At the beginning of this year, the FARC party of Colombia changed its name to “Comunes” in an attempt to rebrand its image as a paramilitary organization. In addition, FARC has committed to working with the Colombian government to address the conflict’s nearly 8 million victims through a process of ‘transitional justice.’ This process, however, is hindered by a complex and violent history, which continues to produce anger and resentment from much of the population.
To some, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are freedom fighters, to many others they are terrorists. In 1964, a communist uprising over economic inequality in rural areas sparked a 52-year civil war between the government, supported by the Colombian elite, and guerilla fighters, supported by the rural poor. By the 1990s, the ballooning profits of drug trafficking had strengthened the leftist militia. At its peak, FARC had over 20,000 fighters and engaged in kidnapping, extortion, and murder. Eventually, a combination of pressure from right-wing paramilitary groups funded by the elite, support from the United States, and targeting the leadership led to a weakening of the group’s influence, and FARC was forced to ask for a compromise. By the time peace talks ended, over 6.9 million people were displaced and 220,000 were dead.
In October 2016, after years of failed negotiations, President Juan Manuel Santos presented a finalized peace agreement to the public. Through a referendum, Colombian citizens rejected the proposed deal, citing its leniency towards FARC soldiers. The proposal was then rewritten, but rather than allowing people to vote again, President Santos sent it straight to Congress, where it was ratified. As such, the final agreement, finalized in November, did not have the official support of Colombians.
The deal included 578 provisions intended to help reintegrate FARC members into society. The headlining first steps included the demobilization and disarmament of around 13,000 members, and the establishment of a tribunal, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, tasked with investigating war crimes. Low level ex-members who testified were given blanket immunity, and ordinary soldiers did not face jail time. FARC became a political party and was guaranteed 10 seats in Congress. To combat the origins of FARC, promises of economic investment were made to improve access to water, electricity, education, and roads in rural areas.
The deal was successful in several ways: disarmament occurred on a large scale, violence was mostly terminated, and homicides declined significantly after the agreement was signed. But the overwhelming demands of national reconciliation were hampered by the lack of commitment of the succeeding government. Iván Duque became president in 2018, and his right-wing government has taken a much harsher stance against FARC compared to his predecessor. His party, the Democratic Center party, is outspoken about its disapproval of the peace deal.
Duque refuses to compromise with the remaining gangs and splinters of FARC that are still active. His implementation of the provisions set out in the agreement is lagging, and there are concerns that he will attempt to change the stipulations of the deal. Estimations of the cost of the agreement are around $45 billion over 15 years, but the staggering amount, paired with government indifference, has led to a severe lack of funding for economic projects, as well as compensation for victims.
Moreover, the power vacuum that FARC left behind was filled rapidly, and although not to the extent of FARC’s reign, Colombia continues to struggle with the brutality of gang activity. The Marxist National Liberation Army (ELN) and other armed groups have perpetrated violence in the wake of FARC’s dissolution. Dissidents, among them FARC members that either took up arms again or had not stopped earlier, are especially involved in growing the lucrative coca plant and illegal mining.
However, while many citizens dislike FARC and the other groups, there is also serious distrust in the government, whose intervention has done little to stop the proliferation of violence. In fact, in May 2019, when armed forces were ordered to crack down on criminal activity, the spike in the number of people killed was partly due to “false positives,” where civilians were intentionally passed off as rebel fighters to meet military demands of enemy deaths.
Threats exist also for those not engaged in conflict. Notably, community leaders and activists have frequently been targeted, with over 400 activists killed since 2016. Ex-combatants have also become victims. Attacks on former FARC members are worrying, and in the past four years, 248 ex-combatants have been killed. The overwhelming tensions between civilian victims, gang members, former FARC fighters, and the hostile government have not reached a tipping point, but the unease of the status quo is sharpened by occasional bouts of violence and death.
Forcing a deal through without majority support was a poor way for a government to start something as delicate as peace, and replacing that leadership with a reluctant administration has only made the situation worse. Without the trust of the people, true reconciliation can never be achieved, and without the support of the government, the peace deal is sure to fail.
President Santos was the foundation of the agreement, and because the promised provisions outlined have not been implemented, success depends heavily on the political situation and administration. Without political stability and the proper support of Colombia’s leadership, it is unlikely that lasting peace and social unity will be achieved.
From the targeted killing of important social leaders to drug trafficking, Colombia’s new president has a long list of responsibilities, but it is essential that this fragile peace is held, whatever the political and financial costs. Crucial to this effort is the recognition of the legitimate frustrations of FARC’s disenfranchised supporters, while also accounting for the very deep and painful scars of war. In doing so, Colombia may be able to inch towards at least a semblance of transitional justice.