Singapore’s decision to impose sanctions upon Russia in the wake of the war in Ukraine is extraordinary: the only other time the island nation has unilaterally sanctioned another country was in 1978, when Vietnam invaded Kampuchea. The strength of this stance is made all the more clear when one considers that Singapore is thus far the only Southeast Asian country, and one of only four Asian states, to have sanctioned Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.
In a statement released via its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Singaporean government justified its sanctions upon the basis of principle: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was an unacceptable breach of international law and constituted a “violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another sovereign state”. Promoting respect for international law and the principle of sovereignty has consistently formed a key component of Singapore’s foreign policy. Members of the governing establishment have long argued that the small city-state’s survival is contingent upon the existence of a rules-based international order where might does not make right.
While Singapore has quoted principle in justifying its “almost unprecedented” policy toward Russia, it is perhaps worth acknowledging the specific context under which these sanctions have been imposed. Singapore’s trade with Russia is miniscule – constituting just 0.1 percent of the country’s total exports and 0.8 percent of total imports. Singapore also does not depend upon arms exports from Russia in equipping its military, making it an outlier amongst other Southeast Asian states. In some ways, then, imposing sanctions can be viewed as a highly strategic maneuver: for relatively low cost, the small island-nation has set itself apart from its regional peers and asserted leadership in the international arena. This in turn has provided Singapore with an opportunity to raise its standing in the eyes of both the United States and other countries in Western Europe.
Since it has arguably cost Singapore little to impose sanctions against Russia, the “almost unprecedented” nature of these actions may not be all that remarkable after all. The government has nonetheless continued to emphasize that it is principle – and not considerations of short-term strategic gain via increased standing with the West – which have primarily guided Singapore’s foreign policy over the war in Ukraine. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has stressed that Singapore’s stance does not imply the taking of sides or bandwagoning, and he pointed out that Singapore had previously voted to condemn the United States in a 1983 United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion of Grenada. Senior Minister Teo Chee Hean also argued that Singapore’s sanctions were “specific and targeted”, with their intention being only to degrade Russia’s warfighting capabilities. Perhaps the clearest indication of Singapore’s support for principle came in early April when it abstained from a vote to suspend Russia from the UN Human Right’s Council. The MFA argued then that an independent commission of inquiry established to investigate alleged human rights violations in Ukraine had yet to complete its work, and hence abstention was consistent with “support for the rules-based multilateral system and the due application of its mechanisms”.
The imposition of sanctions has thus arguably allowed Singapore to increase its international standing at little cost, while holding fast to a principled approach to foreign policy. Yet, domestic support for sanctions has not been unanimous. While a poll conducted by the firm Blackbox Research found that 95 percent of interviewed Singaporeans sympathized most closely with Ukraine in the ongoing conflict, only 60 percent expressed explicit support for sanctions (while 35 percent had no opinion).
Matters of ethnicity may provide some clues in explaining this domestic ambivalence over the country’s firm policy stance. Chinese individuals make up roughly 75 percent of Singapore’s population, and ethnic affinities seem to have impacted the ways in which many of them perceive the world. Revealingly, a 2021 Pew study found that Singapore was the only country among the 17 advanced economies studied that viewed China more favorably than the United States. Naturally, then, given Beijing’s support for Russia in the ongoing conflict, and Singapore’s implied endorsement of the West in its condemnation of Russia’s invasion, some have argued that Singapore’s decision to sanction Russia risks unnecessarily antagonizing China – which also happens to be Singapore’s largest trade partner.
It is important not to overstate the size of this domestic opposition, and, as in many other countries, some disagreement over policy is completely normal. Yet the presence of this domestic disagreement remains a cause for concern – especially since the conflict in Ukraine is one geographically and culturally remote from Southeast Asia. Singapore’s core national security interests reside closer to home and include maintaining regional stability in the face of an increasingly powerful and ambitious Beijing. To this end, Singapore has consistently sought to encourage US engagement with Asia so as to counterbalance Chinese economic and political influence in the region. At the same time, the country has also promoted the development of conflict resolution mechanisms aimed at preventing tensions between the United States and China from boiling over into full-blown crises. Careful engagement with both powers has hence understandably remained the key focus of Singapore’s diplomatic efforts even amidst ongoing events in Europe. In March, Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs called on China to use its influence with Russia to help end the war in Ukraine. During a weeklong visit to the United States, Prime Minister Lee called for increased American involvement in the Indo-Pacific during talks with President Biden, and at a separate dialogue discussed the likely further straining of US-China relations as a result of the Ukraine war. More recently, the Prime Minister also warned the United States against isolating China through the imposition of ideological lenses upon the conflict in Ukraine.
The ability to walk such a fine line between the two great powers first requires a credible commitment to some notion of impartiality, such as the principled positions which Singapore has thus far sought to pursue in its foreign policy. This commitment will become increasingly difficult to uphold if the general public begins expressing a consistent preference for one side over another. The ability of Singapore to continue maneuvering nimbly and effectively in the realm of international relations – without antagonizing either the US or China – has also been hindered by the increasing use of subversion and disinformation by states as tools of political warfare. In 2017, a Chinese-born academic was expelled from Singapore after investigations found that he had attempted to influence the thinking of senior policymakers by giving them “privileged” information. Perhaps even more worrying is the case of Dickson Yeo, a Singaporean PhD candidate who was recruited by Chinese intelligence services to collect information on classified military projects in the United States.
The limited domestic disagreement over Singapore’s decision to sanction Russia hence provides an indication of the potential difficulties that the government will face when navigating future regional conflicts. Much more courage may be needed to implement assertive foreign policy actions in the future, when crises arise closer to home, and when adherence to principle comes with costs that can actually be felt in the pockets and hearts of individual Singaporean citizens.