential election (Buckman 184).

Over half of the voting population did not vote in the 1985 presidential election even though voting was mandatory and failure to do so could result in heavy punishment (Simon 204). Vinicio Cerezo won over opponent Jorge Carpio Nicolle (Simon 204). Cerezo promised investigations into human rights offenses, but no punishments were carried out (Buckman 185). Cerezo also had to address the financial crisis that Guatemala was facing after years of careless spending by military governments, as well as the “100,000 dead or ‘disappeared’ [civilians]; 1,000,000 internally displaced; some 120,000 refugees in Mexico; another 70,000 in model villages; and thousands of others living in cardboard boxes in Guatemala City Slums” (Simon 205)<sup>3</sup>. Cerezo made fundamental personnel changes in military leadership in 1986 and 1987 and formed a committee on human rights, although its progress was inhibited by “self-protection by the military.” In other words, the military essentially refused to acknowledge its crimes (Buckman 185). Even though “military coups were aborted without violence in 1988 and 1989...

2 *Tierras arrasadas*, or scorched earth policy, is a military strategy that involves destroying anything that might be useful to the enemy; in this case, it was used in home territory, and included the destruction of shelter, food sources, etc. which caused the death and displacement of thousands of indigenous Mayans.

3 Forced migration was often common, as stated by *La Migración por Violencia en Centroamérica: 1980-1990*. El Diario La Prensa news article indicates that in 2009, the Guatemalan migrant population to the United States grew by 300 million persons, while the number of violent deaths in Guatemala had increased by 244% in the past ten years. Migration continued even after the Civil War ended, indicating the problem of living with institutional violence. According to *La Migración*, Guatemala has had one of the lowest rates of repatriation in Central America (97).

murders and disappearances at the hand of right-wing [military] groups continued at the rate of more than 1,000 a year;<sup>4</sup> Cerezo was ultimately unable to maintain control of the military (Buckman 185). In 1990, “the country was in a state of near-anarchy” as military groups murdered freely without any real evidence those they suspected to be leftists, “the definition of which sometimes included anyone found outside after dark at night” (Buckman 185).

The elected president in 1991, Jorge Serrano Elías, promised to end the thirty year Civil War, but “this proved to be impossible” (Buckman 185). Elías dissolved Congress, implemented strict censorship, and began ruling by decree, but when demonstrators put on public protests and both the military support and United States aid were revoked, Elías fled the country, and Congress named León Carpio president (Buckman 185). Violence, however, continued to be commonplace.

### 1.3 *An End to the War and New Beginnings*

Alvaro Enrique Arzú won the presidency in the 1996 elections, promised to “respect human rights and insisted, not altogether convincingly, that the armed forces would be subordinate to the civilian authority” (Buckman 186). Arzú continued the peace talks begun in 1986 with the URNG and government representatives.<sup>4</sup> Buckman tells us that “the two sides met throughout 1996 in Mexico City and finally reached an historic truce” (186).

Justice for the human rights abuses during the civil war was achieved in some degree with the death sentence of “three former members of an army-organized militia...for their roles in the so-called Rio Negro Massacre in March 1982—during the first days of the Ríos Montt regime—in which 130 Indian peasants were slain” (Buckman 187). The Historical Clarification Commission released a report in 1999 that clarified all of the human rights violations that had been committed, confirmed that 92%

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4 The Peace Talks – An Overview:

In 1986-1987, President Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo attends several meetings with other Central American leaders in Esquipulas, Guatemala. The Esquipulas II Accord is signed, which promotes “national reconciliation, and end to hostilities, democratization, free elections, the termination of all assistance to irregular forces, negotiations on arms controls, and assistance to refugees.” In 1987, “first public contact is made between the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) and government representatives in Madrid, Spain, but both sides impose prohibitive conditions on further talks.” In 1989, the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) and the URNG conduct many meetings under UN supervision. The CNR “also inaugurates a Grand National Dialogue to discuss Guatemala’s principal problems,” which pressures the government to take progressive measures, but President Cerezo refuses. In 1990, the Oslo Accord is signed, which “sets out arrangements for facilitation of future government-URNG dialogue...[and] confirms the invitation for UN monitoring of the peace process.” The URNG meets later that year with Guatemalan political parties and produce several agreements promoting reform. President Jorge Serrano Elías creates his “Initiative for a Total Peace” in 1991, and government talks ensue to incorporate these measures. Later this year, more discussions are held, but little progress is made as the “government gradually hardens its position on human rights.” Talks continue into 1992, and eventually agreements are made with regards to a “freezing of Civil Defense Patrols (PACs) and on an investigation of their conduct. Agreement is also reached, with the intervention of the UNHCR, on the terms of return of refugees from Mexico.” Negotiations temporarily terminate in 1993, but restart with encouragement in 1994: “both parties commit themselves to full observe human rights and to improve mechanisms for their protection, while the government assumes a range of specific responsibilities to meet these ends.” In 1995, an Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples is signed in Mexico; it contains “recommendations for wide-ranging political and constitutional reforms”. In 1996, the final peace accords are signed, as referenced above. The Accords of 1996 include the following: The Agreement on Socioeconomic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation; The Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society; The Agreement on a Definitive Ceasefire; The Integration of the URNG; The Law of National Reconciliation; The Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements; and the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace. (“Guatemala: Chronology” 1-7)



of the violations had been executed by the army, and confirmed that the Ríos Montt regime had used most “ruthless means” (Buckman 187). Rigoberta Menchú, “Guatemala’s most illustrious human rights champion” and 1992 Nobel Peace Laureate, further pursued justice when she filed a lawsuit in Madrid, “against eight past military and civilian figures, including former military strongmen Ríos Montt, Lucas García, and Mejía Victores” (Buckman 187).

With the elected presidents Alfonso Portillo and Oscar Berger, in 1999 and 2003 respectively, some social reconstruction began. Although Portillo’s presidency was riddled with scandal and incompetence, Berger’s presidency proved to be somewhat more successful as he “promised to crack down on corruption and human rights abuses” currently taking place, although not at a rate nearly as high as before (Buckman 192). Berger has made significant progress in “coming to terms with the corruption and rights abuses of the past...and [contending] with the growing problem of street crime and an alarmingly high murder rate” (Buckman 194). The newly elected president in 2007, Alvaro Colom, has promised to “fight for the unity of the country, for the harmony with our indigenous people” (“President” 1). Colom’s agenda seems to be primarily focused on social reforms that include building more schools and medical centers, creating more jobs, and trying to mitigate poverty (“President” 1).

Additionally, the Guatemalan Office of Human Rights (D.R. Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala) published a report entitled “Guatemala: Nunca Más” (Guatemala: Never Again) indicating some of the necessary institutional reforms that should be adopted in order to avoid a repetition of this history. These included, “el resarcimiento, la atención a las víctimas, la reparación moral, la restitución de la verdad y la memoria colectiva de las víctimas” (compensation, attention to the victims, moral repair, restitution of the truth and the respect of the collective memory of the victims) (5).

We also see evidence of some reparation with the recent trial of Ríos Montt, based on acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. New evidence links Montt to the deaths of over 1700 indigenous Mayan Indians during his dictatorship (Perez-Díaz 1). Again, we see evidence of exploitation and foreign penetration here, especially in the presence of rape victims speaking out at this trial.

Guatemala’s problems are not yet repaired. The effects of the thirty-year Civil War and military oppression -- as well as violence dating back to the Conquest -- are still seen and felt today, and the culture of violence has persisted and penetrated the lives of all Guatemalans, especially women. Understanding Guatemala’s political history is essential if we want to fully comprehend the experiences of women who are victims of social violence.

## 2. The Cultural Understanding of Violence in Guatemala

This sub-topic involves research of violence studies and different theories regarding violence, specifically in Guatemala. The intent is to understand how Guatemalans interpret and internalize the violence they have experienced.

Nicole Kousaleos’ dissertation *Silence: Experience, Agency, and Transformation in the Lives of American Women Childhood Sexual Abuse Survivors* will provide some background theory and understanding. It will offer more groundwork and framing in understanding violence theories and women’s experience with violence.

Women were often victims of the violence discussed previously during the Civil War, and in subsequent years. Ball’s “Violencia Institucional en Guatemala, 1960 a 1996: Una Reflexión Cuantitativa” (Institutional Violence in Guatemala, 1960-1996: A Quantitative Reflection) mentions that institutional violence perpetrators and victims were of majority men, but this phenomenon changed as percentage rates of women victims increased, especially in rural areas (88). These sources will examine

specifically how women experience and understand their undergone violence.

Judith Zur's *Violent Memories: Mayan War Widows in Guatemala* will serve as a relevant piece to my topic, as her work examines the political and social violence experienced by rural Maya women during the Civil War. Zur utilizes narratives and discourses provided by the affected women themselves, giving a closer look to how the women discuss and explain the violence they have experienced. In this way, she gives voice to how these women have understood violence and the strategies they have utilized to overcome the inflicted damage. Her work will be essential to understanding how Guatemalan women internalize and understand the social violence they experience.

Zur describes the Civil War as a “war against memory...a falsification of reality,” since the military denied civilians the truth, “thus contaminating their morality and their memory...[resulting in] ‘historical amnesia’...the suppression and neglect of alternative and oppositional voices” (159). She indicates that survivors are more often than not silenced by fear – indicating the use of silence as a survival tactic, but also something structurally imposed. The survivors of violence during the Civil War often experienced a paralysis of thought, and an inability to fully access their memories -- as the trauma and chaos of what they have experienced was unprecedented and difficult to mentally process, and because there was no time for reflection. Rather, daily survival was the primary concern. This phenomenon has permeated Guatemalan culture:

‘Silence’ is pervasive but not fatal. La violencia comes up sooner or later in many conversations, not only in private but also in more oblique ways in public. Many things are said, despite reticence and repression, even about so-called subversives, although there is a great reluctance to discuss la violencia in any great depth. Explicit discussion is avoided in all contexts for fear of army spies (orejas). (162)

Zur was writing during the Civil War itself, but this phenomenon continues to be a reality in the present day.

Zur also discusses the specific silencing of women during the Civil War. The military and civil patrol chiefs (jefes) perceived women’s speech, especially that of war-widows, as powerful; they were “aware that the widows’ memories have the potential to infiltrate history by providing access to hidden domains of a past long since obliterated by the official version of history offered for public consumption; thus they threaten, control, persecute, and occasionally rape and kill widows...in order to ensure their silence” (163). In turn, women have internalized this, viewing themselves “as lacking the authority to speak” (Zur 163). However, Zur argues that this silence can also be a form of resistance in and of itself:

Women’s choice to be silent and hidden is a form of communication which is both a form of resistance and a gesture of solidarity and friendship between themselves. One widow referred to herself and her friends as the ‘silent women’, an acknowledgement of the fact that silence and forgetting are present absences or negative spaces shaping what is remembered. Silence and forgetting work themselves back into memory for they structure what is remembered. There is a communal aspect to this: one of the things which makes memories shared is that they are not said (164).

Regardless, it is evident that this silence was initially structurally imposed and has strong ties to fear. Zur’s experiences demonstrate this as well, as the women she spoke with were very careful in choosing when and where to speak and what items to share.

Linda Green uses similar methods and approaches, like Zur, to investigate similar topics in her work *Fear As A Way of Life: Mayan Widows in Rural Guatemala*. Again, Green worked extensively with rural Mayan women who experienced extensive amounts of systematic violence during the Civil War. Her work also takes a closer look at violence and how it is connected to socioeconomic status and gender inequality. Green sheds light on how these Mayan women dealt with disappeared and murdered family members, as well as becoming direct victims of violence themselves.

Green states that the “effects of fear are pervasive and insidious in Guatemala...[destabilizing] social relations by driving a wedge of distrust within families, between neighbors, among friends” (227). The recent Civil War and persistent violence has made fear a way of life for Guatemalans, but Green argues that this has roots even further back in history-- dating back to the Spanish invasion. The fear and violence experienced during the Civil War were even explained in conquest metaphors (Green 235). Fear and violence are routine; “to survive [Guatemalans] have to become inured to the violence, training themselves at first to not react, then later not to feel (see) it. They miss the context in which people live, including themselves. Self-censorship becomes second nature” (Green 231). Green spent time in a village during war-stricken years conversing with Mayan women about their experiences, and she found that fear and oppression are deeply rooted in the lives of all – and that racism is at the root as well. What is more, there is a “dismissiveness of suffering,” a normalization of this fear, violence, and racism (Green 236).

Green found from the Mayan community that silence was the primary survival tactic employed when dealing with their situations, but also an acceptance of the Mayan “subservient role in Guatemalan society” (238). Silence is found in every facet of society here, and it is rarely broken. Green was able, though, to speak to a handful of Mayan widows – and they told their stories to her repeatedly. She interpreted this as a “ritual of both healing and a condemnation of injustice” (244).

Green also found that even in subsequent times of safety, the women she spoke with have never recovered from their traumas: “people carry their psychological horror with them even into situations of relative safety” (246). She also hypothesized that many of the women who experienced extreme trauma suffer physically from those after-effects; “some of the discrete illnesses from which the women suffer may also be a moral response, an emotional survival strategy, to the political repression they have experienced and in which they continue to live” (246). There is a physical manifestation of the emotional and mental trauma these women have undergone, and it is experienced by many. Green notes that “the invisible violence of fear and terror becomes visible in the sufferings, sicknesses of the body, mind, and spirit of the widows” (247). The onset of these physical maladies are often in conjunction with “the events surrounding the death or disappearance of their husbands, sons, or fathers,” or in conjunction with economic or social problems (247). As Green states, “there does seem to be a level of awareness in which the women attribute political causality to particular illnesses” (247). One Mayan woman is quoted saying, “I have these nervios because I am poor” (249). Another mentions, “I have this headache because they killed my husband and now I am alone, and it will not go away because I am afraid” (249). The persistent fear and violence experienced creates a culture of violence and silence, and the women who undergo these experiences suffer from prolonged physical and mental effects as they internalize those violent experiences.

Finally, Diane Nelson’s *A Finger in the Wound: Body Politics in Quincentennial Guatemala* will be relevant in understanding how Guatemalans view their experiences, both physical and otherwise, during the Civil War and subsequent related social movements. Nelson also focuses upon gender inequalities and experiences of violence during the Civil War and in subsequent years.

### 3. Feminist Theory on Gender Roles

Rosamaria Cruz examines rural Mayan women specifically and how they have worked to overcome disadvantages specific to indigenous people, and even more so to women, in her article “Development and Gender in Guatemala.” Cruz’s piece contains narratives from women who are involved in grassroots organizations that fight for women’s rights in Guatemala. Leticia Toj, one of these women, discusses the separation of indigenous peoples and Ladinos in Guatemala and the discrimination against women that exists. She herself is an indigenous woman, and therefore experiences the intersection of racism and sexism firsthand. Her mother told her that education was for men only, and she was instructed to discard her native dress at her school; she did not obey. Her experience allowed her to grow and become educated, but she realizes that “the greatest challenge in this work is discrimination on a public policy level. Until more individuals from our ethnic groups are trained to make decisions, things will not change. We need to improve ourselves, but education as well as health programs must be adapted to our cultural systems” (Cruz 26).

Other women are profiled as well, speaking of their experiences of female empowerment and overcoming Guatemalan society’s prescribed position for women. These women foresee change in the future generations by both teaching children to become part of a “fairer and more just society” and changing policy (32). Cruz’s piece demonstrates how these women have not carried out traditional gender roles, but instead how they are working to change the gender constructs existing in Guatemala.

This work is also evident as there are more organizations to help women that have suffered from violence or abuse. A UN report entitled “La Atención y Prevención de la Violencia en Contra de la Mujer en Guatemala” enumerates different organizations available by state or province in Guatemala, giving each location’s mission statement and services provided. This indicates some action for women’s rights.

Another closer look at Guatemalan feminists can be seen in Christine Eber’s *Women and Alcohol in a Highland Maya Town*. Her ethnographic work profiles women in Chiapas, Mexico and how they utilize alcohol consumption as a form of feminist empowerment. Eber connects major political and social historical events in connection to how these women control alcohol consumption in the community -- which in turn becomes the women’s assertion of their own empowerment.

Eber reviews a moment during her fieldwork experience where women spoke their views in public forums regarding alcohol consumption and its detrimental effects upon the communities where they live. Women chronicle their own personal experiences with alcohol consumption, in which their husbands drank excessively, causing domestic suffering -- which in turn made many women strong supporters of local prohibition movements. These efforts are interpreted as self-empowerment: “In Catholic Action meetings women learn that alcohol is not the cause of all their problems, but they see efforts to control its use as a starting point for reevaluating traditions and relationships” (Eber 234). In these re-evaluations, women are seen as holding more public authority rather than just household authority; these women are effectively challenging traditional gender roles.

#### 3.1 *Guatemalan Women and Their Political Economy*

Amartya Sen’s economics research in explaining the underlying factors of poverty and related gender inequalities will serve as a basis to understanding the position of Guatemalan women. Sen argues that “the importance of gender as a crucial parameter in social and economic analysis is complementary to, rather than competitive with, the variables of class, ownership, occupations, incomes and family status” (Sen 2). Sen investigates why women often feel the burnt of poverty and how gender inequality

affects socioeconomic status.

Irene Kahn's "The Unheard Truth" provides a multi-faceted approach to understanding the global problem of poverty, and how economic empowerment can and must be achieved via human rights empowerment: Kahn defines global poverty as a human rights violation. Kahn's insight in this area will help to understand how changes in gender roles and relationships in Guatemala might come about, and how women might become economically and socially empowered. This ties into the theme of agency for Guatemalan women.

### 3.2 *Narrative and Silence in Feminist Ethnography*

The connection that has emerged from the participant observation I conducted at Nuevos Horizontes, a women's shelter in Guatemala, and the narratives or oral histories I collected from a group of elderly in Xela is the theme of speech, silence, and the role of narrative. Silence is imposed upon the women of Guatemala; speaking out is taboo and implicitly discouraged. This phenomenon manifested itself in various ways and in different settings where I performed research, and I was intrigued as to why women are so readily discouraged to speak out about their social violence experiences, and subsequently often refuse to speak about such experiences. Here Nicole Kousaleos' dissertation *Screaming the Silence: Experience, Agency, and Transformation in the Lives of American Women Childhood Sexual Abuse Survivors* will provide substantial evidence that "narrative is a particularly salient feature of the healing process" for many abuse and violence experiencers, as it is an act of transgression (9, 15). Charles Brigg's piece "Since I am a Woman, I Will Chastise My Relatives: Gender, Reported Speech, and the Reproduction of Social Relations in Warao Ritual Wailing" discusses this concept of "telling as a transgressive act" in further detail, where Warao women utilize ritualized wailing and grief as an outlet (Kousaleos 31). Kousaleos implemented new strategies, combining the "theoretical with the autobiographical voice," as she found that personal narrative is essential in the healing process (35). Alcoff and Gray's article "Survivor Discourse: Transgression or Recuperation?" investigates just this and argue that discourse is one of the only ways to bring empowerment to victims of abuse. They argue that "women and children's speech has been historically prohibited in public places," and that survivor discourse has always been silenced or deemed as "mad or untrue" (Alcoff 1). The act of survivor discourse and narrative is transgressive and empowering in several manners: it transforms and challenges traditional speaking arrangements; "presumes objects antithetical to the dominant discourse" (for example – the term 'husband rapist' calls into question the dominant discourse where the husband is considered to have unlimited access to sex); and points to an alternative to the dominant discourse and to different arrangements of speech rules (Alcoff 1). As Alcoff and Grey state, survivor discourse and narrative "[have] great transgressive potential to disrupt the maintenance and reproduction of dominant discourses as well as to curtail their sphere of influence" (Alcoff 1). Narrative and speech are important in the process of self-empowerment and healing itself. Alcoff and Grey summarize their argument here: "We conclude that survivor strategy must continue to develop and explore ways in which we can gain autonomy within (not over but within) the conditions of our discourse" (Alcoff 1). As I discuss more below, this indicates that survivor speech or narrative is important to healing – but only if fully allowed in different conditions and settings without restrictions.

The two following sources will also be essential in understanding the importance of the narrative in feminist ethnography and in the healing process for victims of violence and abuse: Charlotte Linde's "Life Stories: The Creation of Coherence" and Personal Narratives Group's "Interpreting Women's Lives: Feminist Theory and Personal Narratives." Both of these sources emphasize the value of the personal narrative and its importance in understanding an individual's gendered experience where the victim is the expert on her own case.

Charlotte Linde emphasizes the importance of life stories. She says that they “express our sense of self: who we are and how we got that way” (3). They are also a form of currency that we use to “claim or negotiate group membership and to demonstrate that we are in fact worthy members of those groups, understanding and properly following their moral standards” (3). The emphasis on narrative and sharing one’s experience is evident.

The Personal Narrative Group asserts that personal narratives “both present and interpret the impact of gender roles on women’s lives,” and serve as “potentially rich sources for the exploration of the process of gendered self-identity” (5). This source also places emphasis upon the context in which personal narratives are shared – which is extremely important and can affect the transgressive act. The following quote from Kousaleos’ dissertation serves as an emphasized summary advocating for the importance of the narrative, but also places importance on where the narrative occurs.

When the narratives studied are the narratives of the oppressed and violated that tell stories of fragmented lives, it seems ultimately necessary to begin to understand how these women tell about these lives, where, why, and to whom. Just because women do tell narratives in therapeutic settings does not mean that they are always empowered by this process. (48)

Therefore, I argue that women should be free to share their personal narrative in settings that they choose; restricting the location and context in which narratives are shared can be detrimental. The importance narrative location will be further discussed in my case study as I utilize experience from participant observation and oral histories.

## **Methodology**

### **1. Purpose and Design of Study**

My research will be constructed by three major theories: critical theory, violence theory and feminist theory. Critical theory will provide an analysis of my background information and provide the framework for my research in general. I will use critical theory to critique and analyze the current structure of Guatemalan culture and society as well as politicize current problems and connect them to the contemporary social and political climate in Guatemala. This critical theory will also aid in understanding current gender roles and social violence issues within the context of Guatemala’s social, political, and economic scene.

Violence theory will aid in analyzing different types of violence in their different contexts. My study ranges in focus from violence in general, to more specifically violence in Guatemala and how women experience and perceive it. I will closely investigate how Guatemalan perceive, analyze, and internalize the violence they experience and how they cope with it. I will use feminist theory to analyze different gender roles and the effects of violence upon the contemporary construction of gender roles. Feminist theory will also provide background information regarding the contextual nature of gender inequality, oppression and discrimination in the Guatemalan context. It will also support connections between gender and race, class, and potential political ties. Furthermore, I will also utilize discussions about the narrative versus silence in feminist ethnographies and how the narrative supports women who have experienced violence in their healing processes. I will connect these theories and discussions to the current state for women who have experienced violence in Guatemala, and how their silence or speech is connected to their healing processes.

These three theory categories will support my research and provide the constructs for my

hypotheses. With my research grounded in this theoretical framework, I will be able to provide different conclusions and possible solutions to the posed problems.

The initial primary research was conducted through personal interviews with a group of elderly Ladino Guatemalans of a lower socioeconomic status who came to a local church every weekday to be served a free hot lunch. In addition, participant observation was also conducted four-to-five days a week for six weeks at *Asociacion Hogar Nuevos Horizontes*, a battered women's and children's shelter and daycare. This data will prove support to different hypotheses and the theories I discuss above.

## 2. Sampling

I chose to conduct interviews and observations at locations where I would be able to maintain a strong extended presence. A former worker directed me to the group of elderly Ladinos that came for hot lunches at a local church. His approval helped in gaining their trust and ultimately hearing their stories. I spent three-to-four one-hour lunches with them each week for six weeks. For the first three weeks, I did not approach the group about interviews and histories; I wanted to gain their trust and let them acquaint themselves with me before I pursued more intrusive questions. Once I spoke to them regarding interviews, a few men were quite eager to speak to me and share their experiences. My original intentions had been to obtain histories from men and women, and more specifically women, but this did not occur. The women were shy and essentially unwilling to speak, giving me excuses of all range and kind when I would ask whether any of the women wanted to share experiences, stories, or histories. I was only able to obtain one interview with a woman in this group.

I also chose to conduct participant observation at the shelter and daycare where I was volunteering. I was not able to conduct interviews here due to privacy and legal issues, but I was able to observe extensively the activities at the shelter and began to understand more of the constructs existing in Guatemala today. Although I did not specifically press the women at the shelter and daycare for more information, I was able to obtain a substantial amount through casual conversation, listening, and simple observation. The field notes and data I conducted through this observation will be key in analyzing my data as a whole.

## 3. Data Collection and Instruments

I used a simple, small digital voice recorder when conducting interviews with the elderly group. This was more beneficial than using large, cumbersome equipment that would distract from the original focus. The device was intriguing to those in the group, but once they realized its function they seemed to have no qualms about being recorded. Difficulties that I faced when conducting interviews included a struggle to focus the conversation in the direction I wanted; I was not always able to achieve the goals I had formed for each day's session. It was also quite difficult to obtain any stories from the women; they simply did not want to discuss their experiences. When I asked them if they would like to share stories, experiences, or histories their responses often ranged from "I do not remember my history," or "I do not have a history," or even "My history is too sad to share." The institutionalized and tacit silence was overwhelmingly evident here. I was only able to conduct one interview with a woman.

Another difficulty I faced was an inability to conduct interviews with women at the shelter and daycare due to the above-mentioned legal and privacy issues. I had to resort to simple observations of daily goings-on and gathering data from natural conversations; I was not able to explicitly ask the women about their experiences and discuss their own perceptions and thoughts regarding those experiences. As a result, there were limitations for analysis.

Finally, my role as a foreigner created limitations of its own. I represented a form of oppression for many Guatemalans. My position as a United States citizen created yet another tie between these parallels of exploitation and foreign penetration into Guatemalan culture. Regardless of my intent, my citizenship status indicated a representation of the foreign exploitation to which Guatemala had been previously subjugated.

#### **4. Protection of Human Subjects**

I obtained verbal consent from all who gave me interviews, so all of the conducted interviews were done with the explicit permission of the interviewees (and that permission is recorded before each of the interviews began). Any observations I conducted were done so with the permission of the organization where I worked (Asociación Hogar Nuevos Horizontes). In order to protect their identities, I will not be using actual names or photos of anyone involved.

#### **5. Data Analysis**

I use discourse analysis to integrate my interviews and observations. Qualitative analysis is useful in analyzing the interviews and observations and connecting it to my research. The analysis also adds to the basis of my hypotheses and potential proposed solutions. In order to further connect my interviews (where I will be using discourse analysis much more heavily), I will use theories on narrative and silence in feminist ethnography. Since my experiences at the shelter and daycare serve as a physical embodiment of the idea that silence is key for women survivors of violence, this theory will play largely into my analysis and provide a framework for any conclusions I make.

### **Case Study**

#### **1. Introduction**

Guatemala has a history of systematic and structural violence that has permeated the very culture of the nation and its peoples. Throughout the thirty-year Civil War and in the years following, Guatemalans have become regularly accustomed to social violence, whether perpetrated by the state, by civilians demonstrating interpersonal violence, or by abusive individuals in the framework of domestic violence. I first noticed this aspect of Guatemalan culture when I began participating in yearly medical brigades trips to Guatemala at the age of sixteen. I served as a translator and medical assistant on these two-week aid trips, so I was able to connect on a very personal level with all of the patients we served, many of whom were indigenous. I have continued to participate in this yearly medical brigade through this last summer, which also culminated in a longer visit during which I volunteered and worked at other locations.

My language abilities allowed me to speak in a much more in-depth manner with the patients than many of the medical providers who did not speak Spanish could. The lack of a language barrier often allowed many patients to disclose somewhat personal information to me, and I began to notice trends with regard to violence. Many women had experienced domestic violence and sexual abuse starting at a very young age (although this was often insinuated, rather than explicitly stated). Older generations of men spoke briefly of their time in the Civil War and alluded to the violent atrocities experienced during that period. I noticed that violence was a norm, integrated deeply into the culture and inherent since the Conquest itself.

These experiences inspired me to extend my stay in Guatemala. I chose to volunteer at Asociación Hogar Nuevos Horizontes, one of Guatemala's few women and children's shelters and daycares, as well as



conduct small interview sessions with a local elderly group for several months.

## 2. **Political Economy and the Women of Asociación Hogar Nuevos Horizontes**

At Nuevos Horizontes, most of the women were teenage mothers or very young women who had often undergone sexual abuse and extreme cases of domestic violence. I immediately noticed the extremely young ages of all of the women; the average age range for these women was thirteen to seventeen. Most were mothers, and several mothered children that were born from incest and familial sexual abuse cases. Many of these women and girls had very little in terms of money and material goods. The young women under the age of eighteen had been court ordered to live in the shelter, based on the circumstances of each woman's case. Either the majority of the women had low socioeconomic statuses or were unable to gather material belongings before moving to the shelter. Some women had fled their homes or unsafe situations rapidly, moved to the shelter very quickly, and had little time to bring any belongings with them. These women were very minimally economically empowered. Were they aware of this? As Amartya Sen notes:

Deprived groups may be habituated to inequality, may be unaware of possibilities of social change, may be hopeless about upliftment of objective circumstances of misery, may be resigned to fate, and may well be willing to accept the legitimacy of the established order. (9)

These women were certainly marginalized, but perhaps not fully resigned to their fate. The following experience demonstrates this.

Many women had very little prior comprehensive education. Schooling seemed to be irregular for many of the women; I helped several thirteen-fourteen year old young women as they were still learning to read. All of the women were extremely eager to learn and were very excited about any activities the volunteers presented that involved learning of any kind. Geography and English were favorites.

This observation indicated that these women suffer in regards to their political economy: they are of low socioeconomic status, socially marginalized as victims of abuse or violence, and have few opportunities with regards to educational opportunities. Although men often experience these hardships and situations, women often experience impoverishment in a harsher sense as gender inequalities in society greatly affect socioeconomic status. We can see evidence of gender inequalities in Guatemala, as women are more often socially marginalized and the victims of violence both structural and physical. The society itself is a patriarchal construct that often reduces women to dependents of men, greatly affecting women's educational and economic opportunities.

Without adequate access to education and economic capabilities, women are unable to change their situations. Irene Kahn's *The Unheard Truth* addresses the global poverty problem and acknowledges that it requires a multi-faceted approach and solution. In order to alleviate the impoverished livelihoods of these women, it is necessary to evaluate the structural impositions placed upon them. This refers to their ability to access adequate education and social resources. Many women do not understand that they have undergone human rights violations because they have never been able to obtain adequate access to these basic human rights. This in turn perpetuates these situations of social marginalization.

## 3. **Political Economy and the Elderly Hot Lunch Group**

A nearby church in Xela offered free hot lunches on weekdays to the local elderly cooked and provided by the church staff. The attendance of the elderly patrons indicated a lower socioeconomic

status, as it was a free lunch provided for those in need. There were more women overall who attended these lunches than men, although not an overwhelming number of patrons were women. On average, there were three to four more women than men attending out of a group averaging fifteen to eighteen people. This observation might indicate again that women often feel the brunt of poverty and their political economy is largely more negatively affected than those of men (although men do often feel these negative affects as well).

In all of my interviews, the subject of political economy and socioeconomic status was touched upon or alluded to in some way. The six histories I collected comprised of five men's narratives and one woman's. The men often discussed impoverishment as they experienced it when growing up; they would describe poor neighborhoods they lived in or the labor they had to complete due to their socioeconomic status. Don Miguel discussed how he had to carry firewood each morning from a nearby mountain so that his family could cook. Don Enrique discussed some of the necessary local social projects he participated in when growing up to install electricity and running water into his neighborhood. These histories shared do indicate impoverishment and low socioeconomic status.

Doña Elena's experiences and histories, the only female perspectives I obtained, were extreme with regard to the negative impact on political economy she experienced. Her husband had invested in a bus so that he could be a bus driver and earn a living in this way. However, he was an abusive drunkard (often abusive to Elena and her two daughters) -- and died because of his alcoholism. Her experiences with alcohol were reminiscent of Eber's experience with women and alcohol in Chiapas, Mexico. Alcohol was the root cause of Elena's abusive relationship and eventual debts, similar to how many of Eber's profiled women experienced relationships with alcohol.

When her husband died, Doña Elena was left to pay his debts from his business. The banks increased her interest rates, and Elena was forced to extract her two daughters from school in order to have them employed and earning money to pay off the family's debt. After seven years, during which Elena would work from approximately five A.M. until ten P.M., this debt was finally repaid. At that time, the children were finally able to return to school, but only one daughter completed her education until high school. Both are now married, and Elena now has a very small section at the local market where she sells artisan goods.

Elena's story is the archetypal tale of gender inequalities that affect women and sometimes contribute to impoverishment, as Amartya Sen discusses in depth. In this patriarchal society, women are subject to be dependent upon their male counterparts until they fail. When they fail, women do not have adequate means or resources to succeed on their own -- which is often due to structural issues. For example, why was Elena's interest on the debt her husband accrued raised after her husband died and the debt was transferred to her name?

#### **4. The Cultural Understanding of Violence in Guatemala**

Based on my observations and narratives, experiencing violence and violent situations are not often discussed openly. Those experiences and situations might be insinuated, but not usually explicitly explained. Additionally, violence against indigenous populations might be considered differently from violence against non-indigenous peoples -- although it is still dealt with in a socially similar manner. These narratives display explicit parallels between violence during the Conquest, violence during the Civil War, and social violence women experience today.

Largely, there is a normalization, internalization and overall complete acceptance of fear, violence, racism, and even silence (Green 236). Many women, and men, internalize the violence they

experience, either normalizing it internally or not speaking about it at all. Trust and time are essential to building a relationship with Guatemalan survivors of violence before they will share those experiences explicitly and fully. As Zur discussed, silence becomes that essential survival tactic utilized by those who experience violence. Is that silence imposed, though? Or is it a form of resistance itself (Zur 164)? The persistent silence can easily be interpreted as a form of repression, dating back to the Conquest and forward through the suppressive tactics of the various brutal governments -- or perhaps it is the most tireless form of resistance itself, as Zur hypothesizes.

Violent experiences also have detrimental lasting effects beyond mental and psychological health; as Green discussed, physical ailments often arise from the trauma many women have experienced. Doña Elena's story demonstrates this: she began narrating her experiences by telling me, "como he sufrido yo...soy una mujer muy sufrida, muy dolorida" ("How I have suffered...I am a long-suffering woman, with painful experiences"). Other women would mention their unexplained aches and pains that never seemed to go away.

The violence experienced by so many Guatemalan citizens during the Civil War and dating back to the Conquest has completely pervaded this culture. The experience and normalization of violence point to the conclusion that Guatemalans largely understand and internalize their violent experiences through fear and, overwhelmingly, silence. Whether that silence is repressive or resistant is unknown. Regardless, where are women finding outlets to communicate and find agency within this social context of violence? That is, if they even are? How do women truly achieve agency within this societal construct?

## 5. Narrative and Silence at the Shelter and Elderly Group

I went to Xela, Guatemala with the hopes that I would be able to openly discuss experiences of social and domestic violence and abuse with the women that experienced these things. Granted, these are sensitive topics regardless of where they are discussed. However, I was not able to do so easily.

I contacted Asociación Hogar Nuevos Horizontes before my departure regarding my intent to do research while I was volunteering. I explained my research questions and what my conducted research would entail at the shelter, stating that I would only perform such research with the explicit permission of the women and with the stipulation that none of the women's information would be recorded or distributed for their safety and confidentiality. Unfortunately, I was denied permission to conduct such research. The shelter informed me that "because of the sensitive nature of many of the women's backgrounds and experiences, [they] only allow the trained social workers and therapists to talk with them specifically about their trauma...the work of the volunteer program activities is to provide the youth and women activities to focus their minds on something positive, new, fun, etc instead of constantly revisiting their past" (Email, 5/30/12).

I was understanding of this position, but began to notice other features of the shelter's policies as I continued to volunteer there. The women were strictly told to refrain from sharing their experiences and stories with volunteers. I spoke to a few staff members regarding this, and one mentioned that there used to be "issues" at the shelter with the women repeating their stories and experiences with regards to violence to volunteers over and over again. The position of the shelter was to focus the women's attentions upon different and new things rather than upon their pasts. This was viewed as a healing method.

The shelter did not acknowledge the use of the narrative as a healing method. In all senses, these women were institutionally forced to be silent about their experiences and opinions about those experiences. The shelter itself was secluded and located outside of town, far from any sort of outside

contact (the location was not even able to receive internet or cell phone connection). The women were told repeatedly only to discuss their situations in certain contexts -- where professional social workers or therapists were the listeners. The women were not allowed to choose with whom they share their stories. In this sense, I found it difficult to see silence as resistance.

This entrenched and institutionalized forcing of silence was evident in my interviews with the elderly group as well. It was very difficult to speak to any of the women regarding their pasts. Most women responded with "I don't know my history," or "I forgot my history," or "My story is too sad." One woman, when I asked if she would like to share her experiences, began to tell me a fairytale. She was quickly interrupted by those around, as they told her she was supposed to be sharing her own personal testimony or story. Quite frankly, I was shocked that Doña Elena decided to share her experiences with me after only knowing me for shortly over a month. Even so, she had difficulty with telling me certain parts of her story without simply alluding to violent experiences.

These experiences and observations demonstrate the tight cap Guatemalan society has placed upon women and their violent experiences; it is taboo to speak of such occurrences in most social settings. However, literature and research has proven the importance of the narrative in the healing process, as Alcoff, Kousaleos, Linde, and others discuss extensively. Women have to tell the story of their own lives in order to understand their own experiences and heal from them. It is a process of empowerment, finding oneself, and finding membership within society itself (Linde 3, Personal Narratives Group 5). It is an essential transgressive act that disrupts the status quo and questions different dominant narratives in society itself (Alcoff 1).

## **6. Women's Rights, Empowerment and Agency: Feminist Theory on Gender Roles**

We see evidence of women achieving agency in varying forms, as Cruz demonstrated in her profiling of different Maya women involved in grassroots organizations supporting women's rights in Guatemala. Eber also demonstrates how women and their relationships with alcohol and its effects upon the home become a source of agency for women. Furthermore, there are a myriad of different organizations present in Guatemala that fight for the protection and sanctity of the woman, especially against violence. The shelter where I worked demonstrates just this type of work for female empowerment as well, with an endeavor to empower women socially, economically and politically.

The women themselves find agency within this context of social violence as well. Not always are there happy endings to the stories we hear of violent pasts and experiences, but women often are able to work within this system. Doña Elda is an example of this: after years of suffering and working hard to pay off her late husband's debt, she was finally able to achieve some economic independence and now enjoys her work much more. Women at the shelter find agency and empowerment in sometimes furthering their education and learning new trades and crafts through programs there. Guatemalans are by no means helpless victims; we see constant evidence of their ability to work within broken societal structures. The question still remains, though: what are the outlets for women to communicate and transmit their experiences, if any? Where is there resistance, other than (potentially) silence?

## **Conclusions**

Violence has permeated Guatemalan culture from its birth -- dating back to the Conquest and carrying a significant presence throughout the Civil War and into present-day Guatemala. Varying forms of exploitation, foreign penetration, and violence surface throughout the collective history of Guatemala

that began to mirror each other create parallel experiences; the violent experiences are shared among many. The violence that women experience today is conflated with the violence women experienced during the Civil War, as well as during the Conquest and other violent situations throughout Guatemalan history. A culture of violence against women has been the norm. Rising crime rates against women in Guatemala serve as a testament to this: more than 500 women were murdered in 2012 alone, many after being sexually assaulted -- and justice is not commonly found (Amnesty International 1).

Violence is understood and internalized largely through fear and silence in Guatemala: fear due to repressive tactics during different military regimes, and silence due to either similar repressive acts or resistance. The narratives I collected and participant observation I conducted demonstrated that women largely respond to violence with silence. Complacency and acceptance with regard to violence is also an apparent norm. There are some indications of agency and female empowerment, as women sometimes find themselves economically empowered and engaging in fighting against these women and human rights violations.

The violence is certainly present – but how much is it a part of Guatemalan women’s identities? It is hard to empirically know how much violence has penetrated lives. Yet, it also is hard to imagine that it does not. My research has succeeded in indicating that violence and violent experiences have been mirrored and paralleled throughout Guatemalan history, becoming a norm and integrated into the very culture. However, my research also produces a myriad of unanswered questions. Is the silence that is so pervasive in response to violence a form of repression? Or, as Zur hypothesizes, is it a form of resistance? Resistance is always present throughout these underlying themes of exploitation and penetration -- but is silence a form of this? Furthermore, is their silence any indication of a healing process? Or is this their metaphorical “finger in the wound,” as Nelson discusses at length in her works? How do the women heal, then? Where are they finding outlets to communicate, if at all? Finally, how are women actually taking advantage of this system, a violent societal construct? How do they truly negotiate the systems of this societal construct and find true agency? Further research must be conducted in order to answer these pertinent questions, because aiding the wellbeing of Guatemalan women rests upon the answers.

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