A Ukrainian Ceasefire

The Russian invasion of Ukraine — Europe’s biggest land war since World War II — caught many observers flat-footed. Then observers were surprised again, this time by Russia’s seeming ineptitude on the battlefield. It is important that we are not dumbfounded a third time by a potential ceasefire.

From the onset, Ukraine exceeded expectations. Only minutes after President Putin announced the start of a “special military operation,” flurries of Russian missiles struck Ukrainian targets in the hope of destroying Kyiv’s air capability. To Moscow’s surprise, this effort failed and Ukrainians kept their air defenses mobile, preventing a quick knockout strike. Over a month later, Russia is still denied air supremacy. The advance towards Kyiv has been fully repulsed and the Kremlin is now focusing the bulk of their combat power on the capture of the Donbas.

This is not to say that Russia has been totally unsuccessful. Russia succeeded in capturing some key Ukrainian cities like Kherson, with Mariupol probably falling soon under siege. Ukrainian forces have also suffered heavy casualties and their air force is vastly outnumbered. Some analysts have observed that the current picture of the battlefield is heavily skewed by a disproportionate amount of information from the Ukrainian side. As a result, it is also important, on the tactical dimension, not to overstate the magnitude of Ukrainian victories.

That being said, the overall war effort still seems to have fallen far short of President Putin’s initial expectations. Reports show the Kremlin expected total capitulation of the Kyiv regime within days of an attack. Over a month later, Russia remains far from that goal. And perhaps most important of all, Russian losses are mounting. Estimates for the number of dead Russian soldiers vary widely, but NATO puts it at anywhere from 7,000-15,000. On the low end, this toll equals the American losses sustained in Iraq and Afghanistan over 20 years.

Of course, Russia could still reinforce its armies or turn to unconventional weapons. The Kremlin’s arsenal includes a stockpile of 2,000 tactical nuclear warheads, which might be deployed if Putin feels that victory is impossible through ordinary means. But unless Putin is willing to annihilate Ukraine, then “victory” in the Russian sense — meaning the establishment of a stable and long-lasting pro-Russian regime in Kyiv — is probably impossible.

Indeed, a Russian battlefield victory over the Kyiv regime would not mark the end of the fighting. Instead, the Kremlin could expect to oversee a long and bloody occupation. Like the Taliban in Afghanistan, organized Ukrainian governance would melt away into armed insurgency that might last for years. To keep the populace in line, Putin would have to leave his forces deployed in Ukraine indefinitely.

These facts make a ceasefire exponentially more likely. Although Putin will not back down easily, he probably knows that his military cannot keep sustaining thousands of troop deaths for much longer. If the Kremlin ends the war now, it will have to settle for a humiliating defeat. But that is still better than an ongoing war which might lead to Russian forces being expelled from Ukraine entirely. If that occurs, the Russian leadership will regret not strategizing their current situation to demand concessions. On issues like the recognition of Crimea — which Moscow annexed in 2014 — the Ukrainians are much more willing to entertain concessions today when Russia is in a relative position of strength.

What path the Kremlin ultimately takes is uncertain at best. But the chances of a ceasefire are higher than what is currently being assumed by many policymakers in Washington. Observers in our nation’s capital are continuing to operate under the assumption that Ukraine will inevitably lose. This is understandable, given the raw military disparity between the two combatants. The Russian military has 10 times the budget, 5 times as many armored fighting vehicles, and 11 times as many aircraft as Ukraine.

The Biden administration did an excellent job communicating the severity of Russia’s invasion threat for months, even when others refused to take heed. Their coordination with allies on economic sanctions have also been exemplary, such as the synchronized freezing of Russian foreign exchange reserves. But they cannot afford to get this wrong. An increasingly likely ceasefire means the White House should begin mapping possible exit scenarios for this war.

The ideal, of course, is an unconditional Russian withdrawal followed by reparations from Moscow to rebuild devastated Ukrainian cities. Even if Putin comes to the negotiating table, this scenario is highly unlikely. In order to save face, Putin will need at least some victories to take home lest this brutal war will appear for nothing.

Russian demands have so far been expansive. Under Russian terms, there will be legally codified promises of Ukrainian neutrality and the recognition of parts of Ukraine as independent entities. This includes the breakaway states of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbas, as well as recognition of the Crimean Peninsula.

These demands might seem ambitious given Russia’s poor battlefield performance (and many stipulations will probably be watered down in a compromise). But they are also not as devastating as they might initially appear. Areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, for instance, have been under de facto separatist control for years. This is not true of the entire Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, although the separatists claim the entirety of both oblasts. Nevertheless, there is no reason for why Ukraine cannot cede the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk that are under de facto separatist control already. For all intents and purposes, Ukraine does not lose an inch of land in this “concession.”

The same can be said for Crimea. The Peninsula has been under de facto Russian control since 2014. Legally recognizing it as part of Russia would also not technically disadvantage the Ukrainians. Moreover, legal recognition of Crimea and eastern Ukrainian separatist states would give Putin a useful PR win to sell to the Russian people.

An official stance of neutrality by Kyiv would assuage Russian demands while not significantly changing the country’s strategic position if the West agrees to Zelensky’s “security guarantees.” Those security guarantees could come in assurances from the United States that it will intervene militarily if Russia invades again. It is a clever request from Zelensky, effectively granting Ukraine some of the most important benefits of joining the NATO alliance while officially codifying neutrality in their constitution.

In a hypothetical deal, it is therefore plausible to assume that official neutrality by Kyiv along with recognition of Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk would not materially impact the situation on the ground (assuming the West gives security guarantees to Ukraine in the event of another Russian attack).

Understanding these potential terms is relevant given that the U.S. and its allies will have a large part in brokering these talks. That is because Moscow will most likely push for a rollback of the recent international sanctions that sent the Russian ruble plunging. The West should be prepared to honor Moscow’s request and initiate a gradual rollback of sanctions conditioned on the Kremlin adhering to their end of the bargain and withdrawing troops.

But if Putin pushes for more in the peace talks, the U.S. must be prepared to reject the deal and keep economic pressure on Russia. If, for instance, Russia seeks to annex more land than they de facto have control over (such as the entirety of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), it will set a precedent that countries can materially alter the status quo on the ground through outright invasion. The same is true if Russia pushes for Ukrainian neutrality without security guarantees from the West. Such a situation would effectively give Moscow veto power over Ukrainian security; if Ukraine stepped out of line, Moscow could threaten to invade.

Only a careful compromise can truly preserve the status quo while giving Putin enough of a PR win to withdraw his forces.